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Summar 
The Irish party, comprising both its MPs and affiliated organisations in Ireland, went from 
dominating nationalist politics in 1914 to almost total electoral oblivion in 1918. The goal of 
limited Home Rule, constitutionally achieved within the empire, appeared to die with it. 
Given the speed and extent of the party's disgrace, it has generally been seen as being so 
decayed as to make death inevitable, while also being fundamentally out of touch with the 
4neV nationalism which succeeded it. Though such assumptions have been challenged, there 
has been no detailed study of the Irish party and its relationship to provincial nationalism in 
the immediate pre-war period. 
This study is local, focused on the five adjacent counties of Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon, 
Sligo and Westmeath. At its core is an analysis of eighteen weekly, local newspapers over the 
five years 1910-14, a range sufficiently wide to offset the distortions, often obsessive, which 
characterised the news coverage and editorial values of each individual newspaper. It has 
been possible to : 
" construct a reliable local narrative; 
" analyse elites, organisations and political rhetoric; and 
" assess the impact of national events on local opinion. 
Far from being 'rotten', the Irish party was representative of provincial opinion and not only 
intact but still capable of self-renewal and change. However, Irish nationalism was 
characterised by an intensity of grievance and a pervasive anglophobia which came rapidly to 
the fore as the Home Rule crisis climaxed in 1914, creating a 'great wave' of mass, 
paramilitary mobilisation. Though the party was sufficiently disciplined to remain loyal to its 
leader, John Redmond,, who epitomised nationalist moderation, it did so at the cost of 
slumping cohesion, enthusiasm and activity, leaving it unable to withstand the events of 
uprising and repression by which it was imminently to be assailed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Autumn 1914 - Behind Mr. Redmond 
In the autumn of 1914, the Irish party embarked on what, with hindsight, was to be its final 
successful, nation-wide campaign. Across Ireland, committees, officers and companies of the 
Irish Volunteers were assembled and exhorted to back John Redmond, the 'chosen general of 
Irishmen the world over' I in his support for England in the European war and his call for 
Irishmen to take their place 'in the firing line' as recruits for the British army. This campaign, 
largely concluded by November 1914, appeared on the surface to be outstandingly successful. 
Not only did the party claim an 'extraordinary manifestation of popular regard' for 
Redmond, 2 but it also took control of the Volunteer movement - re-named the National 
Volunteers - across most of provincial Ireland. In the large majority of Volunteer companies, 
'factionists' and 'Sinn Feiners' who openly opposed Redmond's policy were outvoted and 
ousted from committees, with their places taken by Irish party stalwarts. At most, only 
12,000 Volunteers were believed to sympathise with the party's 'Sinn Feiner' opponents, 
while over 170,000 followed Redmond's lead - the inveterate plotter and Irish Republican 
Brotherhood organiser Bulmer Hobson later wrote that Redmond's active opponents were left 
at no more than 3,000.3 
A meeting of Volunteers from across County Sligo on 29thSeptember was part of the Irish 
party's campaign. It was organised by John Jinks, mayor of Sligo town, United Irish League 
man, Hibernian and founder of many of the county's Volunteer companies, in order to swing 
support behind Redmond and create a formal, county-wide command structure. It was 
attended by representatives of no fewer than twenty-six 'corps', by the county's two MPs 
(John O'Dowd for Sligo South and Thomas Scanlan for North) and by an array of leading 
clergymen. Thomas Scanlan MP, Sligo-born but now living and working mostly in London, 
expressed the 'Redmondite' view of recruiting as a moral duty. Ireland was fighting with her 
cco-religionists' for the rights of small nations, as a fully-fledged member of the British 
Empire with the same rights as Australia, South Affica and Canada. The passage of the Home 
Rule Act had created a union of the British and Irish democracies and had recreated Pamell's 
1 Roscommon Messenger, 3rd October 1914. 
2 lVestmeath Examiner, 24b October 1914. 
3 Bulmer Hobson, Ircland Yesterda-v and Tomorrow (Tralee 1968), p. 58. 
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'Union of Hearts'. Obligation now bound Ireland to the empire in its great fight, and 
Ireland's place was with all freedom-loving people on the side of the Allies. 4 
However, his fellow Sligo MP, the ex-Fenian chairman of Sligo county council John 
O'Dowd, was rather more guarded. Though he did say that Ireland would only be safe from 
attack by taking her place in the empire, he also emphasised that 'he did not come here for the 
purpose of preaching recruiting. ' Even more cautious was Rev. Brian Crehan - one of the 
most respected Gaelic scholars and temperance men in the county who had recently left Sligo 
town to become the parish priest in Grange. An active supporter of the Volunteers, Crehan 
was distinctly uneasy at the thought of them defending anything other than 'that portion of the 
Empire called Ireland'. Only when Ireland had its own distinct army, like the Boers or 
Canadians, should it consider sending men to the Front. The Volunteers should not be 
4 swallowed' into the British army. Crehan cautioned against 'turning ourselves into 
recruiting sergeants'. 5 
However, all the speakers at the meeting pledged allegiance to the man Crehan called 'our 
6 leaderRedmond'. Whatever his misgivings, Crehan's priorities were still clear: 'I am on the 
side of unity and against dissension, wherever it comes from. ' For John Jinks, the party boss 
of Sligo town and North Sligo, the matter at hand was simply one of loyalty, the crisis had 
been created by a few factionists, Redmond was 'the great Irish leader and statesman' and 'we 
are at the back of the Irish parliamentary party'. The keywords used throughout the meeting 
were 'discipline', 'loyalty' and 'unity'. Party unity basically held firm, and while their 
distance behind their leader might vary, those present were still overwhelmingly Redmond's 
followers. One of the younger politicians present, Henry Monson, more than once addressed 
the issue of being behind Redmond. For Monson, a Hibernian and Sligo Corporation 
member who had risen to become a provincial director of the Connaught Hibermans, 
Redmond's back was in danger of being stabbed by a clique of 'Sinn Feiners'. The leader 
Sligo Champion, 3d October 1914. 
Ibid. 
6 The meeting was not completely packed with party loyalists. One of the attendees was Alex McCabe (Sligo 
Champion, 3d October 1914). already an IRB man, who as the Sinn Fem candidate in 1918 would unseat 
O'Dowd as MP for South Sligo. 
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faced no such threat from- the Hibernians. They were, he declared, 'right behind Mr 
Redmond'. 7 
The party's victory was, however, illusory. Not only did the newly-controlled National 
Volunteers rapidly disintegrate in its hands, but the party's own standing and support declined 
almost uninterruptedly from then onwards. Over the next four years the party was virtually 
destroyed. It became discredited in the opinion of most nationalists, its leaders were 
humiliated and its organisation collapsed. Even its symbols, flags, anthems and ceremonials 
were replaced by newer nationalist inspirations. 8 Its Sinn Feiner opponents, whom Redmond 
in 1915 could still declare 'do not amount to a row of pins as far as the future of Ireland is 
concerned', 9 took over the 'copyright' of nationalism. ' 0 The Irish party, which in different 
guises had dominated Irish politics for nearly fifty years, slumped to electoral oblivion in the 
general election of December 1918. 
In Sligo, the descent from victory in 1914 to heavy defeat in 1918 was just as steep. In 1914 
only three out of 44 Volunteer companies and 280 out of nearly 5,000 Volunteers sided with 
the Sinn Feiners. 11 In 1918 Scanlan lost his seat to Sinn Fein by 9,030/4,242 votes and 
O'Dowd lost his by the crushing margin of 9,113/1,988. Of other speakers at the September 
1914 meeting,, Jinks surrendered the mayoralty of Sligo (the Corporation would imminently 
become bankrupt) to a Sinn Feiner as early as January 1917. Rev. Crehan continued to be a 
respected parish priest and Gaelic scholar, but by 1918 had ceased to be the president of the 
Grange United Irish League. ' 2 Instead he was president of Grange Sinn Fein. ' 3 As for Henry 
Monson, who after the September 1914 meeting helped to set up a Hibernian company of the 
National Volunteers, 14 he was by the beginning of 1917 seconding Jinks's Sinn Fein 
successor as Sligo's mayor and campaigning against the Irish party in the Roscommon by- 
7 Sli go Champion, 3d October 1914 
8 See Peter Alter, 'Symbols of Irish Nationalism' in Alan O'Day (ed. ), Reactions to I7-ish Nationalism, 1865-1914 
(London and Ronceverte, West Va. 1987), pp. 15-16. 
9 Warre B. Wells, John Redmond (London 1919), p. 137. 
10 It was the Liberal chief whip, the Master of Elibank, who described the Irish party as owning the 'copyright' 
of the national movement in a March 19 10 paper on Irish politics (memorandum dated 31' March 19 10, Elibank 
papers, National Library of Scotland, Ms. 8802 f 39). 
" Monthly report of the Sligo RIC county inspector, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
12 Sligo Champion, 23rd September 1916. 
13 Ibid. I 10' May 1918. 
14 Michael Farry, Sligo 1914-21, A Chronicle Qf Coqflict (Trim 1992), p. 50. 
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election. 15 After he was suspended as the AOH's Connaught regional director - the Sligo 
town AOH division was also suspended by August 1917 16 _ Monson continued to campai -an 
politically at the back of Mr Redmond, but now at the side of those Sinn Feiners who were, in 
Monson's imagery of 1914, 'stabbing' his former leader. 
Historians and the Irish Par 
The local basis of this study, the period covered by it, its key definitions (particularly of 'the 
Irish party'), the study's geographic extent and sources used are analysed below. However, 
the scope of the study cannot be defined without first addressing the historical treatment of 
Redmond's soon-to-be- doomed party, that party's presumed decay and its failure to connect 
with, let alone lead, contemporary nationalist public opinion. 
The decline of Redmond's party was so rapid and so total that it has become a commonplace 
to see it as something that was bound to happen. Moreover, its condition prior to its demise 
had to be something profoundly rickety and decayed - in Tom Garvin's phrase, the Easter 
Rising of 1916 'merely administered a final push to an edifice that was already on the verge 
of collapse'. " The party has variously been described as stale, tired, ossified, bourgeois, 
corrupt, ageing, incapable of self-renewal and unattractive to the young. As the contemporary 
editor and conscience of Irish nationalism, D. P. Moran, wrote in July 1916, 'extremists of 
some kind were a long-felt want in the Party and the machine had become rotten'. 18 One of 
the more unrelenting historical critiques of the party was supplied by E. Rumph and A. C. 
Hepburn. For them, the party was the upholder of the status quo, run nationally by ageing 
men and locally by publicans, shopkeepers and larger farmers. Considered to be synonymous 
with 'wire-pulling' and jobbery, 'its long-term deficiencies left it ill-equipped to cope' with 
the crises of the years 1912-16. It was unattractive to the young, to the educated young in 
particular, to urban populations, to labour unions, to younger farmers' sons and to rural 
labourers. '9 So consistent was this portrait of the party's unattractiveness that one could ask 
how it retained any popular support at all. The question was posed by the 
15 Sli go Champion, 27h January 1917. Roscommon Herald, 'Who's Who in Sligo Politics', 31" March 191 
16 Sligao Nationalist, I" September 1917. 
17 Tom Garvin, The Evolution ofIrish Nationalist Politics (New York 198 1), p. 99. 
'8 D. P. Moran to J. J. Horgan, 15 th July 1916, quoted Mi J. J. Horgan, From Parnell to Pearse. - Some 
Recollections and Riqflections (Dublin 1948). p. 307. 
19 E. Rumph and A. C. Hepburn. Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Centuiý- Ireland (LIverpool 1977). p. 8. 
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Roscommon/Westmeath newspaper editor Jasper Tully, who repeatedly ascribed the party's 
support solely to the power of venality and patronage. As he once asked of one of the party's 
inner leadership, T. P. O'Connor: 'Can freedom come from such ungodly hands? 920 
The party's organisation has also been portrayed as being in severe decline before the war. 
The theme for such studies was set over fifty years ago by F. S. L. Lyons, who in his 
pioneering work on the party in parliament believed that its disintegration was well under way 
long before 1910 and its unity and cohesion broken from 1890.2 1 Later studies of the party 
outside parliament have also exposed structural weakness. Marie Coleman and John Noel 
McEvoy, in their studies of County Longford and King's County respectively, show the 
party's leading local organisation, the United Irish League, to be in pronounced, endemic 
decline in the pre-war years. Even Paul Bew, who is more sympathetic than many towards 
the party, portrayed an organisation locally riven by class, sectional and personal feuds. The 
'Ranch War' of 1906-09, far from uniting the party behind a robust agrarian campaign in 
those years, further exacerbated its weaknesses. Though differing in some particulars as to 
how the Ranch War was actually fought, Bew's work has been substantially confirmed by 
Fergus Campbell's study of Land and Politics in Connacht, particularly in relation to County 
Galway. 22 
Contemporary belief in the party's decay often went hand in hand with an analysis that it was 
fundamentally out of touch with the 'new' nationalism of 'Irish Ireland'. As the journalist, 
nationalist and labour man W. P. Ryan put it in 1913, the party 'threw the weight, or rather the 
dead-weight, of its influence against independent thought and criticism, political and social'. 
The party was quite separated from the 'youthful and reconstitutive forces' of Ireland, the 
Gaelic League, the Irish Industrial Development Association, the suffragists and co- 
operatives. 23 This hypothesis has been advanced in the work of historians such as Patrick 
20 Midland Reporter, 28'hMarch 19 1-2. Tully demonised O'Connor as the party's chief 'wire-puller'. another of 
O'Connor's many sins in Tully's eyes was his irreligion. 21F. S. L. Lyons, The Irish Parliamentan, PartV 1890-1910 (London, 195 1), p. 10. 
22 See Marie Coleman, Counýv Longford 1910-23 :A Regional Study of the Irish Revolution (PhD thesis, 
.o National University of Ireland, Dublin, September 1998); John Noel McEvoy, A Stu4i, f the United Irish League in Kings County, 1899-1918 (MA thesis, National University of Ireland, St. Patrick's College. 
Maynooth, July 1992), Paul Bew. Coqflict and Conciliation in Ireland 1890-1910, Parnellites and Radical 
Agrarians (Oxford 198 7): Fergus J. A Campbell. Land and Politics in Connacht, 1898-1909 (PhD thesis. 
Bristol University, December 1996); 
23 W. P. Ryan, The Labour Revolt and Larkinism (London 1913), pp. 6-7. 
O'Farrell and John Hutchinson, the former accentuating the gulf between 'Redmondism' and 
the assertive Catholic nationalism of tum-of-the-century Ireland; the latter between the 
4 political nationalism' of the party and the 'cultural nationalism' pervading Irish Ireland. For 
O'Farrell, the party was 'losing contact with the dynamic forces within Irish society 
particularly the Catholic church and the burgeoning cultural and temperance movements. 24 
For Hutchinson, the outlook of party politicians was quite different from that of 'cultural 
nationalists' - religious, linguistic, academic, literary, athletic and/or teetotal. 
25 It was the 
latter who were to underpin the imminent Irish revolution and who were seen almost as a new 
breed who would inherit the earth - or at least twenty-six thirty-seconds of Ireland - on the 
extinction of the party's dinosaur. The failure of the party to relate to the new Ireland was 
comprehensive. According to the historian Philip Bull, the Irish party lost the capacity to 
inspire with enthusiasm those on whom its future depended. For Bull, it had no distinctive 
policy other than agrarianism, no vital appeal other than to sectarianism and no basis of co- 
operation with 'Irish-Ireland' . 
26 In the words of F. S. L. Lyons, the party's leadership was 'no 
longer swimming with the stream' of modem Irish nationalism. If anything, they were 
throwing 'a barrier across the course of the current' and were swept subsequently into the 
'limbo of forgotten things'. 27 
This view of an Irish party beyond redemption has, nevertheless, come to be challenged. 
David Fitzpatrick, the author of what is still the most influential study of local Irish politics in 
the early twentieth century, of County Clare in the years 1913-21 '28has noted that if anything 
the party gained in authority after the two general elections of 1910, in which it captured the 
parliamentary balance of power and dramatically increased the probability of Home Rule. 
For Fitzpatrick, constitutional nationalism under Redmond was 'vigorous and eclectic' at least 
up to 1913, and 'militant nationalism still appeared as securely saddled by Redmond as by 
Parnell in all his pomp'. 29 Moreover, the party continued to represent a remarkably broad 
spectrum of Irish opinion. In Fitzpatrick's view the Irish 'Cause' could accommodate both 
24 Patrick O'Farrell, Ireland's English Question (London 197 1), p. 258. 
25 See John Hutchinson, The Dynamics Qf Cultural Nationalism, The Gaelic Revival and the Creation o the Irish f 
Nation State (London 1987). 
26 Philip Bull, 'Land and Politics, 1879-1903' In D. George Boyce (ed. ), The Revolution in Ireland, 1879-1923 
(Dublin 1988), p. 42. 
27 Lyons, The Irish Parliamentaiy Paqv, p. 264. 
28David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lýfe 1913-1921, Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Dublin 
1977. Gregg Revivals edition 1993). 
29 Fitzpatrick. The Two Irelands 191-1-1939 (Oxford 1998). pp. 17-18 
12 
the "hand of fiiendship" [to England] and commemorations of the 1867 rising against 
. 
30 ederation of interlocked local "tyranny and oppression" Structurally, the party was af 
organisations and was, as the historian Patrick Maume has observed, anything but a 
'centrally-controlled monolith' . 
31 Some party affiliates thrived as others declined. In Clare, 
the United Irish League was waning while the other main affiliate, the Ancient Order of 
Hibemians, flourished - 'the revived AOH was almost a carbon copy of the UIL; and as the 
one shrank the other spread. 932 Local politics, dominated by these affiliates, formed 'an 
integral part of social life. The party's affiliated organisations were still the primary channels 
for a ceaseless local jostling for power and influence. 33 
Rumph and Hepburn may have listed an array of groups to whom the party, supposedly, did 
not appeal, but the roots of party support in rural middle-class life were still sufficiently deep 
for the historian L. P. Curtis to cite a formidable catalogue of party supporters in his snapshot 
of Ireland in 1914 : 
Catholic merchants and shopkeepers, newspaper and hotel proprietors, lawyers and 
doctors, minor civil servants, clerks, publicans, journalists and commercial agents. Their 
allies and social analogues in the country were strong fan-ners, cattle-traders and 
graziers ... men well versed in the value of 
land, livestock and dowries. 34 
Such propertied, professional and commercial groups can be argued to have dominated Irish 
political life, at least outside Dublin, for much of the twentieth century. It seems improbable 
that a political movement backed by such groups in 1914, even if it subsequently and rapidly 
lost support, could have been both terminally moribund and out of touch with the religious 
and cultural orthodoxies of provincial Ireland. Indeed, Alan O'Day has described the party on 
the eve of war as still strong, a multi-issue movement and organ of social integration, with no 
credible rivals and a middle-class base corresponding to the realities of rural life. 35 For Paul 
Bew, the party in parliament was not some decrepit edifice waiting to be blown over, but 
rather represented 'the accumulated political capital of an increasingly self-confident, middle- 
class Ireland'. Moreover, for all the class and sectional divisions identified by Bew, 'the 
30 Fitzpatrick. Politics and Irish Life (Gregg revivals edition), p. 9 1. 
31 Patrick Maurne, The Long Gestation .- Irish Nationalist Life 1891-1918 (Dublin 1999), p. 77. 32 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, p. 98. 
33 Ibid. pp. 94-98. 
34 L. P. Curtis, 'Ireland Mi 1914' in W. E. Vaughan (ed. ), A Neu, Historv ofIreland, Fol. T7, Ireland Under the 
Union 18, -0-19-'. '] (Oxford 1996). p. 185 
35 Alan O'Day, Irish Home Rule 1867-1921 (Manchester 1998), p. 267. 
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overwhelming impression is that it was representative of the mass of the nationalist 
population and its sentiments'. 36 
The concept of a 'representative' Irish party still begs the question of why it failed so totally 
over the next four years. Some have emphasised almost a 'deus ex machina' or, in Theodore 
1 37 Hoppen's phrase, 'a bizarre congeries of accidents , of world war, political misjudgements 
and government policy mistakes. For others, it was not so much the party that was out of tune 
with nationalist feeling as its leader, Redmond. 'Redmondism' in this view, though 
accommodated under the broad nationalist umbrella of the party, was deeply socially- 
conservative, wedded to parliamentary forms, conciliatory to unionists, sympathetic to 
England, 'Whiggish' and imperialist. It could be an uneasy bedfellow with the strident 
Catholic sectarianism, land radicalism, anglophobia and nationalist assertiveness that also 
came within the party's embrace. Whereas in September 1914 Redmond's wartime loyalty to 
the cause of England and her allies was instinctive, that of many of his followers, even if they 
declared their support for him, was not. It was, in this view, Redmond's policy that came to 
be comprehensively discredited by 1918. As Alvin Jackson has stated, what died in 1918 was 
not Pamellism but Redmond's version of it. 38 
The fact that the vast majority of Redmond's party was 'right behind' him in the autumn of 
1914 meant that subsequently it faced the choice of going down with him, abandoning 
politics or, like Rev. Crehan and Henry Monson in Sligo, making the transition to Sinn Fein, 
which by 1918 was the new 'umbrella' national movement. Whatever the course followed, 
'the Irish party' as an organisation died. Was it, however, almost immediately reincarnated? 
David Fitzpatrick has been one of the clearest exponents of the case for continuity between 
the party and its Sinn Fein successor. Such continuity - of ideologies, organisational. methods 
and personnel - would be consistent with the belief that the party had indeed been 
representative of middle-class, nationalist Ireland's 'accumulated political capital' before the 
war. The party's mantle passed during the extreme discontinuities of world war to Sinn Fein. 
36Bew, Jdeologv and the Irish Question, Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912-1916 (Oxford 1994), pp. 
xvill and 20. 3' ' K. Theodore Hoppen, Ireland Since 1800. - Conflict and Con omity (London and New York 1989). 
38 
01 
, p. 
137. 
Alvin Jackson, Ireland I"9S-1998 .* 
Politics and War (Oxford 1999), p. 213. 
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For Fitzpatrick, 'the political culture of nationalist Ireland re-emerged, draped in a tricolour 
that barely obscured the outline of a golden harp'. 39 
There are, therefore, two contrasting portrayals of the Irish party, in shorthand 'rotten' or 
6 representative', on the eve of its destruction. Variations of both concepts are still very much 
in print. Michael Laffan, writing in 1999, though he acknowledged the boost to the party's 
status after the elections of 1910, believed that in the pre-war period a minority of nationalists 
were irrevocably against the party's 'bland acquiescence in an improved version of the status 
quo'. The party was faction-ridden with a weak local organisation, was becoming 
conservative and was seen as increasingly irrelevant to Ireland's needs. Its habit of seeking 
British support had become ingrained and 'by the outbreak of the First World War, many 
intelligent and ambitious young people felt frustrated and resentfulg. 40 By contrast Patrick 
Maume wrote in the same year of his inclination to the view that the new Irish state was built 
41 
on 'the achievements of the Irish party and on local continuity between old and new elites'. 
Neither conception can be credible unless the party's pre-war condition is assessed without 
the benefit of hindsight. The party should not be considered beyond hope in 1914 simply 
because it almost immediately expired; nor should it be deemed healthy because of any later 
continuity to successor movements. In the pre-war years, the imminent traumas of war, death, 
uprisings and republican revolution were not anticipated by contemporaries. R. F. Foster has 
written of the early twentieth century that the 'expected future' was instead one of 'Home 
42 Rule, constitutionally achieved' . Senia Paseta 
has described these years as a period of 
gpreparation, not for independence but for Home Rule and a central place in the Empire'. 43 
The heightened political tensions and mass paramilitary mobilisation encompassed in the 
Home Rule crisis had by August 1914 sorely tested such confidence, but the imperialist, 
conservative John Redmond was still the 'Leader of the Irish Race' and his party seemed to 
be right behind him. Just how far they were behind him and how far they were or were not 
39 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, p. 69. 
40 Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party 1916-1923 (Cambn*dge 1999). pp. 4-6. 
41 Maume, The Long Gestation, p. 2. 
4' R. F. Foster. The Irish Stoiý- .- 
Telling Tales and Making It Upfior Ireland (London 200 1). p. 5 1. 
43 Senia Paseta, Bqfore the Revolution : Nationalism, Social Change and Ireland's Catholic Elite, 18'9-1922 
(Cork 1999). P. 153. 
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4swimming with the stream' of Irish nationalism, before being swept into the 'limbo of 
forgotten things', is the subject of this thesis. 
LOC. Rikm 
If the questions asked in this study are 'national', its focus is unashamedly local. An analysis 
of the pre-war Irish party is meaningless unless it looks at the party at its roots, the array of 
local organisations and interests that so dominated the party and from which the large 
majority of its MPs and activists originated. As Theodore Hoppen has emphasised time and 
again, the norin of Irish politics was for it to be dominated by 'dances around local gods', 44 
the result of 'a penetrating and tenacious political culture in which limited goals and local 
priorities could, more often than not, count for more than heroic principles and dramatic 
brilliance'. 45 Alliances that appeared to be based on social class, ideology or political 
principle were the product more often than not of personal, family or parochial interests. 
Rivalries between leading citizens, dynasties, farmers, tenants, businesses and/or newspapers 
were the common driving force behind enduring, 'national' political disagreements. As 
Fitzpatrick wrote in his Clare study, certain key questions relating to any history of popular 
politics - concerning the social status of Participants, their motivation, the interconnections of 
political groups and the processes whereby they won or lost local popular support - must be 
addressed through local study. 46 
Despite the example set by Fitzpatrick, detailed local studies of the Irish party immediately 
before its demise remain rare. General narrative histories of politics in County Sligo and 
Meath have been published, 47 but these have not focused on the issue of the Irish party and its 
pre-war health. As noted before, the unpublished theses of Marie Coleman and J. N. McEvoy 
have charted the decay of the party's largest affiliate, the United Irish League, in County 
Longford and King's County and have constructed local political narratives for both counties 
covering both the pre-war and wartime years. Fergus Campbell's thesis, focused primarily on 
County Galway, stops with the easing off of the Ranch War in 1909, though an appendix does 
address the issue of later continuity - or in Campbell's view the lack of it - between party and 
Sinn Fein personnel. 
"Hoppen. Ireland Since 1800, p. 129. 
45 Hoppen, Elections, Politics and Societi, in Ireland, 1832-1885 (Oxford 1984), pp. vill-ix. 
46 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lýfe, p. x. 
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Far and away the most important 'local' work on the pre-war Irish party is Paul Bew's 
Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland. While writing anything but a county study, Bew created 
a narrative of the Irish party's agrarian struggle in the middle and west of Ireland and 
illustrated both the sheer density of local interests and their relationships to national 
agrarian/political campaigns in the 1900S. 48 Nevertheless, Bew's work concluded with the 
winding down of the Ranch War and the 1910 general elections. His later work, analysing 
nationalism and unionism in the years 1912-16, did not take forward his local work on the 
middle and west of Ireland . 
49 Therefore, despite the local and county studies that have 
complemented Fitzpatrick's work of twenty-five years ago, there remains a gap in Irish 
historical studies -a detailed study of the state of the Irish party locally, and of provincial, 
nationalist politics, in the immediate pre-war period. 
Timescale - From the Ranch War to the Great War 
This study begins effectively where Paul Bew's Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland left off, 
with the winding down of the agrarian campaign known as the Ranch War, the passage of the 
1909 Land Act in November of that year and the general elections of January and December 
1910. These elections gave the Irish party the balance of power in parliament and restored to 
the forefront of politics the idea that Home Rule could actually be achieved. The following 
years are usually seen as being dominated, across Ireland, by the 'Home Rule crisis', a period 
in which local pre-occupations were subsumed into a protracted, deeply-polarised, national 
political struggle. For over four years, Irish nationalists and their Protestant, unionist 
opponents were supposedly swept into a vortex of threats, drilling, public disorder, 
extravagant rhetoric, sectarian bitterness, government vacillation, arms procurement and 
paramilitary mobilisation. Though starting out with the whip hand over its Liberal allies, the 
Irish party effectively lost the parliamentary battles that it fought in this period, being forced 
to accept a series of compromises, delays and disappointments simply to keep the Home Rule 
bill alive. It still remains to be seen, however, just how far this sense of crisis was felt outside 
Dublin and Ulster, in 6middle Ireland', and how far the Irish party was discredited. 
47 See Famy, Sligo 1914-21: Oliver Coogan, Politics and ff 'ar in Meath, 1913-23 (Dublin 1983). 
48 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland. 
49 Bew, Ideologgi, and the Irish Question. 
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The Home Rule crisis peaked in the late spring and summer of 1914. When the Home Rule 
bill passed in the House of Commons for the last time, in May 1914, it still faced the prospect 
of further truncation, the exclusion of at least four Ulster counties and an uncertain date of 
operation (probably mid-to-late 1915, quite possibly after the Liberal government had lost a 
general election to the unionists). The belief that Home Rule was being betrayed, linked to 
events as dramatic as the Curragh mutiny or the Lame gun-running, compounded the crisis. 
Across Ireland, there was a degree of popular 'political' mobilisation unseen since the Land 
League and the Tarnellism' of the early 1880s. Moreover, this new mobilisation was into 
paramilitary organisations. On the eve of the First World War over 250,000 Irishmen had 
joined either the Irish or Ulster Volunteers; i. e. nearly an eighth of all Irish males at the 1911 
census and over a quarter of active, adult males. The imminent parliamentary passage of 
Home Rule was expected by both sides, but so too was a further intensification of the crisis 
and, at the least, serious popular disorder. 
The study of the Irish party could therefore end abruptly on the outbreak of war, with the 
Home Rule crisis at its peak and before the 'deus ex machina' of war had had a chance to 
upset the course of Irish politics. Indeed, the immediate impact of the war was to defuse the 
crisis - Irish concerns were temporarily dwarfed by the perceived drama, horror and scale of 
the European conflict. However, such a cut-off would exclude what would be the party's last, 
successful national campaign, to back Redmond's war policy and to control the Irish 
Volunteers. This campaign, in the autumn of 1914, proved to be the final point at which the 
position of the Irish party could be assessed before its rapid descent to oblivion. Just how 
decayed or robust was the party as it embarked on what it did not know would be its 'last 
hurrah'? As a consequence, this thesis extends into the opening months of the war and covers 
five full years of politics in provincial Ireland, from December 1909 to December 1914. 
Though chronologically the study ends at December 1914, the question of continuity between 
the Irish party and wartime Sinn Fein is discussed in Appendices A and B. Additionally. the 
three case study chapters in the main body of the thesis (analysing localism in County 
Roscommon, North Westmeath and Sligo town) each conclude with a section on 'War and 
Sinn Fein', going beyond December 1914 to show the impact of local allegiances on the 
wartime affiliations of pre-war politicians, whether to the Irish party. abstention or Sinn Fein. 
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The nine central chapters of this thesis analyse : 
" the state of popular political activity and elites in the aftermath of the Ranch War. 
" the condition of political, cultural, sporting and social organisations, 
" the nature of contemporary, popular political language, 
" three case studies - of County Roscommon, 
North Westmeath and Sligo town, 
* the pre-occupations of provincial, nationalist opinion during the earlier 'Home Rule crisis' 
years of 1910-1913, 
0 the creation, mobilisation and control of the Irish Volunteers during the climax of the 
Home Rule crisis, from the autumn of 1913 to the outbreak of war and 
9 the outbreak of war, the formation of Redmond's war policy and the takeover of the 
Volunteers, through to December 1914. 
Definitions 
A number of terms are used consistently throughout this study and are outlined below : 
The Irish Party. It is essential, in defining 'the party', to distinguish between : 
the Irish parliamentary party, consisting of pledge-bound, nationalist, Westminster MPs, 
the 'nationalist' or 'national' movement, embracing virtually all Irish nationalists, and 
the 'Irish party', comprising both the pledge-bound MPs and local members of their network 
of affiliated organisations. 
For contemporaries, the term 'the Irish party' could mean either the parliamentary party or the 
wider body of MPs, affiliated organisations and supporters in the country. Just to confuse 
things, during the first world war the general body of 'Irish party' supporters came to be 
called 'Redmondites'. However, before the war the beliefs of the broad body of party 
supporters were not necessarily synonymous with support for an ideology of 'Redmondism'. 
'Redmondism' is now used by historians to describe the socially-conservative, conciliatory 
and imperialist strands of John Redmond's thought. 
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For consistency, the thesis will use the following terms 
'Parliamentary party' for the pledge-bound MPs; 
'Irish pally' for the wider body of organised public support for the parliamentary party, 
including members of the United Irish League (UIL) and Ancient Order of Hibernians 
(AOH); 
'Nationalists' and 'national movement' for any Irish nationalists, of any faction or party: 
'Redmondite' for exponents of a specific rhetoric, 'Redmondism', primarily used by the Irish 
party's leader, John Redmond, advocating support for the empire, conciliation with unionists 
and the wooing of men of property to help lead the independent nation. 
Hibernians. The Ancient Order of Hibernians was still split in the years 1910-14 into the 
AOH (Board of Erin), loyal to the Irish party, and the AOH (Irish-American Alliance), 
effectively an adjunct of Sinn Fein. The latter were, however, non-existent in middle Ireland 
and when contemporaries referred to 'Hibernians', 'the AOH' and 'the Order'.. they referred 
to the organisation supporting the Irish party, as will this thesis. 
Sinn Feiners. Supporters of Sinn Fein in the years 1910-13 and 'Sinn Feiners' in the autumn 
of 1914 were two quite different groupings. 'Sinn Fein supporters' were a dwindling band of 
followers of Arthur Griffith's Sinn Fein party and advocates of abstention from Westminster. 
They were just one of a range of nationalist 'kickers, cranks and insurgents' or 'factionists', 
including the followers of William O'Brien's All for Ireland League (AFI ), who were 
sniping at the Irish party in the pre-war years. By contrast, the tenn 'Sinn Femers' in the 
autumn of 1914 rapidly came to encompass all advanced nationalist opponents of Redmond's 
war policy. To keep the distinction clear, Griffith's pre-war followers will be referred to as 
'Sinn Fein supporters' and the Irish party's wartime, advanced nationalist opponents as 'Sinn 
Feiners'. 
The Irish Volunteers. The Volunteer movement of 1913-14, prior to its split in September 
1914, was variously called by contemporaries 'the Volunteers', 'the Irish Volunteers, ' or 'the 
Irish National Volunteers'. The more commonly used terms were, however, the first two. 
After the split, those loyal to Redmond rapidly assumed the title of 'National' or 'Irish 
National" Volunteers, while those under John MacNeill who opposed Redmond's war policy 
took, or as they saw it kept. the title of 'Irish Volunteers'. In this study. the terms 
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'Volunteers' and 'Irish Volunteers' will relate to the movement before its split; 'National 
Volunteers' to those loyal to Redmond after the split and 'MacNeillite Volunteers' to those 
opposing Redmond's war policy. 
Spellings and place names. Contemporary spellings and place names will be used in the 
study, with the exception of a more limited use of capital letters than was practised in the 
period. 
Geography - Five Counties in 'Middle Ireland' 
Five neighbouring counties have been selected for study, forming a geographic block with 
overlapping and interlocked political elites. From Connaught they are Leitrim, Roscommon 
and Sligo and from Leinster the neighbouring counties of Longford and Westmeath. At the 
time of the 1911 census their combined population was 340,389, or 7.8% of the total Irish 
population. Overwhelmingly, these counties were Catholic and nationalist. In the census, 
93.1 % of their population was declared to be Catholic and in no county did this figure fall 
below 90%. 50 Politically, the counties had been dominated for over thirty years by 
nationalists, normally members of the Land League, the Irish National League, the Irish 
National Federation or the United Irish League - the successive, sometime competing, 
organisations supporting nationalists in parliament. All of the counties' MPs were 
nationalists, nearly all of them elected unopposed. County and district councils across the 
region had been controlled by nationalists since the reform of local government in 1898. 
By contrast, the political and economic power of Protestants locally had been in decline for 
years. Only in Sligo town, the largest town in the region, was there still a significant 
concentration of Protestant economic power and influence. 51 In four of the counties, 
Protestants (overwhelmingly in the Church of Ireland) formed between 7.9% and 8.8% of the 
population, with a slightly higher representation in the northern counties of Sligo and Leitrim. 
Numbers in Westmeath were boosted by the military garrisons stationed in Athlone and 
50 A detailed occupational analysis of the 1911 census, county by county, by T. Galloway Rigg, was published 
by D. P. Moran in The Leader during 1913-14. The county analyses used here are for Sligo (6h December 1913), 
Leitrim (20th December), Roscommon (27th December), Westmeath (2 nd May 1914) and Longford (20'h June 
1914). 
51 Sligo's Protestant professional and commercial elite is best described in Michael Fariy's The Afte7-math of 
Rcnvlution: Sligo 1921-23 (Dublin 2000). 
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Mullingar. In Roscommon, however, there were only 2,082 Protestants in 1911 (2.3% of the 
population) compared with over 16,000 in 1861. This prompted the contemporary writer T. 
Galloway Rigg to remark : 'It is just possible that Protestant prospects in Roscommon, as in 
the other Connaught counties, may brighten a little under Home Rule. They can hardly 
become any worse! 
52 
The counties were also overwhelmingly agrarian. For the census, no less than 44,525 people 
recorded their occupation as farmers and graziers, and to this number should be added farm 
workers, farm servants and dependent family members. Well over half of the population 
derived their income directly from the land. Agriculture was in turn overwhelmingly 
dependent on livestock fan-ning, and in particular the rearing and fattening of cattle. For the 
RIC county inspector in Roscommon, who had recently arrived in 1911 and who was 
completing yet another detailed monthly report on the state of his county, the prospect (from 
his window? ) was quite uniform : 'This is a grass county, grass as far as the eye can reach. 953 
Though the three Connaught counties were, after the 1909 Land Act, included in the ambit of 
the Congested Districts Board (CDB), they were not 'congested' in the way that so many 
believed the west of Ireland still to be. The secretary of the CDB, William Micks, 'talking to 
people who have never been to the West of Ireland', mocked them for imagining that 'the 
people live in hovels with little potato-patches in the midst of great bogs and moors'. East 
Connaught in particular was quite different from the notion of a conventional 'congested' 
district, with numerous small holdings, much good land and almost entirely devoted to the 
cattle trade. Counties Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo - at least south of Donegal Bay - were 
included in Micks's definition of East Connaught. 54 All five counties studied here had been 
massively depopulated in the last sixty-five years and relentless emigration had shrunk their 
population by a further 6.5% in the ten years since 1901. The dominance of livestock fanning 
meant that all were far more 'empty' than congested, with the landscape frequently described 
as a 'desert' or a 'prairie'. The nationalist writer William Bulfin in 1907 described the 
Connaught plains west of the Shannon as having 'no woodlands, no groves, scarcely any trees 
at all. There is no agriculture - the fertile desert is uncultivated from end to end'. Here there 
52 T. Galloway Rigg. 'Catholics and Protestants - Their Occupations in County Roscommon', The Leader, 27h 
December 1913. pp. 501-03. 
53 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. November 1911 (PRO CO 904 ý85). 
54 NN,, illiam Micks, An Account q the Constitution, Administration and Dissolution of the Congested Distilcts 
Board, From 1891 to 1923 (Dublin 1925). pp7-8. 
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ý 55 was Cnothing but pasture and sheep and stone walls and the Western winds and loneliness 
Further east, while the plains of Meath lacked this 'bleak monotony', with a much more 
varied landscape of woods and hedges, the land was still 'a verdant, fertile desert ftom which 
man has banished himself, and into which he had sent the beasts to take his place'. 56 
However, these apparently deserted grasslands were now enjoying what was to be a 
protracted spell of relative prosperity, driven primarily by rising farm incomes. They were 
characterised less by isolated 'hovels with little potato patches' than by improved and 
purchased farms, better buildings, healthy bank balances, public investment in roads, 
agriculture and housing, and sometimes bustling small towns. David Seth Jones has analysed 
the sophisticated commercial relationships underlying the cattle trade and the land market at 
this time 57 which took the region way beyond the stereotype of 'peasant' farming. The 1911 
census identified over 3,000 individuals directly involved in 'commerce' in the five counties, 
whether as merchants, brokers and factors, bank workers, auctioneers, commercial travellers, 
commercial clerks, publicans and hoteliers, grocers, drapers or general storekeeperS. 58 
Though trade was periodically interrupted - by rail strikes in 1911; foot and mouth disease in 
1912 - monthly police reports sent in to Dublin Castle repeatedly commented on a general 
prosperity, underpinned by livestock prices. 'Industries' - the docks and mills of Sligo, the 
woollen mill in Athlone, coal mining at Arigna on the Roscommon/Sligo/Leitrim border - 
might be few and far between, but for the Sligo RIC county inspector, they were 'flourishing' 
and 'farmers are doing well' (November 1910). In Leitrim, livestock prices were buoyant and 
farmers were having 'a good time' (January 1911), and in Roscommon (though industries 
here were languishing) 'the farming class are well satisfied with the prices obtainable in 
stock' (April 1911). 59 In a guide to Ireland published in 1913, the London Times wrote of 
'thousands of neat and well kept labourers' cottages', 'a change of spirit', 'not a discouraged 
or down-hearted people today' and 'a great improvement in the material surroundings of the 
55 William Bulfin, Rambles in Eirinn (Dublin 1907), pp. 45-46. 
56 Ibid, pp. 87-89. 
57 David Seth Jones. Gra.: iers, Land Rqform and Political Conflict in Ireland (Washington D. C. 1995). pp. l- 21 
and 89-133. 
58 T. Galloway Rigg in The Leader, December 1913-June 1914. 
59 Monthly reports of the Sligo, Leitrim and Roscommon county inspectors, November 19 10. January and April 
1911 (PRO CO 904/8 2 and 83 )) - 
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people'. It contrasted material reality with popular misconceptions : 'Things are much better 
than they have been or than most people have any idea that they are. '60 
No town in the five counties was large - Sligo, the biggest, had a population just over 11,000. 
Indeed, there were only five towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants : Sligo (11,163 in the 
1911 census), Athlone (7,472), Mullingar (5,539), Longford (3,760) and Boyle (2,691). 
However, in contrast to their rural hinterlands, their populations had stabilised in recent years 
and were often growing. Moreover, L. P. Curtis has emphasised that the ranks of these 
'towns', defined in the census as having more than 2,000 people, should be increased by those 
with populations of over 1,000, which were also 'urban' with a variety of churches, schools, 
judicial petty sessions, police barracks, post offices, town halls or newspapers .61 Carrick-on- 
Shannon, Castlerea, Granard, Manorhamilton, Moate and Roscommon all fell into this 
category, making eleven credible 'towns' in the area. 62 The five counties also boasted a 
further thirty-five of what Curtis called 'semi-urban' communities, with populations of 120- 
1 000. However, many of these were patently not towns and some, deprived of good road or 
rail links, were a tale of woe. Thus the people of Drumkeerin in County Leitrim, admittedly to 
back their demand for a rent cut, painted a picture of their village characterised by no rail link, 
63 
no town fairs, falling trade, depopulation and crumbling buildings. That said, other 
communities (Mohill with a population of 755; Strokestown with 801) were sufficiently 
vigorous to support even their own newspapers and were indistinguishable from their slightly 
larger urban neighbours. 
Again, popular perceptions and reality did not always coincide. Towns were still often 
portrayed as decaying, particularly by neighbours and rivals. For the Athlone-based 
Westmeath Independent in 1911, Roscommon town was a 'tattered patch of cabins'. In 1914 
it was 'the poorest looking parody of a county town there is to be found in the thirty-two', 
with only four large buildings - church, courthouse, poorhouse and Masonic lodge. It was, 
60 The Times, The Ireland qf Todql, (London 1913), pp. 4.5 and 11. 
61 Curtis, 'Ireland in 1914'. in Vaughan (ed. ), A Neu, HiSt07-11 qfIreland Vol. FI, p. 150. 
62 Ballaghadereen (pop. 1.317). was included 111 the area of County Roscommon after the reorganisation of local 
government in 1898. It elected a Roscommon county councillor, but polit I ically was tied far more to county 
Mayo, falling within the East Mayo parliamentary constituency of the town's leading citizen, John DIllon. Its 
ties to 'Roscommon' politics were far weaker and it has not been included in this study. 
63 Leitrim Obse7-ver WhMarch 19 1 22. 
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from the Athlone perspective, 'a very nice place to live out of . 
64 In fact Roscommon (pop 
1 . 858) boasted recent investment in its 'Harrison Hall', waterworks, 
labourers' cottages, post 
65 
office and steam-rollered streets, as well as its Catholic church . 
Moreover, in 1912 it 
registered entries in a leading commercial directory for no fewer than forty grocers and spirits 
merchants, eight drapers, five hardware merchants, four publicans, five solicitors, five 
stationers and newsagents, four hoteliers and five victuallers, together with chemists, bakers, 
booksellers, com, egg, hide and wool merchants, a dentist, hairdresser, coach-builders and 
auctioneers. 66 The town supported not one but two newspapers (fierce commercial rivals) 
and possessed a medley of social, cultural and political societies, including the United Irish 
League, Gaelic Club (and football team), Gaelic League, Physical Culture Club, Social Club, 
old age pensions committee, Race Committee, volunteer fire brigade, 'commercial dancing 
class'. Juvenile Dramatic Club, commercial and woodwork classes, Trade and Labour 
Association, church co-fratemity, Roscommon Associated Estates Committee and Mikado 
Opera Company. 67 
Athlone itself, at least to the eyes of a small boy, was a model of busy activity. The writer 
Patrick Shea, brought up there before the Great War as the young son of an RIC head 
constable, remembered the bustle of the town, its weekly market in the square and the annual 
horse fairs and dealers with their 'strange, hard dialects of the Northern counties'. Athlone 
was frequented daily by the country gentry in shiny carriages, by farmers, shopkeepers, 
soldiers, tinkers and vagrants. Artillery salutes were fired for British celebrations and 
'Foresters' in plumed hats 'walked sedately in procession through the town' on nationalist 
memorial days. Band parades, sports meetings, regattas and swimming galas were constant 
occurrences, with a major race meeting held twice a year. Everywhere, remembered Shea, 
goods were carried by donkeys pulling small carts. 68 
64 Westmeath Independent, 22 nd April 1911 . 9bMay 1914. 65Roscommon Messenge7-, 29h November 1913. 
66 MacDonald's Irish Directory and Gazetteer (Edinburgh 1912). Care must be taken, though, with such 
directories. as several local traders made multiple entries. inflating the level of 'activity' in any one town. One 
trader in Roscommon. Hugh Flynn (a 'grocer'), could advertise in the press that he sold spirits, tea and coffee, 
jewellery, fancy goods. hardware, musical instruments, agricultural equipment, bicycles and manure (see 
advertisements in Roscommon Journal). 
67 Roscommon Messenger, II thDecember 1909; RoscommonJOU7-nal, 4h November, 1911. 
68 Patrick Shea. Voic-cs and the Soiind qfDrums (Belfast 198 1). pp 11- 13. 
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County Roscommon, geographically close to the centre of Ireland, has in many ways fori-ned 
the centre of this thesis. It alone bordered all of the other counties studied and in 1911 had by 
far the largest population (93,956). It had provided the location of the first cattle drive of the 
Ranch War and was one of the most disturbed areas during that campaign. The county was 
run for years by a monolithic Irish party machine that appeared deeply entrenched and secure 
in its loyalty to Redmond and the parliamentary party. Yet in 1917 Roscommon, 'believed to 
be so peaceful and so free from Sinn Fein and the rebellion taint', 69 would also see the 
imported, elderly Count Plunkett, father of an executed Easter rebel, swamp the Irish party's 
long-established local candidate in the North Roscommon by-election, a defeat that initiated 
the party's electoral obliteration. 
In fact the county's politics, beneath the surface control exercised by two party 'bosses' - 
John Hayden the MP for South Roscommon and John Fitzgibbon the chairman of 
Roscommon county council - were riddled with unending 'parish pump', personal disputes. 
Families, newspapers, fan-ners, 'ratepayers' and road contractors, job-hunters and turbulent 
priests sniped at each other throughout the pre-war years. In particular, the county was riven 
by the feud, dating back to at least the early 1880s, of two prominent nationalist families, the 
Tullys and the Haydens. This rivalry extended from Roscommon town in the south of the 
county to Boyle in the north. In Roscommon town William Tully, owner of the Roscommon 
Journal, had clashed regularly with the brothers Luke, Joseph and John Hayden, each of them 
in turn owners of the town's other newspaper, the Roscommon Messenger. In Boyle 
William's nephew Jasper Tully, owner of the Roscommon Herald, led the charge against John 
Hayden and John Fitzgibbon, whether they were Parnellites (in the 1890s) or leaders of the 
county's reunited Irish party from 1900 on. This political and newspaper war was bitter and 
protracted - the feud effectively lasted from the 1880s through to Jasper Tully's death in 1938 
- and the county's contending newspapers as a result published a wealth of material on local 
dissensions and splits. Moreover, Jasper Tully's expulsion from the United Irish League in 
1903 meant that from then on the Herald was one of a tiny band of pre-war, local, nationalist 
newspapers published by an unremitting enemy of the Irish party. In these years it provided 
the perfect contrast to the steadfastly loyal Roscommon Messenger, its journalistic and 
editorial bias equal and opposite to that of the Haydens' paper. 
69 The Irish Times, quoted in the Roscommon Herald, I Oth February 1917 and by Denis Carroll in Thev Fooled 
You Again : Michael O'Flanagan (1876-194- Priest, Republican, Social Critic (Blackrock 1993). p. 55. 
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The political feuds and alliances of Roscommon permeated through to its neighbouring 
counties. Athlone, 'an appendage to the tail between two counties', 70 was nominally in 
Westmeath and the largest town in that county, but extended west over the Shannon into John 
Hayden's constituency and had been part of County Roscommon until the 1898 local 
government reorganisation. More directly, the Hayden/Tully feud was duplicated almost 
exactly, with the same principals, in Mullingar in North Westmeath. Here, the Westmeath 
Examiner had been owned by John Hayden since the early 1880s and for nearly twenty years 
had faced the bitter rivalry of the Midland Examiner, run by no less than Jasper Tully and his 
brother George W. Tully. When Hayden in turn fell out with the nationalist MP for North 
Westmeath, Laurence Ginnell, nothing could be more natural than that Ginnell and the Tullys 
should be allies, not only in Westmeath but in electoral contests in Roscommon. 
The Roscommon Herald did not just report on Roscommon and Westmeath affairs, but 
covered news from Leitrim, Longford and Sligo. Indeed Tully was the MP for South Leitrim 
from 1892 to 1906 (the last three years as an independent). J. P. Farrell, the MP for North 
Longford and owner himself of the Longford Leader newspaper, started his journalistic career 
as the Longford correspondent of the Roscommon Herald, and with Hayden, Fitzgibbon and 
Ginnell was one of the leading instigators of the Ranch War across the area. In 19 10, Farrell 
and Jasper Tully were in turn to be co-defendants against charges that their newspapers 
incited agrarian violence against 'land-grabbers' in Longford (Farrell) and Leitrim (Tully). 
Longford, Westmeath and Leitrim politics were themselves intertwined. One of the leading 
Irish party men in Westmeath, Patrick McKenna, originated from Longford and by 1909 had 
become a bitter opponent of J. P. Farrell. McKenna went on in 1910 to stand as the Irish party 
candidate in the January general election in North Westmeath, where John Hayden had 
4 watched me in my political cradle'. 71 He was defeated by Ginnell. There were also close 
ties between several Longford and South Leitrim men. The Longford Independent and the 
Leitrim Advertiser (the latter published in Mohill) were owned by the same family, the 
Turners. J. P. Farrell and T. F. Smyth, Tully's successor as South Leitrim's MP, were related 
70 TT'evtmeath Independent, 5'ý July 1913. 
71 McKenna was speaking of his Westmeath (and Roscommon) mentor Hayden at a meeting at Newtownforbes, 
County Longford, which was in turn reported in the Leit7lm Adveniser of 7h October 1909. McKenna returned 
to Longford politics in the South Longford by-election of May 1917. Here he was to stand, again for the party, 
as a local man and he lost again, this time to Sinn Fem. 
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by marriage, 72 while Smyth was himself Longford-bom and educated, as was Farrell, at St 
Mel's College. 
Leitrim had also seen the one major, recent electoral scare experienced by the Irish party 
locally, when in 1907 the MP for North Leitrim, Charles Dolan, defected to the Sinn Fein 
party and triggered a by-election. Though the Irish party candidate, F. E. Meehan, won the 
election in 1908, he did so after a protracted and heated campaign organised by the then MP 
73 for North Sligo, P. N. McHugh . McHugh, who 
himself originally came from Leitrim, was 
leader of the party in Sligo town and owner of the Sligo Champion, still the largest and 
widest-read newspaper in this part of Ireland. The Champion's local coverage, and 
McHugh's influence, extended beyond Sligo town to all of County Sligo, to Leitrim and to 
North Roscommon. Sligo town was itself the prime source of professional and commercial 
services for the county, for Leitrim and North Roscommon. It was the location of the 
Catholic see covering much of the region - the diocese of Elphin, which extended over 
virtually all of counties Leitrim, Sligo and Roscommon (the other principal diocesan areas 
were Meath, based in Mullingar, and Ardagh, based in Longford). Sligo town also provided 
local examples of a thriving mass labour movement and, as noted, of a still vigorous, 
politically vocal, Protestant commercial class. The latter had its own newspaper outlets in the 
Sligo Independent and the Sligo Times, both of which were published in the town. 
For all the interconnections between the five counties, it would be a mistake to believe that 
their politics were perfectly homogeneous. Leaving aside the distinctive strengths of labour 
and Protestant politics in Sligo town and the existence of a formal political schism into two 
nationalist parties (led by Hayden and Ginnell) in North Westmeath, the multitude of strictly 
local issues that did not count beyond a single county, town or village ensured that easy 
generalisation across counties is not possible. The 'case study' chapters of this thesis have 
therefore been focused on the particular conditions of County Roscommon (localism), North 
Westmeath (the Ginnellite split) and Sligo town ( the relationship between the Irish party and 
labour). Significant differences between and within these counties, and Leitrim and 
Longford, probably ensure that no single one of them was 'typical' during the final years of 
72 Farrell's xv] fe was Smyth's cousin, (Longfiord Leader, 21" October 1911). 
73 This campaign is described by Claran Dulbhir in Sinn Fein .- 
The First Election 1908 (Manorhamilton 1993). 
McHugh died in 1909. 
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union with Britain. Nevertheless, the wider coverage attempted here, across a broad area of 
6middle Ireland', does provide useful insights into the experience of provincial nationalists, 
and the condition of Redmond's party, on what they still believed to be the eve of Home Rule. 
Sources - The Use of Newspaper 
A range of primary sources - police records (particularly the monthly reports on their counties 
prepared by RIC inspectors), correspondence, archives and, to a limited extent, diaries - have 
been used in this study and are outlined in the Bibliography. However, research for this thesis 
has consisted primarily of the reading of eighteen weekly, provincial newspapers published in 
the five counties over the five years 1910-14. The eighteen newspapers studied are 
summarised below: 
Leitrim Advertiser. Politically independent. Published in Mohill, Leitrim and owned by the 
Turner family. Four broadsheet pages. News coverage local (Leitrim and Longford) and 
national. 74 The two centre pages were frequently printed off the same plate as the paper's 
sister, the Longford Independent. Advertising content normally I 
V2 
-1 3/4pages. Full series 
of archived copies read for 1910-14. 
Leitrim Observer. Nationalist and loyal to the Irish party. Published in Carri ck-on- Shannon, 
Leitrim. Acquired by Patrick Dunne at the end of 1910 and expanded from four to eight 
broadsheet pages. However, four pages every week consisted of syndicated magazine pieces 
from the British press - fashion, society gossip, 'humour'. Of the residual, advertising 
typically took up to two and a half pages a week. News coverage local, focused on Carrick, 
with intermittent coverage of national news. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Longford Independent. Independent. Published in Longford and owned by the Turner 
family. Four broadsheet pages. News coverage local, with significant duplication of content 
with the Leitrim Advertiser. 40% or more of the paper advertising. The Turners were 
consistently hostile to the North Longford MP J. P. Farrell. Full series read for 1910-14. 
74 'National' stories are here defined as any news story of direct interest to Ireland, whether originating in Ireland 
or in Britain 
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Longford JournaL Unionist. Published in Longford and owned by W. T. Dann. Eight tabloid 
pages. However, only one page of local/national news, with up to seven pages taken up by 
syndicated magazine pieces from the British press and by advertisements. Low advertising 
content of under two pages. Full series read up to August 1914 when the archived series 
terminated. 
LongfordLeader. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Longford and owned by J. P. 
FarrelIMP. Eight broadsheet pages. News coverage local (Longford and South Leitrim) and 
national. High advertising content, at up to three and a half pages. Archivedseries 
incomplete for 1910-11 but full series read thereafter. 
Midland Reporter. Nationalist but hostile to the Irish party. Published in Mullingar, 
Westmeath. Owned by George W. Tully, brother of Jasper. Eight broadsheet pages, though 
often widened to fit in 10 columns to a page. Local (North Westmeath, Longford and 
Roscommon) and national news, with frequent editorials on international events. Low 
advertising content at one to one and a half pages. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Roscommon Herald Nationalist but hostile to the Irish party. Published in Boyle, 
Roscommon. Owner and editor Jasper Tully. Eight AO pages each week, with ten columns 
per page. Detailed coverage of and comment on local, national and international events. 
Local coverage of counties Roscommon, Longford, Westmeath, Sligo, Leitrim and Mayo 
(Ballaghadereen). Low advertising content (usually no more than two and a half pages a 
week), an d much of that for businesses in Carrick-on Shannon, Sligo and Dublin. Full series 
read for 1910-14. 
Roscommon JournaL Nationalist, loyal to Redmond, but hostile to the town's UIL. 
Published in Roscommon and owned by William Tully. Eight pages. News coverage local 
(South Roscommon) and national. Advertising content typically two to three pages. Full 
series read for 1910-14. 
Roscommon Messenger. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Roscominon and owned 
by John Hayden MP after the death of his brother Joseph in December 1909. Eight 
broadsheet pages. News coverage local (South Roscommon, Athlone and North Galway) and 
30 
national, with editorials on international events. Advertisements three to three and a half 
pages. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Sligo Champion. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Sligo and owned by the McHugh 
family after the death of P. A. McHugh MP in 1909. Edited by Alfred McHugh, James 
Cawley and later J. A Flynn. Twelve broadsbeet pages. Coverage of local (Sligo, Leitrim and 
North Roscommon), national and international news. Advertising four to five pages. Full 
series read for 1910-14. 
Sligo Independent Unionist. Published in Sligo and owned by the Gilmour family. Edited 
by T. Boyd. Eight broadsheet pages. Local (Sligo), national and international news. 
Typically over three pages of advertising. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Sligo Nationalist. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Sligo and owned by Bernard 
McTernan,, who founded the paper in 19 10 after he resigned as general manager of the 
Champion. Eight broadsheet pages with coverage of local (Sligo), national and international 
news. High advertising content - sometimes up to five pages. Archived series only begins in 
June 1913, with significant gaps up to the end of 1914. 
Sligo Times. Unionist. Published in Sligo and owned by Robert Smyllie, who founded the 
paper in 1908. Increased in 1909 from eight to twelve broadsheet pages. Local (Sligo) and 
national news coverage. Over seven pages of advertisements in 1911, but the paper's overall 
size was reduced to eight - ten pages in 1912. Paper plagued by bad debts, the loss of its 
account books and a fire, closing in 1914. Full series read up to January 1914, when the 
archived series ended. 
Strokestown Democrat Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Strokestown, Roscommon, 
owned by P. Morahan and established in 1907.4 broadsheet pages. News coverage local 
(Roscommon) with editorials on national events. Over 60% of the paper's content 
advertising. Archived series only starts in March 1913, with significant gaps through to the 
end of 1914. 
31 
Western Nationalist. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Boyle. Owned and edited by 
J. Flanagan. Established in 1908 as a direct competitor to the Roscommon Herald. Eight 
broadsheet pages. News coverage local (Roscommon, Leitrim and South Sligo) and national. 
Higher advertising content than the Herald, with three to four pages of mostly local 
advertisements. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Westmeath Examiner. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Mullingar. Owned by John 
Hayden, MP for South Roscommon. Eight broadsheet pages. Local (Westmeath) and 
national news coverage with comments on international events. Typically three pages of 
advertisements. Full series read for 1910-14. 
Westmeath Guardian. Unionist. Published in Mullingar. Owned by F. J. Farrell. Four 
broadsheet pages. Local, (North Westmeath) news only. Over half of content advertising. 
Full series read for 1910-14. 
Westmeath Independent. Nationalist and party-loyal. Published in Athlone. Owned by the 
Chapman family (led by the nationalist Westmeath county councillor, Thomas Chapman) and 
edited by Michael MacDermott-Hayes. Eight AO pages. Local (Westmeath, Roscommon, 
Longford and King's), national and international news. Advertisements up to three and a half 
pages. Full series read for 1910-14. 
The political affiliations of these papers were clearly flagged : until the outbreak of war, 
twelve were nationalist (ten supporting the Irish party and two enemies of it); two 
independent and four unionist. The eighteen titles ranged from significant weekly papers, 
selling to a wide catchment area and still striving to be the prime source of news and opinions 
for their readers, to 'miserable sheets' 75 struggling to exist. In the former category were the 
Roscommon Herald, Sligo Champion, and Westmeath Independent, while in the latter 
category were six titles : 
7 The phrase 'miserable sheet' is that used by David Fitzpatrick to describe similar papers M Clare (Politics and 
Irish Lý1ý, p. 90). 
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- the Leitrim Advertiser and Longford Independent, four pages only and doubling up on 
content, 
- the LeitritnObserver, with half of its content 'magazine' material from Britain and over 
half of the rest advertisements, 
- the Longford Journal, with up to seven out of eight pages advertisements and 'magazine' 
material from Britain, 
- the Strokestown Democrat, four pages with only minimal news coverage outside its 
immediate area,, and 
- the Westmeath Guardian, four pages only and no view of the world beyond North 
Westmeath. 
In between these two extremes, though, were nine other newspapers, typically each of eight 
pages, covering local and national news, sometimes editorialising on international events, and 
still constituting significant local media for the dissemination of news and views. 
Contemporary circulation figures for these newspapers are lacking, as internal records no 
76 longer exist and the last government-collated figures were for 1892 . However, benchmarks 
for circulation in the pre-war years can be derived from the 1892 figures using: 
a) the Sligo Champion, which had an 1892 circulation of 11,000 (though this included copies 
printed for free circulation), serviced the largest town in the area and at least three 
surrounding counties. It presumably had still by far the largest local circulation before the 
war, 
b) the Roscommon Messenger which had an 1892 circulation of 696, but which was publicly 
claimed to have been trebled by Joseph Hayden between 1897 and 1909.77 This could 
give a pre-war circulation for the Messenger of close to 2 '000.78 
It is possible that 'middle-ranking', nationalist papers such as the Messenger, serving towns 
of 1,000-2,000 and their hinterlands, sold between 1,000 -2000 copies; the local 'miserable 
sheets' well under a thousand copies; the three more substantial papers anything in excess of 
76 1892 circulation figures were collated in Dublin Castle and published by Marie-Louise Legg, in Newspapers 
and Nationalism .- The Irish 
Provincial Press 1850-1892 (Dublin 1999). p. 127. 
77 Roscommon Messenger, II ýh December 1909. 
78 This is confirmed by Nicholas Nally, the editor who succeeded John Hayden at the Westmeath Examiner in the 
1950s, who believed that the pre-war circulation of the Examiner, also below 700 in 1892, was around 2,000 
(conversation xvith Nicholas Nally. 15'h November 2001). Lucius Farrell. grandson of J. P. Farrell, and a former 
editor of the Longford Leader, believed that that paper'sXre-war circulation was also around a couple of 
thousand (conversations with Lucius Farrell, 14th and 15 November 200 1). 
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2,000-3,000 copies. Athlone's population of over 7,000 provided a major support for the 
Westmeath Independent, and the Roscommon Hei-ald was widely sold outside Boyle, across 
North Roscommon, Leitrim, Longford and South Sligo. 79 At the top of the tree stood the 
Sligo Champion. 
The local press remains a key primary source for what the historian J. J. Lee has called 'the 
study of contemporary perception and opinion'. However, as Lee has stated in a recent cri de 
coeur, 6vast tracts of the newspaper press remain virtually terra incognito to the historian. 
The press did not, and still does not, enjoy the status of an archival source in the minds of 
many historians. '80 In large part this was the result of a blatant and transparent bias which so 
suffused the local press that it appeared to lack any objectivity or value as a source. Local 
owners and editors for years had seemed to see their role, in the best or worst traditions of 
late-Victorian 'new journalism' 81 as being politically-aligned but self-appointed leaders and 
moulders of local opinion. For the historian Marie-Louise Legg, a late-Victorian Irish 
newspaper was 'a lever on local affairs ... conducted by the proprietor as a preacher in a pulpit 
in a church addresses the congregation'. 82 This 'preaching' permeated leader writing, news 
reporting and the editorial selection and weighting of news stories. It could also be co- 
ordinated across a number of papers; for many nationalist papers, there was a clear Irish party 
'line' which was also laid out in syndicated columns supplied by the party's Irish Press 
Agency, most notably in 'Home Rule Notes from the Campaign'. 
Blatant bias meant that any one newspaper was of limited value as a source. Some news 
stories were genuinely considered uninteresting by editors but others were played down or 
completely omitted because they were politically embarrassing. Throughout early 1914, as 
the prospects for peaceful Home Rule went from bad to worse, John Hayden's two papers 
week after week printed leaders, supplied by Hayden from London, repeatedly proclaiming 
its imminent, glorious, parliamentary success; coverage of reverses, and there were many, was 
minimal. Another party-supporter, the Strokestown Democrat, avoided all mention of the 
79 The 189" circulation of the Westmeath Independent was reported by the government to be only 150. This 
seems ludicrously low, and in any case the Chapman family bought and rescued the title afterwards. . 80 J. J. Lee, 'The Challenge of a Collins Biography' 111 Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (eds. ), Michael 
Collins and the Making qf the Irish State (Cork and Dublin 199 8), p. 2 1. 
81 See J. 0. Baylen, 'The "NeA, Journalism" in Late Victorian Britain' in The Australian Journal ofPolitics and 
Historv, 1972. Vol. 18, pp. 367-85. 
81 Leg, Nciispapers and Nationalism, p. 172. 
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Ulster unionist Lame gun-running of April 1914 - it could be said to have focused only on 
local news, until it became clear the same edition that ignored Lame played up a fictitious, 
nationalist arms-landing in Donegal . 
83 Among the party's enemies, Jasper Tully maintained a 
black-list of people he would not cover. 84 As a result, Boyle's Gaelic League and, for several 
months in 1914, its Irish Volunteer company were simply not reported on. As for the 
Westmeath Independent, it could both suppress news (it did not once mention the dissident 
Laurence Ginnell in 1912), and make it up. In October 1913 it created wildly bogus accounts 
of thousands of 'Midland Volunteers' parading through Athlone. 85 No one paper, however 
voluminous its prose or dense its coverage, was a reliable mirror of what was actually 
happening or of the state of local opinion. It is not surprising that Marie Coleman, in her 
study of County Longford, could dismiss the Longford Leader, owned by J. P. Farrell MP and 
the leading newspaper in the town, as 'little more than a propaganda sheet for the Irish 
parliamentary party'. 86 
These are significant reservations, but they do not invalidate the use of the local press as a 
contemporary historical source of 'published opinion'. 87 Though local editors and owners 
may have seen themselves as men of great local influence, the economics of their trade were 
such that they could not stray too far out of line'with popular beliefs and orthodoxies. If they 
did, virtually every one of them faced the prospect of losing readers, advertisers and/or 
printing work to their competitors, in the same town, in the same county or across counties. 
The Victorian journalist W. T. Stead wrote of the mandate of the press being renewed every 
day, with the 'electorate' registering their votes by their daily purchases . 
88 The same applied, 
on a weekly basis, in provincial Ireland. Roscommon, Boyle, Mullingar, Longford and Sligo 
all witnessed direct competition between papers within the same town and Sligo saw an 
additional, parallel fight between two unionist papers. Newspapers in Strokestown, Carrick, 
Mohill and Longford had to face the ever-competitive Roscommon Herald (and in the two 
83 Strokestown Democrat, 2'8 May 1914. 
84 Hugh Oram, The Newspaper Book ( Dublin 1983), p. 164. 
8-5 J1 estmeath Independent, 25b October 1914. 
86 Coleman, Couno- Longford 1910-1923, pp. 28-29. 
87 The distinction between published opinion and public opm*ion was made by Tom Harrison, of the second 
world war's 'Mass Obsen, ation', quoted by D. George Boyce Mi 'Public Opinion and Historians' HistonY, June 
1978, Vol. 63. p. 215. 
88 W. T Stead ATiting on 'Government by Journalism'.. quoted in Baylen, 'The "New Journalism" in Late 
Victorian Britain', p. 384. 
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Leitrim towns the Sligo Champion); Athlone's Westmeath Independent competed with papers 
from Roscommon town and Mullingar. The cost of entry for new competitors was not high 
and local advertising and printing revenues could be both quickly established and just as 
quickly lost to rivals. The Ker7yman in 1902, for example, was set up with capital of f 500 
F900.89 and had a first-year turnover as high as - When Laurence Ginnell and Jasper Tully 
contemplated buying another local paper in Westmeath in 1909, sums modestly in excess of 
E500-600 were considered. 90 In Ireland as a whole, the number of newspapers had increased 
from 109 in 1853 to 230 by 1913,91 and in the five counties four of the papers studied - the 
Sligo Nationalist, Sligo Times, Strokestown Democrat and Western Nationalist - had all been 
established only since 1907. A fifth, the Leitrim Observer, was purchased in 1910. 
Though new titles were still being launched, some local weeklies were succumbing to 
competition. Several Protestant papers were in steep decline - those in Mullingar and 
Longford had become 'miserable sheets' and the newly-launched Sligo Times failed in 1914. 
Nationalist weeklies also faced increasing competition from the Dublin press, in particular 
from the rapidly growing and efficiently-distributed Irish Independent. The Independent did 
not yet arrive sufficiently early in the day to make the local weeklies' coverage of anything 
but local news unnecessary, but it was now regularly delivered on the day of printing. 
Moreover its own weekly edition competed directly with the provincial press. Local papers 
adopted different strategies to survive. Several acted as local correspondents for the Dublin 
paper. Others cut back on coverage of international and even national news, on the 
92 
assumption that their readers had already read about it in the dailies. However, the impact 
of the Dublin papers, while it would intensify, should not be overstated. For all local news, 
and much national news, the provincial weeklies remained the primary medium for informing 
local opinion and transmitting its views. Even on the outbreak of war, when the circulation of 
the I7-ish Independent shot up by 40% to over 100,000, the local papers were not threatened. 
Nearly all of them produced voluminous, and very un-local, war coverage. In Athlone and 
other midlands towns, the Dublin papers still arrived only at around 9.00am and the 
89 Oram, The Nevtspaper Book-, p. 78. 
90 Extracts fi7om the unpublished diaries of Laurence and Alice Ginnell, p. 72 (9h April 1909), p. 75 (15'h and 
16'h April 1909). 
91 Boyce. A ationalism in Ireland (London and New York, third edition 1995), p. 204. 
92 In covering the Dublin strikes of 19 1'), the Sligo Nationalist actually referred its readers to news reports in the 
Dublin dailies 'which reach most of our readers' (30'h August 1913). 
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Westmeath Independent proposed the production of a daily 'war telegarn' to fill the perceived 
void in its readers' service. On the same day the Western Nationalist noted that the Dublin 
dailies were still simply not read in country districts. 93 
On any assessment, the provincial press's coverage of both local and national stones was 
extensive throughout the pre-war years. Virtually every major national story was reported 
and commented on by several titles. Deficiencies in local coverage by any one paper were 
offset by the compensating coverage, and often the equal and opposite bias, of its rivals. Not 
only can the coverage of 'head to head' rivals in a particular town be aggregated and 
compared, but also that of whole groups - newspapers in one county against those in another, 
nationalists against unionists or Irish party supporters against their nationalist enemies. 
Moreover, though highly selective in their editorial bias, local journalists still followed the 
practice of taking verbatim notes of a wide range of local meetings, which were then 
reproduced in detail. Political rallies, council meetings and court proceedings were all 
voluminously written up, with long lists of attendees and of resolutions Passed, and with the 
speeches made clearly attributed to each speaker. Local societies, and particularly political 
societies, also submitted their own reports of meetings for inclusion - the volume of such 
reports provided another indicator of an organisation's health or decline. This plethora of 
verbatim reporting had the effect, in the opinion of the contemporary writer Padraic Colum, of 
making the Irish provincial press 'probably the worst-written in any European language. The 
sheets are filled with reports of meetings of Boards of Guardians and proceedings at petty 
sessions. ' 'Yet' he continued, 'a good deal of national expression gets into a local paper'. 94 
Writing in the 1920s, the unionist historian W. Alison Phillips believed that local papers were 
more valuable as a historical source than those in Dublin, because of 'the more intimate light 
they threw on the life of the people'. 95 This study attempts to show that contemporary 
newspapers were not just megaphones for the egomaniacal prejudices of their owners and 
editors, but did indeed provide an accurate, contemporary reflection of the beliefs of their 
91 ' Tfestmeath Independent; Western Nationalist, 8'h August 1914. 
94 Padraic Colum, Mv Irish Year (London 1912), p. 148. 
95 W. Alison Phillips. The Revolution in Ireland 1906-23 (London 1923). p. ix. 
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readers. By studying a broad range of local newspapers across five Irish counties it has been 
possible to : 
a) construct a reliable narrative of local events; 
b) assemble information on elites, organisations and political language; and 
c) assess the impact of national events on local opinion. 
In this way, perhaps, the local, political 'life of the people' can be recreated and a long- 
neglected primary source given proper recognition. 
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Chapter 2: The Waning of Popular Politics 
Apathv 
The discussion of 'apathy' was never far from political debate in pre-war nationalist Ireland. 
In 1908 it was given expression by the French political economist and observer of Irish affairs 
L. Paul-Dubois (translated into English by the Irish party MP Tom Kettle). In Contem orari. P 
Ireland, Paul-Dubois described: 
the fatalism, the lethargy, the moral inertia and intellectual passivity, the general absence 
of energy and character, of method and discipline, which we remark in the Ireland of 
today. 1 
Though he ascribed this, as did others, to English degradation of the Irish 'national mind', 
there was also a widespread contemporary belief that all was not well, in particular, with Irish 
politics. The alleged inactivity, ossification, decline and even corruption of the national 
movement provided recurring themes both for contemporaries and for later historians. 
According to the historian Philip Bull, the 1903 Land Act was a watershed in this process of 
nationalist political decay. The old impetus given to nationalism by tenant farmers was dying 
and the fanning class now had new problems and aspirations. Mass land agitation gave way 
to local machine politics. Efforts to ginger up the Irish party and its ideas were met with 
distrust. The Irish party was ensnared within the legacy of an increasingly irrelevant and 
outdated agrarian policy and its only remaining vital element was sectarianism. 2 As Paul Bew 
has described, the one later, serious land campaign to occur, the Ranch War of 1907-09, far 
from reinvigorating nationalists exacerbated structural weaknesses and class divisions among 
them. 3 Bew has written of the loss of momentum experienced after the divisive Ranch War: 
'In effect, in the 1912-14 epoch we are dealing with the confused side effects of the 
stabilisation of revolutionary fervour. 4 
A lack of enthusiasm, of any compelling cause to mobilise popular opinion, was regularly 
commented on by contemporary writers in the five counties studied. At the beginning of the 
L. Paul-Dubois (translated by T. M. Kettle MP), Contemporai)7 Ireland (Dublin 1908), p. 368. 
2 
3 
Bull. 'Land and Politics. 1879-1903', in Boyce (ed. ), The Revolution in Ireland,, pp. 42-46. 
See Bew, Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland. 
4 Bew, Ideologgi- and the Ir1*Sh Question, p. 80. 
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period, ahead of the first 1910 general election, the Westem Nationalist asked of the Liberal 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George: 
could even he, with all his great powers, waken up the people of Ireland from the 
lethargy into which they seem to have fallen? ... Criticism and complaint, grudging 
acknowledgement of good services, and more or less quiet grumbling if another victory 
is delayed is the contribution of the Irish farmer of the present day to the cause of his 
own emancipation. 5 
On the same day, the Westmeath Independent could only exhort in hope rather than 
expectation that 'the people should be up and doing. Apathy should disappear and 
enthusiasm should be aroused. 16 Attacks on apathy, and refutations of the unionist claim that 
it demonstrated a lack of nationalist enthusiasm for Home Rule, were to form the staple 
content of nationalist comment throughout the years 1910-13. 
Equally recurrent were the succession of monthly police reports describing the inactive state 
of local politics. Reports from all five counties in these years observed that things were quiet, 
that there was no stir in local politics, that political societies were inactive, that there was no 
interest in elections, or no recent political activity. 7 There were, of course, exceptions. The 
March 1912 report on Roscommon stated that 'political and other societies are in a fairly 
flourishing condition', 8 but far more typical was the report from Westmeath for August 1913, 
that 'political societies have only a nominal existence'. 9 The symptoms of this inactivity, 
manifesting themselves as a lack of both people and funds, recurred in the local press. 
Writing of the forthcoming 1912 municipal elections, the Longford Leader noted that there 
had for some time been a difficulty in getting men to accept public office, ' 0 while two months 
later the Sligo Champion wrote : 'However worthy of support the cause may be, it is 
5 Western Nationalist, 16'b October 1909. 
6 Westmeath Independent, 16fl' October 1909. 
7 See monthly reports of the county inspectors for: 
Leitrim : November 1910 (PRO CO 904/82) 
Longford: October 1911 (PRO CO 904/85) 
Roscommon: December 1910 (PRO CO 904/82), August 1911 (PRO CO 904/84), September 1911 (PRO CO 
904/85) 
Sligo: February 19 10 (PRO CO 904/80), July 1910 (PRO CO 904/8 1), December 19 10 (PRO CO 904/82) 
'Kestmeath: December 1910 (PRO CO 904/82), September 1911 (PRO CO 904/85), December 1911 (PRO CO 
904/85). 
Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, March 1912 (PRO CO 904/86). 
Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, August 1913 (PRO CO 904/90). 
10 Longford Leader, 30t" November 1911. 
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notorious that people do not rush to the collectors with their contributions, and circulars 
appealing for funds are liable to be mislaid and neglected. "] Even if elected, district 
councillors and poor law guardians commonly did not bother to attend meetings, which not 
infrequently failed to make a quorum. Thus in 1913 just one guardian attended 45 meetings 
of the Roscommon board of guardians, another attended 27 and one 24. Five others managed 
10 or more, but the other thirty made it to less than 10 meetings. ' 2 
The RIC Inspector General remarked regularly on the quiet of nationalist Ireland, and at the 
end of 1912 summed up his perception of reduced political fervour: 
In rural Ireland generally political enthusiasm is not very marked. Purchased tenants are 
constantly improving their farms, while those who have not yet bought their holdings 
appear to devote all their energies to expediting land purchase. 13 
Only in districts where there was agitation about the use or ownership of land was there any 
measurable nationalist political activity. ' 4 The recurring refrain, whether from the Inspector 
General, the Western Nationalist or Philip Bull, is thus that the role of farmers in provincial 
Irish politics did change fundamentally during the 1900s. The great tide of agitation was 
ebbing, leaving the Irish party stranded and producing a withdrawal from politics, and a 
shrinkage of the active political class, that explained the incessant cries of 'apathy'. Central 
to such analysis in the five counties studied would be the question of whether land tensions, 
which had appeared to burgeon again during the Ranch War years, had really dissipated. 
Land - The End of the Wars? 
Contemporary police statistics did not show a total cessation of agrarian hostilities in the five 
counties in the years 1909-14. However, with significant county variations, they did provide 
convincing evidence of a marked decline. Thus the 'Intelligence Notes' compiled in Dublin 
Castle showed the following annual data for cattle drives (the main manifestation of serious 
disputes since 1907), for unlet and unstocked farms, and for boycotts: 
11 Sligo Champion, 2 nd March 1911 
12 Roscommon Jow-nal, 31' January 1914. 
13 Monthly report of the Inspector General, November 1912 (PRO CO 904/88). 
14 See rnonth]y reports of the Inspector General, January 1913 (PRO CO 904/89). February 1913 (PRO CO 
904 /89) and May 19 1 -') 
(PRO CO 904/90). 
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Table 1: Cattle Drives in the Five Counties 1907-14 15 
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 
Leitrim I 1 0 2 5 0 0 1 
Longford 9 16 5 6 3 0 0 0 
Roscommon 55 37 4 3 2 0 1 2 
Sligo 5 84 7 15 2 7 8 22 
Westmeath 23 71 32 30 30 6 7 6 
Table 2: Unlet and Unstocked Farms mid-1908 to mid-1914 (grazing farms unlet, 
unstocked or partly-stocked as a result of UIL activity) 16 
1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 
Leitrim 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 
Longford 11 3 3 4 2 2 2 
Roscommon 27 11 3 10 9 10 3 
Stigo 16 7 3 6 8 2 3 
Westmeath 4 2 1 1 1 6 2 
Table 3: Boycotts end-Jan 1909 to end-Jan 1915 (all boycotts-'total', 'partial' and 
6minor') 17 
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 
Leitrim 13 16 1 1 1 0 0 
Longford 39 39 38 9 6 5 0 
Roscommon 8 5 7 5 4 0 0 
Sligo 16 9 3 2 0 2 1 
[-Westmeath 13 12 14 0 0 0 2- 
15 Compiled fi7om the annual 'Intelligence Notes' for 1907/08 (PRO CO 903/14, pp. 32 and 140); 1909 (PRO 
CO 903/15. p. 116); 1910-11 (PRO CO 903/16, pp. 153 and 157); 1912 (PRO CO 903/17. p. 45) and 1913-14 
(Brendan Mac Giolla Choille (ed. ). Intelligence Notes 1913-16 (Dublin 1966), pp. 62 and 124). 
16 Ibid, 1908 (PRO CO 903/14 p. 64) : 1909 (PRO CO 903515 p. 107); 19 10 (PRO CO 903/16 p. 1 -3 ) 5); 1911 and 
1912 (PRO CO 903/17, p. 45)-, 1913 and 1914 (Intelligence Notes 1913-16, pp. 68 and 130). 
17 Ibid, 1909 (PRO CO 90-3314 p. 176); 19 10 (PRO CO 904/15 p. 116); 1911-12 (PRO CO 903/16 p. 162). For 
1913-15 data were collated from the January monthly reports of the relevant county Inspectors (PRO CO 
904/89/92 /96). 
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The tables indicate that in Leitrim the Ranch War was largely a non-event. Moreover, there 
was little agrarian tension thereafter. As will be seen, the boycotts of 1909-10 related almost 
entirely to only one dispute. The agitation in Longford was also a relatively small affair; after 
limited driving in 1907-08, boycotting was the main local tactic and this was not sustained 
beyond 1911. Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath, which had witnessed major cattle driving 
activity in the years 1907-08, all saw their agitations slump in later years. In Roscommon, 
cattle driving fell away drastically after 1908, though some tensions - expressed in unlet farms 
and low-level boycotts - appeared to persist. Boycotting of individuals and farms fell to an 
even greater extent in Sligo, but in terms of drives Sligo seems to have been more persistently 
disturbed; they partially revived here in 1910 and again in 1914, in which year they were 
largely absent elsewhere. Westmeath saw the most sustained cattle-driving activity in the 
years 1910-11, but thereafter it fell off rapidly. 
Attempts to portray increasingly sporadic agrarian incidents as a continuation of the Ranch 
War 18 appear unconvincing in the light of such statistics, at least in the five counties studied. 
Throughout the period, though incidents were reported in detail as they flared up, there was 
no sense of 'land campaigning' in the local nationalist press, and only minimal reporting of 
land issues in unionist papers which had never hesitated to report nationalist lawlessness in 
the past. The plethora of white gloves awarded to circuit judges as a token for presiding over 
(crimeless' quarter sessions and assizes also bore witness to the ebbing of agrarian tensions. 
At the end of the period, during 1914, white gloves were awarded to judges sitting in Carrick- 
on-Shannon, Longford, Manorhamilton, Mullingar, Roscommon and, despite the revival of 
driving, even Sligo -a 'full set' of the counties researched. 
The successful purchase of their land-holdings by former tenant farmers was held to be 
central to the 'pacification' of the countryside. In 1913, the handbook The Ireland of Today 
published a county-by-county table showing the total acreage purchased up to the end of 
March 1912 under all Land Acts from 1870 onwards, plus the total of land in each area 
(excluding land under water, buildings etc but including mountain land, woods, bogs and 
marsh). For the five counties the purchased percentages derived from these figures were 
18 For example, though primarily focused on Mayo rather than Longford and Roscommon. see Clare C. Murphy 
'Conflict in the West : The Ranch War Continues 1911-12, Part II Cathair na Mart, Journal of the Westport 
Historical Societv, No. 15,1995, pp. 85- 100. 
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Table 4: Land Purchase to end-March 191219 
Leitrim 
Longford 
Roscommon 
Sligo 
Westmeath 
Leinster 
Connaught 
AR-Ireland 
45.4% (160,059 out of 352,336 acres) 
55.3% (132,502 out of 239,255) 
54.9% (313,004 out of 569,457) 
32.2% (132,251 out of 419,597) 
39.8% (163,326 out of 410,243) 
38.5% (1.772m out of 4.602m) 
37.8% (1.509m out of 3.990m) 
38.2%. (7.368m out of 19.290m acres). 
The figures were of acreage rather than holdings and did not include uncompleted but agreed 
sales. Furthermore, the percentages understated the rate of purchase because the total of 
'land' in each county included non-fanning land. To illustrate the degree of contemporary 
confusion over the rate of purchase, the Leitrim county inspector - in easily the least agitated 
of the five counties - reported at the end of 1909 that over 80% of tenants had purchased and 
were now 'thrifty and contented'. 20 In three of the counties, Leitrim, Longford and 
Roscommon, The Ireland of Today figures did, however, show clearly that the rate of 
purchase was well above both provincial and national averages. Slower progress in Sligo and 
Westmeath appeared to correlate to the greater persistence of tensions there after the Ranch 
War. 
In other counties, however, land purchase failed to remove all discontents and could instead 
foment new tensions. In his work on Galway and Mayo up to 1909, Fergus Campbell has 
emphasised that the 'western problem' - the juxtaposition of overpopulated, impoverished 
settlements next to vast tracts of underpopulated, 'untenanted' grass lands - was still anything 
but an abstraction. 21 Here land purchase appeared to widen the gap between large farmers, 
normally the first to purchase, and landless men and smallholders. The unsatisfied demands 
of smallholders, 'congests' and landless men for enlarged holdings had provided a 
fundamental, redistributive impetus from below to the outbreak of the Ranch War. 22 Basic 
conflicts of interest between large 'shopkeeper/graziers' and 'small' men further split the UIL 
19 The Times, The Ireland of Today, p. 273. 
20 Monthly report of the Leitrim county inspector. December 1909 (PRO CO 904/79). 
" Campbell, Land and Politics in Connaught, pp. 9- 10. 
12 - Ibid. -195,247 and 256. , pp. 
186 
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during the Ranch War and generated open conflict locally in Galway in the years 1910-14.23 
In police reports Galway, with a higher rate of land purchase than Sligo (35.0% in The Irelmid 
of Today), remained materially more disturbed and one of the most troubled areas of Ireland. 
In Eastern Connaught only muted echoes of Galway's tensions were heard in the years 1910- 
14. Unsurprisingly William Micks, the long-standing secretary/member of the Congested 
Districts Board, wrote that there was a hunger and 'jealousy' for land, but, as noted above 
(page 22), he stated that the countryside in Roscommon, Leitrim and Sligo south of Donegal 
Bay was much less poor than the congested districts further west, with numerous small 
livestock farmers keen to acquire their tenancies and much good land. 24 In Roscommon, the 
worry of many 'small' men related to the 1909 Land Act's definition of a 'congest', entitled 
to additional land - i. e. as a holder of land with a rateable value of 0 p. a. or less. This low 
threshold had the effect of excluding most Roscommon smallholders from being 'congests' 
and generated a fear that when the CDB restructured estates, land that 'should' go to 
Roscommon men would instead go to 'migrants' from outside the county. From the end of 
1909 a rash of UIL resolutions denounced the possibility of migrants - primarily Mayo 
25 families - coming into the county, with the lead coming from the Tulsk UIL branch . The 
thrust of this agitation was critical of John Fitzgibbon, the most powerful UIL man in the 
county and from the beginning of 19 10 a CDB board member. However, complaint did not 
turn into outright opposition. There were no reported instances of any actions against 'small' 
migrant congests, though Fitzgibbon had to appeal to Roscommon smallholders; not to be 
26 
selfish. The issue did not die, however, and even in April 1914 required the intervention of 
the South Roscommon MP, John Hayden, to quash a proposal to bring Mayo migrants into 
the south of the county. 27 
When a 'migrant' dispute did arise, at Ballybeg farm in South Roscommon from October 
1910 into 1911, the intruder, Mr. Payne, was in fact a Protestant large farmer fTom Galway, in 
possession of Estates Commission land against the wishes of the locals, who happened to be 
23 Ibid, pp. 233-248. 
24 Micks. An Account qf the Constitution, Administration and Dissolution of the Congested Districts Board, p. 8. 
25 Report of the Roscommon county mspector, December 1909 (PRO CO 904'79); February 1910 (PRO CO 
904/80), Roscommon Messenger, 4hDecember 1909,5hFebruary 19 10; Roscommon Journal, 21 st May 1910. 
26 Roscommon Messenger, Roscommon Herald, 7'ý May 1910. 
27 jf, estmeath Independent, "I' March 1914. 
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the Tulsk UIL. The arrival of Payne, who had previously been a target of Roscommon's 
ranch warriors in 1907-08, provided the ideal opportunity for Fitzgibbon and Hayden to take 
over the agitation and reaffirm their radical credentials with the Tulsk UIL 
28 
. Payne's arrival 
was a clear breach of the 'unwritten law' against which all could unite. Fitzgibbon addressed 
29 
a Tulsk rally in October, with no irony, as 'fighting John Fitzgibbon of former times'. 
Hayden, taking particular care not to fall foul of incitement provisions of the Crimes Act, told 
the rally that he could not advise publicly how to act under circumstances which had not yet 
arisen. However, he said, it was pointless to tell parliament there was turmoil unless 'that 
discontent finds expression in words and acts'. 30 The first major cattle drive, complete with a 
police baton charge of the crowd, duly took place in November 1910. As the county inspector 
reported in early 1911 on continuing agrarian disturbances : 'They have possibly got a hint to 
take up this attitude'. 31 Though the Ballybeg agitation persisted, with drumming parties, 
'groaning' at Payne and resolutions to prevent him from hunting, it fizzled out in 1911 with 
Payne still in possession. Locally, resentment was caused by the political leadership's 
perceived abandonment of Tulsk. Nearly three years later, a poem sent to the Roscommon 
Journal on 'The Battle of Ballybeg' accused the 'great Mr Fitz' of coming in, raising hopes 
and then leaving 'the congests' alone. 32 
Ballybeg was Roscommon's only major top-down agitation in the years 1910-14, but 
underlying tensions remained. The police wrote periodically of the prevalence of the UIL's 
6unwritten law' 33 on land matters, and its very effectiveness seems to have reduced the need 
for, and thus the incidence of, actual intimidation. They also wrote throughout the period of 
continuing land hunger in the county - thus in June 1910 
The proceedings with reference to the numerous farms in this county ... are still, so to 
speak, under the microscope. Every move by the occupier who wants to retain the land is 
34 
closely scanned by the small farmers who desire to occupy the land . 
Again the subject came up in May 1912 : 
28 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, November 1910 (PRO CO 904/82). The inspector also 
believed that the UIL leadership wished to choke off an incipient O'Brienite revival in the county. 
29 Roscommon Messenger, 2 9h October 19 10. 
30 Ibid: Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, October 1910 (PRO CO 904/82). 
31 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, January 1911 (PRO CO 904/83). 
32 Roscommon Journal, 31' January 1914. 
33 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, April 1910 (PRO CO 904/80). 
34 Ibid, June 1910 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
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Land is the great question in this county and people seem to think that if they had a little 
35 bit of land their ideal of happiness would be reached . 
Disputes persisted, taking the form of: 
" withholding rents, to force landlords to sell, 
" stopping auctions, when the wrong people looked like outbidding the CDB, or 
" intimidation, when 'I I month' graziers, 36 on estates that had been sold to the CDB 
pending redistribution, refused to budge. 
However, they had the characteristics of local, mopping-up operations after the major change. 
a fundamental shift to land purchase, had already taken place. The frequency of disputes 
declined gradually and in January 1914 the county inspector made his first nil monthly return, 
with no land agitation, no 'drumming' (outside the premises of those intimidated) and no 
boycotting. 37 
In Leitrim, there was only one significant dispute over the whole five-year period, with a 
cattle drive and police charge right at the beginning, on January 1" 1910. Two Protestant 
brothers named MacNeill occupied the farm, at Aughavas on the Leitrim/Cavan border, of a 
local 'evicted' man. The dispute had rumbled on for two years, but a heavy boycott was 
effective from late 1909, covered fiiends and suppliers of the MacNeills and spilled over into 
County Cavan, where they had to go for supplies. It persisted through to April 1911, when 
the MacNeills left for Ulster. 38 Thereafter, Leitrim was much the quietest of the five counties. 
This could be ascribed to the extent of land purchase, to universal acceptance of the 
4unwritten law', or both. From late 1910 onwards police reports tended to be that the county 
was peaceable and fTee of crime. 39 
In Sligo, land agitations came to be directed as much against the CDB itself as against 
landlords and graziers. From 1910 onwards, complaints recurred about the snail's pace of the 
35 Ibid, May 1912 (PRO CO 904/87). 
30 Since the 1881 Land Act, tenancies of less than 12 months had not been subject to rent controls. 
37 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, January 1914 (PRO CO 904/92). 
"ý The dispute was also noteworthy for triggering the 'coercion' trial against Jasper Tully, whose Rosconimon 
Herald had published local UIL resolutions against the MacNeills by name. Tully did his best to publicise the 
trial and to tie the prosecution up in procedural knots. The case was eventually dropped in November 19 10. 
39 See monthly report of the Leitrim county inspector, November 19 10 (PRO CO 904/82). 
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CDB's work. 
40 In November 1911 , the 
South Sligo MP John O'Dowd talked of a 'grave 
41 
agrarian crisis' caused by the slow work of the CDB . In 
September 1912, the police 
reported 'the people have lost patience' with the CDB and the Estates Commission. 42 The 
grievance was real. The 1909 Land Act had given the CDB a greatly enhanced role in buying, 
restructuring and reselling estates over most of Connaught but it also discouraged direct sales 
from landlords to tenants. 43 However, the Board operated with far greater alacrity in 
Roscommon than in Sligo and the contrast between the CDB's treatment of Roscommon and 
its East Connaught neighbours was startling. In August 1913, the Roscommon Herald 
reported a reply to a parliamentary question concerning CDB purchases since the passing of 
the 1909 Act. The Herald noted that 772 holdings in Roscommon ('where Mr. John 
Fitzgibbon MP is on the Board') had been vested in the CDB and 24,629 Roscommon acres 
sold to it. Comparable figures for Sligo were only 7 holdings and 2,903 acres (and for the 
admittedly much less troubled Leitrim, no holdings and 1,091 acres). 44 In May 1914, a 
Roscommon Journal piece on discontent in the west emphasised that there was still jealousy 
of Roscommon, where large sums of money were said to have been spent and where there 
was 4relatively little congestion'. 45 Sporadic disputes in County Sligo continued to erupt 
through to 1914, particularly in the west around Easkey, and although the police estimated 
that two-thirds of the 'county' had been purchased by March 1914, a new Easkey agitation to 
46 force the sale of non-residential farms and II -month tenancies to the CDB had resumed . 
Outside Connaught, the most active ranch warrior had been Laurence Ginnell, MP for North 
Westmeath and 'father of the hazel' - the first public advocate of cattle driving. After the 
January 1910 general election Ginnell, now severed from the Irish parliamentary party, 
attempted to sustain the Ranch War in his constituency. During 1910 his visits were 
characterised by calls for action across the county to end ranching in a single parliamentary 
40 For example, see monthly reports of the Sligo county inspector, December 1910 (PRO CO 904/82). January 
1911 (PRO CO 904/83), April 1911 (PRO CO 904/83), or the Roscommon Herald, reporting on North Sligo 
UIL executive (10 January 1911) and on disorder at the South Sligo UIL executive (3rd September 1911). 
41 O'Dowd was speaking to the South Sligo UIL executive, Sligo Champion, 2 nd December 1911. 
42 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, September 1912 (PRO CO 904/88). 
43 Western Nationalist, 31' August 1912. Fitzgibbon told a Mayo audience that the CDB would not normally 
give permission for direct sales fi7om landlord to tenant - otherwise graziers would just buy their own farms and 
block redistribution. 
44 Roscommon Herald, 9th August 19 133 
45 Roscommon Journal, 2 nd May 1914. 
46 Monthly reports of the Sligo county inspector. January and March 1914 (PRO CO 904/92). 
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session, 47 and by attempts to provoke arrest by teasIngly naming malfeasants publicly (such as 
when he called on his audience, against a Mr Knott, to 'cut the knot with the hazel ). 
48 
Though in 1910 he called for. a 'hurricane' of driving 49 , Ginnell 
dropped his local agitation in 
1911. Already by August 19 10 the county inspector noted : 'I am informed that people 
generally are tired of this form of lawlessness' 50 and by October he wrote that no attempt had 
been made to revive the anti-grazing agitation. 51 By contrast, driving was more sustained in 
the south of the county around Moate, the base of the Irish party boss Eugene Robins. 
Around Moate the agitation focused on clearing up unresolved Ranch War disputes and had 
the benefit of reaffirming the party's agrarian radicalism and seeing off Ginnellite incursions, 
but even here activity tailed off sharply by late 1911. In January 1912, the bishop of Meath, 
Dr. Gaughran, based in Mullingar, noted that he had heard nothing of driving of late and 
hoped he would hear nothing in the future. 52 
The Ranch War agitation in Longford had also had a strong degree of political leadership 
from above, from the MP for North Longford, president of the South Longford UIL and 
owner of the Longford Leader, J. P. Farrell. Farrell chose his targets carefully and his 
enthusiastic espousal of land radicalism in 1908 had coincided with a by-election in South 
Longford and a Sinn Fein challenge in North Longford. As noted above, boycotting rather 
than driving was the staple of campaigning here and the bulk of boycotts in 1909-11 were 
continuations of assaults on 'land-grabbers' dating from 1908. Farrell's newspaper took the 
lead in promoting boycotts and as a result Farrell and others underwent a prolonged 
'coercion' prosecution during 1910 (a Dublinjury was finally'hung' in January 1911). In 
February 1911 a new agitation began, for a cut in the Longford town rents of the tenants of 
Lord Longford. Again, this agitation had a strongly political element - Lord Longford was an 
active unionist. However, falling enthusiasm for Farrell's campaigns can be seen ftom the 
failure of the 'County Longford National Defence Fund', set up to pay court-imposed 
damages arising from the earlier 1908 agitation. Launched in March 1911 to raise El 65, it 
47 Westmeath Guardian, 27hMay 1910. 
48 Midland Reporter, 20th August 19 10. 
49 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, May 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
50 Ibid. August 19 10 (PRO CO 904 /8 1). 
51 Ibid, October 1910 (PRO CO 904/82). 
52 Leiti-im Adveniser, 4hJanuary 1912. 
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closed in August having raised less than E44.53 Both the imposition of these damages and the 
campaign against Lord Longford led to some of Farrell's goods being seized by the sheriff 
and repurchased by Farrell's supporters, but activity was clearly waning in 1911. By January 
1912 the county inspector commented that the Longford Leader was 'milder than of old' and 
he reduced recorded boycotts from over 30 to 9. By May he reported that the agitation had 
6 54 practically disappeared' . 
In both Westmeath and Longford further disputes did re-erupt and Dr. Gaughran's hopes of 
not hearing of drives again were not fulfilled. Nevertheless, protracted disputes, though 
triggering boycotts, drumming and even drives, were now rare and, as in Roscommon, related 
more to mopping up operations than to any deep-seated anger. A dispute in 1912-13 over the 
Donore farm near Moate resulted from the owners refusing to sell to locals at a 'fair' price. 
From November 1914, at the Pilkington estate near Tyrrellspass, Westmeath, two graziers 
refused to budge from an estate sold to the Estates Commission. The Ballyinulvey ranch near 
Ballymahon, Longford became a source of contention in the spring of 1913 when three 
Ballymahon town traders pre-empted their neighbours in buying the farm. Ginnell's 
'hurricane' was rather a series of squalls. 
The net result of all this was that for many local commentators the issue was plain - the land 
war was over and fan-ners were leaving politics, becoming 'selfish' and mean-spirited, paying 
no regard to wider issues. In late 1909, a correspondent of the Roscommon Messenger 
lamented : 'It seems that when the people have got the grass of a few sheep and cattle they 
imagine all is won. Are there no other grievances to be addressed? 955 In February 1912 the 
Westmeath Independent bewailed the new political outlook of local farmers : 
For very shame sake there is just the possibility that some patriotic feeling may be 
touched in the emergency of the present great national crisis. It is pitiable to see our 
farmers so mean-spirited and so poor-hearted. 56 
53 See monthly report of the Longford county inspector June 1911 (PRO CO 904/84) and Longford Leader, 2 nd 
September 1911. 
Monthly reports of the Longford county Inspector. January 1912 (PRO CO 904/86), May 1912 (PRO CO 
904/86) and March 1913 (PRO CO 904'89). 
55 Roscoinmon Messenger, )nd October 1909. 
So Wesoneath Independent, 240'February 1912. 
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From a quite different perspective, police reports from Longford and Leitrim from the end of 
1909 onwards would repeat, month after month, comments on the 'beneficial' impact of land 
purchase on local behaviour, while the Westmeath inspector later made it clear that purchased 
farmers would now 'hold aloof from political activity. 57 Even the prospect of new land 
legislation aroused little interest. When a new Land bill was stalled in 1913 and failed in 
1914 - it had been supported by the parliamentary party to improve purchase terms and extend 
compulsory purchase outside Connaught - its demise triggered not a flicker of popular 
protest. 
58 
In March 1910 John Dillon confided to his ffiend Wilffid Scawen Blunt that the Irish 
'peasantry' had changed, becoming much more like the French, 'industrious and economical, 
59 
even penurious'. More scathingly, the O'Brienite clerical novelist Canon Sheehan also 
wrote of the French nature of Irish farmers : 
So long as there was a Cromwellian landlord to be fought and conquered, there remained 
before the eyes of the people some image of the country. Now the fight is over, and they 
are sinking down into the abject and awful condition of the French peasant who doesn't 
care for king or country and only asks "who is going to reduce the rates". 60 
The UIL organiser Seamus O'Mulloy used a more agrarian turn of phrase to describe the 
phenomenon in Roscommon in 1913: 
Wherever I go I am told that since the tenants got their holdings and since they got a 
reduction in their rents and other things like that, you might as well be trying to knock 
blood out of a turnip as to get them to contribute to the cause (hear hear). 61 
Local Political Elites 
The withdrawal of many farmers from active politics meant that what remained of political 
life shifted further from the parishes to the towns, from farmers to urban traders and 
57 For example see monthly reports of the county inspectors for: 
Leitrim: December 1909 (PRO CO 904/79) 
Longford: January 1910 (PRO CO 904/80), March 1910 (PRO CO 904/80) 
Westmeath: December 1911 (PRO CO 904/85). 
58 See Midland Reporter, I Oth and 24th July 1913, Roscommon Messenger, 17'h January 1914, Westmeath 
Independent, 21" February 1914. 
59 NA, 'ilfrid Scawen Blunt, Ati, Diaries, Being a Personal Narrative qfEvents, 1888-1914, Part Two 1900-1914 
(New York 1980), p. 286. 
60 From Canon Patrick Sheehan, The Blindness ofDr Gray p. 235, quoted in Catherine Candy. Priestli, Fictions, 
Popular Irish Yovclists qf the Earli- 20th Centui? - (Dublin 1995). p. 88. 
61 Roscommon Messenger, 22 nd February 1913. 
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professionals. When, in February 1912, the Westmeath Independent lamented the behaviour 
of Irish farmers as 'so mean-spirited and so poor-hearted', it added the significant rider : 'The 
towns may be relied upon as ever to stand by the Irish Party'. 62 
The political power of the 'trader' in provincial political life had already long been a staple of 
contemporary comment and was taken as axiomatic by writers such as Padraic Colum, Canon 
Hannay and, most vividly in his contempt for the 'groggy-patri ot-publi can general-shop man', 
by J. M. Synge. 63 The English commentator Sydney Brooks wrote in 1912 : 
Uniting in himself the functions of shopkeeper, moneylender, publican and political boss, 
it is the country trader who, as a rule, has the final word in the local government and 
64 
economic destinies of Nationalist Ireland . 
The phenomenon has been analysed best by Liam Kennedy - traders were consistently over- 
represented in political life while large farmers failed to achieve dominance in the rural 
electorate. Traders were at the centre of networks of kinship, credit, information and 
employment. They had geographic proximity to local government, the time to participate in 
politics and the strong economic self-interest to promote their trade, status and the nationalism 
th 65 that had so pervaded their rural hinterland from the last quarter of the 19 century. Their 
prominence was generally uncontested : 'In the eyes of most country people there was 
nothing unnatural in the involvement of traders in agrarian agitation or in their prominence as 
political representatives. ' 66 
The stereotyped image of contemporaries, however, was not just that of the politically- 
influential trader but of the 'boss'. Economic influence, local power, 'Tammany Hall' 
politics and the control of patronage were seen as inseparable. The departing tide of mass 
enthusiasm in the countryside left exposed the grubbier mechanics of local patronage, 
manipulation and factions. In Carrick-on- Shannon, a town of just over 1,000 people, the 
monopolisation of power by a 'boss' was typified by Patrick Flynn, the leading wholesale and 
62 TVestmeath Independent, 24b February 1912. 
63 See Patrick Colum. in My Irish Year, p. 127, or Canon Hannay in a letter to the Spectator, 4h January 1908, 
quoted in Campbell, Land and Politics in Connacht, pp. 31-32; or J. M. Synge, letter to Stephen McKenna, 13, j' 
July 1905, quoted in Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London 1988), p. 455. 
64 Sydney Brooks, Aspects of the Irish Situation (Dublin and London 1912), p. 120. 
65 Liam Kennedy, 'Farmers. Traders and Agricultural Politics in Pre-Independence Ireland', M Samuel Clark and 
James S. Donnelly Jnr. (eds. ), Irish Peasants .- 
I'lolencc and Political Unrest 1780-1914 (Manchester 1983), pp. 
339-373. 
66 Ibid, p. 368. 
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retail merchant. His trades included grocery, tea, wine, timber, coal, firearms, agricultural 
machinery and undertaking. He was also a large farmer, town landlord, JP, member of the 
county grand jury, Hibernian, president of the town UIL, treasurer of the local parliamentary 
fund, chair of both the district council and the guardians, member of the old age pensions 
committee, chair of the county infirmary committee, chair of the county agricultural 
committee, vice-chair of the county council, and member of the General Council of County 
Councils. 67 
Other prominent nationalists seen as such 'bosses' across the five counties were 
Leitrim : Francis Meehan (MP, grocer and publican), in Manorhamilton; 
Longford :JP Farrell (MP and newspaper proprietor) in Longford town, dominant in both 
North and South Longford; 
Roscommon : John Fitzgibbon (draper) in Castlerea, T. J. Devine (grocer and general store 
owner, auctioneer) in Boyle, George O'Reilly (auctioneer) in Strokestown; 
Sligo : P. A. McHugh (MP and newspaper proprietor until his death in 1909), Daniel 
O'Donnell (hotelier), John Jinks (auctioneer, undertaker, carter, publican and grocer) - all 
three in Sligo town - and John O'Dowd (MP, chair of the county council, publican and 
farmer) in Bunninaden, Tobercurry and across South Sligo; 
Westmeath : John Hayden (newspaper owner, also in Roscommon town) in Mullingar, 
Eugene Robins (auctioneer) in Moate. 
The significant towns in which there was not an obvious, leading, local party figure were 
Athlone in Westmeath and Granard in County Longford. 
If small Irish towns were the stagnating hamlets so frequently depicted by their rivals, the 
hypothesis of each being easily dominated by a single, individual boss would be quite 
credible. However, as already seen above (pages 24-25), the reality of small-town life was 
often different. The gulf between the depiction of Roscommon town by Athlone's Westmeath 
Independent as 'the most woebegone, out-at-elbow and tattered patch of cabins to be 
recognised on the map of Ireland )68 and the busyness of life there could hardly be wider. As 
already seen, the town boasted an array of commercial activities -a population of under 1,900 
67 Lein-im Obsemer, 2'6 October 1909,13'b November 1909,5h March 1910,14'h December 1912.17"' October 
1914: TI'estei-n Nationalist, 19'h December 1914. 
68 JVestmeath Independent, 22 
d April 1911. 
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generated, in the MacDonald's Irish Directory for 1912,108 commercial entries 69 (although 
the caveat must be added that many merchants made multiple entries). Moreover, the town's 
societies, whether cultural, sporting, religious, social or political, were many and various. 
Such activity and diversity was common to all the towns in the five counties - certainly to all 
the towns of over 1,, 000 inhabitants - and each society, club or branch had its officers and 
committees. As Sydney Brooks wrote: 
More than any country I am acquainted with, more even than Poland itself, Ireland is a 
network of "organisations", leagues, societies, factions and cliques. Almost every 
department of life seems to be on a committee basis ... A genius for combination 
penetrates to the lowest strata. 70 
A town's leadership, operating through multiple, interlocking societies and committees, was 
commonly a collective. 
It was, of course, still possible for individuals to aggregate considerable local power by 
participating in an enormous range of activities and devoting (damning? ) themselves to an 
almost permanent committee life. Many did so, but even to contemporaries the multiplicity of 
roles of a Patrick Flynn in Carri ck-on- Shannon seemed extreme - in a 1914 libel case he was 
mocked when the long list of his positions was recited to the amusement of the court, 
followed by his being depicted by Sergeant Sullivan as 'a superman and supernatural being 9.71 
Power was more typically shared by a range of traders, grocers, drapers, publicans, hoteliers, 
72 lawyers, newspaper proprietors and, very frequently, auctioneers. In the language of the 
time, there were still 'bosses'. but they surrounded themselves with 'rings', 'cliques' and 
6cronies" - or as Ginnell bizarrely called Hayden's closest lieutenants in Mullingar, 'the 
Rabbis'. 73 
69 MacDonald's Irish Director, y and Gazetteer, 1912 edition. Such commercial activity was matched by other 
towns in the county. Boyle (pop. 2,691 in 1911) had 95 entries, Castlerea (1,224) 101 and Strokestown (801) 70. 
70 Brooks, Aspects of the Irish Situation, pp. 43-44. 
71 Western Nationalist, 19th December 1914. 
ý2 ' The prevalence of local auctioneers in politics is remarkable. The following auctioneers were senior UIL 
and/or AOH figures in the five counties : Eugene Robins in Moate, O. J. Dolan in Athlone, John Jinks in Sligo, 
T. J. Devine and John Keaveny in Boyle, George O'Reilly in Strokestown, Thomas McGovern in 
Manorhamilton, T. F. Smyth in Mohill, Michael Carter in South Leitrim, Michael McGrath in Carrick, P. J. 
Weyme-s in Mullingar. In many cases, holding an auctioneer's licence was one of several busm*ess activities, but 
for Robins. Dolan, O'Reilly, McGovem. Smyth, Carter and even Jinks it was a major business activity. 
73 Roscomnion Herald, 22 nd January 19 10. 
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This provincial political class was entirely male, overwhelmingly Catholic (there were only a 
handful of Protestant nationalists in the five counties) and distinctly middle-aged. Most had 
been senior in local politics for 10,20 or more years. Changes in their composition were by 
definition rare, and came about largely through death or old age. To quote the MP Stephen 
Gwynn, 'control of local affairs was generally claimed by the veterans, and conceded to 
them'. 74 Young men were not excluded as such, but had to work their way up the ladder of 
social participation, influence and committee membership. Those few who emerged more 
rapidly (like Patrick McKenna in Westmeath and Longford, or Henry Monson in Sligo) did so 
as the proteges of local leaders. The participation of individual farmers in the political class 
was also limited. On the surface there were still many men in small towns who called 
themselves 'farmers' - traders and professionals were often keen landowners, tenants and/or 
graziers - but those who were both genuine farmers and active in political life tended to be 
men such as John Phillips (the MP for South Longford and chair of the county council) or J. J. 
O'Neill (Farrell's supporter and president of the North Longford UIL), who had been senior 
in the political machine for years. The one area in which farmers did participate was as 
candidates, often unopposed, for election to the bloated local government boards which 
covered the towns' rural hinterlands. As seen above, however, those elected were often more 
noted for their subsequent absence from meetings. 
The diversity of town life was such that there was plenty of scope for rivals of a town's 
leading group - personal, family, commercial or political - to entrench themselves in local 
organisational bases; urban life was tailor-made to support rival factions. In different towns 
the rival organisations could be any or all of the Hibernians, Town Tenants, Foresters, Town 
Commissionersl ad hoc bodies or, of course, rival newspapers. There was, however, little or 
no consistency in the five counties as to which particular organisations challenged and which 
cemented local political control, other than that in every town the dominant grouping 
controlled its local UIL. In Carrick, the centres of nationalist opposition to Patrick Flynn 
came from within the Irish party, based on the Hibernians and Town Tenants (led by the 
draper and auctioneer Michael McGrath). 75 In Roscommon town, challenges to the Hayden 
74 Stephen Gwynn, The Irish Situation (London 192 1). p. 11. 
75 See Roscommon Herald, 27hDecember 1913, concerning conflicts within the Town Tenants against 
'landlords' and the Roscommon Herald and Leitrim Observer, 6th June 1914 on McGrath's election to Carrick 
No. I RDC, after which he was paraded around the town b,,, Hibernians and Volunteers. 
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family came from the Tully family (William Tully was yet another auctioneer), its newspaper 
the Roscommon Journal, the Trade and Labour Association, the chairman of the Town 
Commissioners (George Geraghty) and the Associated Estates Committee (an ad hoc rival to 
the Town Tenants set up by the parish priest Canon Cummins - see Chapter 5). In Mullingar, 
the Foresters were staunch allies of Hayden and the UIL; in Longford town they were 
opponents of J. P. Farrell, the UIL and the Hibernians, which were also led by Farrell. In 
Sligo town the Hibernians under Daniel O'Donnell first challenged the position of the UIL 
and P. A. McHugh in the mid- I 900s, and then were used to underpin 0 "Donnell's own power 
in later years (see Chapter 7). 
Local goverm-nent in Ireland was not generally considered to be flagrantly corrupt, but 
underneath the surface the prize for local political success was still the control of local 
patronage. The interests of supporters and relatives, allies, businesses and newspapers were 
consistently advanced by 'influence', exercised so automatically that it usually ruled out the 
need for more overt malpractice. Paul-Dubois opined that local councils were not corrupt, but 
that 'the custom of combinazione is widely diffused' . 
76 The co-operator R. A. Anderson, no 
ffiend of town traders, stated : 'With us jobbery is seldom, if ever, the result of corruption, but 
77 is due to a good-natured desire to help a neighbour's child' . Thus 'the neighbours' children' 
collected jobs, committee posts, housing and contracts; their loyalty was rewarded and future 
control cemented. Mary Daly has shown that in Roscommon town, after the War of 
Independence, an investigation into the Town Commissioners (which had been purged of 
Sinn Feiners) reported that the chairman, secretary, assistant secretary and two other members 
were all employed by Hayden's Roscommon Messenger, while tenants of artisan dwellings, 
with low rents often in arrearsl included several town commissioners and Messenger 
employees. 78 When his opponents in 1917 finally attacked Tom Fleming, a lieutenant of the 
controlling group in Roscommon town and secretary of the county insurance committee, they 
noted that he was in addition a relieving officer, sub-sanitory officer, rent collector, rate 
collector, assistant stock-master to the CDB, UIL branch secretary and large farmer to boot. 79 
76 Paul-Dubois, Conteinporai-v Ireland, p. 195. 
7-1 R. A. Anderson, With Plunkett in Ireland: The Co-op Organiser'S St07-1, '(1935, reprinted Dublin 1983). p. 
228. 
78 Man, Daly. The Buffer State: The Histo7-ical Roots o the Department o the Environment (DublM' 1997), p. 
12 1. The Town Commission had by then been purged of any Sinn Fein supporters. 
79 Roscommon Hei-ald, Wh January 1917. 
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In County Roscommon, far and away the most influential nationalist politician was John 
Fitzgibbon, one of the few local leaders to take on a wider provincial and national role even 
before he became an MP. His commercial base was his drapery in Castlerea, a large business 
which at any one time employed some 30 apprentices, of whom possibly only six or seven 
were paid. 80 Active in the local Gaelic League (of which he was treasurer and later vice- 
chairman) the temperance movement and, with the Haydens, as a Pamellite in the 1890s, he 
rose to fame as a land agitator, ranch warrior, supporter of 'labour' against road contractors 
and Irish party organiser during the 1900s, though he combined this with active dealings in 
land as a 'shopkeeper/grazier' and the job of local CDB inspector of industries. His skills in 
organisation and agitation and his old Parnellite ties to John Redmond propelled him to being 
one of Redmond's companions on a US fund-raising trip in 1908 and a trustee of the Irish 
party's parliamentary fund in 1909. In 19 10 he became a CDB board member and, there 
being no Roscommon vacancy, MP for South Mayo. Throughout the years 1910-14 he 
maintained his chairmanship of the Castlerea guardians and Roscommon county council. His 
closest associates were either former South Roscommon Parnellites such as Hayden or Denis 
Kelly, vice-chair of the county council, or Castlerea businessmen such as Michael Grogan 
(grocer, spirits merchant and county councillor), Frank Forde (baker and confectioner) and the 
old Fenian Pat Conry. 
Fitzgibbon was mocked by parts of the press for his maiden parliamentary speech - 'a solid, 
tubby, elderly man with a large head and no hair on it ... 
florid, pugilistic like a prize-fighter 
grown elderly ... all 
his life he has sold pyjamas and talked politics and done well out of 
both i, 82 - but he remained throughout formidable as a man not to be crossed locally and as a 
sharp business dealer. Certainly Augustine Birrell, the Liberal Irish chief secretary, though 
describing him as 'such the statesman' on his joining the CDB, added : 'were it not for his red 
eye-lids which glow like circles of fire'. 83 As noted above, he was again 'fighting John 
Fitzgibbon' in 1910-11, at Ballybeg in particular, and in early 1912 his rhetoric over land 
80 Ibid, 4th January 1913, quoting the Irish Draper's Assistant. One of Fitzgibbon's former shop assistants was 
Maýjor John MacBride, whom Fitzgibbon took pride in welcoming back to Castlerea to talk about his Boer War 
role in 1907 (Roscommon Journal, 5b October 1907). 
81 Micks. An Account of the Constitution, Administration and Dissolution of the Congested Districts Board, p. 
185. 
82 Roscommon Herald, 18" March 1911, quoting a British parliamentary sketch. 
83 Birrell to Dillon, 31" January 19 10. Dillon papers TCD f 6798/17 1. 
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issues led to a brief unionist campaign to force him to resign from the CDB - this was, 
however, met not with defiance but with at least one public apology to Birrell. 84 
Fitzgibbon was undoubtedly keen to keep his membership of the CDB, a major source of 
influence which, as Paul Bew has noted, he had sought for some years. 85 As seen above, his 
native county received preferential treatment from the Board. He himself sold land to the 
CDB several times, completely oblivious to what a later age would call 'conflicts of interest'. 
Micks's history of the Board records three such direct sales, amounting to 266 acres. 86 The 
most spectacular abuse of his position on the CDB related to the sale of the Castlerea 
demesne. After a campaign by the Castlerea Town Tenants, led by Fitzgibbon, Forde and 
Grogan, the CDB had purchased the demesne of the Sandford estate, which in 1912 it 
reorganised and resold. However, instead of distributing the demesne among the townsmen, 
who believed they had been promised it, the CDB allocated most - 605 out of 700 acres of 
'town' land - to only a handful. 
87 In theory the transaction could be defended. Those 
receiving this land were meant to swap 'equivalent' agricultural land outside the town for 
allocation to congests. Woodlands were also being preserved and a new fair green and 
football ground carved out for all the town. The deal was devised by the leading local 
Catholic gentleman, the O'Conor Don, and by Fitzgibbon. 88 However, the few recipients of 
the demesne land included not just associates of Fitzgibbon, notably Forde, but the O'Conor 
Don and Fitzgibbon himself - he got 35 acres. 
89 Fitzgibbon had been involved in every phase 
of the transaction, as Town Tenant, organiser, recipient and CDB member. The transaction 
split the town's bourgeoisie, led to a petition to Redmond to intervene 90 and temporarily 
triggered the formation of two rival Town Tenants' bodies campaigning for and against the 
sale. 91 Fitzgibbon effectively rode out the storm and called his opponents allies of the 
unionist leader Sir Edward Carson - because they promoted nationalist disunity. The deal 
r'l 92 went through, but it led to the temporary disillusiom-nent of Fitzgibbon's lieutenant Grogan 
84 Roscommon Herald, 2 nd , 16th, 23d3Oth March 1912. 85 Bew, Coqflict and Conciliation in Ireland, p. 105. 
86 Micks, An Account of the Constitution, Administration and Dissolution of the Congested Districts Board, pp. 
232-235 
87 Roscommon Messenger, II th, 18th, 25t" May 1912; Roscommon Herald, 18 th May 1912 
88 Tf, estmeath Independent, 4thMay 1912. 
89 Midland Reporter, 25h May 19 12 
90 Roscommon Journal, 21' September 1912. 
'91 Ibid, 8"', 222 
nd June 1912: 
(P - Roscommon Herald, 25thMay 1912. Tj estmeath Independent, 25hMav 1912. 
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and a permanent breach with a range of townsmen. These included the IRB man, former Sinn 
Fein supporter and labour agitator Tom Egan, with whom Fitzgibbon, Conry and Grogan had I- 
only recently travelled to the great Home Rule rally in Dublin. 93 As a supposed concession 
three trustees were appointed in 1913 to administer the unallocated 95 acres for the town as a 
whole - two of the three were the O'Conor Don and Fitzgibbon's son Henry! 94 
Jasper Tully, a long-standing enemy of Fitzgibbon going back at least to the Pamell split, 
characterised him in 1912 as 'Foxy Jack' . 
95 A balanced view of the man - something never 
taken by Tully - would have to take account of his real political skills, lifelong temperance, 
support for cultural nationalism, land campaigning and loyalty to Redmond. However, while 
his CDB colleague Micks could quite genuinely praise his 'reputation for wisdom and the best 
business qualities', 96 Fitzgibbon also typified the 'wire-pulling', narrow self-interest driving 
so much of the Irish party - like Fitzgibbon, apparently 'a prize-fighter grown elderly' - and 
its small-town elites in the years before the war. 
'Dances around Local Gods'27 - Localism in Politics 
Given the dominance of provincial politics by small-town groupings and cliques, it is hardly 
surprising that their political pre-occupations should be almost exclusively local - the 'parish 
pump' issues that were of direct importance to them, namely jobs, property, rivalries (whether 
personal, family, village, town, or county), contracts (whether for roads, printing or 
advertising), railway schemes, newspaper wars and 'the rates'. As seen above, even the 
thirty-year campaign for 'the land for the people' had given way to much more sporadic, 
localised ffictions and often to squabbles that were considered to be little more than 'personal 
spite and trade jealousy'. 98 The analysis of 'localism' made by Theodore Hoppen of mid- 
Victorian Ireland (see page 16) can be applied unchanged to the five counties in the years 
before 1914 : 'limited goals and local priorities' really did, more often than not, 'count for 
more than heroic principles and dramatic brilliance'. 99 
93 IT'estmeath Independent, 8bApnl 1912. 
94 Roscommon Messenger, I O'hMay 1913. 
(). S ý Roscommon Herald, 18thMay 1912, which reported that Fitzgibbon did once say 'people call me foxy: 
perhaps I am' and pinned the soubriquet of 'foxy' on him. . 96 Micks, An Account of the Constitution, Administration and Dissolution qf the Congested Districts Board, p. 
185. 
97 Hoppen. Ireland Sincc 1800, p. 129. 
98 Monthly report of the Longford counry inspector, December 1909 (PRO CO 904/79). 
99 Hoppen. Elcctions, Politics and Society In Ireland, pp. viii-ix. 
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Chapters 5,6 and 7 of this thesis study the issues driving local politics in County 
Roscommon, North Westmeath and Sligo town respectively. The Roscommon analysis will 
show a tapestry of feuds which significantly weakened the Irish party's control of the county 
and influenced subsequent allegiances when the national movement split during the First 
World War. That of Westmeath will focus on the supposed ideological gulf between 
'Haydenites' and 'Ginnellites' and the reality of personal, family and professional rivalries. 
The analysis of Sligo town will focus on the importance of class and sectarian tensions which 
were particular to the town, uniting Catholic nationalists and giving the movement a 
coherence lacking elsewhere. All will reaffirm Hoppen's leitmotif, of the gulf between local 
realities and the rhetoric of national politics. 100 
Outside of Sligo town, in County Sligo, the leitmotif of 'localism' was just as loud. Issues of 
town vs. county, north vs. south, family against family and newspaper against newspaper 
fori-ned the staple diet of political life. Few could be divorced from the vacuum left by the 
death of P. A. McHugh in 1909, and which was only imperfectly filled by the efforts of the 
South Sligo MP John O'Dowd. Typical of the issues important to local politicians was that of 
whether the Sligo Champion or its three Sligo rivals should get the lion's share of the county 
council's printing and advertising contracts - O'Dowd was chairman of the county council. 
This story ran and ran in 1911, and the main challenge to both O'Dowd and the Champion, as 
will be seen in Chapter 7, came from the Hibernians of Sligo town, in a brief, unholy alliance 
with the county's ratepayers. ' 01 It was complicated by the uncomfortable fact that Eugene 
McHugh, son of the late P. A., was both the brother of the Champion's owner, Alfred 
McHugh, and secretary to the county council. Several councillors were in 1912 finally 
surcharged by the Local Government Board for favouring the Champion, which, instead of 
making the lowest tender for the council's contract, had made the highest. ' 02 
As for O'Dowd himself, the nepotism on display in his promotion of family interests was 
quite open. First, in 1910 his niece, though not a qualified nurse, was elected matron of the 
Sligo county infinnary - O'Dowd blasted the 'effete and tyrannical Toryism' of the Sligov 
'00 Hoppen, I7-eland Since 1800, p. vil. 
101 Sligo Champion, 8h July. 22 nd jUIV 2 nd September, 16'h September 21' October 1911, Roscommon Herald, 
4'h November 1911. 
'()2 Roscommon Herald, 176 August 1912; Sligo Independent, I O'b August, 21' September 1912. 
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Independent for daring to criti ci se the appointment. 1 03 Then in 1912 his son Matthew stood 
unsuccessfully, with O'Dowd chairing the meeting, to be secretary of Sligo county council on 
the death of Eugene McHugh; ' 04 he lost against a solid block vote from Sligo town in favour 
of their man. Matthew then stood again, this time successfully, to be the council's 
accountant; O'Dowd again chaired the election meeting and alienated several old supporters 
with his blatant backing. 105 Back in 1910, O'Dowd had had to write to the Roscommon 
Herald to deny that his son had been made a CDB inspector. 'I have never' he said 'got 
anything from any government but persecution' 
son who got the job - it was his nephew. 
' 06 
He was correct to write that it was not his 
In County Longford, the key issue was again personal : would J. P. Farrell ever reach an 
accommodation with the many local nationalists who successively fell foul of him? The story 
of the feud of Longford's two MPs, Farrell and John Phillips - ostensibly over the merits of 
cattle driving and climaxing in fisticuffs between rival supporters in late- 1909 - has been told 
by both Paul Bew and Marie Coleman. 107 The feud went way back beyond 1909 and, despite 
some years of peaceful coexistence after 1900, extended back to the Parnell split. Phillips had 
been a Parnellite and Farrell an 'anti' : in late 1909, Farrell would accuse Phillips of trying to 
have his brother murdered at the Edgeworthstown races in 1892.108 When hostilities were 
resumed in 1908-09,, the real body blow was delivered by Phillips, not when he publicly 
attacked cattle driving, but when in September 1909 he engineered the loss of the Longford 
Leader'S inflated printing contract with the county council (Phillips was chairman and Farrell 
a councillor). Farrell lost an annual income of f 750 - most definitely 'serious money' - and 
the new contractor charged only f 15 0.109 
In addition to Phillips, the list of Farrell's enemies was long, including : 
e William Ganly - the party boss in Granard and president of the North Longford UIL until 
1908, who was purged by Farrell in that year for his adherence to Sinn Fein, 
103 Sli go Champion, Sligo Independent, Sligo Times, 22 nd January 1910. 
'04 Roscommon Hei-ald, Lonofioi-d Leade7-, Sligo Independent, 4 1h May 1912. 
10-' Sligo Independent, 20'h July. Roscommon Joui-nal, 27 1h July 1912. 
106 Roscommon Hei-ald, 8'ý October 19 10. 
107 Be-%N,. Conflict and Conciliation in Ii-eland, pp. 188-90; Coleman, Countv Longfoi-d 1910-23, pp. 34-5. 
108 Midland Repoi-tei-, 21" October 1909. 
109 Longfoi-d Independent, 2 nd October 1909, letter from McKenna to the Midland Reportei-, 28b October 1909. 
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" James and Michael McCann - two prominent Catholic grazier brothers who were among 
the main targets of the cattle driving of 1908 and boycotting thereafter, 
" T. W. Delany - Phillips's ally, vice-chair of the county council, a cousin of Farrell's by 
marriage and the Longford Crown Solicitor who prosecuted Farrell in 1910. 
" Patrick McKenna -a protege of Farrell who turned against him, allying himself with 
Phillips when in late- 1908 Farrell's men deposed his uncle, Pat McCann (not related to 
James and Michael), from the presidency of the Clonguish UIL, 
" Patrick Mallon - another solicitor, firrnly one of Farrell's group up to 1911, but alienated 
from him by 1912 and thereafter promoting the Irish National Foresters to rival the 
Farrell -dominated Hibernians as an insurance society registered under the 1911 National 
Insurance Act. 
In each case save that of Ganly, whose adherence to Sinn Fein remained constant after 1908, 
the dispute was local and personal rather than ideological. 
Vituperation and fighting may have ended temporarily -a truce between the Farrell and 
Phillips camps was imposed by the party in November 1909 - but enmity remained. In 1910 
Phillips continued to attack cattle driving and boycotting" 0 and in 1911 Farrell tried 
unsuccessfully to block Phillips and Delany from being re-appointed to their county council 
positions of chair and vice-chair. 111 Enemies of Farrell continued to frustrate his control of 
the county. Pat McCann caused irritation when in 1911 he unseated a Farrell supporter as 
chair of Longford Rural District Council (RDC). 1 12 In 1913 an ally of Mallon, Michael 
Connolly (a Longford hardware merchant), ' 13 was elected to Longford Urban District Council 
(UDC) to join Mallon in opposing the Farrell 'family party' there. Reconciliations were few 
and far between. Delany did apparently mend his fences with Farrell in 1913,114 butthe 
grazier brothers James and Michael McCann responded to years of persecution not by 
becoming Sinn Femers, as postulated by Paul Bew, but unionists (in 1911). 115 Even as late as 
"0 Monthly report of the Longford county inspector, August 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
Roscommon Herald, 10 th and 17'h June. Longford Independent, I Oth June 1911; monthly report of the 
Longford county Inspector, June 1911 (PRO CO 904/84). 
112 Longford Independent, I Ot" June 1911. 
113 Roscommon Herald, 4th January; Long-ford Independent, I It' January; Midland Reporter, 23rd January 191 
114 Longford Independent, 9th August 1913. 
115 See Bew. Coqflict and Conciliation, p. 214 and Roscommon Herald, 22"d July 19 11 . 
Michael McCann finally 
, seems to 
have returned to the bosom of the Longford UIL in 1918 (Lonagford Leader, 12'h January 1918). In that 
year he was elected the rate collector of Longford UDC. against a Sum Feiner and proposed by Farrell's brother. 
Christopher (Longford Leader, II th May 1918). 
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October 1914, Farrell was privately and, it appears quite falsely, libelling Phillips by calling 
him 'pro-German mad and fiercely denouncing Redmond in all directions. ' 116 In the 1917 
South Longford by-election after Phillips's death, Farrell ostentatiously failed for some weeks 
to provide public support for the leading party candidate, Patrick McKenna. ' 17 The endemic 
personal feuding of Longford nationalists, as has been observed by Marie Coleman, 
undoubtedly shortened the political horizons, and the life, of the Irish party in the county in 
the years 1910-17. 
The profoundly inward-looking nature of provincial Irish politics could be seen most clearly 
in Leitrim, where, despite the recent upheaval of the 'Sinn Fein' election in North Leitrim in 
1908, the countryside and politics were the quietest of any of the five counties in the years 
after 1909. Here, the most important spur to political action was the Cavan and Leitrim Light 
Railway (the 'C&L'). From the very beginning of the period, from T. F. Smyth's victory 
speech on his uncontested election as South Leitrim's MP in January 1910, he referred to 'a 
little clique' opposing him because of his exposure of the railway's goings-on. " 8 Again and 
again the press - not just the two Leitrim papers but those in Roscommon and Sligo - reported 
the twists and turns of C&L-related disputes. In 1909-10, the main issues were those of 
whether the right county council directors (including Patrick Flynn) had been nominated to 
the C&L and of the lack of disclosure in its accounts. The railway was seen as only 
intermittently profitable, ultimately Protestant-controlled, and indissolubly linked to its major 
customer, the Arigna [coal and iron ore] Mining Company on the Roscommon-Sligo border. 
(Both companies even shared the same general manager, a Mr. McAdoo, ' 19 but oddly the 
railway did not actually reach the Arigna mines. ) In 1911 the focus of dispute shifted to the 
sheer scale of the burden on Leitrim ratepayers - over E3,000 and rising - stemming from the 
116 Farrell made the accusation in a letter to Dillon (8'bOctober 1914. Dillon papers, TCD, f 6753/430) and it is 
cited in Bew, Ideolog-y and the Irish Question, p. 122. Marie Coleman (Couqv Lon Ord 1910-23, p. 57) 1 9f 
considered the claim 'somewhat exaggerated'. but it seems rather to have been completely untrue. Phillips had 
shown no recent Sinn Fein sympathies - indeed he had been mocked as a 'guileless old gentleman' by Griffith's 
Sinn Fein in 1910 (Midland Reporter, 25th August 19 10). If he had suddenly in 1914 converted to 'pro- 
Germanism' it was a remarkably private affair. with no newspaper picking it up, even the anti-party Tully papers 
which covered Longford. Nor did it stop Phillips signmg a Longford Recruiting Committee circular in March 
1916 (Longford Leader, 18'hMarch 1916). pledging loyalty to Redmond at a UIL meeting with Farrell in April 
1916 (Longford Leader, go' April 1916). nor. when very frail, from deferrmg his resignation at Redmond's 
request in November 1916 (Long-ford Independent, I lb November 1916). 
117 Coleman, Counti- Longfiord 1910-23, pp. 94-95. 
118 Leitriin Advertiser, 20'h January 1910. 
119 Leitrim Observer, 17'hFebruary 1912. 
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county's legal obligation to provide financial support. In the autumn the impact of this on the 
rates triggered political activity even among farmers, with the formation of Farmers' Defence 
Associations and later a county ratepayers' movement, led by the fan-ners James Geoghegan 
and Pat Gaffney and the auctioneer Michael Carter. 120 This movement came from within the 
Irish party and all three were party stalwarts. Carter was county president of the Hibernians 
while Geoghegan would later move a resolution of 'love and gratitude' at the South Leitrim 
UIL executive, to Liberal, Scottish and Irish MPs. 121 Carter and Gaffney were UIL-backed 
county councillors. During 1912 their movement flourished in country districts as farmers 
faced a direct threat to their pockets. The MPs Smyth and Meehan were caught in the middle, 
publicly supporting the ratepayers but also defending their own county council (including 
Flynn). 
However, momentum subsided rapidly in 1913, as the county council was able to cut its rail 
subsidy and freeze the rates. In that year, the issue-became instead that of a speculative new 
company, the Arigna Valley Railway (and its attendant parliamentary bill) designed to link 
directly to the Arigna mine from County Sligo. This triggered a realignment within Leitrim, 
with almost all locals now supporting the C&L against its Sligo-backed rival, on the obvious 
grounds that competition to the C&L would only increase the Leitrim county subsidy. It also 
triggered greater parliamentary involvement by the MPs, with Smyth and Meehan trying to 
kill the bill, the Sligo MPs O'Dowd and Scanlan supporting it and O'Dowd fulminating that 
'the people who run the Cavan and Leitrim railway are all Orangemen'. 122 As for Meehan, 
though with Smyth he succeeded in killing the bill, he also amused the Irish Independent by 
sitting all morning in the wrong parliamentary committee to review a railway bill - not the 
Arigna one - without realisingit. 
123 
The last chapter of the saga, in 1914, related to yet another private speculative venture, and 
again a parliamentary bill, this time to extend the C&L itself to the Arigna mine. This 
reopened divisions in the local ranks, notably between figures such as Flynn and Carter, keen 
to get the entire C&L sold to the promoters and then extended, and a revived ratepayers' 
120 Leitrim Advertiser, 5h October 1911. 
12 1 Leitrim Observer, 2 9h March 1913. 
122 Sli go Champion, 25"' October 1913. 
123 Reported in the Lcitrim Advertiser, 5th June 19 13). 
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movement (the rates had gone up again in 1914), led by Geoghegan, who was anxious to 
avoid any further outlay, whether of capital or subsidy. 
124 In the end county support for the 
extension died when it became clear that the private promoters could offer neither funds nor 
security to support it. ' 25 
The response of Leitrim ratepayers to the C&L was at least indicative of the fact that farmers 
could still be mobilised in political activity, though it took a strong local rates issue to achieve 
this. In Longford and Westmeath, where no comparable issue emerged, no coherent 
ratepayers' movements followed. In County Longford, brief attempts to start a ratepayers' 
association in the town of Granard were squashed in 1912, primarily by Farrell's supporter 
J. J. O'Neill, who argued that their interests could be represented by the UIL. 126 In 
Westmeath, no significant movement emerged, and less than a handful of isolated branches 
were left to fulminate over the road programme or, literally, the sinking of new parish 
pumps. 1 27 Significantly more coherent ratepayers' movements did evolve in Roscommon and 
Sligo, but other than their hostility to paying rates, they had little in common with the Leitrim 
association. In Roscommon (see Chapter 5), the ratepayers' movement was primarily a 
coalition of long-standing nationalist enemies of John Fitzgibbon. In Sligo town (Chapter 7), 
the bulk of ratepayers were Protestant businessmen, united in opposition to the near-bankrupt 
nationalist Sligo Corporation. In the rest of County Sligo, the ratepayers were, according to 
the police, 'practically a Unionist body'. 128 In the five counties., Dillon's and Canon 
Sheehan's 'French peasants' were mobilised only occasionally, in Bew's description, as a 
purely sectional group of aggrieved taxpayers and ratepayers. ' 29 Without specific local 
targets to attack, such as a railway, Sligo Corporation or Fitzgibbon, they were mobilised 
hardly at all. 
124 Roscommon Herald, 3d, 176,246 January, 7h, 14'bFebruar-y 1914. 
125 Leitrim Advertiser, 2 6"' March, WbApril 1914. 
126LongafordLeader, 14"' September 1912. 
127 ff'estmeath Examiner, 10 March, II th April 1914. 
12' Report of the Sligo county inspector. February 1911 (PRO CO 904! 83). 
129 Bew. 'Sinn Fein Agrarian Radicalism and the War of Independence', in Boyce (ed. ), The Revolution in 
Ireland, 
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In the five counties as a whole, the years after 1910 were characterised by a distinct slowing 
of the political pulse and a contraction of the number of those active in politics. The local 
Irish party leadership was indeed 'representative' of the literally bourgeois milieu in which 
political activity was increasingly concentrated. While the myriad, interlocking networks of 
town-dwellers sustained both party cliques and their local rivals, the shrinking of the political 
world to small towns, as the land wars faded away, reinforced the sense of quiet and 
nationalist apathy on which so many commentators so frequently remarked. For most of the 
pre-war period, this envirom-nent was not a hotbed of radicalism or wild enthusiasms and the 
local political world was conservative. Writing of the typical midlands country trader in 
1912, Padraic Colum. saw that: 
The man with the blinking eyes and wavering speech became representative of the real 
conservative Ireland - of that Ireland which is Profoundly sceptical of revolutionary 
movements and revolutionary ideas. Behind him I saw farmers, ecclesiastics, officials 
and Catholic conservatives whose weight would make an Irish deliberative assembly the 
most conservative assembly in Europe. ' 30 
Of all the five counties, Leitrim was the quietest and the most 'apathetic'. Here, the 
significance of the Cavan & Leitrim Light Railway saga was that it was almost the only story, 
apart from the Flynn-McGrath rivalry in Carrick, to trigger any political activity for most of 
the period. Until the end of 1913 it was this issue, solely one of hard cash, which inspired 
political manoeuvrings, shifted allegiances, sparked inter-county rivalries, embarrassed local 
MPs and briefly quickened the pulse of local farmers. At the end of 1913, a correspondent 
from Ballinamore, where Geoghegan chaired the local ratepayers, wrote thus to the Leitrim 
Advertiser on the importance of the railway to local life. What he said had a resonance for 
political life beyond Ballinamore : 
An Irishman without a grievance would be like a fish out of water. A grievance properly 
aired is once a tonic and a stimulus. Were it not for the Light Railway grievance, 
Ballinamore would be a sleepy, hum-drum place - no life, no progress. 
1 31 
130 Colum. Mv Irish Year, p. 12 7. 
13 1 Lcitrim Advo-tiscr, I" January 1914. 
66 
Chapter 3 : 'Still Flourishing More or Less' - Or2anisations, Societies and 
Clubs 
Writing in early 1908 at the climax of the 'Sinn Fein' by-election in North Leitrim, the local 
RIC county inspector believed that : 'Every society and organisation almost, known to Irish 
Political Science exists in this county'. ' Admittedly he. was not writing at a 'normal' time; the 
by-election had substantially boosted the range and tempo of Leitrim's political activity and 
this surge was distinctly temporary. Leitrim, as just seen in Chapter 2, instead went into a 
protracted political lull and across all the five counties the pace of popular politics slowed 
significantly. How far, however, was this waning of activity felt in the intermeshed network 
of clubs, divisions, branches, societies and committees which underpinned local political life? 
The number of 'political' organisations - including many which resolutely called themselves 
'non-political' (i. e. non-party political) - was reported routinely by the police, though not by 
every county inspector. In late 1909 the inspectors for Leitrim, Longford and Westmeath 
were reporting 'branches' as follows : 
Leitrim: UIL 32; AOH 35; Gaelic Athletic Association [GAA] 11; Gaelic League 1; Irish 
National Council [Sinn Fein] 12; Irish National Foresters [Foresters] 2; Town Tenants 5; 
Longford: UIL 22; AOH 14; Sinn Fein 1; Town Tenants 4; 
Westmeath : UIL 40; GAA 25; Gaelic League 4; Sinn Fein 1; Land and Labour associations 
5; Trade and Labour 1; Foresters 2; Town Tenants 1; Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants 1. 
In Roscommon, such numbers were only reported from June 1911, by a new county inspector, 
starting with 
UIL 54, AOH 2 1, GAA 14; Gaelic League 7; Land and Labour 5; Town Tenants 5. 
The Sligo inspector did not report 'branch' numbers until January 1916.2 
' Monthly report of the Leitrim county inspector. February 1908 (National Archives 3/7 15, box 13). 
itrim. Longford and Westmeath county i spectors. September 1909 (PRO CO 2 Monthly reports of the Lei in 
90479) and of the Roscommon county inspector. June 1911 (PRO CO 904/84). 
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As sources of data on local activity, monthly branch counts by the police were anything but 
perfect. It was not until January 1916 that inspectors were required to use a common format. 
Both before and after that time, while they were quick to report on new activities, they also 
displayed great inertia in continuing to count branches which were long moribund. Some 
entire organisations, such as the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), temporarily disappeared 
below the police radar. For example, in County Longford the inspector reported no GAA 
clubs in September 1909 but fourteen three months later. A vast range of other activities were 
not, or were not considered, 'political' and therefore went unreported - music societies, race 
committees, agricultural societies, dance clubs, bands, Gaelic social clubs, Feis committees, 
co-operatives, industrial development associations, craft trades unions, temperance societies, 
charities, sodalities, many sports clubs and, especially after the legislation of 1911, insurance 
societies. However, even in their imperfect form the monthly police reports showed that two 
political associations (the UIL and AOH) and one sporting association (the GAA) did extend 
beyond the towns to the countryside and, in the case of the UIL, to almost every parish. 
Moreover, it was these which Fitzpatrick has described as part of a wider myriad of local 
3 
associations, suffused by politics and almost all of them subscribing to the 'National' creed. 
This chapter analyses such organisations in the five counties - their stability, growth or 
decline, their inter-relatedness and their PolitiCS. 4 It will assess the health or otherwise of the 
main affiliates of the Irish party; were they in the state of terminal decay so often assumed 
because of their subsequent collapse? Just how far should they be differentiated as 'political 
nationalists'. to use the definition of John Hutchinson in The Dynamics of Cultural 
Nationalism, from the 'cultural nationalism' of organisations such as the Gaelic League? For 
Hutchinson, 'political nationalists' were focused on the mechanics of Irish statehood, 
secularised, anglicised and run by a 'mediocre elite of publicans and shopkeepers'. By 
contrast 'cultural nationalism', a movement independent of political nationalism, had been 
'transformed into a significant ideological movement by a rising Catholic intelligentsia', had a 
5 
natural affinity with the Catholic church and held as its aim a moral regeneration of Ireland. 
Was such a distinction valid? If so, were the 'mammals' of cultural nationalism poised to 
3 Fitzpatrick. Politics and Irish Lffie 1913-19,11, pp. 94-95 and 10 1. 
4 The separate and parallel world of Protestant and/or unionist societies. diversified as were Catholic/nationalist 
societies but on a far smaller scale, is not studied in this chapter. 
5 See Hutchinson, The Pi, namics qf'Cultural Nationalisin, pp. 9.1-3.115,136,152,168, and 196. 
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take over from the soon-to-be extinct 'dinosaurs' of the Irish party or was the situation the 
rather more mundane one described by the Roscommon county inspector in 1912? Having 
recited yet another long list of 'political' societies (including the UIL, AOH. GAA and Gaelic 
League) he concluded that they were 'flourishing' and 'generally friendly amongst 
themselves'. 
6 
The Irish Par - The United Irish League 
As noted in Chapter 1, the premise of some local studies has been that the UIL was in decline 
in the immediate pre-war years and that its decrepitude, if not making subsequent collapse 
inevitable, was certainly an important precondition. In Marie Coleman's study of County 
Longford, the success of Sinn Fein in 1917 could only be explained by looking at the previous 
decline of the UIL. 7 Clare C. Murphy, in her study of the 'continuing' Ranch War, saw the 
UIL as failing, 'faltering in its efforts to steer a balanced course' between the conflicting 
demands of parliamentary Home Rule and land agitation, of shopkeeper/graziers and 'small' 
men. 8 By contrast, John Noel McEvoy, writing on King's County, saw the success of land 
purchase and the consequent loss of farmers' political enthusiasm as the causes of the key 
theme of his work, the 'long decline' of the UIL. 9 Given the dissipation of land tensions 
outlined above in Chapter 2, McEvoy's model of UIL decline would appear to be more 
relevant here than Murphy's. The UIL's 'decline', if such it was, certainly came from a high 
base. In 1908, at height of the Ranch War, the Sligo county inspector considered it 'perfectly 
organized and most aggressive'. ' 0 UIL statistics for all Ireland were collated in the quarterly 
RIC Crime Special Branch report. At the end of 1909 it estimated that in the five counties 
the League had no less than 193 branches and an amazingly precise 24,462 members" 
(equivalent to just under 14% of the local male population in the 1911 census). Moreover, 
there was little apparent change in succeeding years : 
6 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, March 1912 (PRO CO 904/186). 
7 Coleman, Couno, Longford 1910-23, pp. 3-4. 
8 Murphy. 'Conflict in the West: The Ranch War Continues, 1911-1912, Part F, p. 8 5; 'Part 2' (Journal of the 
Westport Hivorical Socieýv, No. 16 1996). pp. 119.120,134. 
9 McEvov, A Stud17 of the United Irish League in King'S COUntV, 1899-1918, p. 164. 
ional Archives 3/7 15 box 13). 10 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, August 1908 (Nati I 
Crime Special Branch, Quarterlý, Returns re the United Irish League (PRO CO 904120). 
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Table 5: UIL Branches and Membership (Crime Special Branch Returns) I-) 
December 1909 
Branches Members 
December 1913 
Branches Members 
Leitrim 34 5,378 37 51663 
Longford 22 3ý162 2 
22.9 82 
Roscommon 55 6ý675 56 51894 
Sligo 42 6ý209 43 6,193 
Westmeath 40 3ý038 33 21,325 
Total 
1 
193 249462 191 23,057 
In four counties these police returns showed only marginal fluctuations; only in Westmeath 
was there any decline in the number of recorded branches and only in Roscommon and 
Westmeath did indovodual membership fall by more than 10%. In Leitrim both membership 
and branches went up. However, any aggregate stability across the region as a whole was 
superficial. Though the reported UIL membership numbers implied a continuing mass 
organisation, other police sources, notably the monthly reports of county inspectors, 
repeatedly described that membership as inactive and many branches as 'nominal'. Despite 
the UIL's comprehensive branch network, anecdotal evidence of decay was also published in 
the local press. The Sligo Champion summed things up in March 1912. UIL branches might 
well continue to function, but the paper attacked the quality of the branch meeting reports 
submitted to it and admitted : 'In some districts the branches have really little to do, and that 
little they do not do over well. ' 13 Incidences of inactivity were far from confined to Sligo. In 
Leitrim, from January 1910 onwards the county inspector commented on the inactivity of 
almost all, sometimes all, UIL branches. 14 In Longford, the lack of funds, poor attendances at 
meetings, and the failure of branches to pay subscriptions to the League's National Directory 
were the subject of regular complaint. Thus J. P. Farrell and Frank MacGuinness at the South 
Longford executive regularly grumbled about the number of paid-up branches, or the level of 
donations to the Home Rule fund. 15 In Roscommon town, John Hayden's associate James 
Grogan could lament in March 1911 : 
12 Ibid. 
13 Sli go Champion, 30'hMarch 1912. 
)4 See monthly reports of the Leitim county inspector. January 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 0): July 19 10 (PRO CO 
904/8 1). November 19 10 (PRO CO 904,82) and September 1911 (PRO CO 904/8 5). 
15 See Lon,, gfiord Leader, 17d' February 1912; 86 March 1913; Roscommon Herald, 126 October 1912. 
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I don't know what is coming over the Ul League branch in Roscommon. There was to 
be a meeting this day week, and there was nobody at all there, not even the chairman to 
take the chair. 16 
The biggest 'black hole' of the League was, however, in Westmeath, where the northern split 
between followers of John Hayden (loyal to the Irish party) and of Laurence Ginnell seriously 
undermined it. The considerable impact of this split is examined in Chapter 6. By late 1911 
the Westmeath county inspector could report only three active branches in the entire county - 
the rest (including the 'Ginnellite' branches, still recorded by the police as 'UIL') were 
(merely nominal'. The state of the UIL in the county was not helped by its perceived 
weakness in the largest town, Athlone, where the merger of two branches into one was 
presented in the best light by the Westmeath Independent as replacing two poor branches with 
one good one, but by the police as 'making a show of keeping the League active there. ' 17 T'he 
Westmeath Independent, when the merger was first mooted, explained the phenomenon of the 
'dormant' branch : 'Except in name, we have no branches of the League here, for meetings 
are seldom held after the branches are affiliated. " 8 
Throughout the period the recurring refrain was that without a serious land agitation there was 
little for UIL branches to do. The effect of this on more general political enthusiasm, and the 
widespread perception of popular apathy, has already been described in Chapter 2. In 
February 1913 the RIC inspector general observed of the UIL that 'in districts undisturbed by 
agitation, it was inactive'. 19 His county inspectors' reports were entirely consistent : where 
land tensions rapidly faded, as in Leitrim, the UIL relapsed to dormancy; where they 
persisted, in parts of Sligo and in 1910-11 in Roscommon, activity held up. Similarly, it was 
a land agitation which sustained the few Westmeath branches remaining active (led by 
Eugene Robins in Moate and around Mount Temple). 
Excluding 'the land', there were some other activities. Periodically, paid national organisers 
toured the counties, encouraging branches and addressing public meetings and annual branch 
16 Roscommon Jounial, 18'hMarch 1911. 
17 fl'estmeath Independent, 6hJanuary 1912; monthly report of the Westmeath county Inspector, January 1912 
(PRO CO 904/86). 
18 Westmeath Independent, 23 rd December 1911. 
19 Monthly report of the Inspector General, February 1913 (PRO CO 904'89). 
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4reorganisations' (which, contrary to some modem perceptions, were not restructurings of 
defunct branches but AGMs to conclude the election of officers and payment of the f3 annual 
affiliation fee to the National Directory). General elections might be almost entirely 
uncontested, but candidates still had to be selected and supported in local elections. 
Patronage had to be exercised, though few branches were as blatant as Boyle in publicly, 
annually minuting which individuals should chair which local government bodies. 20 
The UIL also continued to raise funds. Here its record, whether to pay J. P. Farrell's legal 
costs (pages 49-50) or for the national Parliamentary and Home Rule funds, was not 
considered perfect. Fund-raising seems to have retreated from the countryside to the towns. 
This was, again, a regular complaint of the Longford UIL, uniting both the Phillips and Farrell 
factions, 21 but few statistics were as dramatic as those for South Leitrim at the end of 1909. 
Here the Leitrim Advertiser noted that Mohill had contributed E9 13s to a recent 
parliamentary fund collection, while all its surrounding parishes had raised only 15s 6d. 22 
A detailed record of the UIL's fund-raising can be collated from the RIC's Crime Special 
Branch reports : 
Table 6: Annual funds raised by the UIL by county (fs) 23 
1910 1911 1912 1913 
Leitrim 345 148 257 229 
Longford 339 237 148 304 
Roscommon 480 366 525 523 
Sligo 560 489 538 553 
Westmeath 768 209 303 235 
Total E2,492 0,449 0,771 L1,844 
20 Wcstci-n Nationalist, 17'h June 1911,15'h June 1912. 
21 See Coleman, County Longfoi-d 1910-23, p. 3 1. Lon,, -fo7-d Independent, 13th November 1909. In the latter, 
John Phillips noted that the party was getting very little from South Longford and that only from the town. 
11 -- Leitrim Advertiscr. 9h December 1909. 
23 Crime Special Branch, quarterly returns on the Uruted Irish League (PRO CO 904/20). 
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These returns do reveal a clear, overall decline, but hardly a catastrophic one. In all but one 
case - Roscommon - 1910 was a peak year, but this is hardly surprising given the incidence 
then of two general elections. The fall in Westmeath in 1911 was precipitous, but the local 
'League' in 19 10 was 'collecting for two' - Ginnellite and Haydenite collections were 
aggregated by the police. In every case except Longford, collections revived significantly in 
1912 as the Home Rule fund got under way, and Longford then revived in 1913. In the cases 
of Roscommon and Sligo, it is hard to discern any consistent decline. Of course these police 
returns may be as suspect as those for branches and members, and Marie Coleman in her 
Longford study argued that they had to be so, 'in the light of the evident dissatisfaction of 
nationalist leaders in Longford at the low level of contributions. ' 24 However, while anecdotal 
evidence from Longford certainly told a story of decline, so too did the Longford police 
statistics of funds raised - until 1913. These statistics, more revealing than the static Police 
branch counts, could be consistent with a view that the UIL's decline, while real, was not 
unrelenting and its condition not yet terminal. 
The UIL itself provided another statistical series by keeping records of branches whose 0 
annual subscription was paid up to the League's National Directory : 
Table 7: UIL branch subscriptions paid to the National Directory (years ending approx. 
end-January). 
25 
1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13 1913-14 
Leitrim 30 25 22 20 31 
Longford 19 14 12 12 15 
Roscommon 39 34 34 36 24 
Sligo 33 26 33 26 34 
Westmeath 35 25 16 12 17 
Total 156 124 117 106 121 
24 Coleman, Counti- Longford 1910-23, p. 3 1. 
25 Minute Book of the UIL National Directory (NLI, Ms. 708). Sally Warwick-Haller has also observed that the 
UIL kept on its books each branch the dues of which were paid, even if that branch was otherwise quite inactive. 
See Sally Warwick-Haller, William O'Brien and the Land War (Blackrock 1990). p. 207. 
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Again the picture presented was hardly robust. Paid-up branches were materially fewer than 
those recorded by the police. In addition the Athlone example (see above) indicates that even 
some of these paid-up branches were still dormant. Secondly, there was a clear downwards 
trend at least until 1912-13 in Leitrim, Longford and Westmeath, with the fall in Westmeath 
particularly sharp as Ginnellite branches defected and remaining UIL branches declined. 
Thirdly, while there was a marked up-tick in 1913-14, particularly in Leitrim, that year also 
witnessed a slump in Roscommon, to a level well under half that reported by the police. In 
aggregate, whereas over the period the RIC reported on around 190 branches, the number in 
good standing with the national directory, still including some dormant branches, fell from 
156 to 121. 
A fourth statistical measure of UIL activity was the frequency of reports submitted by 
branches to the local press. For the years 1910-13 this can be measured from reports written 
by branch secretaries for publication in the Roscommon Herald, Roscommon Messenger, 
Sligo Champion and Western Nationalist, covering virtually all of counties Leitrim, 
Roscommon and Sligo. The same exercise cannot be undertaken for Longford or Westmeath. 
The incompleteness of the preserved series of the Longford Leader for 1910/11 and the erratic 
nature of reports in the Mullingar papers after the Ginnellite split rule this out (for South 
Westmeath, reports in the Athlone Westmeath Independent were few and far between). 
Nevertheless, for three counties a large pool of data is available. 
Table 8: UIL reports in local newspapers 1910-13. 
1910 1911 1912 1913 
Roscommon Herald 326 282 192 160 
Roscommon Messenger 160 130 146 102 
Sligo Champion 612 534 536 433 
Western Nationalist 153 138 106 75 
Here, a pattern of steadily falling activity is clearer than in the other statistical series, with all 
four newspapers showing large reductions in reports of branch and committee meetings, 
public rallies and social events, of between 30% and 51%. It could be argued that Jasper 
Tully's strident opposition to the party's leadership reduced the willingness of branch 
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secretaries to submit reports to his paper, but the Herald'S rate of decline - 51 %- was exactly 
the same as that of its Boyle-based party rival, the Western Nationalist. 
Overall, therefore, both statistical and anecdotal evidence did show the UIL to be an 
organisation significantly in decline. Reports of branch activities dropped markedly, while 
fund-raising and the number of paid-up branches also fell, albeit erratically. Certain areas, 
notably Westmeath, were in a dire state. However, while it is tempting to link this pattern to 
the League's wartime collapse, as 'cause and effect', it should also be placed in the context of 
the several phases of growth, decline and renewal which had already characterised the League 
and its predecessors over the past thirty-five years. Moreover, the state of the Irish party in 
the pre-war period cannot be assessed without looking at its other key auxiliary, the AOH. 
The Hibernians 
Unlike the UIL, the AOH's overall profile before the war was one of growth. In Longford, 
for example, the police count of 'divisions' went from 14 in January 1910 to 15 in January 
1912 and 19 in January 1915. Leitrim divisions rose from 35 to 41 between January 1910 and 
1912; Roscommon from 17 in December 1910 to 25 in January 1912; Westmeath from none 
at the beginning of the period to 6 by October 1913.26 When consistent numbers were 
collated by the police for all five counties, in January 1916, the reported position of the AOH 
was as follows: 
Leitrim 29 divisions, 4,284 members (well down ftom 1912); 
Longford 20 divisions (no membership shown, but well up from 1912); 
Roscommon 43 divisions, 1,697 members (well up from 1912); 
Sligo 29 divisions, 3,599 members; 
Westmeath 6 divisions, 640 members. 27 
When measured by reports submitted to the local press, AOH activity also grew : 
2o DraAm from county inspectors' reports for January 19 10, December 1910, January 1912. October 1913. and 
January 1915 (PRO CO 904/80,82,86,91 and 96). 
27 Monthly reports of county inspectors, January 1916 (PRO CO 904/99). 
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Table 9: AOH reports in local newspapers, 1910-13 
1910 1911 1912 1913 
Roscommon Herald 257 401 439 444 
Roscommon Messenger 8 20 18 54 
Sligo Champion 136 173 260 308 
Western Nationalist 44 113 83 54 
By 1911, Jasper Tully's AOH coverage dwarfed his reports of UIL meetings, while the 
Champion's coverage of divisions in Sligo and Leitrim increased year-on-year. The 
Roscommon Messenger's initially minimal coverage reflected the late start of the Hibernians 
in the south of County Roscommon. Only the Western Nationalist's coverage declined, after 
1911, with the result that aggregate coverage in the two Boyle papers plateaued after that 
year. 
The AOH was greatly boosted by its role as an approved society under the 1911 Insurance 
Act, and from 1912 attracted individuals to separate insurance sections as purely 'insurance' 
members - the Longford division openly advertised that any Catholic man or woman could 
become a member of the insurance section without becoming a member of the Order. 28 By 
the end of 1912, the AOH was far and away the largest Irish approved society, with 130,000 
insurance members. 29 Its establishment in Westmeath, where there had been no divisions 
until 1911 ý 
30 was linked to this role and the police reported that divisions in Moate and 
Strearnstown were set up to capitalise on the Act. 31 The Mullingar division touted for 
business by advertising that the AOH would take on the insurance of anyone not insured 
elsewhere ! 32 In other counties, however, the Order predated the Act; in Sligo and Leitrim 
going back to before 1900. The Order took off in these counties, and in Longford and North 
Roscommon, in the mid- I 900s,, even though the membership numbers reported by the police 
remained way below those for the UIL. Such was its strength in Leitrim that from 1910 
28 Longford Leader, 6'h July 1912. 
2() Leitrim Advertiser, 23d January 19 13. The next largest societies were the Orange and Protestant Friendly 
Society. 61.760 members; the Prudential, 35,000: the National Amalgamated Approved Society, 32,000; the INF 
Benefit Societý'. 30,360 and Presbyterian Health Insurance. 30,000. 
-10 There was a division of the Sinn FeM-supporting 'Scottish Section' in Mullingar Mi 1906, but this was inactive 
by 1908 and had collapsed by mid- 1909. 
31 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector. July 1912 (PRO CO 904/87). 
32 Midland Reporter, 15'b August 1912. 
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onwards the county inspector regularly reported that the AOH dominated the UIL. For the 
Sligo CI, the Order began to become 'more powerful' than the UIL at the end of 1912.33 
In 1910, the contemporary AOH writer, James J. Bergin, in a book blessed by both Devlin 
and Redmond, saw the Order as 'the national organisation of Ireland', but duly added that it 
34 had to extend the support and influence of the UIL . There was potential for rivalry and the 
two organisations, while clearly allied, had not always existed in perfect alignment. In Sligo 
town (see Chapter 7) the Order had in the mid- I 900s been a rival power base to the UIL and 
openly in conflict with the then MP (P. N. McHugh), the bishop (Dr. Clancy) and the Sligo 
Champion. In Roscommon town in 1906, the AOH division's joint secretaries were two 
dissidents who were in 1907-08 to be Sinn Fein supporters - George Geraghty and John 
McGreevy. 35 The division sooncollapsed and was not revived until after 1914. In Boyle, the 
AOH was initially established in 1905 by no less than Jasper Tully as 'a counterpoise to the 
United Irish League' 36 ftom which he had been expelled in 1903. Tully (making a mockery 
of the supposed rule that all AOH members should also belong to the UIL) maintained his 
influence with the Boyle AOH, remaining a trustee in 1914.37 This compelled party loyalists 
to break yet another AOH rule (of no more than one division per parish) and run their own, 
rival division, 'Curlieu Pass'. The rivalry spread to the mining village of Arigna, where the 
Arigna AOH expelled the UIL national directory member John Keaveny, who in 1910 duly 
established the 'Lough Allen' division. 38 
Incidences of local disputes taking the form of AOH/UIL friction could be found right up to 
the war and contesting local factions themselves aligned against each other in one or other of 
the organisations. In Keadue, Roscommon, the two took opposite sides in a row over the 
ownership of a farm, involving bad debts, a 'retumed American' and shootings, lasting from 
November 1909 to October 1911.39 In Carrick (see Chapter 2) the rivalry of Patrick Flynn 
(though he was also a Hibernian as well as leading the town's UIL) and Michael McGrath 
33 Monthly reports of the Leitrim county inspector, May 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1), January 1912 (PRO CO 
904/86) and Sligo county inspector, December 1912 (PRO CO 904/88). 
34 James J Bergin. Histoi-i, of the Ancient Order QfHibernians (Dublm 19 10), p. 85. 
35 Roscommon Journal, I 3'bJanuary 1906. 
36 Crime Special Branch report. April 1905 (PRO CO 904117). 
37 Roscommon Herald, 17'h January 1914. 
38 TT'Cstmeath Independent, 15'hMarch 1913. 
39 Monthly reports of the Roscornmon county inspector, November 1909, July 1911, November 1911 (PRO CO 
904 79.84 and 85). 
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(AOH) was well known. Elsewhere in Leitrim the AOH county president, Michael Carter, 
stood and won in Drumshanbo against a UIL man Pat McManus in the 1911 county council 
elections. 40 These and the earlier frictions in Sligo, Boyle and Arigna all seem to bear out 
Fitzpatrick's description of the AOH in County Clare as a direct competitor to the UIL as 'a 
launch pad for public office'. 41 However, organisational friction should not be overstated. 
After P. A. McHugh's death, Sligo's AOH men - Daniel O'Donnell and John Jinks - came to 
lead nationalist politics in Sligo town and in North Sligo. In Roscommon, despite Tully's 
influence over two divisions, the county organisation was staunchly loyal to the party and the 
RIC county inspector wrote repeatedly of the harmony and cordiality of the county's UIL and 
AOH. 42 In Longford the AOH was actively promoted, and effectively led, by 'Brother 
Farrell' and in Westmeath the new AOH supported Hayden rather than Ginnell. In Leitrim, as 
already noted, the AOH 'dominated' the UIL. Even where the two organisations were 
supposedly in dispute, allegiances could be confused. In the contested 1911 Drumshanbo 
election, the AOH's Michael Carter was also chairman of the Kiltubtide UIL, while the UIL's 
43 
Pat McManus was one of the leading lights in the Tully- supporting Arigna AOH . 
The AOH remained distinctive from the UIL in a number of ways. It was overtly sectarian, 
defending what the Roscommon county president George O'Reilly called 'the cause of 
Catholicity in Ireland which we so dearly love (cheers) 04 and coming to be seen, in the 
historian Eamon Phoenix"s phrase, as 'a Catholic Orange Order to protect the Catholic faith 
and people'. 45 If not a secret society it kept the trappings of one which, for J. J. Bergin, kept 
its business 'strictly to its members' 46 : initiation ceremonies, 'vigilance committees' to 
control membership, and the 'secret signs and passwords that are attractive to young men'. 
47 
Apart from being a benefits society it supported a wide range of social activities : dances, 
bands, concerts, 'cinematic displays', temperance clubs, outings, support for sports (Gaelic), 
rowing clubs and the ubiquitous AOH halls. The Western Nationalist in February 1913 
reported the claim that every division in Roscommon, Sligo and Leitrim now had its own hall, 
40 Leitrim Observer, 13'h May, 3rd June 1911. 
41 Fitzpatrick. Politics and Irish Lýfe, p. 94. 
42 Monthly reports of the Roscommon county inspector, March and June 1913 (PRO CO 904/89 and 90). 
43 Roscommon Herald l3tý May 1911, Westmeath Independent, 15th March 1913. 
44 Roscommon Messenger, 19th March 1910. 
45 Eamon Phoenix, Northern Nationalism : Nationalist Politics and the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland, 
1890-1940 (Belfast 1994). p. 4. 
46 Bergin, HisI07ý'qf the Ancient Order qfHiber-nians, p. 35. 
4" Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. March 19 10 (PRO CO 904/80). 
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providing recreational clubs for the young men of the country. 48 There were also 'Ladies' 
Auxiliary' divisions, though only a handful in the five counties. The aims of Sligo town's 
lady Hibernians included supporting the Church, promoting Irish Catholic literature, stopping 
the spread of poisonous novels, raising funds for burial and medical expenses, and forming 
both an approved insurance society and a co-operative union. 49 
It was also a commonplace that the AOH represented 'youth'. This was particularly so in 
County Longford. Addressing 2,000 at an AOH parade in Longford in 1910, Farrell called 
the AOH an Order 'composed of young men, who are the hope of every country'. At same 
parade, Farrell's associate Thomas Duffy referred to an 'AOH rule' that excluded 
membership beyond 'a certain age' and John O'Dowd, the South Sligo M. P. and a guest 
speaker, called the Hibernians 'the banded youth of the country'. 50 When opening the AOH 
hall in Athlone, Hayden emphasised that it was for 'the young men of this town' and T. F. 
Smyth echoed him when opening the hall at Gorvagh, Leitrim. 51 Jasper Tully wrote of 'the 
2 interest which that organization [the AOH] holds for the young men of Roscommon. '5' As 
Farrell's Longford Leader put it : 
The might of organised young Longford ... should give those petty tyrants and mean- 
souled grabbers notice that alongside the United Irish League there is now grown up a 
young and powerful organization. 53 
The AOH also remained, as the historian Michael Foy put it, 'at the militant side' of the 
Home Rule movement. 54 As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 8, Hibernians took a leading role 
in campaigns against immoral foreign [English] literature at the end of 1911 and for a boycott 
of Belfast goods in the summer of 1912. The AOH's militancy was confirmed with particular 
emphasis by the Roscommon RIC county inspector, who reported in 1913 that the AOH 
operated a membership ban, and a limited social boycott, against soldiers, ex-soldiers and 
policemen: 
48 11 estern Nationalist, 22 
nd February 1913. 
49 Sligo Champion, 13'h April 1912. 
50 Roscommon Herald, II "' June 19 10. 
51 Roscommon Messenger, 23dDecember 1911, Leitrim Advertiser, 206 November 1913. 
52 Roscommon Herald, 17'h December 19 10. 
53 Longford Leader, 4h June 1910. 
54 Michael Foy, The Ancient Order qfHibernians : An Irish Political-Religious Pressure Group, 1884-19 75 (MA 
Thesis, Queen's University Belfast. 1976), p. 80. 
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The AOH is strong and influential throughout the county. If a soldier or a Policeman 
walks into a house where there are Hibernians the latter walk out. If a soldier, or a 
Policeman, on full pay, or on pension, takes part in one of their games the game is 
stopped. Recruiting for the RIC in this county is practically stopped and I attribute it to 
the infiuence of the AOH divisions. These facts indicate the attitude of the AOH towards 
the forces of the Crown and Government. 55 
Much of the Order's distinctiveness and militancy was summed up in a Leitrim Obsenver 
article, 'A Defence of the AOH' by the Roscommon county secretary, P. J. Neary. 56 The 
AOH had been born out of English cruelty and deception. A Catholic society was needed to 
resist the inroads of Socialism, and its mission was to protect the Church. Every member 
must live in conformity with the doctrines and conventions of Catholicity. The Order had to 
second the propaganda of the party, whether it was constitutional or a policy of open 
rebellion. 'In it [the AOH] the glorious bonds of union and charity exist. In it a common 
hatred of English rule and týrranny is nursed. 957 
The relative vigour of the AOH locally is not consistent with the stereotype of an ageing, 
weak, decayed Irish party in the pre-war years. In the five counties, the growth of the AOH 
substantially offset the organisational weakness of the UIL and, with the obvious exception of 
Westmeath, the notion of a straightforward 'long decline' becomes hard to sustain. This can 
be seen when the reports submitted by the AOH and UIL to the local press are aggregated : 
Table 10 : UIL and AOH reports in local newspapers, 1910-13 
1910 1911 1912 1913 
Roscommon Herald 583 683 631 604 
Roscommon Messenger 168 150 164 156 
Sligo Champion 748 707 796 741 
Western Nationalist 197 251 189 129 
55 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. November 1913 (PRO CO 904/9 1). 
56 Neary was also a UIL man, chairman of the Aughrim AOH, a Gaelic Leaguer. Gaelic athlete and regular 
supplier of verse to the ress, particularly to Hayden's Roscommon Messenger. 
5'Leithm Obsei-ver, 19 July 1913. 
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. perhaps 
the aggregate, local state of the Irish Rather than being in an inexorable decline. 
party's popular movements (with the obvious exception of Westmeath) was better described 
by the Roscommon county inspector in July 1912, when he reported that political societies 
were still flourishing, 'more or less ,- 58 
Affiliates of the Party 
The 'Irish party' in the provinces consisted primarily of the UIL and AOH, but it also had a 
number of other affiliates. Some were recognised in the UIL's constitution; the Irish National 
Foresters and Land and Labour associations could provide delegates to UIL candidate 
selection conventions. Some sent affiliation fees to national, UIL-backed organisations (the 
Town Tenants) or subscribed to the parliamentary and Home Rule funds (the Foresters, town 
tenants and some labour organisations). It has to be asked, however, how far the interests of 
these bodies and the Irish party coincided, and how far they were seen as potentially 
independent challengers to the party that had to be controlled. 
The Foresters 
The Irish National Foresters were a rather less active, more middle-aged, middle-class version 
of the Hibernians. Longer-established, they were another Catholic benefits and social 
organisation whose main public, political function seemed to be to march, in regalia, in annual 
St. Patrick's Day and Manchester Martyrs' processions. In January 1916, the police reported 
some eleven branches across the five counties, 59 against 127 Hibernian divisions. For most of 
the branches there was no question of their operating independently of the Irish party and no 
sign from either press or police reports that they did so. The memberships of Hibernians and 
Foresters overlapped, and their competition to recruit 'insurance members' as approved 
societies under the 1911 Act was relatively restrained. 
Where tensions arose, they seem to have stemmed not from organisational disputes between 
Hibernians and Foresters, but as the public expression of well-entrenched local, personal 
rivalries. One focus of tension, yet again, related to Jasper Tully in Boyle. In August 1911, 
the Roscommon county AOH attempted to merge the Boyle and Curlieu Pass Hibernian 
58 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, July 1912 (PRO CO 904'87) 
5() Monthly reports of county inspectors, January 1916 (PRO CO 904/99). Ten branches were counted in all five 
counties except Sligo, where none was listed. There was. however, at least one Sligo branch, in Sligo town. 
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divisions, as the police put it, 'to oust Mr. Jasper Tully from influence in local politics'. 60 In 
June 1912, the 'Boyle' Hibernians responded by taking the lead in setting up a branch of the 
Foresters, with a view to defecting to it. 61 However, little seems to have happened 
subsequently, and the Boyle AOH continued to meet right up to the war. A second focus was 
J. P-Farrell, who at some stage in 1911 fell out with one of his associates Patrick Mallon, a 
Longford solicitor and a Forester (see page 62). In 1912, Mallon led the establishment of new 
INF branches across the county to capitalise on the Insurance Act, competing with Farrell's 
Hibernians. More damagingly to Farrell, in January 1913 he supported the candidacy in the 
UDC elections of another Forester, the ironmonger and house-furnisher Michael Connolly, 
who stood against Farrell's supporters as a 'labour' and Foresters' man, and won. 62 At the 
UDC and backed by Mallon, Connolly promptly defied the chairmanship of Farrell's 
lieutenant Frank MacGuinness by defending an attack already made on the 'family 
organisation' (i. e. Farrell's) running Longford. A public shouting match duly ensued. 
Nevertheless, when MacGuinness called Connolly a 'catspaw' of unionists, Connolly stressed 
his loyalty to the Irish parliamentary party. 63 In the case of neither Boyle nor Longford could 
the tensions be put down to other than the local personal rivalries generated by Tully or 
Farrell. In the five counties, with only these two exceptions, the pre-war Foresters were 
safely under the party's umbrella. 
The Town Tenants 
In a further contrast between urban political activity and rural apathy, Town Tenants' 
associations were active across the five counties right up to the war. Though agrarian 
tensions had subsided, the rapid advance of land purchase triggered a wave of agitations in 
towns not automatically covered by the workings of the Land Acts. The possibility of 
purchasing 'townlands', comprising both town buildings and nearby agricultural land, 
appeared to open up as many neighbouring estates came up for sale, but there was no legal 
obligation on landlords to sell townlands. Funds for purchase could only be advanced by 
bodies such as the Estates Commission or CDB if the townlands were sold as part of an 
agricultural estate. Even then. the issues of demarcation between the various state agencies 
60 Crime Special Branch report, August 1911 (PRO CO 904/119). 
61 Sliao Times, 29hJune 1912. 
62 Longgford Independent, 18'hJanuary 1913 
63 Longford Join-nal: Roscommon Herald, WhFebruarýv 1913. MacGuinness then threatened to put Connolly out 
of the window. 
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provided endless scope for delays. Moreover, only those lucky enough to be direct tenants 
could participate in a state-assisted purchase, while large tracts of townlands were Instead 
sub-let from 'middlemen'. The opportunities open to town tenants, primarily to purchase 
both buildings and land, were, therefore, matched by the frustrations and tensions arising from 
their lack of 'rights' relative to their rural counterparts. 
Thus in the years 1910-13 town tenants were campaigning in Carrick, Mohill, Drumshanbo, 
Dromahair, Manorhamilton and Drurnkeerin (Leitrim); Longford, Edgeworthstown, Granard, 
and Ballymahon (County Longford); Castlerea, Elphin, Strokestown, Roscommon and Boyle 
(County Roscommon); Riverstown and Ballymote (County Sligo); and Castlepollard and 
Kilbeggin (Westmeath). Rent cuts were demanded, not just in their own right, but as a 
prelude to securing better sale terms, and associations also campaigned for the 'Three Fs' 64 to 
be extended from agricultural to town tenants. Protracted purchase negotiations were 
undertaken. Rent strikes and protests at evictions provided the perfect opportunity for the 
intermeshed and fractious town elites to rally to the causes of 'justice' and their own mutual 
self-interest. 
The town tenants were weakest, by contrast, in the three largest towns in the region - Sligo, 
Athlone and Mullingar - where the opportunities to purchase major parts of the town in single 
transactions simply did not arise, and where tenancies were normally held at the bottom of a 
long chain of sub-lettings. In Sligo, though O'Donnell and Jinks had promoted an association 
in the mid- 1 900s, there was no active town tenants' body until 1914 when it was revived, 
again by John Jinks. In both Athlone and Mullingar there were associations during the pre- 
war years, but neither did much other than holding a few irregular and sparse] y-attended 
meetings. In Mullingar in 1911, the Midland Reporter mocked the lethargic state of the town 
tenants, led by associates of Hayden who could attract no more than a dozen to any meeting. 65 
In Athlone the Westmeath Independent, while welcoming moves to revive the association in 
the same year, noted that 'Athlone has the reputation for doing many things in turn and doing 
none of them for very long'. 66 
64Fair rents. fixity of tenure and freedom of sale, enshrined in the 1881 Land Act. 
65 Midland Reponer, 9h November 1911. 
66 Westnieath Independent, 2 
nd December 1911. 
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In his King's County study, John Noel McEvoy argued that the town tenants movement was 
born of frustration and a belief that whatever the Irish party had achieved for agricultural 
tenants, they ignored the needs of town tenants : the party's response was to 'vieA' with 
suspicion' and then take over the movement. 67 However, in the five counties there were only 
isolated glimpses of such anti-party tensions. Only one association openly broke away from 
the party, in Carrick-on- Shannon. Here the Hibernians Michael McGrath and Thomas 
MacDen-nott had led the campaign to purchase the town, advised by the national Town 
Tenants' association in Dublin. However, at the end of 1913, the town tenants announced that 
they were reluctant to subscribe to the Home Rule fund because two of the collectors were 
landlords. Tthe main local collector was the omnipresent Patrick Flynn. 68 McGrath, 
however, went further than his long-standing rivalry with Flynn and spoke openly against 
Redmond and the party, saying that neither had done anything for 'the poor, rack-rented town 
tenants 9.69 In two other towns, though staying loyal to the party, the town tenants split. As 
will be seen in Chapter 5, the Roscommon town tenants were effectively by-passed when the 
singularly energetic parish priest, Canon Cummins, set up his own body, the Roscommon 
Associated Estates Committee, in frustration at the total inability of the town tenants to buy 
parts of the town from the Essex estate. The more acrimonious split, against the party boss 
John Fitzgibbon, occurred in Castlerea. As described in Chapter 2, it was Fitzgibbon's 
flagrant pursuit of his own interests in 1912 which alienated a significant number of his 
fellow townsmen. 
In virtually every other case, leading Irish party figures were active town campaigners, in 
their own and their town's economic and/or political interests, right from the start. There was 
little or no anti-party tension and no need for 'vampirisation', a modem name for the process 
by which the party took over and assimilated new and potentially rival movements. 70 The 
town tenants, for the most part, were already firmly under the party's 'urnbrella'; most 
associations happily affiliated and paid their dues to the national, and party-led, association in 
Dublin. William Field MP and Coghlan Briscoe from Dublin were regularly in the five 
67 McEvoy, A Stu4v qf the United Irish League in King's Couqv, p. 83.. 
68Roscommon Herald, 27hDecember 1913. 
6" Leitrim Observer, 13'h and 20'hDecember 1913. 
70 See Fitzpatrick. Politics and Irish Lffie, p. 10 1: 'The almost mechanical reaction of Home Rule organisers 
when coriftonted by an energetic popular organisation claiming to be without politics was to infiltrate it. 
reorganise it and add it to the cluster of party auxilianes. ' 
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counties to handle purchase negotiations and provide technical advice. In Longford, Farrell 
and MacGuinness led the association from its re-launch in 1908 71 (Farrell having set up a 
'House League' in Longford as long ago as the mid- 18 80s) and in 1911 and 1912 used the 
association to organise a campaign for significant rent cuts and to force the sale of the town 
park (see page 49). Politically, the campaign also challenged the position of the newly- 
returned Lord Longford ('the worst-dressed man in the world' according to his fiiends)72 who 
had recently given up his army commission to return to Ireland, manage his estates and set up, 
to Farrell's outrage, a Unionist Club in the town. Farrell took the lead in rent strikes and in 
the ensuing street-theatre of the sheriff s confiscation, and repurchase by Farrell's supporters, 
of his cow. 73 As in Longford, so in Manorhamilton (Meehan), Mohill (Smyth after his move 
there) and Ballymote (O'Dowd) party MPs all took the lead quite naturally, reflecting their 
positions in local elites and their community of interest with their fellow campaigners. 
Labour 
74 In the 1900s, as John Cunningham has analysed in Labour in the West of1reland , labour 
associations and trades unions had spread across much of provincial Ireland. If not always 
building a 'labour' political consciousness among their followers, they had campaigned with 
intermittent success in pursuit of their own particular economic and class interests. In 1910 
these organisations generally took the form either of rural, parish-based associations focused 
on 4 small' tenants and labourers - normally called 'Land and Labour' - or urban branches of 
craft unions. Land and Labour associations focused on the employment by councils of direct 
labour forces for roadwork, the cost and availability of labourers' housing and more general 
support for the land agitation. In Roscommon, where the police counted five Land and 
Labour branches in 1911 , the 
key campaign in the years 1906-09 had been to force the county 
council to encourage direct labour. 75 In Westmeath in 1910, where five branches were also 
counted, Land and Labour had participated under Laurence Ginnell in the Ranch War. For 
the urban unions - bakers, carpenters, tailors, printers, stonemasons and bricklayers - the 
issues were those of pay, the protection of local industry and the protection of craft status. 16 
71 Longford Journal, 2 nd October 1909. 
72 lbid, 14th January 1911. 
73 Longford Leader; Roscommon Herald, 4h May 19 1 
John Cunningham. Labour in the West of Ireland: Working Lffie and Struggle 1890-1914 (Belfast 1995). 
75 lbid, pp. 122-123. 76 lbid, p. 53. 
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Some towns, such as Athlone, did see the establishment of 'Trade and Labour' associations 
from across the membership of different craft unions, but only one, Sligo, saw the 
establishment of a fully-fledged Trades Council. 
Sligo was also the town in which organised labour grew radically in numbers and cohesion in 
the pre-war years. As will be seen in Chapter 7, this was through the activities of both the 
Sligo Trades Council and the newly-established Irish Transport and General Workers Union, 
which mobilised dock and general labourers to a series of significant industrial victories. 
Chapter 7 analyses this movement and, for all its explicit 'labour' rhetoric, its continuing 
close relationship with the Irish party, particularly the Hibernians. In stark contrast to the 
party/union hostility seen in Dublin during the lockouts and strikes of 1913-14, Sligo trades 
unionists formed a close alliance with the local party leadership - Daniel O'Donnell and then 
John Jinks - which survived until after the outbreak of the First World War. 
Outside Sligo town, trades unions tended to come to notice of press or police only when there 
were disputes or strikes. Thus the Mullingar stonemasons and bricklayers in October 1911, 
Arigna miners in July 1910 (and again in April 1911), Roscommon town labourers in 1910, 
railway workers (twice involved in national disputes) in 1911, Longford carpenters in mid- 
1912 (Farrell's Longford Leader supported the strike)" and Athlone gas workers in 
November 1913 all agitated for more pay and if necessary went on strike, usually 
successfully. None appeared particularly political, either for or against the party, though as 
noted above, Pat McManus of the Arigna miners was also in the Tully-supporting Arigna 
AOH. The one area of marked growth in urban union activity related to shop assistants, who 
organised and campaigned across the five counties, in Longford, Granard, Mullingar, 
Roscommon, Carrick, and Athlone. Here the spur was the 1911 Shops Act and a resultant 
campaign to enforce its provisions limiting opening and working hours. In the case of 
Longford and Granard this brought the assistants into conflict with the town's political, 
nationalist establishments, so many of them shopkeepers and traders, when the two Urban 
District Councils - with Longford UDC chaired by Farrell's associate and draper Frank 
MacGuinness - dragged their heels on the issue of early closing. In October 1912 both 
Longford and Granard councils were 'named and shamed' by Augustine Birrell in parliament 
11 Longfi rd Leader, 18 
th May 1912. 
10 
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for their non-compliance with the Act and the assistants in Granard took their council to 
court . 
78 Compliance remained distinctly patchy. Finally assistants at one Longford shop - not 
that of MacGuinness - went on strike, but this folded when the striking assistants left town 
and were replaced. 79 
Outside the towns, 'labour' activities were largely those of the Land and Labour associations. 
John Noel McEvoy has argued that in King's County these, like the Town Tenants, were 
another potential rival to the UIL, having 'lost confidence in the League because it appeared 
in most instances to favour the claims of farmers or their sons when such farms were being 
divided' . 
80 The expression of such feelings was not, however, widespread in the five 
counties. In North Westmeath local Land and Labour associations did rally behind Laurence 
Ginnell and his rhetoric against the 'ranchers' clique' in Mullingar, but in Roscommon only 
one Land and Labour branch wavered, in 1910, in its loyalty to the party. In late 1909 the 
land agitator Richard Corr returned to the county to try to organise in the interests of the 
dissident William O'Brien, and in early 1910 the Ballinaheglish Land and Labour association 
followed his lead. At this time it agitated on issues of direct labour wages and cottage rents, 
initially pledging loyalty to the UIL, but also passing resolutions praising O'Brien, 
congratulating Ginnell and attacking Roscommon town's UIL 'clique'. When Corr left the 
county in April 1910, however, the Ballinaheglish Land and Labour association quickly 
reverted to conventional expressions of support for the party. 81 Elsewhere, the organisation 
basically 'ticked over' and was not particularly active. In South Westmeath, in contrast to 
Ginnell's constituency, Land and Labour branches provided an explicit support base for the 
party's man Eugene Robins. As president of Moate's 'Land and Labour', Robins led its 
absorption into the Moate AOH. 82 
The one county which saw clear growth in organised rural labour in the pre-war years was 
Longford. Here an agitation fi7om late 1911 pushed for directly- employed labour (by the local 
councils) for roadwork and housebuilding and the leading organiser was Peter Connor from 
18 Longford Journal, Wh October 1912. Longford Leader, 26 Ih October 1912. 
79 Roscommon Herald, 29th November. 6h December 1913. 
80 McEvoy, Study o the United Irish League in Kings County, p. 83. 
81 Monthly reports of the Roscommon county inspector, October 1909 and April 19 10 (PRO CO 904'79 and 80); 
Roscommon Journal, 30'h October 1909; 29h January: 5'h February: 12 Ih February 19 10. 
'2 Monthly report of the 'Westmeath county inspector, March 1913 (PRO CO 904'89). 
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Edgeworthstown. At the end of 1912, a county-wide 'Labour Union' was formed, with 
Connor as secretary and eventually encompassing eight branches. 83 Right from the outset it 
pledged loyalty to the Irish party and enjoyed as its patron that perpetual organiser Farrell, 
who spoke at branch formation meetings, noted that the 'Labour League' was separate from 
the 'purely political' UIL and praised the 'giant power' of organised labour. 84 
Overall, therefore, labour activity strengthened in the years 1910-13, but with growth almost 
entirely concentrated upon three areas : the Longford Labour League, Sligo's mass unionism 
and organised shop assistants across the region. Barring the obvious potential for conflict 
between shop assistants and local shop-keeping elites, labour locally was an ally (in Sligo 
town) or an auxiliary (elsewhere except for Ginnellite North Westmeath) of the Irish party in 
the pre-war years. 
Enemies of the Party - Sinn Fein 
The Sinn Fein party was an outright enemy of the Irish party and had directly opposed it in 
the North Leitrim by-election of 1908. However, according to R. M. Henry, writing just after 
the Great War, Sinn Fein was 'practically moribund' in the years 1910-13 85 and the position 
of Sinn Fein in the five counties was no different. The support that had been seen across the 
region between 1906 and 1909 appeared to evaporate over the next four years. For J. P. 
Farrell in March 1912, Sinn Fein was a spent force and was now confined to 'one back room 
in a side street in Dublin'. 86 
In late 1909 and early 1910, the local press still reported on Sinn Fein activities. Indeed, in 
North Longford, where Farrell's enemy William Ganly had declared for Sinn Fein in 1907, a 
new branch was founded at Granard as late as October 1909, with Ganly's associate the co-op 
manager John Cawley as its secretary. 87 In general, however, the press reported on the 
movement's decline rather than its growth. The tone was set a month later by the chairman of 
Athlone's branch, M. J. Lennon, who resigned because, as the police put it, he had 'regained 
83 LongfiordLeader, I Vh November; 256November; 1911,21' December 1912. monthly report of the Longford 
county inspector, January 1916, (PRO CO 904/99). 
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85 R. M. Henry. The Evolution qf Sinn Fein (New York 1920), p. 98. 
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confidence in the Irish Parliamentary Party'. 88 Sinn Fein as a party played no part in the 1910 
elections. An attempt in November 1909 to revive interest in what the Sligo Champion called 
'factionism', by James Dolan, brother of the defeated North Leitrim candidate of 1908, was 
still-born. 89 In January 1910, Jasper Tully chronicled the failure of the daily Sinn Fein 
newspaper, writing that 'like all newspapers devoted to an ideal, it was run in defiance of all 
ordinary newspaper business lines'. 90 Sinn Fein branches simply ceased to meet. The 
Athlone branch had no meetings in the year to June 1912 and was 'almost extinct'. 91 The rash 
of Leitrim branches, set up around the 1908 by-election (and still nominally twelve in number 
in September 1909) closed steadily over the next few years. By January 1910 according to 
the police, 'no interest is now taken in this organisation'. In June 1910 the county's one 
division of the 'AOH Scottish section' (also called 'Irish American), long inactive, was 
reported to be no more. At the beginning of 1913 the police ceased reporting even on the four 
remaining, 'dormant' Sinn Fein branches - 'it is stated that the organisation in this county is 
nearly extinct'. 92 
People who had been active Sinn Fein supporters in the mid- I 900's still featured in the local 
press after 1909, but nearly always in 'non-political' roles. John Cawley and William Ganly 
were mentioned for their role in the Granard Co-operative society, and James Dolan for his 
roles in the Manorhamilton Gaelic League and as a town tenant (at one point alongside 
Francis Meehan MP in withholding his rent). 93 In Roscommon town, former Sinn Fein 
supporters did retain a position in local life. The builder George Geraghty, a bitter opponent 
of Hayden and Fitzgibbon in 1907, became the chairman of the town commissioners, but 
confined his public campaigning to matters such as the replacement of the town's graveyard, 
the site of the town's race-course and organising a new football ground. Of Geraghty's allies, 
Michael Finlay, a baker expelled from the UIL in 1907, was quiet until the arrival of Canon 
Cummins's RAEC. Only John McGreevy, a clerk, a guardian and rural district councillor, 
maintained an overt political opposition to the party, standing and losing as an 'Independent' 
nationalist in the 1911 county council elections - 'the poor man's friend', enemy of all 
88 Precis of Crime Special Branch reports, November 1909 (PRO CO 904/118). 89 Sli go Champion, 4"' December 1909. 
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6grabbers' and against Roscommon's 'old played-out rotten clique'. 94 In Castlerea, the 
champion of Sinn Fein policies had been Tom Egan, who as late as October 1909 was 
95 
suspected by the police of putting up anti-recruitment posters . By 1912, 
he was sufficiently 
reconciled to Home Rule to go with Fitzgibbon to the great April rally in Dublin, though soon 
afterwards he became one of 'Foxy Jack's' strongest opponents among the newly-divided 
town tenants. 
The Sinn Fein supporter attracting the most personal publicity was the defeated North Leitrim 
candidate of 1908, the former MP Charles Dolan. The Midland Reporter reported Dolan's 
'triumphant' return to Manorhamilton in May 1911 (a temporary visit from America, where 
Dolan lived until 1963) and the Sligo Times noted his visit a week later to the House of 
Commons; many of his ex-colleagues greeted him 'cordially'. 96 The rest of the press tended 
to focus on the 'personal interest' story of his marriage and on his promise of American and 
Irish capital for an Irish boot factory. 97 All of these stories were personal. Explicit mention 
of Sinn Fein in the local press, whether of its policies or its organisation, dried up after the 
first half of 1910. Save for Farrell's dismissal of it in 1912, it was not worth mentioning, let 
alone attacking. 
The Irish Republican Brotherhood 
Leon 0 Broin's history of the IRB estimated that in 1912 there were 1,660 IRB members in 
Ireland, of whom 250 were in Connaught. 98 The IRB had shrunk dramatically from the 
semi-public, semi-secret society of its mid-Victorian heyday and, according to later memoirs, 
was by 1910 taking extreme care over recruitment and security. 99 One would hardly, 
therefore, expect 'the Organisation' to attract press publicity, and it did not. Moreover, not 
only was the press silent, but police scrutiny had been scaled down in the 1900s and local 
police reports were sparse and dismissive. Those by county inspectors were confined to 
periodic notes that there was no IRB activity. What local evidence there was of IRB activity 
94 Roscommon Journal, 20'bMay 1911. 
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therefore stems ftom post-war memoirs. Thus Sean MacEoin's unpublished autobiography 
states that Ganly's associate John Cawley was an IRB centre for Longford who recruited him 
and Sean Connolly in 1914.100 The Tyrrellspass, Westmeath man, Seamas 0 Maoileoin, 
claimed that he joined the IRB at a Mullingar Feis in 1909 and promptly formed a 
Tyrrellspass 'circle' by enrolling his two brothers. 101 Andrew Lavin, a schoolteacher and 
Gaelic League activist of Ballyfamon, Roscommon, joined the IRB in 1908, though he spent 
most of his pre-war years in Dublin. ' 02 
Virtually the only Tenians' reported in the local press were 'old' ones, not quite illustrating 
Oliver MacDonagh's maxim that 'the best of all Fenians was of course a dead one', 103 but 
getting pretty close in the case of J. J. O'Kelly MP, the 'Fenian chief who was so infin-n that 
he did not visit his North Roscommon constituency after 1902. O'Kelly, John Phillips and 
John O'Dowd all referred to and were praised for their Fenian past, though O'Dowd and 
Phillips (not the invisible O'Kelly) would also stress that violent methods were not now 
needed. The local press would also write at length on past Fenian exploits - from the escape 
of John Stephens from Richmond Jail in the 1860s to the role of the late Boyle man John 
Hopkins ('one of the old guard') in the attacks on Chester Castle and Clerkenwell Prison. 104 
After all, as Tom Kettle had put it, Fenianism was 'the fountain from which all subsequent 
Irish movements had sprung'. 105 
Of young 'Fenians', there was only one public manifestation of activity, the Fianna - or, as 
the press and police described them, 'the Boy Scouts' - in South Westmeath. Though Sinn 
Fein withered as an organisation in Athlone, the Fianna were launched there in December 
19,1106 and a troop of no more than 30-40 boys drilled, camped and took lessons right up to 
the outbreak of war. The Fianna did not succeed elsewhere. A company in Moate lasted only 
100 Page 33 of Sean MacEoin's autobiography, quoted in Coleman, County Longford 1910-23, pp. 115 and 279. 
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six months. ' 07 Rumoured companies in Roscommon and Mullingar never materialised. In 
Athlone, the Fianna remained part of a nexus of 'cultural' nationalists - in the Gaelic League 
and the Athlone Pipers" Band - which never adhered to or participated in the Irish party and 
which, as will be seen in Chapter 9, in October 1913 formed part of Athlone's Midland 
Volunteers, the first modem nationalist Volunteer formation in Ireland. Outside Athlone, 
however, such defined 'revolutionary' groups did not really exist beyond a few handfuls of 
individuals. The relative isolation of IRB men is summed up by Alex McCabe, a 
schoolteacher and Sinn Fein supporter who joined the IRB in County Sligo. Quoted in 
Michael Farry's history of Sligo politics, McCabe stated that he was one of only two active, 
pre-war 'Sinn Feiners' in the county: 'We were both standing jokes in the area and being 
regarded as harmless as we were, it must be said, treated with kindly tolerance. ' 108 
Alienated from the Party? - The Cultural Nationalists 
Language, cultural and sporting organisations existed right across the five counties and it was 
the Gaelic enthusiasts inspiring these societies and clubs who formed the provincial backbone 
of the 'cultural nationalist' movement analysed by John Hutchinson in The Dynamics of 
Cultural Nationalism. For Hutchinson, a wide range of causes came under the umbrella of 
'the Gaelic League', including the promotion of the Irish language, the industrial revival, arts 
and crafts, temperance and co-operation. Cultural nationalism, as opposed to political 
nationalism, was described by Hutchinson as 'a distinctive ideological movement with its 
weltanschauung and propounders, forms of organisation, constituency and socio-political 
programme'. 1 09 Locally, however, the lines between the two nationalisms were considerably 
more blurred. It was the interconnectedness of organisations - social, sporting, cultural, 
sectarian, benevolent and overtly political - that was characteristic of provincial life in the pre- 
war years. 
The Gaelic League 
Using the criterion of 'forms of organisation', the Gaelic League was certainly different fi7om 
the political 'league' of the Irish party. A 'branch' often consisted, as Padraig 0 Fearail wrote 
107 Westmeath Independent, 29h June 1912; monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector. January 1913 
(PRO CO 904'89). 
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in his history of the league, simply of a group of people that had come together to form an 
Irish class. "O Branches could thus be anything from single language classes to fully-fledged 
language-teaching and cultural organisations. In addition there was a wide range of league 
activities - social clubs, celidhs, summer schools, festivals - which never featured in even the 
league's broad definition of a 'branch'. The league's newspaper An Claidheamh Soluis had 
declared in 1902 that 'half the Gaelic League does not know what it is about'. III Its 
organisational confusion certainly created significant muddle about just how healthy it was. 
The consensus of recent writers is that the Gaelic League declined in the pre-war years, after a 
phase of mushrooming growth in the early 1900s. For all his caution about the nature of 
'branches'. 0 Fearail noted that in Ireland their number fell from 964 in 1906 to 588 in 1909 
and 388 by 1913. Moreover, Irish appeared to be losing ground in primary schools; while it 
was taught in some 3,000 National schools in 1910, this number had fallen to 1,600 by 
1913.1 12 Hutchinson believed that this decline was only interrupted in the years 1909-10 by 
the successful campaign for 'Essential Irish', to make Irish compulsory for matriculation at 
the new National University. He ascribed the decline, among other causes, to a resurgence of 
political nationalism, severe internal dissensions and a temporary alienation of the Catholic 
hierarchy. 11 3 McEvoy's King's County study noted that the number of active league 
branches there fell from seventeen in 1908 to three in 1914.1 14 For Peter Hart, in his study of 
Cork, the league before the Easter Rising was, like Sinn Fein, reduced to 'diminutive urban 
clubs and isolated enthusiasts'. 115 
In the five counties, there was no shortage of press coverage of the league's decline. In 1910, 
the Westmeath Independent noted that 'the activities of the Gaelic League in other directions 
[than the 'national festival' of 17 th March] may not be as pronounced and as much before the 
public as they have been'. 116 At the 'Clan Uisneach' branch in 19111 P. V. C. Murtagh said 
that it was no use pretending that the movement was flourishing. Despite there being 7,000 
people in Athlone, he did not suppose that he had ever attended a class of more than 40, and 
in 110 Padraig 0 Fearail, The Stoi?, q Conradh na Gaelige (Dubli 1975). p. 17. 
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the branch could not continue paying its teacher. ' 17 At the Sligo branch AGM in 1911, 
teaching of adults over the past year was reported to be 'practically nil', though teachers' and 
children's classes continued. ' 18 For the Roscommon Journal the Gaelic League locally had 
not received the support it deserved and 'local life has a notable tendency for matters 
English'. Progress in the parish of Roscommon had been very little and the county had been 
left untouched by the Gaelic revival. ' 19 The Roscommon Herald reported that the league was 
still dormant in County Longford in 1910, and that the number of volunteers prepared to work 
for a 'self-centred' Ireland was 'alarmingly' small'. 120 This was a recurring theme for Tully 
and, for the Herald's 'Gaelic Notes' in 1912, the movement was not attracting new volunteers 
- las the veterans drop out one by one, their places remain unfilled. ' 
121 
For all this, the pattern of decline was anything but clear-cut and contemporary press 
references, from the same newspapers, can also be cited lauding the movement's health and 
success. Thus the Westmeath Independent, so cautious earlier in 1910, could in June write of 
the forthcoming Midlands Feis in Mullingar: 'The advance of the Gaelic League in County 
Westmeath in the past two years has been phenomenal. ' 122 The Roscommon Journal in 1911 
wrote on the progress of the league, its 'excellent organisation' and 'marvellous work ,. 123 
Was it possible that the league, in the June 1910 words of the Roscommon Herald, was 
getting along wonderfully after all )? 
124 
The manic-depressive nature of local press comment reflected the ebbs and flows of the 
league's activities in the pre-war years. In essence, it was so disorganised and amorphous that 
its activities flourished or decayed at different times in different towns and counties, and no 
consistent pattern of overall growth or decline could be discerned. Thus in Leitrim the 
activities of a league organiser, Sean Ruadhain and a travelling teacher, Kathleen McGowan 
from London, appointed at the end of 1909, transformed the league there. Miss McGowan 
was rapidly teaching up to 500 pupils a week, and by July also attended eleven schools in 
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South Leitrim. By September 19 10, the Roscommon Herald claimed that there were 19 
'branches' in South Leitrim alone. For the police, progress was smaller but still startling, with 
the number of reported Leitrim branches rising from one in September 1909 to eleven in May 
1911.125 The departure of Kathleen McGowan led, however, to the end of this renaissance. 
even though she was replaced by another teacher. By October 1911, the Herald reported only 
five South Leitrim branches. ' 26 
The league did, however, still grow in several parts of the region. It revived in Roscommon 
town in 1911; in Longford town and the countryside of North Longford in 1913 and Moate in 
1913-14. In all three cases, the lead was taken by newly-arrived clergy. In Athlone, for all 
the laments of 1911, the league continued its activities, sustained by a range of musical, 
sporting and, as seen above, scouting activities. A new club house was opened in 1913, with 
a view to boosting what was then seen as a weak organisation across the Midlands. In 
Mullingar, activities revived in 1912, in what was believed to be the third upswing, after two 
declines, of language activity in the town. ' 27 The arrival of Seamas 0 Maoileoin as an Irish 
teacher certainly contributed (reported by the press as 'Seamus Mallon', the IRB man from 
Tyrrellspass and a teacher at the Mullingar Christian Brothers school). 128 However, of at least 
equal importance were the establishment of a branch of the Leinster Irish college at St Mary's 
Hall, tap-dancing classes, a choir and a cycling club. 129 As activity spread from Mullingar to 
North Westmeath, the Midland Reporter in 1913 could thank God that 'there has been a great 
National awakening in the language revival in the last year', after all the years of apathy. ' 30 
In the several instances where the league's revival was not short-lived, it derived institutional 
support from other activities and organisations. In Roscommon town it was bolstered by two 
energetic clerics (Canon Cummins and Rev. Michael O'Flanagan) and by the long-establ 1 shed 
social evenings, music and sports (football and billiards) of the town's Gaelic Club. In Sligo 
a Gaelic Club was set up complementing an existing league branch, by John Treacy in 1911. 
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In Longford consistent support came from the bishop and diocesan clergy and in Mullingar 
from activities such as the choir and the cycling club. The Westmeath Mdependent might 
complain that in Westmeath 'the study of Irish is largely over-shadowed by the social side of 
the Gaelic League programme', 13 1 but the diversity of social life in towns appears to have 
underpinned the movement there. Unsurprisingly, the most prolific 'Gaelic' activities were in 
the largest town, Sligo. Here a new branch was set up by Rev. Brian Crehan (the later, 
qualified supporter of Redmond in September 1914) in the diocesan Gillooly temperance hall. 
Crehan's language students could also participate in the abstinence pioneers, dance and 
gymnasium classes, handball, billiards, cinema shows, a pipe band, singing lessons, a drama 
club, Latin classes, social evenings, excursions, boating competitions and, of course, an 
approved insurance society. 132 
The league's activities were, therefore, best sustained in the towns. Towns were also the 
location of many of the summer festivals or Feiseanna. These were normally, but not 
exclusively, held under the auspices of the league, with competition syllabuses published well 
in advance and a series of competitions in Irish language, history, and music. Annual 
festivals were held in Athlone, Mullingar, Boyle, Castlerea, Manorhamilton, Riverstown (Co. 
Sligo) and Sligo town. 133 Again, the Feiseanna flourished not just because of their focus on 
Gaelic culture and language, but because they embraced a diversity of less Gaelic local 
activities - in one case including knitting, lace, crochet, laundry, fretwork, woodwork, 
hemming, bread-making, freehand-drawing, handwriting, letter-writing and prayers. ' 34 These 
festivals, often held over several days, attracted large crowds and, certainly until 1912, record 
numbers of competitors each year. 
In its language teaching, the league continually came up against the barrier of the common 
perception that to learn Irish was too difficult for most adults. As Rev. Doorly put it at the 
1912 Language Day procession in Sligo : 'It is not to be expected, and we can scarcely 
expect, that people who have arrived at middle life will ever acquire a very good knowledge 
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of the Irish language. ' 135 According to the writer of the Tf estmeath Examiner's 'Gaelic 
Notes' in February 1914 : 'I may assume that it is true that the average adult members of 
Gaelic League classes are not fluent speakers of Irish. I am sure it is a fact that several who 
have attended the Irish classes for many years have only a smattering of the language. 1136 At a 
Mullingar celidh in 1913, Rev. Flynn noted the widespread belief that it was impossible for 
most individuals to get a speaking knowledge of the language. Instead, hopes had to be 
centred on teaching children. ' 37 Here, the general belief was that things were still progressing 
well and, as Hutchinson has recorded, by 1914 60% of boys and 40% of girls were taking 
Irish as a subject in secondary schools. 138 When reporting the 1911 census, the Midland 
Reporter noted that in Westmeath the increase in Irish speakers in the county was almost 
entirely in the age range 10- 18; 'it is really in the schools that the work is being done'. 139 In 
County Sligo, the number of Gaelic speakers had fallen since 1901 - 15,927 against 17,570 - 
but the number of these under 18 had risen from 1,070 to 3,869.140 Even the supposed 
collapse of Irish teaching at National schools in 1913 was explained away. It was widely 
acknowledged to have plateaued for several years at under 3,000 out of over 8,200 National 
schools -a stagnation believed to stem from government parsimony in providing supporting 
grants. When An Claidheamh Soluis reported a collapse, down to some 1,600 schools in the 
year to June 1913, this was hastily refuted by no less than Douglas Hyde, who made clear that 
all but 250 of the 'two thousand' schools which had apparently 'dropped' Irish had since 
resumed it. 141 
The league's most successful educational campaign in the period, for Essential Irish, attracted 
support across the spectrum of local nationalists. All hailed the success of the campaign, 
which locally took the form of politicians on county councils refusing to fund scholarships 
from the rates until the National University had conceded compulsory Irish for matriculation. 
For the Sligo Champion its success in June 1910 was 'A 'National Triumph'. The Leitrim 
Obse7-ver said that the result would make Irish compulsory in practically every school and 
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quoted the prediction of J. P. Boland MP that in forty years Ireland would be Irish-speaking 
from sea to sea. "' Indeed, the Gaelic League received repeated support and encouragement 
from the local political elites throughout the period. Eulogies for St. Patrick's Day parades, 
Language Fund collections, pipe bands, the Feiseanna and compulsory Irish for scholarships 
and/or teachers, together with periodic columns in Gaelic, appeared across the nationalist 
press. Irish party politicians also backed the League's educational campaigns and participated 
in their local branches. Fitzgibbon was a committed treasurer and later vice-president of the 
Castlerea branch and his family participated actively. 143 Hayden, on the committee of the 
Midlands Feis, seemsto have been a less committed, honorary vice-president of the Mullingar 
branch; his brother Joseph had been a patron of Roscommon's Gaelic Club. 144 T. F. Smyth 
backed the revival of the Leitrim league in 1910-11, and brought together the league, the UIL, 
AOH and co-operatives to promote the Irish industrial revival. 145 In Sligo, John Jinks became 
the vice-president of John Treacy's Gaelic club. 146 In Boyle, the head of the town's UIL, T. H. 
Devine, was also a luminary of the town's league 147 and as a result Tully's Roscommon 
Herald did report on it. 
The 'politically correct' view of an Irish politician towards the league, whatever his personal 
cultural affiliations, was given by the party's leader, Redmond, speaking at the 1911 Wicklow 
Feis. All United Irish Leaguers had to give their utmost support to the language movement, 
and the first duty of an Irish government would be to foster the spread of the Irish language. 
'There could never be a great Nation in Ireland unless everything was Irish from top to 
bottorn. ' 148 This was the generally expressed view of local party politicians and the press. In 
1913, it was echoed by F. H. Meehan MP, opening the Breffni Feis in Manorhamilton, who 
stated that every Irishman had to assist the league and, in particular, oppose the secondary 
school scholarships recently offered by Augustine Birrell. 149 These scholarships, proposed in 
1912, were for secondary education and generated another issue on which local politicians 
could support a Gaelic League campaign. As Douglas Hyde put it at the 1912 Castlerea Feis, 
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a knowledge of Irish would not be compulsory for such scholarships and thus Essential Irish 
would be undermined. 150 The local nationalist press was adamant, in a repeat of the 1909- 10 
campaign, that county councils should not support the scholarships out of the rates. Local 
politicians duly obliged. 
This is not to say that the Gaelic League was an adjunct of the Irish party. In public it 
remained resolutely 'non-political'. Many of its activists were not connected with the party. 
In Athlone in particular, the town's Gaels associated with obvious 'advanced' opponents of 
the party; in 1914, when the town's defunct Sinn Fein branch finally closed, it merged itself 
into the Gaelic League. ' 51 Moreover, the party's advanced nationalist opponents in the five 
counties were almost all active in the league. ' 52 However, unlike the political manifestations 
of advanced nationalism, whether Sinn Fein or the IRB, the Gaelic League was not isolated or 
insignificant, but was rather an established, respectable part of the local nationalist 
community of provincial Ireland. Support for the league was axiomatic for nationalist 
politicians, whether Irish party men or their opponents. The league's 'philosophy' was the 
accepted conventional wisdom, a reality expressed with some confusion of language by the 
Sligo Champion in 1912. For the Champion, those who believed in Ireland believed in an 
Irish-Ireland and the Gaelic League had transformed Irish thought. A 'national sentiment' 
had, it said, been converted into a 'philosophy of nationalism'. 153 
The Gaelic Athletic Association 
Like the Gaelic League, the GAA was well integrated into the fabric of local nationalist life, 
but the movement for Gaelic sports showed clearer signs of consistent growth in the pre-war 
years, in both towns and villages. Reports of new clubs and teams being formed, for football 
and hurling, peppered the local press. County associations, revived generally in the early to 
mid- I 900s, held their own local tournaments and fielded county sides in provincial 
championships. Most importantly, as W. F. Mandle has emphasised, county, provincial and 
national football championships grew in popularity as a spectator sport, drawing large, paying 
150 Roscommon Messenger, I O'h August 1912. 
151 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, April 1914 (PRO CO 904/93). 
1-52 Nevertheless. Rev. Michael O'Flanagan, on the league'-s national coisde gnotha and a member of SUM FeIII's 
executive in 19 10-11. addressed a joint AOH, UIL and Gaelic League rally in Ballygar. Galway in June 1913. 
His fellow speakers were the league organiser Philip Waldron and the UIL organiser Seamus O'Mulloy 
(Roscommon Messenger, 14th June 1913). 
153 Sligo Cliampion, 23 rd March 1912. 
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crowds, often coming in chartered trains to permanent sports grounds. 
' 54 Thousands attended 
matches in Athlone, Carrick, Longford, Roscommon and Castlerea. 
At the club level, police 'counts' were, as for other organisations, a poor guide to the GAA's 
health. Again, they were not consistently undertaken across all five counties until January 
1916. Moreover Gaelic sports clubs not currently affiliated to the GAA were not counted. 
(The most extreme case of this related to the wartime police count of the Sligo clubs, the bulk 
of which had then defected from the GAA. The police as a result reported on only two GAA 
clubs in the whole county, with 86 members. ) 155 Youth clubs, school clubs and ladies' 
hurling clubs were not counted. Police inspectors did, however, comment anecdotally on the 
health of the GAA and sporadic counts at the end of 1914 gave patchy evidence of growth. 
Thus in January 1915,19 clubs were counted in Roscommon (against 14 in June 1911) and 32 
in Westmeath (against 25 in September 1909), but in Longford the number was unchanged 
ftom December 1909 at 14.156 The 'English' sports of soccer and cricket were still played 
and, according to the Midland Reporter the Gainstown GAA club failed when members were 
seduced to play cricket by copious supplies of porter from a nearby 'ranchers" pub. 157 
However, even a 'soccer town' such as Carrick fori-ned a GAA football club at the end of 
1913.158 In that year, the Sligo Champion stated that 'foreign games' were all but dead in the 
county. 159 
W. F. Mandle's history is quite clear that at the national and provincial levels the GAA was 
controlled by the IRB, 160 but virtually no trace of such influence can be seen locally in what 
was a considerable volume of press coverage. Press reports, often long, of GAA committee 
and sports meetings were largely on sporting matters. Where feuds and disputes were 
reported, and they were many, they almost invariably related to intra-club, inter-club, or inter- 
county rivalries. Only once did the issue of control of the movement surface, when in June 
1913 the Westmeath Independent and Westmeath Examiner both backed the Dublin Kickham 
154 W. F. Mandle, The Gaelic Athletic Association and Irish Nationalist Politics, 1884-19-74 (London and Dublin 
1987), p. 140. 
155 Monthly report of the Sligo county 111spector, January 1916 (PRO CO 904/99). 
156 Monthly reports of the Longford, Roscommon and Westmeath county inspectors, JanuarY 1915 (PRO CO 
904/96). 
157 Midland Reporter, 6"' July 191 L 
158 Leitrim Obsenwr, l3th December 1913. 
159 slic'o 
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Club's efforts to reduce the power of the GAA's central and provincial councils. to stop the 
, 161 GAA from being 'a lever in the hands of any particular influence . Unlike the press, police 
reports did address the issue of the GAA's 'politics'. However, while the RIC inspector 
general acknowledged the IRB's role ('The leaders are men of extreme views and the general 
tone of the organisation is disloyal ), 162 local county reports repeatedly stated that GAA clubs 
were run for purely 'athletic' purposes. For the Leitrim inspector in February 1913, the GAA 
clubs were 'flourishing, but do not display disloyalty'. For the Roscommon inspector in April 
: 'The GAA clubs are chiefly concerned with their games and do not display disloyalty, but 
that is not saying that they are loyal. ' 163 
Many politi call y-advanced nationalists were active in the GAA, but so too were many Irish 
party figures. These were not just, as Marcus de Burca claimed in his history of the GAA, 
politicians trying to show sympathy for and climb on the bandwagon of the GAA's success. 164 
T. F. Smyth chaired the Leitrim GAA early in its revival, from 1905-07.165 J. P. Farrell had, as 
with so many other Longford societies, founded the local GAA in the 1880s. His lieutenant 
MacGuinness was president of the Longford Football and Hurling Club., 66 One example of 
party support, cited by de Burca as opportunism, came from John Hayden in Roscommon. 1 67 
In 19 10 Hayden continued the support for the GAA given by his late brother Joseph. He and 
John Heverin, another UIL man and secretary to the county council, made a gift of silver 
medals for the winning players to revive the Roscommon county football and hurling 
championships. At the beginning of 1911 the GAA county president P. J. Gillooly paid tribute 
to Hayden who, he said, had rescued the county GAA from being in a bad way financially. 
This provoked the secretary, Michael Brennan (no friend of Hayden or the Irish party) to 
remind Gillooly that it was the GAA, through Gillooly, who first approached Hayden and 
Heverin. However, Brennan's attempt to play down Hayden's initiative, and that of his 
fellow UIL man Heverin, was slightly negated by the fact that Gillooly was himself secretary 
161 Westmeath Independent; Westmeath Examiner, 21" June 1913. 
162 Monthly report of the Inspector General, April 19 10 (PRO CO 904/80). 
163 Monthly reports of the Leitrim county inspector. February 1913 and the Roscommon county inspector. April 
1913 (PRO CO 904/89). 
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of the Four-Mile-House UIL, a member of the South Roscommon UIL executive and assistant 
secretary, under Heverin, of the county council. 168 
In the five counties, support for Irish sports was a fully-accepted part of local life, whether 
through playing in local teams, backing them financially or attending their matches. GAA 
clubs were not a mental world apart from the 'political' nationalists, but rather interconnected 
with them as they were with so many other societies and organisations. As with the language 
movement, the dividing lines locally between 'party men' and 'Gaels' were blurred and the 
concept of a separate 'weltanschauung' was relatively meaningless. 
Temperance 
The temperance movement thrived across provincial Ireland. Temperance clubs, quite 'non- 
political' and uncounted by the police, existed in every town and many large villages in the 
region. The local press, particularly at Christmas or at the time of the St. Patrick's Day 
parade, commented with approval on the new sobriety of the celebrations and a more general 
decline of public drunkenness was noted and praised. Thousands turned out at public 
temperance events and the movement enjoyed the unconditional support of the Catholic 
church. Far and away the largest rally in the five counties in the pre-war years was a 
temperance one, organised by Dr. Hoare and his cathedral clergy, in Longford town in 1910. 
It was claimed that anything from 12,000 to 30,000 people and some 40 bands were in the 
town on 3dJuly, including 3,000 brought by special trains from Dublin, 800 from Athlone 
and 700-800 from Mohill. The procession took over an hour to pass. 1 69 Even unionist 
commentators, often ready to patronise and denigrate the character of their nationalist 
compatriots., approved of the change. The Sligo Independent, admittedly noting that 500 
Protestant 'Catch-my-Pal' men had also taken the pledge, wrote in 1911 : 'To anyone who has 
watched the drinking customs during the past three to four years it is evident that the increase 
of temperance and the discouragement of intemperance has been very marked. ' 170 The 
168 Roscommon Meývsenger, 21' January 1911. Roscommon Journal, 22 nd June 1912; Roscommon Messenger, 
24"' February; 6h July; 19'h October 1912. Gillooly was also a delegate to the Connaught provincial GAA 
council and a stalwart of the Roscommon Gaelic League, race committee and coursing club. 
169 Leitrim Advertiser, 7h July, Longford Independent: Longford Journal: Roscommon Herald, - ff 'estmeath 
Independent, 9' July; Midland Reporter, 14'h July 1910, 
170 Sligo Independent, 9th September 1911. 
102 
Ireland (? f Today, published by the London Times in 1913, proclaimed that the 'Insh peasant' 
now presented a new image - 'he has even ceased to drink . 
171 
The paradox remains that if greater sobriety was now diffused across the five counties, so too 
was the spirit of Wr Bung'. Every town remained riddled with 'public houses'. John 
Fitzgibbon claimed that Castlerea had 43 public houses 172 for a population of under 1,300. 
The resident magistrate Captain Owen lamented Roscommon town's 40-42 'public houses' 
(1911 population 1,858) when only four to six would be quite enough. 173 Such numbers, 
which seem almost incredible, were not proof that the region was overrun with modem-day 
pubs, but rather that drinks licences had to be obtained by every individual wishing to sell any 
alcohol. Thus in MacDonald's Irish Directory for 1912, only four 'publicans' were listed for 
Castlerea, but 45 'grocers and spirits dealers'. For Roscommon there were also four 
'publicans' - the number desired by Captain Owen - but also 40 grocers and spirits merchants, 
almost all of whom would have been licensed. 174 Add in hoteliers, 'dining rooms' and 
'victuallers' and a large proportion of traders and shopkeepers derived part of their livelihood 
from sale of alcohol. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the Irish party locally should be 
linked to the drinks trade, by both contemporary and modem writers. The 1912 MacDonald's 
Directoi)7 entry for Longford town, the site of the great temperance rally of 1910, listed 17 
publicans and 41 'grocers and spirits merchants'. When the unionist Longford Journal 
wanted to denounce the town's 'council of bosses', in 1913, its key complaint was that of the 
fifteen councillors, eight were 'publicans'. 175 
Antipathy between the temperance movement and local 'political nationalism' was not, 
however, the result. The movement could not have progressed so well in provincial Ireland 
without the support of a significant proportion of small-town elites. Admittedly, some of this 
support was opportunist. Farrell, speaking at the Longford temperance rally in 1910, could 
remind the crowd that he had been secretary of the Longford Temperance Association in 
1883, but one month later he could also denounce the Lloyd George budget and call for the 
17 1 The Times, The Ireland of Todav, p. 16. 
172 Westmeath Independent, 29h June 1913. 
173 Strokavtoit'17 Democrat, I O'h May 1913. 
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Party to oppose that budget's extension of the whiskey tax, 'by all the means in its power . 
176 
However, large parts of the press and many leading party figures were far more consistent in 
their attacks on drink. The Western Nationalist, Westmeath Examiner, Roscommon 
Messenger, Leitrim Observer and Westmeath Independent - all party papers - regularly 
published leaders praising the movement, encouraging sobriety and in 1910 supporting the 
Lloyd George budget. They were certainly happy to see public houses closed on public 
holidays and in one case, the Leitrim Observer, even permanently. 1 77 For the Westmeath 
Independent the temperance movement was 'the most encouraging feature of our national 
life '). 178 For Hayden's Westmeath Examiner it would 'stem the tide of infidelity, of a corrupt, 
degraded, disorderly standard of social rights and ideals, which unfortunately too many 
modem influences imply'. 179 When the Lloyd George budget supposedly wrong-footed the 
'drink-related' Irish party, Hayden, Meehan, and Philips of the MPs all spoke up locally in 
favour of increased alcohol taxes; Meehan, himself a publican, backed a 'poor man's budget' 
which taxed the landlord, the brewer, the distiller,, men of means and those who drank and 
smoked. 180 Of the MPs, Smyth and Fitzgibbon were total abstainers and they and Phillips 
publicly encouraged abstinence at meetings and rallies. Fitzgibbon, a lifelong abstainer as his 
father had been, went so far as to say that all issues were subordinate to that of temperance - 
even the winning of a native parliament. 1 81 Again, the line between 'political' and 'cultural' 
nationalism, locally, was hopelessly blurred. 
The Church 
Far and away the strongest 'organisation' in the region remained the Catholic church. 
Entrenched in every town and village, with massive attendance at services and its activities 
reverently reported by the press, the church's position was embedded in what L. Paul-Dubois 
termed its shared 'common interest and sentiment with the people'. 182 All contemporary 
176 Westmeath Independent, 9h July; Roscommon Herald, 7th August 19 10. 
177 Western Nationalist, 60'November 1909, Roscommon Messenger, I Vh and 25th March 1911, Westmeath 
Examiner, I It" March 1911; Leitrim Observer, 4 th May 1912; 
178 W estmeath Independent, 90'August 1913. 
179 Westmeath Examiner, 15'h March 1913. 
180 Hayden reported in the Roscommon Messenger, II th June 19 10; Meehan in the Leitrim Advertiser, 3 O'h June 
19 10, Phillips in the Longford JOU7-nal, 2 7th November 1909. 
18 1 Fitzgibbon speaking to the Castlebar Total Abstinence Society, reported in the Roscommon Journal, Wh 
September 1911. He went on to say that he would never entrust a secret to a man who frequented a public house 
and that if he employed a boy who took a drop he would let him go. (Did he ever think of doing do this to his 
former shop assistant John MacBride? ) 
-arl' Ireland, p. 494. L. Paul-Dubois, Contemp07 
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writers stressed the influence of the church, and even its critic Filson Young, who in 1904 
wrote of it sucking the life and wealth out of the country, noted that individual priests were 
often 'true ffiends' of the people. 'They help them in their affairs, settle their disputes, claim 
for them their rights, comfort them in their sorrows, admonish, encourage, cherish and watch 
over them. ' 183 For Padraic Colum., writing in 1912 of his travels in Ireland, the role of the 
individual priest was all-pervasive : 
In an Irish democracy, the priest is like some great, semi-independent public servant. He 
marries, christens and buries; says Mass and preaches sermons; hears confession and 
attends sick call; he manages the schools, helps to organise League branches and co- 
operative societies, advises the people as to the price they should pay for the land, and 
the time they should spray potatoes. In addition to all this he takes a very active interest 
in the conduct of his people. 
184 
Priests unsurprisingly, therefore, took their place at the centre of the network of committees 
and connections which characterised provincial life. Every county provided examples of such 
intensive clerical networking: 
Rev. Daly, administrator at Mullingar cathedral and from 1910 parish priest in Castlepollard, 
Westmeath, was on committees of the Midland feis, the Westmeath horse show, the county 
agricultural committee, the Mullingar lunatic asylum, the UIL, the Castlepollard agricultural 
and industrial show, the Westmeath county infirmary and the Castlepollard town tenants. 
Rev. Lang , parish priest 
in Abbeylara, Longford until 1913 when he moved to Moate, ran 
Abbeylara's temperance society and pipers' band and the Gaelic League in both Abbeylara 
and Moate. With Rev. Daly in 1913 he also organised the erection of the 'Myles the Slasher' 
memorial at the bridge of Finea, Westmeath. He was also active in the UIL. 
Rev. Mannin , curate in 
Mohill, Leitrim until 1912 and Mount Temple, Westmeath, 
thereafter, was on the committees of the Mohill Gaelic League, the county's 'coisde 
ceanntair' the Leitrim county GAA, the Mohill 'Cycling and Athletic Sports, the Donohue 
temperance memorial hall and the UIL. He was also the 'religious examiner' assessing the 
183 Filson Young, Ireland at the Crossroads .- 
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pay and results of National school teachers and a champion of the use of 'modem' Irish at 
University College, Galway. 
Canon Coyn 
, parish pi est in Boyle, Roscommon until 
he became bishop of Elphin in 1912 nI 
with his curate. Rev Sharke supported the Boyle feis, the town's Gaelic League and hurley 
club, the UIL (for Rev. Sharkey the AOH), the parish committee of the Congested Districts 
Board and the 'Boyle No. V pensions committee. 
Canon Cummins, administrator at Sligo cathedral (and from 1910 parish priest in 
Roscommon), had perhaps the widest range of interests of any priest in the five counties. The 
Sligo Champion described 'the extraordinary energy which Canon Cummins threw into every 
progressive movement' and noted that he 'thinks rather of a good end to be obtained than of 
the obstacles that may have to be surmounted in attaining it. ' 85 While in Sligo, he was active 
in temperance, the county agriculture committee, the Sligo infirmary, the NSPCC, the Irish 
Industrial development Association, the fever hospital, the Gaelic League and the UIL. He 
administered and organised the building of the Gillooly temperance hall (later used so 
comprehensively by Rev. Crehan). The hall as organised by Cummins offered a free library 
and reading room, National school classes, a base for the St Vincent de Paul society, two 
billiards rooms, Irish and history classes, weekly lectures and a band. 186 When he left Sligo, 
many of his responsibilities and positions passed to his successor as administrator, Rev. 
Doorly. 
Almost every 'nationalist' organisation in the five counties had some kind of clerical 
involvement, with the only serious exception being that of 'labour'. If there a positive bias in 
this range of clerical activities it was, as noted by John Hutchinson, to 'cultural' 
nationalism. 1 87 According to Paul-Dubois, 'very soon everything that was youngest and most 
enlightened in the clergy was touched by the new movement' . 
188 The 'Gaelic' activities of 
Coyne, Crehan, Cummins, Daly, Doorly, Langan and Manning and Sharkey were 
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O'Flanagan in Roscommon, Rev. O'Grady in Keash (Co. Sligo) and Rev. O'Reilly in Tang 
(on the boundary of Longford and Westmeath). Did it follow that these clerical, cultural 
nationalists were unsympathetic to the political nationalism of the Irish party, or if not hostile 
were merely content, in the words of the historian David Miller, 'to continue endorsing the 
party, if requested', much as they 'might endorse the products of a manufacturer of vestments 
or stained glass' ? 189 In fact, clerical participation in and support for the Irish party went far 
beyond mere indifferent endorsement. All but two of the examples discussed above (Harte 
and O'Flanagan) were active participants in party affairs. Crehan, Coyne, Cummins, Daly, 
Doorly, Langan, Manning, O'Grady, O'Reilly and Sharkey were all senior UIL officers, 
speakers at rallies and/or attendees at UIL conventions. 190 The clergy, the Irish party and an 
array of societies and clubs were all inter-linked. 
Above them, the hierarchy was admittedly more semi-detached. Dr. Hoare of Ardagh was 
probably the most supportive of the party, particularly of his former pupil from St Mel's, 
Longford, J. P. Farrell. 191 One bishop, Dr. Gaughran of Meath, was studiously neutral 
between Hayden and Ginnell in Westmeath, and all the hierarchy at some stage condemned 
cattle-driving, boycotting and rent strikes. However, even Dr. Gaughran publicly subscribed 
to the parliamentary fund, as did Drs. Hoare and Clancy. Dr. Clancy, bishop of Elphin, had 
clashed most with 'the party' locally, strongly opposing boycotts and rent strikes and then in 
the mid- I 900s taking on Daniel O'Donnell's AOH in Sligo town. In this latter instance, 
however, his allies were the party MP, P. A. McHugh, the town's UIL and McHugh's Sligo 
Champion. 
189 David Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland, 1898-1921, (Dublin 1973), pp. 246-47. Miller was 
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Clancy's prot6g6 Canon Cummins continued to share his bishop's aversion to the Hibernians. 
In 1912 he wrote to Clancy of his past dealings with 'designing men' : 'My experience of 
societies in Sligo was a very bitter one &I dread a repetition of that experience', 192 but he 
was also perhaps typical of local, pre-war clerical views in being what the Sligo Champion 
called 'a staunch and orthodox Nationalist'. 193 In 19 101 before he progressed to Roscommon, 
Cummins could clash with John O'Dowd over the appointment of O'Dowd's unqualified 
niece to be matron of the Sligo county infirmary, 194 but he also ringingly declared his support 
for the Irish party, as 'one of which any country might feel proud'. 195 
Flourishinp, more or less 
On balance, the 'waning of popular politics' described in Chapter 2 did not significantly 
weaken the life of local organisations. Though the Irish party's main local vehicle, the UIL, 
did perceptibly decline, this was in large part offset by the vigour of the Hibernians, who 
thrived not only because of their 'Catholicity', relative youth and aggressive nationalism, but 
also through their promotion of a broad range of sporting, social, cultural and benefits 
activities. The Irish party maintained its connections to a plethora of other societies. In the 
years 1910-13 it showed sufficient signs of life to make its subsequent, imminent, demise still 
far from inevitable. 
Just as 'political' organisations could not exist independently of an array of other clubs, 
societies and committees, nor could the 'cultural' ones analysed by John Hutchinson in his 
study of Irish cultural nationalism. The Gaelic League's aims and objectives had become part 
of the conventional political wisdom of local life. The GAA may have been controlled 
nationally by the IRB, but locally its personnel and activities were so intertwined with other 
organisations that it showed, in the words of W. F. Mandle, 'an uncanny identification with the 
political mood of the ma ority of nationalists'. 196 The temperance movement derived its i 
strength not solely from cultural nationalists, but from right across the spectrum of provincial 
Irish politicians, press and clerics. Local nationalist organisations were intricately interwoven 
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and the overlaps of memberships between them were too many to make for easy 
categorisations. Suff-using almost all of them was the Catholic clergy. The participation of so 
many clerics in the Irish party or Gaelic League locally was not a result of any special 
relationship with either political or cultural nationalism, but rather a reflection of the church's 
involvement with almost all aspects of life in Catholic provincial Ireland in the pre-war years. 
The complexity of personal affiliations and the danger of too simply pigeon-holing 
individuals can be seen in 'Foxy Jack' Fitzgibbon MP - the quintessential party boss of much 
of County Roscommon, but also the committed total abstainer and Gaelic Leaguer. At the 
end of 1913, anticipating Home Rule, he did indeed predict the end of the UIL. It would be 
replaced, he thought, by an organisation whose purposes were 'quite in line with' those of the 
national movement and the Irish parliament - the Gaelic League. 
197 
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Chapter 4: Nationalist Political Language - New Hope or Old Hatreds? 
Political rhetoric. ) whether 
defined as the calculated use of public language by elite 
practitioners of 'high' politics or as the everyday, routine, background noise of local 
politicians, suffused the content of the Irish provincial press in the years before the First 
World War. Major speeches on Irish affairs by national political leaders, British and Irish, 
were reported in detail, while lengthy reports of the many words uttered by local men at a 
plethora of committee meetings, chapel gate gatherings and court and council sessions formed 
the backbone of news coverage. The verbatim nature of these reports meant that the range of 
public political language used by national and local figures was fully on display. They were 
in turn supplemented by somewhat more structured local contributions : articles, letters, 
poems, lectures, endless 'supplied' reports by secretaries of cultural and political societies, 
bishops' lenten pastorals and MPs' speeches, plus the papers' own leading articles. 
Several key strands of language can be identified, including the 'Redmondism' of the Irish 
party's leader, the long-used language of 'The Cause', talk of a new alliance with 'the 
democracy' of England and, notwithstanding this, a deeply pervasive anglophobia. Though 
quite contradictory, they often cohabited quite happily in the language of the same individual 
politicians and newspapers. Together they gave a comprehensive view, reproduced across the 
weekly newspapers published in the five counties, of the spectrum of nationalist political 
beliefs and values. 
Redmondism 
According to the IRB man and revolutionary, Bulmer Hobson, pre-war nationalist beliefs and 
values were almost unreservedly docile. By the I 900s, the Irish people had given up the 
struggle for independence and were quite content with the prospect of a parliament 
subordinate to the British, while 'my generation was bom into an Ireland which, for the most 
part, had lost even the will to resist'. 
' From an opposite perspective, Patrick Shea, the son of 
an Athlone-based RIC head constable and later a senior Northern Ireland civil servant, agreed. 
In his autobiography Voices and the Sound ofDi-ums, Shea wrote: 
1 Hobson, Ireland Yesterday and Tomorrow, pp. 2 and 20. 
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at the beginning of the twentieth century Ireland was at peace; the turmoil of the Land 
War had come to an end and the campaign for Home Rule, which had the support of the 
great majority of the people, was being conducted constitutionally. Violence, it seemed, 
had at last disappeared from the Irish political scene. There was no resentment of 
Irishmen who took employment under the British crown ... and now, with improved 
educational opportunities, more and more young men were going into the British civil 
service and government departments were staffed almost entirely by Irishmen. ' 2 
For Shea,, his father's RIC was 'a native police force under the British crown, a force of 
Irishmen with the duty of maintaining peace and order in their homeland. They had, they 
knew, the backing of their clergy... '. 3 Both Hobson and Shea portrayed a settled, 
conservative, unrevolutionary society and such depictions appear to be quite consistent with 
the waning of political activity, the 'apathy' and the distinctly 'bourgeois' politics outlined in 
Chapter 2. In the words of David Fitzpatrick, 'seldom had Irish nationalism seemed less 
revolutionary' than in 1912. Thus for Fitzpatrick it was John Redmond who 'sounded the 
characteristic public notes of pre-war constitutionalism'. 4 
Redmond was indeed the very model of moderation and modem historians now typically 
label as 'Redmondism' a specific set of beliefs which, though nationalist and committed to 
Irish self-government, were conciliatory to Britain, loyal to the empire, reassuring to 
unionists, wooing men of 'all classes and creeds' to take their proper place in the 
administration of a united Ireland and wedded solely to parliamentary and constitutional 
political methods. Such 'Whig', 'Buttite ý5 beliefs were undoubtedly ingrained in the minds of 
many older, landed and/or upper middle class Catholic nationalists, who were themselves 
assimilated into British life and culture. A contemporary political observer, the Master of 
Elibank (the Liberal chief whip until 1912), wrote of Redmond on his death in 1918 : 
I found him a thorough gentleman and absolutely reliable. Apart from the Home Rule 
principle ... 
be would have been known as a rigid Conservative and Constitutionalist... In 
reality, he was at heart a true Loyalist and the example of his family during the war 
proves it. 6 
2 Shea, VoiCes and the Sound of Drums, p. 28. 
Ibid. 
4 Fitzpatrick. The Two Irelands, 1912-1939, p. 13. 
5 After Isaac Butt, first leader of the Irish Home Rule movement in parliament in the 1870s 
('Quoted in Arthur C. Murray, Master and Brother : Murrays ofElibank (London 1945), p. 108. 
Redmond's fellow MP, Stephen Gwynn, wrote of him that 'the whole bent of his mind was 
toward moderation in all things' and that 'no man was ever less of a revolutionary'. 7 Another 
sympathetic contemporary biographer, Warre B. Wells, wrote that 'from the first' Redmond 
4contemplated the spectacle of Anglo-Saxon civilisation with a sentiment akin to awe' 8 while 
Redmond himself confided to Gwynn : 'if I were an Englishman, I should be the greatest 
Imperialist living'- 9 
Redmondite views were clearly articulated and reported in the local press. In particular, the 
platform and parliamentary speeches of 'the Leader of the Irish Nation' were regularly 
reproduced, even sometimes in unionist papers. Before the war, the vast majority of the 
nationalist press in the five counties, with the sole exception of the Boyle and Mullingar 
papers of Jasper and George W. Tully, remained loyal both to Redmond personally and to the 
Irish parliamentary party of which he was chairman. A figure such as Sir Walter Nugent, MP 
for South Westmeath, member of the Westmeath Catholic gentry (educated at Downside; 
recreations racing, hunting and shooting; member of the Turf, Refon-n, United Services, St 
Stephen's Green and Kildare Street clubs; director of the Midlands and Great Western 
Railway and Northern Insurance; deputy lieutenant of County Westmeath)' 0 could 
consistently advance the most conciliatory and imperialist of views without any apparent 
damage to his local political support. Indeed, in Dublin, his views were no bar to his chairing 
the Freeman's Journal Limited, which owned the Irish party's main national press 
mouthpiece, from 1912-16. 
In the pre-war years, Nugent advanced the full gamut of Redmondite views, which were 
reported without any adverse comment in the party press, particularly the Westmeath 
Independent and the Westmeath Examiner. During 1911 he called repeatedly for the unity 
and strengthening of the British empire, which he saw as a liberal ideal based on equality of 
treatment for every citizen. Only in Ireland, he claimed (presumably ignoring non-white 
colonies) was this ideal not fulfilled. ' 1 In 1912, he stated that the great Irish landed families 
7 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years (London 1919), pp. 3 and 11. 
8 Wells, John Redmond, p. 40. 
9 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 15. 
in 1923 10 Thoms Irish "o's no (DubIM 
" See the Wcývtmeath Examiner, I Vh March, 30'bSeptember 1911 and ff, estmeath Independent, 13dMay. 
1911. 
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were no longer leaders of unionism and called for all 'thoughtful' men with the interests of 
the empire at heart to join together to reach a general agreement'. 12 Ultimately, the King and 
Queen would come over to Ireland to open the Irish parliament and complete the 'great work 
of conciliation'. Ireland would then take her place within the empire. 13 In the autumn of that 
year he told the Athlone UIL : 'We only want to be taken into the Empire, to form part of the 
Empire, part of the United Kingdom, in reality instead of name'. 14 In October 1913 he laid 
out to a Tang public meeting what Home Rule stood for - 'justice for Ireland, the integrity of 
the United Kingdom, the maintenance of the Empire and loyalty to the Crown'. 15 
To the dismay of figures such as the Tullys, such thinking was not just the preserve of Sir 
Walter Nugent. In September 1912 the Roscommon Herald's 'Gaelic Notes' could comment 
that 'the demon of Imperialism has recently entered into possession of many honest souls in 
our midst who were quite proud of their nationality only a few short months ago'. 16 One local 
paper, the Athlone-based Westmeath Independent (owned by the Protestant Chapmans and 
edited by the secretary of the South Westmeath UIL, Michael MacD ermott-H ayes) certainly 
used Redmondite rhetoric more than its rivals and praised conciliatory initiatives taken by 
Nugent. In October 1912, it supported Nugent's call to woo 'thoughtful' men into a new 
'general agreement' by praising 'moderate Unionists' such as Lord Dunraven and Lindsay 
Talbot-Crosbie. 17 In February 1913, the paper explicitly defended an article by Nugent 
promoting Ireland's role in the empire, declaring that the Irish wanted to live as 'freemen in 
the Empire', as free and independent as the people of Canada. ' 8 
Nor was Nugent alone among local MPs. A fellow imperialist was Thomas Scanlan, MP for 
South Sligo. Scanlan came from anything but from the same social or cultural background as 
Redmond or Nugent. He was a local boy made good, went to the same Drumcliffe National 
school as the Sligo town party boss John Jinks'9 and had emigrated to Scotland to work as a 
12 JJ'estmeath Examiner, 9b March, ff 'estmeath Independent, 27 th April 1912. Nugent subsequently welcomed the 
defection from unionism of his ffiend Gerald Dease. 
13 Nugent speaking to the South Westmeath UIL executive. Westmeath Independent, 6tý July, 1912. 
14 Nugent speaking to the Athlone UIL, Westmeath Independent, 12'h October 1912. 
15 Lonofi -d Leader, 4h October 1913. g oi 16 Roscommon Herald, 28th September 1912. 
17 ff, "estmeath Independent, 19'j' October 1912. 
18 Ibid, 150'February 1913. 
'9 S. Hennessy, The Lýfe and Career ofjOhn Jinks (unpublished typescript in Sligo County Library, undated). p. 
4. 
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journalist and solicitor. However, Scanlan shared with Nugent the fact that he was largely 
remote from his constituency and assimilated into British life, in Scanlan's case as a lawyer 
now practising in England and, with Stephen Gwynn, running the Irish Press Agency in 
London. 20 Like Nugent, Scanlan used the language of conciliation and imperialism, and his 
speeches were well-reported in the Sligo press. Typically, speaking in London in November 
1911 , he made it clear that what the Irish wanted was 
'a position within the British 
Constitution, within the British Empire, under the King'. The end of maltreatment of the Irish 
would lead to far stronger bonds to the empire than could possibly exist at present. 21 
Redmondism Disowned: Redmond and the 'Daily Express' in 1910 
Redmondite rhetoric was, therefore, clearly articulated in the five counties in the pre-war 
years, but its use was confined to a minority. Effectively, across the region only the two MPs, 
Nugent and Scanlan, and possibly only one newspaper, the Westmeath Independent, could be 
found to give it voice. The lack of momentum behind this conciliatory, imperialist agenda 
was shown in the autumn of 19 10. At this time Redmond and his parliamentary colleague 
T. P. O'Connor, while they were touring North America to raise funds, promoted a thoroughly 
Redmondite political initiative, in favour of federal 'Home Rule All Round' for the United 
Kingdom and the empire. O'Connor made a series of openly imperialist speeches in Canada 
which, in the words of William O'Brien, 'out-Redmonded Redmond and indeed almost out- 
Kiplinged Kipling'. 22 In these speeches and in an interview given by Redmond to the London 
Daiýv Express in New York in early-October, both men made it clear that they sought for 
Ireland only the degree of self-government given to an American state or to a Canadian 
province. Immediately, they found themselves almost totally isolated back in Ireland and, 
within two weeks, Redmond was forced to repudiate his Express interview. During that 
interval,, no Irish MP or newspaper spoke up in his or O'Connor's defence. Nationalist 
opponents of the party denounced the perceived betrayal of the 'National demand' and 
covered the story in detail, while the response of party loyalists was one of silence, with 
minimal news coverage and no leader comment whatsoever. Then, with Redmond's 
repudiation of the Exp7-ess interview, there came a collective sigh of relief from the party 
20 Sligo Times, 18'h November 1911. 
11 ' Sligo Chainpion, 25"' November 1911. 
22 William O'Brien in a letter to The Observer, 23d October 1910. 
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press, extensive reporting of Redmond's denial and a succession of attacks on what was now 
widely seen to have been a fake. 23 
In the five counties, the Roscommon Herald reported at length on the Redmondite betrayal, 
denouncing it and commented on the contrasting 'frostiness' and silence of party organs such 
as the Freeman's Journal. 24 Its sister paper the Midland Reporter pronounced that Redmond 
had abandoned the national demand and that O'Connor was 'slobbering on' about Ireland's 
imperial destiny. 25 By contrast, party papers such as the Sligo Champion, Western Nationalist 
and Leitrim Observer initially produced at most only truncated factual reporting of the 
Express interview and no cornment at all. This paucity of coverage was then succeeded by 
extensive reporting of and comment on Redmond's denial. All of these party papers accepted 
the denial at face value and that the Express interview was a fabrication. The Sligo Champion 
said that the Express had tried to portray Redmond as accepting a 'very mild milk and water 
26 form of devolution' to the delight of Tory papers in London and of Irish factionists . The 
Western Nationalist said that the Express had caused the 'usual regulation critics' to be up in 
arms against Redmond . 
27 Only Paul Dunne's Leitrim Observer in Carri ck-on- Shannon struck 
a sour note, remarking that while Redmond had denied the interview nothing had been said 
about T. P. 'This is a bar sinister, ' it said, requiring further explanation. It concluded, not 
inaccurately, that 'the whole imbroglio would be laughable if it were not tragic. ' 28 
Throughout the affair, the most Redmondite local newspaper should have been the Westmeath 
Independent. However it followed the exact pattern of the other party- supporting nationalist 
papers. Its initial coverage of Redmond's interview was minimal and its comment non- 
existent. After the denial, it moved quickly to attack the Express's attempt to promote 'gas 
and water' Home Rule. Two weeks later a leading article, 'Lowering the Flag', mocked the 
'absurd' rumours which had circulated that Redmond would tolerate such a watered-down 
version of self-government. 29 In theory, John Hayden's Roscommon Messenger and 
23 For a ftiller account of Redmond's and O'Connor's initiative, and its demise, see Michael Wheatley. 'John 
Redmond and Federalism in 1910' in Irish Historical Studies Vol. XXXII (May 200 1), pp. 343-364. 
24 Roscommon Herald, 8"' and 15th October 1910. 
25 Midland Reporter, 13'hOctober, 1910. 
20 Sligo Champion, 22 nd October 19 10. 
27 ff'(ýstern Nationalist, 22 nd October 1910. 
28Lcitrim Obsen, er, 22 d October 19 10. 
29 U, estmeath Independent, 22 
nd October and 5 "' November 19 10. 
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Westmeath Examiner should also have expressed support for Redmond's initiative. Hayden 
was, after all, one of Redmond's longer-standing Parnellite associates, a ffiend and one of the 
few house guests at Redmond's summer home at Aughavanagh, County Wicklow. 30 When 
the Express interview came out, however, Hayden's titles were as reticent as any other local 
party paper - indeed the interview was not reported at all. After the denial (now reported by 
the paper) had been made, the Messenger believed that those who had attacked Redmond for 
his 'alleged' change of policy should be ashamed. The 'genius and statesmanship' of 
Redmond [though he had presumably not done anything, not having given the interview and 
not having changed policy] had forced the issue of Home Rule through, making it 'the 
question of the hour'. 31 Hayden remained resolutely loyal to his friend and leader, but not 
'Redmondite'. 
Redmondism, it appeared, remained a minority taste. Opponents pointed out that strategic 
retreats by Redmond had happened before; he had pulled back from a position in advance of 
his followers in 1904 (over Irish devolution) and again in 1907 (over the ill-fated Irish 
Council bill) . 
32 In 1910, only two local figures - Nugent and Scanlan - provided any defence 
of what Redmond and T. P. O'Connor had been saying, though like all local MPs they were 
publicly silent prior to Redmond's repudiation of the Express. At the end of October, 
Scanlan, speaking on Teeeside, said that some unionists now realised that 'Mr Redmond was 
not asking for something that would be a danger or menace to the Empire, but something 
which would tend to its greater strength' . 
33 Nugent spoke in Ireland in mid-November and 
was more explicit, defending both Redmond and O'Connor at a local UIL branch 
reorganisation meeting. It was absurd, he said, to portray Redmond and O'Connor as going 
back on the national demand. Nothing had been done other than to define that demand clearly 
and specifically. For years Redmond had been attacked for being too vague. Now that he 
provided definition he was attacked even more. 34 Nugent and Scanlan remained atypical 
figures, however, in their defence of their leader's imperialism and moderation. A more 
30 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 38. When Redmond in August 1914 was to launch his great 
'offer' of the Irish Volunteers to defend Ireland's shores on the outbreak of war, Hayden was to be one of only 
two MPs with whom he first discussed it - the other was T. P. O'Connor (Ibid, p. 13 1). 
31 Roscommon Messenger, 22 nd and 29th October 19 10. 
32 See Tim Healy's brother Maurice speaking at Limerick, 22 nd October 1910, Irish Weekly Independent, 29h 
October 1910. 
Slio, i -e a date for Scanlan's speech, merely noting 
,,, o 
Champion, 20' October 19 10. The newspaper did not gix 
that he spoke 'recenfly'. It is possible, though unlikely, that Scanlan spoke before Z-- Redmond's denial. 
Nugent speaking to Loughnavalleý, UIL, Westmeath Independent, 19'b November 19 10. 
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typical party response was provided by the Longford Leaderý owned by the stalwart party 
loyalist, J. P. Farrell - the Express interview had been 'a lying fabrication for which Mr 
Redmond was in no way responsible'. There had been no 'tremendous lowering of the 
35 
national flag'. Another 'Tory lie' had been nailed . 
Nugent and Scanlan remained unusual in the consistency of their Redmondite beliefs in the 
years prior to the outbreak of war. Other local figures would, of course, use individual 
Redmondite catch-phrases - reassuring Protestants, calling for the unity of 'all creeds and 
classes' or refuting any desire for total separation from Britain. Many others would repeat the 
stock debating point that a generous Home Rule settlement would provide far more security 
for England, Britain or the empire than all the police, armies or dreadnoughts employed by 
that empire. The example of the Boers (and sometimes of Canada in the 1860s) was deployed 
again and again - generous Home Rule settlements brought peace and loyalty. Newspapers 
and politicians did write and speak of the loyalty of self-governing nations to the empire, or of 
the need for Ireland to embrace all its 'sons and daughters'. However, in the case of nearly all 
writers and speakers in the five counties, the use of such rhetoric was anything but consistent. 
Their circumspection towards Redmond's federalist initiative in 1910 indicates that merely 
citing isolated Redmondite utterances is not proof that they embraced the Redmondite creed 
with any of the conviction of figures such as Nugent. Moreover, any Redmondite phrases 
used formed only a part of a much broader and often quite different political vocabulary. Far 
and away the largest component of that vocabulary was that of 'The Cause'. 
The Cause 
One of the regular contributors to Hayden's Roscommon Messenger was PJ Neary, district 
councillor, UIL man, Gaelic Leaguer, Gaelic footballer, leading Hibernian (Roscommon 
county secretary of the AOH) and poet. His verse, ftom 1910 to 1914, reminded the 
Messenger's readers of the epic struggle they and their forefathers had undertaken. The tone 
of his verse was unchanging. At the beginning of 1910 his 'To the Gaels' concluded : 
5 Longfoi-d Leader, 22 "d October 1910. 
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Old Ireland is a land of slaughter, 
Tyrants find their home is here 
Our best's away far o'er the water 
Ireland's wounded sons are here 
Oh! Forward then, erase the Saxon 
Battle give to tyrants mean 
Let our's be pure determined action 
Proudly hail the flag of green. 36 
His 'Ode to Emmet' of the same year ended : 
We'll there avenge our martyred dead 
That murdered cold had been. 
We'll there tear down the English red 
Instead plant Ireland's green. 37 
In 1913, the message of 'To Irishmen' was : 
Let passions brave fan high the martial flame 
Of those who well their country's freedom claim. 
The purpose pure of patriotic minds 
A confirmation 'fore the God head finds. 
The soldier ne'er o'er his bright sword should pause; 
God blesses swords when drawn in freedom's cause. 
A people's lawful banner too is blest 
If raised in fight when people deem it best. 
Let cowardly Gaels who linger in the fight 
Learn now to know God ever aids the right. 
Awake! Advance onto the battle scene 
And soon we'll fTeedom have in College Green. 38 
36 Roscommon Mavsenger, 15'h January 1910. 
7 lbid, I' October 19 10. 
38 lbid, 136' September 1913. 
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The words used by Neary were a mixture of bellicosity, liberty, justice, struggle, victory. 
martyrs, militarism, religion and patriotic freedom. They were entirely consistent with a 
standard nationalist rhetoric which, according to the historian George Boyce, was embodied 
in a mass of popular Victorian Irish literature and history, forming the staple content of 
speeches, editorials and poems. According to Boyce, the substance of popular Irish 
nationalism stemmed from 'the teaching at every level of a catholic Irishman's life - home. 
school, places of work and leisure, place of worship, press, the penny song books, of the myth 
of the persecuted but now arisen nation'. 39 
Ireland's history was one of suffering and struggle, of tyrannous and treacherous oppression 
by the Saxon over the Gael. The list of enemies of the Irish nation was long - tyrants, 
landlords, the aristocracy, the ascendancy, bloodsuckers, parasites, carrion crows, 
Orangemen, masons, the Saxons, the English. Irish unionists were firmly on the list and were 
repeatedly the subject of thoroughly 'un-Redmondite' language in the mainstream nationalist 
press. In 1911, the Sligo Champion cautioned the unionist, J. H. Campbell, who had attacked 
the papacy as a 'foreign power', to remember that : 
the Catholic church has been intimate in the minds and hearts of Irishmen for close on 
sixteen hundred years, whereas the men of whom he is the spokesman have not yet been 
naturalised, and are in fact the most unnatural and foreign thing on Irish soil. They are 
not English, they will not be Irish, and so they can only describe themselves as "His 
Majesty's Loyal Subjects". Has any race of men reached a lower stage of degeneration 
than this? 40 
The Western Nationalist saw 'the respectable classes of Ireland' as 'the spoiled spoon-fed 
descendants of planters, the camp followers of every successful English army, the carrion 
crows who would rob the dead of their own side'. 41 Such belligerent language was used again 
and again across the five counties by newspapers, party bosses, MPs, lecturers, 'poets' and 
councillors, the vast majority of whom nevertheless remained loyal to Redmond as leader of 
the Irish party. Its force can be seen in a summary of Irish history, written in 1913, in a 
Roscommon Journal leader: 
3Q Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, pp. 246,247 and 385. 
40 Sli go Champion, 4hApril 1911. 
41 lVestern ATationalist, 28thSeptember 1912. 
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Through centuries of misgovernment when our foes made endeavours to eradicate the 
rightful owners of the soil and bequeath it to aliens, when our holy religion that St. 
Patrick taught us was attempted to be wrested from us by the lawless Saxon, when the 
cruel Saxon soldiers despoiled the verdant aspect of our "gem of the sea" and likewise 
attempted their atrocities on the virtue of our feminine kin. Through the years of famine 
and pestilence when existence was almost impossible, again came the fierce agrarian war 
and its attendant fight with landlordism. Such is a brief summary of those awful episodes 
from which we eventually emerged and carries us into the present epoch. 42 
For nationalists., the fight for freedom had been handed on to the present generation by a 
succession of Irish martyrs and leaders -a list that could include any of Malachy, Brian Boru, 
Tone, Emmet, Fitzgerald, O'Connell, Smith O'Brien, the Manchester Martyrs, Butt, Davitt 
and Parnell, covering the full spectrum from mythology to constitutionalism to physical force. 
In particular, the national movement was seen as being in a direct line of descent from the 
Fenians. In the case of two local MPs, the absentee J. J. O'Kelly and the elderly John Phillips, 
this was quite true and, as noted in Chapter 3, both were regularly described as 'Fenian 
chiefs'. John O'Dowd also had an IRB past while John Fitzgibbon, speaking in 1910, 
supposed that he, had he been as old as his Castlerea lieutenant Pat Conry, would, like Conry, 
have been one of 'Stephen's men'. He went on to declaim that 'every fat landlord and gutter 
agent' would be swept away, and that his hearers still had to 'fight' the 'landlord garrison'. 43 
When a figure as obviously associated with the IRB and physical force as John MacBride 
visited Sligo to give the Manchester Martyrs' lecture in November 1911 (see also Chapter 7), 
'that gallant soldier' was feted by almost the entire nationalist political establishment of the 
town. Daniel O'Donnell welcomed MacBride. O'Donnell was the AOH's Connaught 
provincial director, national treasurer of the Order and friend of Joe Devlin (the West Belfast 
MP who headed the Hibernians and, with Redmond, T. P. O'Connor and John Dillon, led the 
Irish parliamentary party). O'Donnell told his audience that it 'must respect those amongst 
them who had the courage, not alone in the past, but at present, to give practical expression to 
42 Roscommon Journal, 18'bOctober 1913. Unlike the papers of his nephew Jasper, William Tully's Roscommon 
Journal remained largely loyal to Redmond until after the outbreak of war. 
43 Roscommon Messenger, 16thApnl 19 10. 0 
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that God-given freedom to which man the world over was entitled'. The audience was there 
'to pay a debt not just to the Manchester Martyrs but to the men who had died for Ireland'. 
44 
The debate among local nationalists was more about means than ends : should physical force 
still be employed, or should the 'fight' and 'struggle' be carried on by constitutional methods? 
P. J. Neary, in a 1912 prose article defending Hibernianism in the Roscommon Messenger, 
said that Hibernians would support the party 'whether it is for rebellion or constitutional 
means'), 45 but generally the Cause was seen by the press and by local speakers as on the brink 
of victory. Violence was not now needed. The Roscommon Journal concluded its catalogue 
of Ireland's historic woes by saying that after the almost 'ceaseless toil' of MPs, Ireland was 
now on the brink of Home Rule. 46 Fitzgibbon's 1910 fight against 'every fat landlord' was 
now to be conducted through the Congested Districts Board, 47 of which he had just become a 
member. Physical force was seen as something to be revered but also as, thankfully, 
unnecessary. As John Phillips put it in 1912, he still had the bullets that he had cast in 1866, 
together with his old rifle, but he hoped that Ireland would never again have to resort to such 
methods. 48 
Such language, however much it placed physical force in the past and pledged loyalty to 
Redmond, sat ill at ease with the conciliation repeatedly advocated by the party's leader. The 
inconsistency of tone, between new ffiendships and older hatreds, could be seen again in 
Philips, essentially a rather pacific figure for all his Fenian past and mocked in 1910 as a 
'guileless old gentleman' by the Dublin Sinn Fein newspaper. 49 Speaking to a Longford party 
convention at the end of 1909,, he stressed that the party's goal was Home Rule within the 
empire and not separation. However, his combination of this with stock 'Cause' rhetoric led 
the unionist Longfiord Journal to report this speech as 'full of the bitterest hatred of the 
Empire'. For Phillips, brutal English government was responsible for the Famine and 
44 Slit 0 "d go Champion, 2 December 1911. MacBride in his lecture touched all the bases by stating that if the time 
came again he hoped Ireland would find as many men ready to die for her as in '67', while also announcing that 
he 'did not in any way want to hamper the work of Mr Redmond'. MacBride had been similarly received four 
years earlier by the nationalist establishment in Castlerea, led by his former employer, Fitzgibbon (Roscommon 
Journal, 5h October 1907). 
45 Roscommon Messenger, 30th March 1912. 
4' Roscommon Journal, 18d' October 1913. 
47 Roscommon Messenger, 16th April 19 10. 
48 Longford Leader, 15'h June 1912. 
49 Midland Reporter, I" September 19 10. 
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landlords were 'the enemies of our race and religion'. He was proud to have held a rifle for 
Ireland, and told young men to keep alive the 'ideals' of 1798,1848,1867 and the Manchester 
Martyrs. The Longford Journal concluded that Phillips did not seek Home Rule but rather 
separation, and 'at the point of a bayonet'. 50 In this instance, the power of the traditional 
rhetoric used by Phillips far outweighed the impact of his widely-known respectability and 
even his explicit, formal adherence to moderate Home Rule policies. 
Hayden's newspapers showed the same inconsistency of tone, even within the same editorials. 
Thus the Westmeath Examiner in July 1912 could hail the visit of an English prime minister, 
Asquith, to Dublin and say that the heart of the Irish nation went out to him. It then 
immediately called for the restoration of Ireland's 'stolen right of nationhood' and for a 
healthy national life in a country 'freed from the clutches of the parasite minority'. The 'last 
great stand' for liberty was now being fought . 
51 In February 1913 the Roscommon Messengei- 
lauded the result of a by-election in Derry and praised those Protestants who had voted in a 
nationalist MP. However, it then went on to lambast 'Shoneen Unionist Cawtholics' who 
were still found on too many public boards, crawling after 'the ascendancy'. The Irish had to 
tighten their ranks against the enemies of liberty and progress. 'Those who are not with 
Ireland are against her. ' 52 Hayden himself illustrated the contradictions that riddled so much 
of Irish political rhetoric when speaking at Govan in late 1913. He stressed first, in the best 
Redmondite spirit, that the national movement knew nothing of creed or class, and that the 
6 separation bogey' had been completely buried. However, concerning the Irish unionist 
minority, he said that their watchwords were 'inhuman, uncharitable, unchristian and brutal'. 
They made contemptible threats and fought hard to maintain the ascendancy they had so long 
enjoyed. The people's turn had come. 53 
The Leio-im Obse7-ver demonstrated the range of opinions that could be expressed by a paper 
loyal to Redmond throughout the pre-war years. In April 1911 it hailed 'Ireland's Day of 
Hope'. Home Rule was coming and Irishmen would 'soon place the long lost diadem of 
liberty on the head of their dear motherland'. The 'carrion crows' would no longer fool 
-'0 Longford Journal, I" January 19 10. 
51 Westmeath Examiner, 20'h July 1912. 
52 Roscommon Messenger, 8 th February 1913. 
53 lbid, I" November 1913. 
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anyone. These achievements were the result of the 'splendid genius' of Redmond and the 
unity of his party. A contented Ireland would be a great strength to the empire - witness the 
South Affican example. Of course 'factionists and humbugs' would have to be fought, and 
there was still a 'battle' to come 'in the name of National and human liberty'. 54 By November 
1912 the same paper, still loyal to Redmond and under the same editor and owner, was 
overtly anti-imperialist. There was a danger of Ireland being too contented and conciliatory. 
The paper attacked the 'West Britonism' of those who went into 'ecstasies' at the mention of 
the word 'Empire'. It went on to condemn the idea of Ireland 'taking its rightful place' in an 
empire which was built on 'rapine and bloodshed'. Home Rule must not set the boundary to 
the march of a nation. 55 
A more consistent use of traditional, belligerent, nationalist rhetoric came from J. P. Farrell 
and the Longford Leader. The paper throughout worked for 'this glorious consummation to 
the greatest struggle ever made by a poor down-trodden country'. 56 According to Farrell, men 
57 'knew in their hearts that Unionists were enemies of the Irish national cause' . Speaking at 
an AOH rally in 1912 at Ballinamuck, County Longford, Farrell started by apologising for his 
cold, caught in a 'Saxon parliament', and said that the Hibernians were on 'holy ground', 
moistened with the blood of Irish martyrs 114 years ago. Even after Home Rule was 
achieved, he said, his hearers would still have to fight the demon of ascendancy, and a 
'Catholic society' (i. e. the AOH) would still be needed to fight both Orangemen and 
Freemasons. 58 In the words of the Clare MP, Arthur Lynch, if Irishmen were 'together in a 
public meeting ... the address to which they respond, which vibrates 
in their hearts and thrills 
them in enthusiasm, that address is one which throws before their eyes the image of Irish 
59 
struggles and points the way to the fulfilment of Ireland's triumph' . Such an address, 
though it was made over the years by virtually all party speakers, including Redmond himself, 
was emphatically not 'Redmondism'. 
54 Leitrim Obsen, er, I" April 1911. 
55 Ibid, 9hNovember 1912. 
56 Longford Leader, 31' December 19 10. 
57 Farrell speaking to the UIL at Moylough, Longford Independent, 26 th August 1911. 
5" Farrell speaking to the AOH at Ballinamuck, Longgford Leader, 15th June 1912. 
5Q Arthur Lynch MP, Ireland. - Vital 
HoUr (London 1915). p. 102. 
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The 'Democracy' and its Enemies 
Party supporters of course gave most of the credit for the impending triumph of Home Rule to 
the national movement, the labours of its MPs and the 'genius' of its leaders, past and present. 
However, a new ally was also seen as important to the movement's success : the 'democracy' 
of the old enemy, England. The conversion of 'the slow, plodding but progressive people of 
England 5 60 to support for Home Rule was regularly hailed by party speakers and writers. 
Speaking at Bermondsey in March 1912, Fitzgibbon said that Ireland was now in sight of the 
promised land. The struggle which stretched back to the men of '67 and on to Davitt and 
Parnell was being fulfilled. He thanked God that the English view of Ireland had changed and 
that Ireland now shared the friendship of 'the democracy'. 61 The North Leitrim MP Francis 
Meehan asked in 1912 whether Ireland could ever hope to obtain Home Rule without the help 
of the democracy of Great Britain, 62 while John O'Dowd could declaim that the Irish were 
'now free men practically within their own land'. All had been achieved through the masses 
of the 'democratic forces' of the c ountry. The ideals of British democracy were now identical 
63 to those of Ireland . 
Such language did not embrace all of England in this victorious alliance, but only its 
'democracy'. Praise was directed far more to the democracy than to the Liberal party as a 
whole. Nor was the rhetoric an exact clone of the 'Union of Hearts' language used by 
Redmond himself in the years 1910-14, nor that of nationalists of the mid- I 880s and 1890s 
who hoped for Gladstonian Home Rule. It was explicitly radical, attacking privilege, class 
and wealth as well as the old shibboleths of landlords and the aristocracy. It was, moreover, 
commonplace in nationalist circles in the five counties in the pre-war years. J. P. Farrell stated 
that the Irish now had no quarrel with the vast bulk of English opinion, which had had no 
64 democratic say in government until 1885 . Fitzgibbon claimed that the 
Irish had helped to 
destroy the power of the aristocracy and had thus helped to raise the English democracy to 
power. English prejudices towards Irishmen no longer existed. 65 As the Westmeath 
Independent wrote in 1911, commenting on the new parliament and the imminent Parliament 
"" Westmeath Independent, 28b January 1911. 
61 Roscommon Messenger, 9h March 1912. 
62 Meehan speaking to Maugherow UIL. Sligo Champion, 17th February 1912. 
63 O'Dowd speaking to Gurteen UIL, lbid, 3rd February 19 122. 
64 Farrell speaking at Finsbury Park, Longford Leader, 15th June 1912. 
6S Fitzgibbon speakin, -, in Cardiff. 
Roscommon Messenger, 19'h April 1913. 
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bill to end the veto power of the House of Lords, a revolution was coming to assert the 
independence of the masses. 'The people shall rule. '66 The same paper hailed Asquith's visit 
to Dublin in 1912, saying that he represented 'the new-born spirit of justice which permeates 
the British democracy'. Asquith represented 'the masses' against 'the ascendancy'. 67 J. P. 
Farrell, that long-time exponent of the national struggle, went further, and several times spoke 
up in support of the labour element of the democracy. In 1911 he openly backed the strikers 
disrupting Great Britain : the people were supreme when they took 'the bit in their mouth 68 
'In this country', he said, 'we are carrying on a fight on all fours with the fight the Trades 
Unionists are carrying on in England'. 69 Speaking to a new Labour League branch in County 
Longford in 1912, he stated that 'this is nominally a Liberal government but really a 
democratic one'. The 'Independent Labour party' was the mainspring of democratic advance 
in the House of Commons. The 'giant power' of organised labour was such that if only the 
workers acted they would be the real rulers of the empire. 70 
Apart from the nationalist allies of labour in Sligo town (see Chapter 7), no other leading 
party figure or newspaper in the five counties adopted Farrell's explicitly pro-labour 
language. Nevertheless, almost all party- supporting papers paid homage to the democracy 
and to the radical alliance, of which the British Labour party was a part and which, with the 
Irish parliamentary party, sustained the Liberal government in office. The most consistent 
friend of the English democracy was John Hayden. In May 19 10 the Roscommon Messenger 
could write that 'the National question is now identified with the interests and aspirations of 
the democracy of Great Britain'. 71 In November the paper declaimed: 'freedom for the Irish 
people is now bound up with the freedom of the British people. The democracies are now 
72 
marching side by side toward a single goal' . In Coventry 
in April 1911, Hayden made it 
clear that 'Ireland long ago recognised that it was not the people of England that kept Ireland 
under subjection, but the titled and wealthy classes that kept the people ignorant'. 73 The 
Westmeath Examiner in 1914 stated that Home Rule was Ireland's charter, but the Parliament 
66 Westmeath Independent, 28"' January 1911. 
67 Westmeath Independent, 20'hJuly 1912. 
68 Farrell speaking to Moydow UlL. Longford Independent, 26th August 1911. 
69Farrell speaking to Clonlough UIL, Longford Leader, 26 th August 1911. 
70 FarTell speaking to Killoe Labour League, fbid, 6bJanuary 1912. 
71 Roscommon Messenger, 28hMay 19 10. It> 72 Ibid, 19"' November 19 10. 
73 11 ýestmeath Examiner, 8h Apnl 1911. 
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Act was the charter of millions of the masses of Great Britain. The struggle was that of 
autocracy against democracy. In the fight of wealth against the masses Asquith and Redmond 
were together engaged in the 'struggle for human liberty'. 
74 
Local Irish Politicians were therefore saying complimentary things about a significant section 
of English opinion in the pre-war years, but it would be a mistake to label such language as 
conciliatory, imperialist or Redmondite. It was explicitly radical, attacking the men of 
property appealed to by figures such as Redmond and Nugent. Moreover, though the range of 
enemies of the Cause may have narrowed, bitterness towards the enemies of both Ireland and 
the democracy remained undimmed. These enemies were still the aristocracy, landlords, the 
ascendancy, the House of Lords, the Tories and all of their Irish, Orange and unionist hangers 
on. This could be seen clearly again in Hayden's papers, which continually attacked Ireland's 
class and ascendancy enemies in a spirit quite inconsistent with any Redmondite appeal to 'all 
creeds and classes'. Thus the Westmeath Examiner inveighed against 'the vampire class 
which has had its grip for so long on the throat of the Irish Nation and sucked the life blood 
away'. 75 Its New Year leader in 1914 could still praise the democracies of Great Britain, but 
in their fight against the 'miserable parasitic tendencies of the ascendancy'. 76 Forthe 
Roscommon Messenger in 1911, unionists were 'the conservators of class privilege and 
tyranny'. 77 In March 1913, the paper dismissed 'landlords' (without qualification) as 'a 
mean, narrow-minded, selfish class'. as they had been throughout their history. 78 
The Cause, for all its impending triumph and alliance with the democracy, was still defined by 
reference to its enemies. In addition, the adherence of its followers to constitutional methods 
was always conditional. If Ireland were cheated and Home Rule lost who knew what might 
happen. Even Sir Walter Nugent could muse in October 1912, with more than a little 
prescience, that if Carson were successful and the Irish adopted his methods, 'the Irish party 
would be swept away to make room for a party of more irreconcilable men'. 
79 Usually the 
threat was more blunt. John O'Dowd in January 1912 said that Irishmen had fought 
74 Ibid, 146' and 21' February 1914. 
75 Ibid, 5hApril 1913. 
76 Ibid, 3d January 1914. 
77 Roscommon Messenger, I" April 1911 . 78 Ibid. 8b March 1913. 
79Nugent speak-Ing in Athlone, Westmeath Independent, 12'h October 1912. 
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80 Ulstermen before and if need be would do so again. In April, T. F. Smyth declared that 
Ireland was going to get Home Rule by constitutional means, but if there were a 'slip' he had 
'no doubt that the gallant men and women present here would be just as determined as their 
forefathers. ). 81 In January 1913, Fitzgibbon, speaking in Essex, could emphasise that while 
the democracies of England, Scotland and Ireland were 'knitting together as one web'; if 
Home Rule failed the Irish would give up all hope of getting freedom by constitutional means 
and 'await the opportunity of getting their freedom by other means'. 82 Even obviously 
'Redmondite' national figures could be threatening. In what was admittedly the far more 
febrile atmosphere of July 1914, John Redmond's younger brother, William Redmond MP, 
could tell the Liberal Daily Chronicle in London that if Home Rule were flouted, the youth of 
Ireland would 'resist at all costs'. Sooner than return to the old system of government the 
average Irishman would rather die. 83 In the same month Henry Monson, Daniel O'Donnell's 
protege and successor as the leading Hibernian in Sligo, and the man who was to be 'right 
behind Mr. Redmond' only two months later, put the threat most starkly: 
... coercion [that] has 
for centuries deprived you of the chance of drilling has not killed 
the martial spirit within you, but has rather strengthened and reinforced it, so that now it 
is like a mighty pent up volume of water restrained by but a flimsy dam, the dam of 
constitutional agitation (hear, hear). If English statesmen by paltry tinkering methods 
should yield Ireland's cause and go over to the side of Ireland's enemies then down will 
go the dam, and like a mighty devastating torrent the Irish Volunteers will sweep over 
Ireland, and it will be well for England if they demand no more than Home Rule (loud 
and continued applause). 84 
AnIllophobia - Strikes, Cattle Disease and Immorali 
English Unions 
Despite the perceived alliance with the English democracy, a key component of that 
democracy, British labour, was viewed with suspicion by most of the nationalist press. For all 
of J. P. Farrell's praise for them, distrust of British trades unions was never far below the 
surface, not just because they led disruptive strikes, but because they were 'English'. In 1911, 
80 O'Dowd speaking to Gurteen UIL, Leitrim Observer, 3d February 1912. 
81 Smyth speaking at Ballinamuck AOH rally, Roscommon Herald, 13'h April 1912. 
82 Fitzgibbon speaking in 
Essex. Roscommon Messenger, 8th February 1913. 
83 Sligo Nationalist, I" August 1914. 
84 Ibid, 18'h July 1914. 
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Ireland experienced a significant upsurge of industrial unrest, particularly of railway strikes. 
The striking railwaymen were members of a UK-wide union and their actions posed a direct 
economic threat to the commercial life of Irish towns and farmers. The local press response 
was uniformly hostile. According to the Sligo Champion the 1911 strikes were a symptom of 
4militant socialism', attacking the whole social fabric. Should the striking Irish railwaymen 
have allied themselves with English leaders? 85 For the Roscommon Messenger an attempt had 
been made to make Ireland the battleground for an industrial war, to the benefit of Great 
Britain. The destruction of Irish industry mattered little to a British trades union. Why should 
Irish workers obey the orders of English leaders? 86 The Westmeath Independent believed that 
the railwaymen had to cut themselves away ftorn an English leadership and noted that an 
English agitator in Athlone had been made to leave town rapidly. 87 Jasper Tully, always an 
opponent of the party and hostile to both Liberals and English radicals, also denounced the 
English railway union executive. Parnell, said the Roscommon Herald, never dealt with the 
English unless the terms of the bargain were reduced to writing. The strikes were a 'wanton 
sacrifice of Irish workers. Parnell had remarked that the worst he could say of any man was 
that "he was as false as a Saxon" -) . 
88 
This suspicion and denunciation of things English in labour affairs occurred again during the 
Dublin strikes and lockouts of 1913-14. The Roscommon Mess6-nger denounced the 
selfishness of the British unions. While Irish trade was disrupted and Irish workingmen 
suffered, 'our British rivals' gained. Were the English interfering in the dispute to their own 
benefit? 89 For the Sligo Champion, far the most 'sinister' feature of the dispute was the role 
of the English TUC. 90 The attempt to 'deport' the children of strikers to England came in for 
particular criticism and for the Roscommon Journal this was nothing less than : 'The 
Attempted Anglicisation of Our Race'. 91 Again, it was Jasper Tully's papers which gave full 
vent to anglophobic paranoia. The strikes were a plot, the union leader James Larkin was an 
'Englishman' in league with Dublin Castle. Everything had been inspired by an English 
85 Sli go Champion, 23rd September and 7"' October 1911. 
86 Roscommon Messenger, 30'h September 1911. 
87 Westmeath Independent, 30'b September 1911. 
88 Roscommon Herald, 2.3 3d September 1911. 
8() Roscommon Messenger, 4b October 1913. 
90 Sligo Champion, 2 5h October 19 1 _3 )- 91 Roscommon Journal, 25h October 1913. 
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intrigue to destroy Irish industry and the Irish claim to self-government. 
92 In a leader 
'England the Enemy', Tully claimed that the truth had been made clear by the Larkinite 
strikes. 'The great truth of the last seven centuries' was the venom and hate for everything 
Irish that swelled in the English breast. England's history in Ireland was one of rapine, cruel 
landlords and the ruination of Irish industries. Now they attacked Ireland's Church. A torrent 
of lies was produced in support of 'their brother Englishman' Larkin. Ireland's 'constant and 
treacherous enemy is double-faced, treacherous England'. 93 
Foot and Mouth 
Tully's anglophobia was extreme and unrelenting throughout the pre-war years, but in other 
papers loyal to the Irish party, distrust of, distaste for and sometimes outright hatred of things 
'English' coexisted with praise for the English 'democracy'. As seen above, hostility to 
England as Ireland's historic enemy was inherent in the rhetoric of 'the Cause'. The 
declaration by Farrell to a Roscommon AOH demonstration in 19 10 that he was determined 
to 'clear the Sassanach out of Ireland' 94 was typical of local attitudes. When P. J. Neary wrote 
yet another defence of the AOH in 1913, his conclusion, as noted above on page 80, was that 
'in it [the AOH] a common hatred of English rule and tyranny is nursed. 95 This hostility was 
directed specifically against 'England'; as R. F. Foster has observed, the word 'England' 
carried 'a historical charge, an implication of attempted cultural dominance, an assertion of 
power, which is not conveyed to an Irish ear by "Britain" -) . 
96 
English government, based in London or Dublin, remained a natural target for nationalist 
hostility. The smallest dispute with a government body could trigger a press tirade. Even the 
most conciliatory of local newspapers, the Westmeath Independent, demonstrated its short 
fuse in 1911 when the new Roads Board made disappointing funding allocations to Irish 
county councils. Ireland would always be penalised, said the paper, if linked to 'the English' 
financially. The United Kingdom was united only to rob Ireland. 97 When in 1912 the Local 
Government Board blocked the use of Athlone's workhouse grounds by the Uisneach Feis, 
92 Roscommon Herald, 30'h August and 13'h September 1913. 
93 lbid, 22 nd November 1911. 
94 Farrell speaking to AOH rally at Rooskey. Roscommon. Roscommon Messenger, 14th May 19 10. 
95 Leitrim Observer, 19'h July 1913. 
96 Foster, Pad4i, and Mr Punch, Connections in Irish and English Histolý- (London 1993). p. xii. 
97 Westmeath Independent, 8 th April 1911. 
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the paper responded with a denunciation of 'the bigoted and contemptible innate hatred of the 
official classes to any forrn of Irish nationality', of the 'deeply ingrained spirit of ascendancy' 
and of those who saw themselves as the 'English garrison in Ireland'. 98 
When economic life in rural Ireland really was damaged, by outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease in 1912 and 1914, the response to the actions of 'English' officials was a wave of 
nationalist attacks on them, from both supporters and opponents of the party. The outbreak of 
1912 caused immediate and significant short-tenn disruption to the rural economy. In the 
second half of that year, cattle exports from Ireland were cut by 44% and pig exports by 
56%. 99 Every stage of the livestock trade saw dislocation and reduced prices and profit 
margins. The pain was not just felt by 'large-farmer' exporters of fattened cattle, but by 
sellers and buyers of livestock right down the chain of production. Serious concern was 
expressed locally about the blow to farmers, markets and towns, even in areas where there 
was no local outbreak. The primary culprits were seen to be the English Board of Agriculture 
and its minister Walter Runciman. This assignment of blame was not just paranoia, though, 
for the immediate response of Runciman to the first Irish outbreak, in County Dublin in June, 
was to impose a ban on all imports of Irish livestock into English ports. This blanket ban on 
all live cattle was subsequently relaxed, with a variety of restrictions, inspection rules and 
quarantine requirements being placed on imports from Ireland, but the disruption of Ireland's 
major export trade remained a source of grievance for as long as the restrictions lasted; the 
last ones were lifted only in January 1913. 
Patrick Maume has noted that only two Irish party MPs, Patrick White and William Field, 
campaigned strongly against the cattle embargo and that one, David Sheehy, actually praised 
it as a 'blessing in disguise' because it damaged gTaziers. 100 However, the local political 
reaction to the crisis was far more widespread than Maume believed. The damage to all Irish 
farmers raising cattle, pigs and sheep was such that the typical response was not to take 
pleasure in the plight of graziers but to sound the alarrn on behalf of all farmers, both large 
and small. Many party MPs were, admittedly, constrained in their campaigning, because they 
could not be seen actively to oppose the Liberal government when the Home Rule bill had 
98 Ibid, 9h March 1912. 
" The Times, The Ireland qf Today, p. 3 63. Whether this comparison was with the second half of 1911 or the 
first of 1912 is not clear, but in either instance the damage done was large. 
100 Patrick Maume. The Long Gc-vtation, p. 12 1. 
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just begun its parliamentary passage. The outbreak, therefore, became a political catspaw, 
with loyal party MPs advocating the formation of local committees, deputations and the 
lobbying of ministers, while their nationalist and unionist opponents called for rent and 
annuity holidays, an attack on the government, Runciman's head and even abstention from 
parliament. 
Thus, in Mullingar (where there actually was an outbreak of the disease) John Hayden's 
Westmeath Examiner would say that the party was already doing everything possible to get 
the embargo lifted. The paper attacked 'Unionist tricks', for example that of urging the defeat 
of the goverm-nent, and called for farmers to stay cool and trust their leader, Redmond, to 
handle the matter. 101 The response of Hayden's local rival, the 'land warrior' Lawrence 
Ginnell, was directly to attack the government and start a local campaign for rent relief and 
the cessation of land annuity repayments. Ginnell's press ally, Jasper Tully, was at the 
forefront of the attack on Runciman. According to the Roscommon Herald, Runciman was a 
'typical bumptious Britisher' with that distinguishing 'contempt for everything Irish'. The 
embargo could not continue for thirty seconds if the Irish party stood up to the government. 
Runciman's family was connected to Canadian shipping interests which would benefit if 
Canadian meat exports to England were to grow. When he had been education minister, 
Runciman bad been a bigot against all things Catholic. Why did England not impose a 
comparable embargo on Welsh cattle? The restrictions were intolerable and the Irish party, 
like any other placemen, had been bought and corrupted by the government. 1 02 
The Herald and Midland Reporter were not alone in their attacks on the restrictions. 
According even to Hayden's Roscommon Messenger, Runciman was now acting like an 
'enemy of Ireland', 103 while the Roscommon Journal repeated the accusations about 
Runciman's shipping connections and anti-Catholic bigotry, saying that he 'revels in delight 
to crush Ireland'. 104 For the Longford Leader Runciman was 'one of the hardest and coldest 
types of British official one could find'. 105 The Westmeath Independent denounced the 
English Board's 'pig-headed stubbornness', saying that if necessary Irish MPs would have to 
101 Westmeath Examiner, 14"' September; 2V September; 9 lb November 1912 
102 Roscommon Herald, 31" August; 7b, 14'h and 2 8b September 1912. 
103 Roscommon Messenger, 14'b September 1912. 
104 Roscommon Journal, 7b and 28th September 1912. 
105 Longfoi-d Leader, 7th September 1912. 
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vote against the government. A week later, though, it ruled out this course of action because 
Home Rule could not be lost. Ireland was in 'a pitiable crisis manufactured by England for 
, 106 us . 
In a speech at the Dublin Mansion House in September 1912, John Dillon had emphasised the 
need for party discipline - i. e. not to undermine the government - and the party's discipline 
did hold during the 1912 outbreak. Dillon emphasised that 'the language of threat' would not 
win over English public opinion. However, he also told his audience that there was 'a 
conspiracy backed up by powerful English interests to damage the Irish cattle trade'. 107 
Dillon's speech was illustrative of the fact that though the economic crisis of 1912 did not 
translate into a full-blown political crisis, another example of English antipathy to Ireland had 
been engraved in the collective memory. 
The 1914 outbreak of foot and mouth was less extensive geographically though it lasted 
longer, from January to September. Again, as in 1912, restrictions were immediately imposed 
on live cattle exports to England, though they were more flexible than in 1912 and lifted just 
after of the outbreak of war. However, the response of the Irish press to the outbreak was, in 
its accusations of plots and conspiracies, substantially more paranoid. The Roscommon 
Journal pointed out how the South American shipping trade, together with English and 
Scottish farmers., were all profiting at Ireland's expense. For the paper the origin of the 
outbreaks was 'mysterious', giving 'a sinister aspect'. 108 The Strokestown Democrat reported 
suspicions that the outbreak was the act of 'malicious rivals' and the Western Nationalist said 
that the disease might be the work of men out to damage the Irish trade - 'we do not know'. 
109 
Needless to say, Jasper Tully thought that there were 'plenty of opportunities for people 'on 
the other side' to produce these outbreaks 'to order'. It was all part of a deliberate scheme, 
just after the Dublin strikes, to keep Ireland in 'hot water'. I 10 
As will be seen in Chapter 9, the background to such conspiracy theories was, in 1914, one of 
political crisis, betrayals and popular paramilitary mobilisation. This ratcheting-up of 
106 Tf'eývtmeath Independent, 31" August. 7h September 1912. 
107 Sli go Champion, 28b September 1912. 
108 Roscommon Journal, II th April 1914. 
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tensions could clearly be seen in the Westmeath Independent even though, throughout that 
year's political crises, it continued resolutely to support every initiative made by Redmond 
(its leading article on the outbreak of war would beheaded 'Bravo England'). "' InMarch, to 
paraphrase the 1910 observation of William O'Brien, it almost 'out-Tullied Tully' in its 
intolerance. 'It is more than opinion' it said, 'that a deep and sinister game is being played to 
kill the Irish cattle trade. ' Foreign cattle would replace Irish cattle in England, to support 'the 
Jew millionaires'. 'The Jewman', normally a Tory in politics, 'has a great hatred of Ireland'. 
Men from Birkenhead had recently been seen at a cattle sale in Cork ahead of an outbreak 
there, though it was 'probable' that the disease had not been brought in deliberately. 
Nevertheless 'this is what we get from contact from England - the worst ofit'. 
112 
Immoral Literature 
A marked distaste for foreign culture - its perceived irreligiousness, immorality and 
materialism - regularly manifested itself in the five counties in the pre-war years. This was 
anything but a new phenomenon and in large part its anti-materialism was influenced by a 
centuries-old religious rhetoric exalting asceticism over the baseness and decay of the 
material world. Unsurprisingly, the local clergy were particularly prominent. However, in 
provincial Ireland, the foreign culture that was condemned was in almost all cases English. 
According to the bishop of Meath, Dr. Gaughran, in a 19 10 Saint Patrick's Day sermon, 
'England had fallen away and he would not call it Protestant England but he would call it 
infidel'. 1 13 Father O'Reilly, the parish priest of Tang, damned English dirty trash, vice, 
immorality, materialism, oppression of small nations and dishonesty., 14 The popular Catholic 
novelist, Father Guinan, opened a South Leitrim Feis by saying that the role of the Gaelic 
League was 'to counteract the denationalising inanities and paganising influences of an effete 
civilisation. ' (He later also referred to 'the niceties of a mincing English accent'. ), 
15 In 1911, 
the Western Nationalist gave prominence to articles by a Jesuit writer M.. J. Phelan, over 
several weeks, in which he attacked evils such as 'the Anglicisation that threatens to devour 
us with its filthy plays, its godless literature, its animal standards and pagan ideals'. 
116 
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One particular focus for disgust with things English was 'filthy literature'. The Sligo 
Champion at the end of 1909 could ask whether England was a Christian country. Its leading 
newspapers were owned by Jews, freemasons and sceptics. It produced a 'deluge of hurtful 
and degrading literary matter' characterised by 'nastiness and vileness, generally by 
innuendo'. All patriotic Irishmen should keep away from 'the vile garbage so alien and 
repulsive'. 117 The Leitrim Observer in 1910 blasted 'poisonous and unhealthy' literature' 
flooding in from over the Channel. ' 18 The Westmeath Independent attacked the influence on 
Irish youth of 'cheap trashy garbage' sent over from England. ' 19 For the bishop of Ardagh, 
Dr. Hoare, in his 1911 lenten pastoral, the press teemed 'with the hatred of God and His 
Church', and was 'leavened with. the poison of uncleanliness'. 120 
When, therefore, a national 'crusade' of 'vigilance committees' briefly took off in late 1911, 
to stop the local circulation of immoral, English literature, it was enthusiastically supported 
by local clerics and politicians and by almost the entire press. Leaders were written, public 
meetings held, sermons preached and committees set up in Athlone, Boyle, Longford, 
Mullingar and Sligo. Local bodies such as the Gaelic League, Trade and Labour association, 
Foresters, the St Vincent de Paul society, co-fraternities and temperance pioneers all 
participated, and in each town save for Mullingar the key local role was taken by the 
Hibernians. 121 Their main action was to 'wait on' local newsagents and to persuade them to 
refrain from selling immoral literature. 122 
Though firmly nationalist-led, the crusade was not exclusively Catholic. The unionist Sligo 
Times voiced its support and in Athlone the Protestant, temperance 'Catch-my-Pal' club 
participated on the committee. ' 23 However, the language used remained dominantly that of 
Catholic morality, Irish nationalism and anglophobia. The Sligo Champion made it clear that 
the campaign was against English Sunday newspapers and English boxing papers, 'penny 
117 Sli go Champion, 13flNovember 1909. 
118 Leitrim Observer, 12'h March 1910. 
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dreadfuls' and postcards. 124 The Westmeath Examiner excoriated 'imported trash, morbid 
literary matter and immoral literature' pouring in from across the Channel. It welcomed the 
new movement against national decay, and the formation of Mullingar's vigilance committee, 
'for God, for Nationality, for the intellectuality, character and traditions of a generous pure- 
souled people'. 125 When Rev. Hugh Carpenter lectured on the crusade to the Holy Family co- 
fraternity in Mullingar cathedral, blasting the 'voice of debauchery and crime and sin', he 
talked of a fire spreading through Europe the spark of which had come from hell. England. he 
said, 'had lost the faith and ceased almost to be Christian'. 126 
The mania for vigilance committees at the end of 1911 should not be overstated. There was a 
fundamental inconsistency from the start, in that one of the targeted English Sunday papers, 
Reynolds's Newspaper, was the platfon-n for a regular weekly column by T. P. O'Connor and 
for occasional articles by 'the leader', Redmond, himself The crusade did not stop the 
contributions of either man. In addition,, many Irish readers appear to have responded to the 
publicising of 'evil' by buying more of it. At the end of November, Sir Henry Dalziell, 
proprietor of Reynolds's, claimed that his Irish sales had risen by 50% since the campaign 
started. 127 After an initial flurry of activity, local press coverage of the committees dried up in 
early 1912 and activity seemed to peter out. The Roscommon Herald's 'Gaelic Notes' in May 
1912 took pleasure (as Tully always did in any local failure of his rivals) in noting that 
nothing had happened other than the passing of resolutions and the formation of committees. 
Why, it asked, had all the 'splendid spirit' ended in nothing?, 28 Nationally, D. P. Moran's The 
Leader asked in April 1912 what the committees were doing. Most had done little other than 
to black-list 'only seven or eight dirty papers'. In early 1913 the movement was still going 
strong only in Limerick, Queenstown and Dublin. ' 29 Clerics and newspapers continued 
regularly to denounce English immoral literature, but the 'crusade' had ended. 
In the years 1910-13, the political activity generated in each of the three instances above was 
relatively short-lived. The concerns aroused by the strikes and the first foot and mouth 
124 Sli go Champion, I 
Vh November 1911. 
125 Westmeath Examiner, 9h December 1911. 
126 Midland Reporter, 23rd November 1911. 
127 Ibid, 30"' November 1911. 
12" Roscommon Herald, 18'h May 1912. 
129 The Leader, 6h April 1912, p. 176 and 8h February 1913. p. 643. 
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outbreak ebbed as soon as external stimuli were removed. The immoral literature crusade, 
locally, lasted no more than two to three months from its inception and was if anything 
counterproductive. As seen in Chapter 2, these years were generally characterised more by 
nationalist inertia and apathy than by wild alarms. In the more politi call y-charged atmosphere 
of late 1913-1914, the vehemence of nationalist language in relation to both the Dublin strikes 
and the second foot and mouth outbreak was greater, but the themes expressed were familiar. 
In each of the three cases studied, England was characterised as inimical to Ireland. Whether 
represented by her trades unions, government officials or publishers, she was variously seen 
as at best selfish, uncaring, manipulative, obdurate, anti-Catholic and/or materialist, and at 
worst as conspiratorial, immoral, oppressive, unchristian, malevolent and/or degenerate. This 
language was far more antipathetic to an old enemy than appealing to new fiiends. When, as 
in late 1912, the novelist Father Guinan talked of 'the deadly miasma which exhales from the 
literary filth of the English gutter press (applause)', 130 he was hardly advancing the 'Union of 
Hearts'. 
Political Languag 
'Nationalist' political language covered a strikingly wide variety of beliefs and attitudes 
within the same political movement - from support for English popular radicalism to disgust 
with English popular literature; from conciliation to threat; from Whiggish imperialism to 
visceral anglophobia. Contradictory views were often expressed by the same individual or 
newspaper (with the Westmeath Independent in 1914 throwing in anti-Semitism for good 
measure). Even excluding the unrestrained language of the Tully brothers, examples of the 
full range of this rhetoric could be found in the language of mainstream, party-loyalist 
politicians and newspapers throughout the pre-war period. 
The Dublin Home Rule rally of March 1912 provided a 'set-piece' display of much of 
contemporary nationalist rhetoric. The third Home Rule bill was about to be tabled in 
parliament and nationalists rallied to show support. Some twenty speakers addressed the 
crowds from four different platfon-ns and the event was widely covered in both the Dublin and 
provincial press. Despite this (or possibly because of it? ) the Midland Reporter dismissed it 
as 'Boetian dullness from start to finish), with the speeches 'the dreariest things on God's fair 
13" Guinan was lecturing in Leitrim on changes in Irish social life. Longford Leader, 21' December 1912. 
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earth. One might wade through the columns of them in the "Freeman" and not find a good 
phrase, an original idea or even a happily phrased thought'. 
131 
The speech most reported in the press was, of course, that of the leader, Redmond, who made 
an appeal for future harmony and reconciliation with England, unionists and the empire. 
Ireland was holding out her arms to her sons of every creed and class and longed for the day 
of conciliation. The passing of Home Rule would form a great treaty of peace between 
Ireland and the empire. Ireland would end the ruinous war with England, enter partnership 
with the empire, establish national self-government and become a prosperous land which 
could support herself and in due course bear her fair share of imperial obligations. Ireland 
would have a parliament on College Green sooner than the most optimistic man in the crowd 
would believe, and was about to come into her own again. ' 32 
Redmond was not alone at the rally. First, the majority of speakers repeatedly paid tribute to 
his leadership and statesmanship. Secondly, a number of supporting speakers echoed his 
conciliatory and moderate sentiments. These included, notably, Joe Devlin, but also the MPs 
P. J. Brady, Sir Thomas Esmonde, William Field, J. P. Nannetti and (though he threw in 
references both to 'the persecution, the prison and the gibbet' and to Emmet, Tone and 
Fitzgerald) William Redmond. 133 If these speeches represented one end of the spectrum of 
nationalist language, the other was 
expressed by the non-party speaker Patrick Pearse, who spoke in Irish and shared the 
'Number 3' platform, chaired by Mayor Daniel O'Donnell of Sligo, with Joe Devlin. 134 This 
was the speech in which Pearse hoped that Ireland could win a 'good Act' from the British, 
but predicted 'red war in Ireland' if she were cheated. 'If we are tricked this time, then the 
Gael must have no dealings with the Gall again. ' Thereafter Ireland would need the 'strong 
hand and the sword's edge'. 135 Like the rest of the press in the five counties, the Midland 
Reportei- did not report Pearse's speech, nor indeed the fact that he spoke at all. However, the 
131 Midland Reporter, 4h April 1912. 
132 Sligo Times, 6b April 1912. 
133 Irish Independent; Freeman's Journal, I" April 1912. 
134 Freeman's Journal, I" April and Irish Independent, 2 nd April 1912. Both papers reproduced Pearse's speech 
in Gaelic, with no translation to English. The Gaelic speeches of Stephen Gwynn and Eom MacNeill were 
translated (according to the Freeman on I" April, each platform had a Gaelic speaker). 
135 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 63. FX Martin, 'MacNeill and the Foundation of the Irish 
Volunteers' in FX Martin and F. J. Byme (eds. ), The Scholar Revolutionat? 7, Eoin MacNeill 1867-1945 and the 
Making qf the Ne", Ireland (Shannon 1973). p. 107. 
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paper did remark on the range of language used at the rally, noting the paradox that while 
Redmond on one platform called on Orangemen and Protestants to join the Home Rule ranks, 
Dillon on another called them, in the paper's words, 'the vilest things on earth'. 136 
Dillon did not in fact use these words, but the contrast in tone between his speech and that of 
Redmond's was still great. He asked his audience to declare for national self-rule or for the 
rule of 'the stranger', to decide 'the simple issue of whether the people, the people of Ireland, 
preferred to be governed by Irishmen on the soil of Ireland or be governed by Englishmen and 
Scotchmen sent over to rule them'. He gave no thanks to 'the stranger' for Irish emancipation 
- it had been won by the Irish themselves. The unionist cry was one of 'bigotry and 
intolerance' and their policy one of 'cowards and of dastards and of liars'. The Tories were 
the enemies of English as well as of Irish liberty. In contrast, Ireland wanted no ascendancy 
of Catholics and desired fair play for all Irishmen. ' 37 Though he did make references to the 
threat to English as well as Irish liberty, and to the desire for 'fair play' for all Irishmen, 
Dillon's tone was manifestly not conciliatory. 
Other speakers touched on themes of enmity. The secretary of the North American UIL, John 
O'Callaghan, on Redmond's own platform, predicted that the 'vengeance of an outraged 
people' would pursue Ireland's enemies, both open and covert, if Home Rule was blocked. 138 
John Muldoon MP promised that he would be there to 'meet' Sir Edward Carson should he 
carry out his threatened march on Cork, while the national secretary of the AOH, J.. D. 
Nugent, pledged that the Hibernians were also ready to confront Carson. ' 39 Sligo's own 
favourite son, Daniel O'Donnell, speaking on the same platform as Devlin, Muldoon, Nugent 
and Pearse, struck a particularly sour note, with a barely-concealed threat to the status of Irish 
unionists. He attacked the 'bloaters' who had no faith in their Catholic countrymen, and the 
vile campaign of slander conducted by the carrion crows. He had no doubt that 300 years of 
nursing and pampering (of the ascendancy) from the Castle's feeding bottle were about to 
end. Then the health of these 'superior persons' would 'return to a more normal state' and 
they could take part in the regeneration of the country they had done so much to 'blast' in the 
136 Midland Reportcr, 4b April 1912. 
1.17 Irish Independent, I" April; Sligo Times and Weeklv Freeman, 6d' April 1912. 
138 Irish Independent, I" April 1912. 
139 Ibid. 
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past. 140 Even at a rally meant to anticipate his greatest triumph, the introduction of the third 
Home Rule bill, Redmond's conciliatory message was therefore blurred by its inseparability 
from the bellicosity and threats of many of his fellow speakers. 
Locally, though a decisive majority of Home Rulers expressed loyalty to their leader, only a 
minority sympathised instinctively with the conciliation that he advocated. The passive 
'background noise' of day-to-day nationalist political rhetoric was suffused instead with a 
vocabulary of heroic struggle, suffering, grievance, injustice and enemies. Even the new 
element of party language, that of a radical alliance with the democracy of England and 
Scotland, gained focus from its hostility to a long list of 'anti -democratic' enemies : landlords, 
aristocrats, men of wealth, unionists, Tories, Orangemen. Support for the English democracy 
remained shallow and a clear strain of anglophobia lay not even below the surface of 
nationalist thought; rather it was in the open and regularly expressed by politicians, clerics 
and newspapers. Almost any dispute could arouse hostility to England. The language that 
was to be used during the more general political crises of 1914 or 1916-17, against a 
succession of English 'betrayals of Ireland'. was already fully developed. 
In April 1914, P. J. Neary, this time in the Leitrim Observer, pledged his loyalty to Redmond 
and the Irish party's leaders : 
As shamrocks bloom on mountain crest 
On banks which lordly rivers lave, 
So bloom a gallant trio blest 
Destined a glorious land to save. 
Laud the names! Hail the stars; 
Redmond, Dillon, Devlin. 
141 
Four months later, and written just before the outbreak of war, Neary's next contribution 
returned to John Hayden's Roscommon Messenger. The 'Volunteer Song' shows how little 
Neary really appreciated the beliefs and goals of his leader, but perhaps also demonstrates 
140 Sligo Champion, 6h April 1912. 
141 'Redmond, Dillon, Devlin'. published in the Leitrim Observer, 4h April 1914. 
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how it was Neary, rather than Redmond, who was more in tune with the pre-war beliefs and 
rhetoric of provincial, nationalist Ireland : 
We bend no more to England's lords 
We dread not England's thunder, 
We yield not to the Saxon swords 
We tear our ties asunder. 
The sword alone our wounds can heal, 
Can men from tyrants sever - 
United hearts and glistening steel 
Can weld our hopes for ever. 
142 
14' Roscommon Messenger, 8thAugu,,; t 1914. 
140 
Chapter 5: 'The inner wheels which are workinj4 in the county' - 
Localism in Roscommon 
In January 1917 the electors of North Roscommon voted in the by-election resulting fTom the 
death of the long-absent and infirm J. J. O'Kelly MP. For many observers the result, a heavy 
defeat for the Irish party's candidate by Count Joseph Plunkett, was proof of a decisive shift 
in Irish politics, indicating that the new 'Sinn Fein' movement would sweep the country while 
the Irish party fell apart. For the RIC inspector general : 'The attitude of all sections of 
Nationalists is now hostile to the system of government... Too much reliance cannot be 
placed on continued adherence to Constitutional agitation on the part of the Redmondites'. I 
The Dublin-based Irish Times, Ireland's leading unionist newspaper, wrote that the Irish party 
'would be swept out of three quarters of their seats in Ireland by the same forces that carried 
Count Plunkett to victory'. 2 
The 'forces' propelling Plunkett to electoral victory were undoubtedly national rather than 
local, exemplified by the Count's symbolic role as father of the executed Easter rebel Joseph 
Mary Plunkett. Dismissed as 'an amiable old Whig' by Jasper Tully, 3 with no prior local 
connections and arriving in the county only late in the campaign, Plunkett trounced not only 
the party candidate, Boyle's leading UIL man and Hibernian, T. J. Devine, but Tully himself 
Tully, who split the anti-party vote by standing as an 'Independent Nationalist', had 
dramatically greater local standing and superior opposition credentials, until the Easter Rising 
(vitriolically condemned by Tully) ensured iconic status for almost the entire Plunkett family. 
A near-pen-fianent fixture of Boyle politics since the 1880s, Tully could muster only a fifth of 
the anti-party votes going to his elderly, Dublin-based, academic rival. 
Seen from the perspective of nationwide political movements, the North Roscommon result 
was sudden and startling. The Irish party's grip on the county's affairs had for years appeared 
monolithic, while advanced nationalists had been singularly weak. For the Irish Times, the 
electoral success of Sinn Fein was particularly noteworthy because Roscommon had been 
1 Monthly report of the Inspector General. February 1917 (PRO CO 904i 102). 
2 Quoted in the Roscommon Herald, I O'h February 1917 and by Denis Carroll in The. v Fooled You Again, p. 5 5. 
3 Roscommon Herald, 27th January-1917. 
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'believed to be so peaceful and so free from Sinn Fein and the rebellion taint'. 4 However, if 
the focus of analysis is shifted from national political alignments to the 'parish pump', then 
the previous hold of the Irish party on Roscommon politics can be seen to be have been 
anything but monopolistic. 'Factionist' stresses, the result of local disputes, intensified 
significantly prior to 1914, leaving the party weakened and in a poorer state to withstand the 
earthquake' triggered by the Easter Rising and its aftermath. Newspaper rivalries, family 
feuds, personal affronts, and even the cost of the county surveyors' motorbikes were the 
driving forces of much of Roscommon politics in the pre-war years. As the Roscommon RIC 
county inspector wrote at the end of 1908, after a detailed analysis of the goings-on of the 
Kilmayral branch of the UIL (efforts were being made to reduce, yet again, the influence of 
Jasper Tully) : 'These moves are only of parochial interest but they shed light on the inner 
wheels which are working in the county'. 5 
After the Ranch War 
As already seen in Chapter 2, though the land agitation of the Ranch War subsided rapidly 
after 1909, nevertheless, some tensions persisted into the quieter pre-war years. The 
accelerated pace of land sales in Roscommon did not stop the local campaign against 
cmigrants' - men from outside the county assigned Roscommon land by the CDB - from the 
beginning of 1910 through to the outbreak of war. Boycotts and cattle drives, though 
declining after 1909, still generated lingering grievances. In particular, the 1910 agitation at 
Ballybeg near Tulsk, initially led but soon abandoned by John Hayden and 'the fighting John 
Fitzgibbon of foriner times', fed local ill-feeling against 'the great Mr Fitz' through to 1914. 
In the towns, the sales of agricultural estates which also owned significant townlands aroused 
hopes and occasionally frustrations among a broad range of town tenants, whose agitations 
were if anything significantly more vigorous than those of their now 'apathetic' country 
neighbours. 
The local prominence of John Fitzgibbon provided a target for many of these frictions. As a 
board member of the CDB, he was the focus of almost all local criticisms of the board, 
whether from anti-migrant campaigners, disappointed 'small' men or dispossessed graziers. 
Presiding over the UIL in the county, it was he who was said to have let down the men of 
4 Quoted in the Roscommon Herald, I WhFebruarý, 1917 and by Denis Carroll in neiý Fooled You Again, p. 55. 
_3 716 box 15). 5 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, 
December 1908 (National Archives 
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Tulsk and Ballybeg. Leading the Castlerea town tenants, it was his pursuit of his own 
interests which so decisively fractured the town's association. As chairman of Roscommon 
county council (and Castlerea RDC and Guardians), he dispensed more patronage and 
influence than anybody else in the county and far more than many of the recently- 
dispossessed landlord class. From the end of 1909 onwards there was a continuous undertone 
of discontent with Fitzgibbon, the CDB, the county council and the UIL. As the RIC county 
inspector wrote in June 1910, 'there are many coteries displeased with the present League 
regime'. 6 
The personal grievances underlying these 'coteries' were openly commented upon. For the 
Western Nationalist in July 1910, the enemies of the national movement were a collection of 
boycotted men, road contractors, defeated councillors, those refused admission to the League 
and those too mean to subscribe. 7 From Fitzgibbon's perspective, his Political opponents 
were men disgruntled because he had checked their personal ambitions. Very often he was 
right; they were indeed outside the circle of those benefiting from his jobbery. When in 1913 
the Castlerea county councillor and auctioneer John Hanson attacked the nepotism of Henry 
Fitzgibbon's co-option to the county council, he spoiled the effect by complaining that it was 
Henry's father who had deprived him of a E50 pension and his rate collectorship. Another 
dissident, John Flanagan (a Strokestown guardian) was, according to Fitzgibbon, motivated 
solely by his failure to get the deputy county surveyor's job. In Fitzgibbon's view he faced 
not serious political opposition but rather 'a combine of disappointed men'. 8 
It was, however, such 'disappointed men', based in and around Strokestown, who were 
already chipping away at Fitzgibbon's impregnability from the end of 1909. As county 
council chairman, Fitzgibbon had in 1908-09 supported the cause of employing direct labour, 
usually 'smaller' men and labourers, against the previous practice of letting out road work to 
contractors, mostly larger farmers. 9 In doing so he and the county surveyor, Christopher 
Mulvaney, incurred the ire of a faction of fonner road contractors on Strokestown's rural 
district council. Strokestown RDC was one of the last to fall into line with the county's new 
6 Monthly report of the Roscommon county mspector. June 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
7 Tf r cstern Nationalist, 9h July 19 10 
8 Rosconimon Messenger, I" February and I" March 1913. Hanson was also one of Fitzgibbon's Castlerea town 
tenant opponents in 1912. 
Q See Cunningham, Labour in the TVcst qf Ireland, pp. 122-25. 
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roads policy and in late 1909 led an assault against Mulvaney and his deputy, Michael Hanly,, 
who was found to have paid one of his relatives for 80 tons of never-delivered gravel. Only 
after an investigation by the Local Goverranent Board did Fitzgibbon agree to Hanly's 
sacking, though Mulvaney survived-' 0 
On Strokestown RDC the main assailants of the county's roads regime were the county 
councillor John D. O'Farrell, his brother-in-law James Maguire and the former police 
detective John Shanly' 1- all three of them farmers. Many of these opponents of Fitzgibbon, 
such as O'Farrell, remained party loyalists and party men still fonned a majority of RDC. 
However, the council was consistently hostile to Mulvaney and to the cost of the county's 
road programme. Joseph Maguire (no relation to James), its chairman from 1910 and deputy 
president of the county AOH, was a particular scourge, inveighing against Mulvaney, 
Fitzgibbon, the cost of steam-rolling and the intrusion of 'tourists' ' motor cars into the 
county. Though remaining very much a 'party' man, Maguire raised the spectre of CDB men 
(no prizes for guessing who) flying around in motor cars while those who fought for the land 
were left out in the cold. 12 Such was the consistent opposition from Strokestown (plus the 
nearby villages of Elphin and Tulsk) that Fitzgibbon, throughout 1910, could not get a steady 
majority on the county council to agree to a pay rise for Mulvaney. One meeting in June 1910 
was particularly turbulent, with a large, noisy crowd heckling the councillors and the police 
having at one stage to keep it back from Fitzgibbon. 13 After another Local Government 
Board inquiry, Fitzgibbon in August 1911 could only secure Mulvaney's income by removing 
the surveyor's salary increase from the control of the county council. (In future Mulvaney 
would receive a fee out of grants received from the new, national Roads Board. ) 14 
In this case the challenge was localised (centred on Strokestown), self-interested (with former 
road contractors prominent) and personal (against Hanly, Mulvaney and then Fitzgibbon), but 
it was already an indication of the limits of even Fitzgibbon's authority and of the fractured 
localism of the county's politics. Another dispute to break out, again at the end of 1909, was 
10 Leitrim Observer, Longford Independent, Roscommon Messenger, 20"' November 1909. 
1 Longford Independent, 20"' November; Leitrim Advertiser, 23d December 1909. 
'2 Maguire speaking at a Ballyleague rally. 30'h October 19 10, Roscommon Journal, 5"' November 1910. See 
also Maguire speaking in September 19 10 (Leitrim Advertiser, 8h September 19 10) or in August 1913 
(Roscommon Herald, 16th August 1913). 
13 Roscommon Herald, 4th June 19 10. 
14 Ibid, 19'h August 1911. 
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equally localised, self-interested and personal, stemming from two families which had been 
rivals in Roscommon town for some thirty years, the Tullys and the Haydens. 
The Hayden family had long been influential in Roscommon town, and though John Hayden 
had lived in Mullingar, Westmeath since 1882, he inherited the South Roscommon 
parliamentary seat on the death of his brother Luke in 1897. In December 1909, Hayden 
inherited the proprietorship of the Roscommon Messenger and day-to-day leadership of the 
town's UIL on the death of another brother, Joseph. Almost immediately, Hayden, the 
Messenger and the local UIL were pitched against the Tullys. In this instance, the Tullys 
were William, proprietor of the Roscommon Journal and his son George D. 15 'William Tully 
and Sons' were the town's leading auctioneers. Their hostility to the Hayden family had been 
entrenched for years in the business rivalry of the town's two newspapers and was reinforced 
by the Parnell split from 1890 to 1900 (the Haydens were all Pamellites; the Tullys 'antis'). 
In 1910, William Tully - unlike his nephew Jasper in Boyle - was a loyal supporter of 
Redmond, but had been long at odds with the town's UIL. 
The death of Joseph Hayden triggered the issue of who should be co-opted to replace him on 
Roscommon District Council. George D. Tully wanted to fill the position, but the Tullys 
were not paid-up UIL members and the town's UIL moved rapidly to deny him any chance of 
this honour. The Roscommon Messenger made it clear that George Tully could have no claim 
to the role, 'on the grounds of Nationality'. 16 This led to weeks of leaders and counter-leaders 
in the two papers. For the Messenger, the Tullys' non-membership of the UIL debarred them 
from any office. Their newspaper, which had 'sat on the fence for far too long' was doing 
nothing other than to support factionalism. For the Journal, Hayden's paper was guilty of 
41ow, mean and contemptible misrepresentation', motivated by nothing more than 
'PERSONAL SPITE'. The Tullys claimed that they had always backed the principles of the 
UIL, but had no time for the clique, wire-pullers and 'factionists' who ran the town's branch. 
Two particular objects of their antagonism were H. I. McCourt (a Messenger employee, 
Joseph Hayden's successor as clerk to the town commissioners, secretary of the town UIL) 
and Charles O'Keeffe (secretary to the South Roscommon UIL and accountant to the county 
15 William Tully was the uncle of the Boyle-based brothers Jasper and George '\N'. Tully. 
1` Roscommon Messenger, I" Januarv 19 10. 
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council). 17 After less than a month, the battle was won, easily, by the Tullys. George D. was 
co-opted by the RDC on a 17-5 vote - another indication, in the post-Ranch War period, of the 
limits to the influence of the UIL's 'bosses'. George Tully, admittedly according to the 
Journal, was cheered by a crowd and bonfires were lit on the fair green. ' 8 
The World of Jasper TuR 
Jasper Tully, nephew of William and cousin of George D., was undoubtedly the most vocal 
Irish nationalist in Boyle, and his political influence spread to much of North Roscommon 
and South Leitrim. A veteran, radical Land Leaguer, follower of Davitt, jailed with Pamell in 
Kilmainham, Tully had been the MP for South Leitrim from 1892 to 1906, first as an anti- 
Parnellite and then in the reunited Irish party. He had inherited the Roscommon Herald from 
his father and further wealth from his wife's ownership of the Royal Hotel in Boyle. 19 Tully 
was an influential figure in the region's politics, but he was also one of the most obsessive, 
quarrelsome and litigious. For one local historian, Frances Kielty, his world was 'a welter of 
animosities, hatreds and personal obsessions'. 20 He inherited the family dislike of the 
Haydens, and carried abuse of them to new levels of invective and incoherence. For Tully in 
1892, Luke Hayden MP was 'a fitting, greasy type of the intelligence of the ignorant, besotted 
districts that elected him. Fortunately, he can do no hann to no one [sic] but himself. Luke 
Hayden was 'a man who can barely read and write, who cannot spell properly and is seldom 
totally sober'. 21 The Tullys' rivalry with the Haydens tracked John Hayden's move to 
Westmeath; in 1891 Jasper and his brother George W. founded the Westmeath Nationalist 
(later the Midland Reporter) in Mullingar, explicitly to take on Hayden's Westmeath 
Examiner. 
Tully could hardly be expected to be a ffiend of the Pamellite John Fitzgibbon, but he went 
further and tore apart the UIL's reunion in Roscommon in the years 1902-03. This he did 
during a bitter land campaign, led by Fitzgibbon, on the de Freyne Estate near Frenchpark. 
When Tully allegedly supplied data on the grazier connections of leading UIL officials to 
17 Roscommon Journal, 8'b and 15'h January; Roscommon Messenger, 15th January 19 10. 
18 Roscommon Journal, 22 d January 1910. 
19 Tully's marriage was distinctly fi7aught and it was Tully who, after his wife's death. redirected her post with 
the message : 'Not Known At This Address, Try Hell' (Hugh Orarn, The Newspaper Book, p. 164). 
20 Frances Kielty. 'Jasper Tully 1858-1938' in Count. 1, Roscommon Historical and Archaeological Society 
Journal, Vol. 3. p. 62. 
11 Quoted by J. J. Lee in The Modernisation ofIrish SocictY, 1848-1918 (Dublin 1989 edition). p. 137. 
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22 Dublin Castle, he was expelled from the UIL in 1903 . He remained an 
independent 
nationalist MP until 1906, allying with anyone (Tim Healy, even Pamell's brother Howard). 23 
who would oppose his enemies. In the later 1900s, one of Tully's closest allies was the 
increasingly bitter Westmeath enemy of John Hayden, the North Westmeath MP Laurence 
Ginnell. In Boyle, one of the main victims of his litigiousness was T. J. Devine. In 1905 
Tully brought a court action to overturn the results of the county and district council elections, 
which he and his brother had narrowly lost, on the grounds of the bribery, 'treating' and 
corruption carried out by his opponents, including Devine. The Tullys won and were awarded 
'half costs' of F-800. Devine was effectively debarred from standing for election to the county 
council. 24 In 1908, however, despite the support of Ginnell, Tully lost his own county 
council campaign for re-election. 
At the end of 1909 Tully was, therefore, an ex-MP and ex-county councillor, but remained a 
Boyle town commissioner and district councillor. The Herald, circulating across North 
Roscommon, South Leitrim, South Sligo and Longford, still carried the lion's share of local 
UIL and AOH reports and had successfully defended itself against the competitive efforts of 
the new Western Nationalist. Tully, as seen in Chapter 3, also retained his connections to the 
Boyle AOH, which he had first set up in 1905 to undermine the UIL, and which in turn 
prompted Devine to establish a rival 'Curlieu Pass' AOH division. However, despite this 
Hibernian connection, Tully differed from many opponents of Fitzgibbon and/or Hayden in 
being an outright opponent of the Irish party at both the local and national level. Some, such 
as his uncle and cousin in Roscommon town,, continued to back the parliamentary party and 
Redmond while staying away ftom the local UIL. Others, such as O'Farrell and Maguire on 
Strokestown District Council, remained active in the county's UIL and AOH. For Tully there 
was no such restraint. Through his newspaper, he remained a public and trenchant critic of 
the Irish party at all levels and denounced the Liberal alliance, free trade, placemen, job- 
hunters, socialists, the filth of foreign literature, assaults on Catholic education, the 1909 Land 
Act, the Lloyd George budget and, of course, Fitzgibbon and Hayden. 
22 Bew. Cot! flict and Conciliation in Ii-eland, p. 98. 
23 lbid, p. 104. 
24 Roscominon Hei-ald. 9h December 1905. Devine was finafly co-opted back on to the county council, 
iefly became an enth ii amazingly with Tully's support when Tully bri us*ast*c co-Volunteer with Devine, in the 
summer of 1914. 
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In 1910, campaigns run by Tully related to the election victory of Laurence Ginnell over John 
Hayden's proteg& Patrick MacKenna in Westmeath, the 'crusade' against migrants coming 
into Roscommon and the 'scandal' of the profligacy of Roscommon county council. In the 
latter, Tully took the side of the dissident Strokestown councillors, both district and county, 
against the county surveyor Mulvaney. However, he gave the most coverage, column after 
column, week after week, to his own 'State Trial'. During 1910 Tully was prosecuted on 
charges of publishing incitements to boycott. He relished the opportunity for martyrdom and 
as usual conducted his own defence, declaiming at one stage to presumably bemused 
magistrates : 'We want no favours from the Crown. We didn't come here for favours from 
the Crown. We came here to fight! 25 By September, Fitzgibbon was concerned enough 
about Tully's influence that he could write to John Dillon : 'North Roscommon is not in a 
wholesome condition. Tully with his paper and constant intriguing is creeping in'. 26 
At the beginning of 1911, Tully's campaigning focused entirely on the issue of the rates. It 
cannot now be said whether it was a coincidence that Boyle's rates were projected to go up 
and Castlerea's down in that year, but the issue was a gift to Tully in his sniping at 
Fitzgibbon. The Herald in the first months of the year featured allegations of misappropriated 
accounts, illicit payments to a road foreman, the 'mulcting' of Boyle, overspending in the 
county council offices and (partly successful) calls for an LGB investigation. 27 In his 
campaign Tully found allies on Strokestown RDC (notably John Shanly) and the Roscommon 
28 Guardians (the former Sinn Fein supporter John McGreevy). Complaints from public 
bodies in Boyle, Strokestown and Roscommon were sent to the county council, which was 
defended by its secretary John Heverin and its accountant (and bete noire of the Roscommon 
town Tullys) Charles O'Keeffe. Tully personally attacked Heverin and O'Keeffe in letters to 
the county's newspapers. 29 In the end, the issue died after the Boyle rate was revised 
downwards, but provided a platform for Tully's campaign in the forthcoming county council 
25 Longford Leader, 16'h April 1910. One of Tully's co-defendants was J. P. Farrell and the Longford 
Independent speculated (I 4h May 19 10) that the two men had become firiends again because of the trial. 
Farrell's case was finally tried in Dublin and the jury duly hung. The case against Tully was withdrawn in 
November. 
26 John Fitzgibbon to John Dillon, 4th September 1910, Dillon papers, TCD, f 6754ý478. 
27 Roscommon Herald, 28h January. 4h February, I Vh February. 1911. 
28 Roscommon Messenger, 4h February, 8'h April 19 11. 
2') Roscommon Journal, 18'b and 25h February 1911 
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elections. For Fitzgibbon, Tully was the 'chief outcast' who could produce nothing but an 
'endless cry' to keep down the rates. 30 
Tully stood for election in two county divisions in 1911 - Frenchpark and Boyle - and lost in 
both, though his defeat in Boyle was relatively close at 286 to 338. In fact, for all the noise 
generated by the Herald, the elections were seen as relatively quiet. The Roscommon 
Journal, commenting on a low turnout, considered them tame and the quietest since the 
reform of local government. 31 Nevertheless there were upsets. John Shanly, assailed as the 
6 ex-policeman' by the Roscommon Messengei- and as Tully's 6 satellite' by the Weste7-n 
Nationalist, 32 won a county seat in Elphin. In a district council election in Lough Allen (for 
Boyle No. I DC) John Keaveny, a close ally and later an auctioneering partner of Devine, was 
defeated by Tully's allies in the Arigna Hibernians. Though Keaveny (UIL national director 
for North Roscommon) was promptly co-opted to the district council over Tully's objections 
33 (and easily elected its chain-nan by 28 to 12 votes), Tully's allies, if not Tully himself, were 
6 creeping in'. 
The campaigns run in Tully's papers were local, but Tully's personal world view extended far 
beyond Roscommon or Westmeath. The Herald, and to a lesser extent the Mullingar Midland 
Reporter, voiced opinions on a wider range of national and international stories than any other 
newspaper in the five counties. Tully's readers could learn his views on the Balkan wars, the 
Italian invasion of Tripoli, the Portuguese revolution, the corruption of the French republic, 
the evils of socialism, the Marconi scandal, the global 'Jewish' oil and money rings, the 
'Siege of Sydney Street', 34 England's strikes and, again and again, the inexorable decline of 
England in the face of an ever-stronger Germany. Top of the list of Tully's Irish enemies was 
T. P. O'Connor, an 'English radical', 'the little billiard marker's son fTom Athlone'. 35 
controller of patronage and corruption in the Irish party and contributor to filthy foreign (i. e. 
English) newspapers. During 1911, he also inveighed repeatedly against the introduction of 
30 Fitzgibbon speaking at Frenchpark, Roscommon Messenger, 3d June 1911. 
31 Roscommon Journal, 10"' June 1911. 
32 Roscommon Messenger, 6h May; Western Nationalist, 3d June 1911. 
33 Roscommon Herald, I O'b and 17"' June 1910; Leitrim Observer, 24th June 19 10 (which wrongly reported 
Keaveny's co-option as being to Boyle No 2 DC). 
34 For the Midland RCPOrter of 5th January 1911 the siege was 'Red Anarchy'. 'All the outrages and all the 
_, 
had ended bomb-throwing were traced to Jewish criminals. 'The Russian pogroms had been terrible. but the,, 
the bomb-throwing there. ' Now 'England has got the rinsings of this evil crew'. 
35 Midland Reportcr, 30"' June 19 10. 
149 
national insurance -a socialistic, expensive plan taken up by extreme Liberals that would, he 
wrote, cost Irish toilers and ratepayers E4 million a year. The healthy Irish nation would have 
to pay for 'the stunted and diseased populations of factory towns on the other side'. Even on 
this issue, though, be landed local blows, repeatedly deriding John Hayden's support for the 
36 legislation and re-quoting Hayden's rather incautious praise for it : 'a glimpse of fairyland' . 
Locally in 1912 Tully covered at great length the disunity of the Castlerea town tenants 
(against 'Foxy Jack' Fitzgibbon), but his next significant campaign was the promotion of a 
county ratepayers' movement. This did not begin, however, until the late summer of 1912. 
when meetings were held to protest against a one shilling in the pound rise in the rates. The 
movement was boosted by a fracas at the county council, with councillors shouting and 
waving sticks at supporters of Joseph Maguire. 37 By early 1913, the ratepayers' movement 
merited regular police reports by the RIC county inspector. In January he noted that two 
formal associations had been set up and in February : 
There is a growing agitation against the county council on account of the increase of the 
rates and several meetings of protest by Ratepayers have been held. The prospects of 
38 Home Rule are very little discussed . 
The focus was purely local. Aside from the usual complaints - the roads programme, the 
extravagance of the county council and the onerous rates - there were two particular 
grievances. The first was no less than the cost of motorbikes used by the county surveyor's 
assistants; the second the Hartley Bridge over the Shannon near Carrick. The latter had been 
a cause for dissension between Roscommon and Leitrim since 1910 (i. e. over who paid for it), 
but at the end of 1912 the county surveyor Mulvaney was agitated by the fact that the bridge 
had been built with no new roads connected to it. 39 Who would pay for these? Whatever the 
apparent triviality of the issues raised, the ratepayers' agitation dovetailed neatly with another 
of Tully's pre-occupations, opposition to national insurance. The ratepayers now feared that a 
new county insurance society approved under the Act (and sponsored by Fitzgibbon) would 
become a charge on the rates, as would the county's proposed TB sanatorium. 40 
36 Roscommon Herald, 6h, 13'h and 20'h May 1911. 
37 lbid, 7"' September 1912. 
38 MonthhI reports of the Roscommon county Mspector, Januan, and February 1913 (PRO CO 904/89). 
39 Leiti-im Obsei-ver, 14'h December 1912. 
40 Rosconinion Herald, 7h September. 7th December 1912; Roscommon Messenger, 15'h February 1913; 
Roscommon Journal, 15'h February 19 13. 
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As the movement progressed steadily - by the beginning of 1914 there were six branches, 41 
with a county-wide executive and Tully a trustee of the new county association 42 _ the 
county's 'combine of disappointed men'joined in. John Hanson from Castlerea and Joseph 
Maguire, John Shanly and John Flanagan from Strokestown were all active. J. J. Healy, a 
Hibernian also on Strokestown council, brought with him a particular grievance against 
Fitzgibbon. He had been, according to the Roscommon Journal, 'the principal victim of the 
Ballybeg row ... where Mr Fitzgibbon so well advised his dupes. 
43 A clear focus of support 
for the ratepayers was Strokestown; the town's newspaper, the Strokestown DemoC7-at, was 
hailed in March 1913 by J. J. Healy as being known across the county as 'the ratepayers' 
44 ffiend' 
. Of all the men active in the ratepayers' movement, however, there was none more 
'disappointed' than the first president of the county executive, Fitzgibbon's old associate 
Patrick Webb. 
Webb had for many years been a Castlerea district councillor and a county councillor, and had 
been Fitzgibbon's chief lieutenant in the de Freyne campaign of 1902-03. By 1908 he had, 
however, fallen out with Fitzgibbon. In the county elections of that year, while easily re- 
elected in his own Loughlynn division, Webb also stood and lost against his former ally. 45 A 
cattle-dealer and merchant in the village of Loughlynn, he was ruined in February 1910 when 
his premises burned down half-insured, with all of his records. He filed for bankruptcy in 
May 1910 and in 1914 was still undischarged with debts of some f4,000 . 
46 When in 1911 he 
was re-elected to the county council, moves were immediately made to disbar him as an 
undischarged bankrupt. In the end, his seat was not declared vacant for another six months, 
when the council - with Fitzgibbon, Heverin and O'Keeffe in the lead - finally ruled that a 
fori-nal 'declaration of willingness to serve' from Webb was out-of-date. (Such a declaration 
had to be approved by a magistrate and was in this instance signed, and back-dated, by no less 
than Jasper Tully. )47 Being disbarred was not, however, the low point of Webb's fortunes. 
His house had been sold over his head to pay off debts. In February 1912 a campaign of 
threatening letters sent to the new owner climaxed with Webb trying to break into his former 
41 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. January 1914 (PRO CO 904/92). 
4' Roscommon Herald, 20t" December 1913. 
43 Roscommon Journal, 23r8 May 1914. 
44 Strokestoun Democrat, 22 "d March 1913. 
45 Roscommon Journal, 16th May 1908. 
46 Ibid. 4th June 19 10; Wcwtcrn Nationalist, 14th Februan- 1914. 
47 Roscommon Journal, 24h June; Roscommon Messenger, 9 ffi December 19 10. 
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house - to bum the place down according to the police; talking. when caught, of blowing it up 
according to the press . 
48 In June, he was sentenced to twelve months in prison for the 
attempted break-in. For the Roscommon Herald, Webb's offence had been 'an act little better 
than a mere drunken freak' and the paper implied that the severity of his treatment stemmed 
from his status as an opponent of Fitzgibbon. 49 Webb was released after six months in 
January 1913. 
Almost immediately, Webb was active in the new ratepayers' movement and with Joseph 
Maguire elevated its attacks from specific issues - including nearly always the assistant 
surveyors' motorbikes - to a more general attack by 'farmers' upon shopkeeper-run public 
boards. A succession of meetings and speeches were assiduously reported in the Herald. For 
Maguire, the council was run by 'a ring of commercial shoneens', a clique, 'the tail end of 
landlordism. ' 50 In August, speaking as 'a fanner', he launched into all the shopkeepers on 
public boards. 51 For Webb, something worse than landlordism had emerged in Roscommon, 
'the Clique'. 52 In May he told an audience that if they wanted to get things done they had to 
wash out the clique and in particular wash out the shopkeepers (he added schoolteachers for 
good measure). 53 Webb would claim, along with some other ratepayers' leaders, that he was 
not hostile to the national leadership of the Irish party. However, he declared that 'John' 
(Fitzgibbon) would be voted out at the next elections and called for ratepayers' candidates to 
stand. 54 When the county ratepayers' executive was formed in December 1913, Webb was its 
first president. 55 
The ratepayers' activity and press reporting of it tailed off in early 1914 - as will be seen in 
Chapter 9, the burgeoning Home Rule crisis and the inauguration of local Irish Volunteer 
companies were more pressing priorities. However, the movement did feature again in the 
1914 local elections, achieving one notable success. Again, as in 1911, there was no real 
48 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, February 1912 (PRO CO 904/86): Roscommon 
Messenger, 17'h February 1912. 
49 Roscommon Herald, 29h June 1912. The paper also claimed that Fitzgibbon had never forgiven Webb for 
beating him to become the first vice-chairman of the new county council in 1900. 
50 Ibid, 15'J'February 1913. 
51 Ibid, 16'h August 1913. 
52 Ibid, I' March 1913. 
53 Ibid, 24b May 1913 - 
. 
54 lbid, 16'h August 1913. 
55 Ibid, 20'h December 1913. 
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surge of popular support. The Westmeath Independent noted that there was no general 
56 
excitement and that the ratepayers were less active than in 1913 . Campaigning involved 
either putting up ratepayers' candidates or demanding of UIL men, as a condition of not 
opposing them, that they take a pledge not to approve any further county salary increases. 57 
Shanly was easily re-elected, but Webb was defeated and Tully lost again in Boyle. However 
Tully, who spoke in the campaign solely on the local issues of the rates and the clique, 58 again 
fought in two divisions and this time won in one, Ballinlough, by 234 to 216 votes. Tully 
thus returned to the county council after a gap of six years. 
The extent of popular support for Tully and the ratepayers should not be exaggerated. In the 
years 1910-14 there was no great wave of enthusiasm for their cause. In mid-1914, at the 
height of popular enthusiasm for another movement, the Irish Volunteers, the ratepayers could 
muster no more than six Roscommon branches. Both the 1911 and 1914 local elections were 
regarded by the press as relatively quiet affairs. However, Tully's 'creeping in' continued in 
the years after 1910 and culminated in his own re-election in 1914 to the county council. 
Tully was more than just an irritant to Fitzgibbon and Hayden and did more than just bob up 
every now and then, as the Western Nationalist put it, 'to let the world know he is still with 
them'. 59 Rather he acted as a local rallying point, lending coherence to the motley dissensions 
of the county's 'disappointed men' with their various grudges, particularly against Fitzgibbon. 
Throughout the pre-war years his relentless newspaper campaigning voiced the discontent that 
remained widespread, and almost pen-nanent, beneath the monopolistic veneer spread by the 
UIL over Roscommon's politics. Fitzgibbon's 1910 judgement, that for the UIL North 
Roscommon was 'not in a wholesome condition'. ) was just as valid in 1914. 
Roscommon Town's 'StronLy Man' - Thomas. Canon Cummins 
In the spring of 1910, Thomas Cummins returned from Sligo to Roscommon town to become 
the parish priest. He had previously been a curate in the town and in Loughlynn, County 
Roscommon, then parish priest in Tarmonbarry, County Roscommon and, from 1907, Elphin 
diocesan administrator in Sligo town. On his return to the county, the Roscommon and Sligo 
5" ff'cstnwath Independent, 2 nd M ay 1914. 
57 Peter Shanagher in Tulsk was one such UIL councillor who took the ratepayers' pledge (Strokestoitv 
Democi-at, 2 5h April 1914) Joseph Dorr in Croghan was, another (Roscommon Herald, 18'b April 1914). 
58 Roscommon Herald, 16"' May 1914. 
59 fl'cstei-n Aationalist, 29"' April 1911. 
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papers were unanimous in their comments on his character. For the Roscommon Journal he 
was 6a priest of unflagging zeal and tireless energy'; for the Sligo Independent be had a 
'peculiar force of character and unbounded energy'. As already noted above on page106, the 
Sligo Champion wrote of 'the extraordinary energy which Canon Cummins threw into every 
progressive movement' and went on to remark that he 'thinks rather of a good end to be 
attained than of the obstacles that may have to be surmounted in attaining it'. The 
Roscommon Messenger was more succinct - Cummins was seen as 'essentially a strong 
man ,. 
60 
From the start, Cummins became an active participant in nearly every aspect of public life in 
the town. In 1910 and 1911 he led the county agricultural committee, the town's pensions 
committee, the CDB parish committee, the revival of the Gaelic League, the promotion of a 
temperance society, the town's classes in commercial and technical instruction, the 
waterworks committee and the amateur operatic company (whose 1910 production was 'The 
Yeoman of the Guard -)). 6 1 He lectured his parishioners on the evils of 'porter houses', the 
need for compulsory primary education, the improvement of the roads and better conditions 
for teachers. He mediated in agrarian disputes. He became an active fixer in securing the 
supply of money, land and property for town improvements, whether the new Harrison Hall, 
the relocation of the post office or a new graveyard. 62 His approach was epitomised in a 
letter, as so often with Cummins a public letter, written to the district council in 1911, calling 
on them to clean up the town by getting fairs off the streets and onto a fair green. There were, 
he wrote, 
several ways of doing one thing - there's the right way and the wrong way - there's the 
thorough way or the slipshod way - there's the sure way and the real genuine way - 
there's the half way or the whole way. 63 
Cummins, who had been a senior UIL officer in Sligo, also threw himself into the town's 
politics, but in the spring of 1911 he and the town's UIL branch went through a major falling 
out. 
60 Roscommon Journal 30'h April, - Sligo Independent, 30'ý April; Sligo Champion, 23 rd April; Roscommon 
Mcsseng, cr, 7hMay 19 10. 
61 Roscommon Messenger, I O'h September 1910. 
62 The activities of Cummins featured in both of the town's newspapers, the Journal and the Messenger, in 
virtually every edition from May 19 10 to the end of 1911. 
63 Roscommon Journal, 9h September, 1911 
154 
The story of the dispute was told by Cummins in a letter sent to the county's newspapers; its 
cause was a personal snub administered to him by the UIL. The League had been looking for 
a candidate for the county council election and Cummins was an integral part of this process. 
Having been consulted by Hayden, he had approved the choice of one E. P. Murray, who said 
he would stand if unopposed. Cummins then approached the veteran dissident John 
McGreevy and persuaded him not to stand against Murray, telegraphing Hayden in London to 
secure his approval. It was then, according to Cummins, that a meeting of the town UIL - no 
more than seven or eight in number and including 'Roscommon Messenger employees' (i. e. 
H. I. McCourt and others) plus Charles O'Keeffe - chose the elderly Parnellite veteran Martin 
McDonnell instead of Murray. This dashed the deal worked out by Cummins and provoked 
McGreevy to stand. For Cummins, this was all a 'detestable fraud'. A 'clique' was obviously 
at work. The League in Roscommon was an institution capable of being used by jobgrabbers 
and landgrabbers. He, Cummins, would now take no part in the impending contest. The most 
telling sentence in his letter showed what he now felt about the town's branch. 'What has the 
League done for Roscommon? - nothing, absolutely nothing. 
64 
Did Cummins's hostility to the local UIL pre-date this dispute? At the end of 1918, when 
Hayden and Cummins were outright opponents, Hayden would claim that the parish priest 
had nursed a 'life-long enmity against those who upraised the banner of Pamell in this 
county' . 
65 By this, Hayden meant an enmity - against himself and other Pamellites - going 
back to the Pamell split. However, Cummins's political behaviour, in both Sligo and 
Roscommon before the spring of 1911, was not consistent with Hayden's claim. Cummins 
had for several years been active in the reunited UIL and showed no sign of a consistent 'anti' 
bias. Another possible source of historic ffiction was that Cummins had been the curate in 
Loughlynn in the years 1902-03, close to the epicentre of Fitzgibbon's de Freyne campaign 
which was condemned by Cummins's bishop, Dr. Clancy. Again, however, there is no 
evidence that Cummins brought with him any accumulation of animosity to the local UIL 
when he returned to Roscommon. In early 1911, he had been prepared work to with Hayden 
and secure nationalist unity in Roscommon town, in favour of the UIL candidate. 
641-etter from Cummins to the county's newspapers, Roscommon Journal, 6"' May: Roscommon Herald, h 
6h 
""' May 1911. The Messentger init'all-N, refused to' May; Roscommon Wesscn-rcr, 15 publish the letter on 6t Mav. 
which it said Cummins, on calmer consideration. would regret having written. 
65 Roscommon Messenger, VhDecember 1918. 
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What Cummins did retain was a strong view of the importance of clerical leadership in local 
life. As he wrote to Dr. Clancy in 1912, the only way of keeping societies 'right' in Ireland 
was to 'have the priest closely in touch with them'. 66 A singularly energetic priest, Cummins 
was seriously affronted when the town's UIL branch ignored his role in the selection of the 
UIL's candidate. The branch's actions in May 1911 could not, therefore, have been more 
damaging. Messrs O'Keeffe and McCourt had flagrantly undermined Cummins's personal 
and clerical status and the breach never healed. 
Did this mean that Cummins broke entirely with the League? The answer is 'not exactly'. 
The dispute had not been in any way ideological. Cummins's brother, Patrick, remained 
throughout a UIL activist and Sligo county councillor. 67 Cummins stuck to his word and, 
unlike Hayden's rivals the Tullys in the Roscommon Journal, 68 took no part in the 1911 
election and did not endorse McGreevy. He maintained, at least on the surface, polite 
relations with Hayden, who in the Messenger tried to put the incident down to a 
69 
misunderstanding on Cummins's part and appealed for no personal bitterness. Cummins 
continued publicly to support, as he had for many years, the party's national leadership. In 
November 1911 he doubled his usual subscription to the parliamentary fund, saying that he 
would do all in his power to support the Irish party. 70 In March 1912, after the Ulster Hall- 
related 'Orange hysteria', he donated another two guineas, saying that all Irishmen must now 
back the party. 71 At the end of March he travelled to Dublin, with Fitzgibbon, for the great 
Home Rule demonstration. 72 
With the town's UIL branch relations stayed frosty. Cummins's November 1911 donation to 
the parliamentary fund was coupled with a flat rejection of a request from H. I. McCourt for a 
church gate collection. For Cummins such collections could only be for charitable purposes. 
He called on the UIL to set up the 'good, strong branch' so much needed in the town. 73 Nor 
66 Cummins to Dr. Clancy, 13th February 1912, Elphin Diocesan Archive. File C 1912. 
67 Another brother. Jeremiah, also 111 County Sligo, was a retired RIC head constable and a fourth brother, John, 
was a SlWo J. P. See the account of Jeremiah Cummins's ftineral in the Sligo Independent, 20 May 1913. 
Cummins officiated at the funeral for which the police provided an honour guard 20-strong. 
68 Roscommon Joui-nal, 13'h May 1911. 
69 Roscommon Messenger, 20'h May 1911. 
70 Ibid, 18'h November 1911. 
71 Ibid, 30'h March 1912. 
72 Ibid. 6 1h April 1912. Other to\, vn attendees were John Heverin and Charles O'Keeffe. 
73, Letter from Cummins to the Roscommon UlL. published in the Roscommon Messenger, 18'h November 1911. 
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did this duality of views towards the UIL change before WWI- In January 1914, he noted that 
some people said that he wanted to 'knock out' the UIL. No man, he said, had more respect 
than he for the League, for its past work and for what it was still capable of achieving. 
However, the UIL's affairs could not be conducted 'in a hole in a comer'. Personally, he 
would subscribe to the Home Rule fund, but there would [again] be no church gate 
collection. 
74 
However, Cummins has been studied by historians not primarily as a 'turbulent priest', 
fighting minor battles over local status, but as a land radical and founder of the Roscommon 
Associated Estates Committee (RAEC) at the end of 1911. This committee arose, according 
to the historian David Seth Jonesl 'because of the limitations of the 1909 Land Act, 
disillusionment with the UIL and, especially, the failure of landlords in the Roscommon area 
75 
to distribute their untenanted and nonresidential land' . For several years, the RAEC was to 
agitate for the compulsory purchase and redistribution of the grasslands surrounding the town. 
Cummins himself believed that landlordism and 'grazierdom' were the 'vicious parent and the 
wastrel offspring' of the Irish land system and went on to propose that no man should hold 
more than 300 acres. 76 Moreover, the RAEC acted as a political focal point in the town 
independently of the UIL. In 1912 the RIC county inspector saw the potential for both the 
RAEC's land radicalism and its rivalry with the UIL; he believed the committee was 'likely to 
give trouble' and did not work in unison with the UIL/AOH, but 'rather seeks to take from 
them the credit for settling land questions'. 77 
The RAEC's reputation for 'radicalism' is weakened, nevertheless, by the fact that its origins 
lay less in an aggressive demand for rural redistribution than in a desire to purchase town 
properties; it was in many respects just another town tenants' association writ large. Among 
the estates owning and surrounding Roscommon, the largest was that of the Earl of Essex, 
who since 1908 had been talking of selling up. In October 1910, discontent emerged when it 
became known that his town properties would not be included in the sale. 78 For the next year 
the existing Town Tenants association took the lead in trying both to accelerate the sale and to 
74 Roscommon Messengcr, I O'h January 1914. 
75 Seth Jones, Graziers, Land Rc: fo7-m and Political C07? flict in Ireland, pp. 199-200. 
76 Cummins speaking at a Roscommon public meeting, Roscommon Messen-tger, 20 
th April 1912. 
77 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, April 1912 (PRO CO 904/86). 
78 Roscommon Journal, I' October; Roscommon Messenger, 15th October 19 10. 
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get the town properties re-included. Both Cummins and Hayden were involved in these 
efforts. In February 1911, before his row with the town UIL, Cummins took on the 
presidency of the Town Tenants in succession to H. I. McCourt. 79 However, the problem was 
that they made little headway on either issue; the sale was not accelerated and the town was 
not included in it. All of the frustrations felt by town tenants in provincial Ireland seem to 
have applied in Roscommon. If town properties were not included in an agricultural sale, 
public funds would not be advanced to finance their purchase. Only 'direct' tenants of the 
estate could benefit; tenants of middlemen (there were lots in Roscommon and a number of 
other estates were also middlemen of the Essex estate) would be left out. It was not clear 
whether the Estates Commission and CDB would handle the sale. Efforts to ginger up the 
sale by calling for a 20% rent cut and withholding rents failed to gather momentum. During 
the summer of 1911 the association did not meet for several weeks for lack of a quorum and, 
when it did, noted that those few tenants withholding rents were giving in and paying up. 80 In 
October 1911, a leading article in the Roscommon Journal on the state of the town noted its 
improved public buildings, but lamented its population of under 2,000 and called for the 
settlement of 'our young' on the lands around it. The paper claimed that 'prominent sources' 
had disheartened the town's tenants and that Roscommon's Town Tenants association was 
now inactive. 'Let us not be driven into despairing resignation. ' 81 
Whether through impatience or loss of confidence in the Town Tenants association, Cummins 
took the lead in setting up a separate 'Essex Estate Committee' in September 1911. He did 
not immediately sever all ties with the Town Tenants, musing instead on the need for a 'small, 
representative committee' to take matters forward, and indeed on one day chairing meetings 
of both bodies. 82 By November, however, Cummins had given up on the old association and 
he then substantially enlarged the remit of the new committee : 83 
79 Roscommon Journal, 18'h February 1911. McCourt stood down, ostensibly, because the Town Tenants' 
meetings clashed with those of the St. Vincent de Paul Society. Why Cummins would be able to attend both 
Town Tenants and St. Vincent de Paul meetings was not made clear. Indeed Cummins himself apologised to 
the Town Tenants in September for non-atendance because of the clash of meetings (Roscommon Journal, 16th 
September 1911). 
80 Ibid, 22 nd jUly 19 11. 
8' lbid, 21" October 191 L 
82 The Town Tenants, association and Essex Estate Committee, both chaired by Cummins. met on I Oth September 
1911 (Roscommon Journal, 16"' September 1911). 
Roscommon Messenger, I I" November, 2 nd December 1911. 
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for the town purchase to go through, there had to be greater co-operation with agricultural 
tenants to ensure a simultaneous sale of town and rural properties; 
- for tenants of many middlemen to be Included, all the relevant estates owning 
Roscommon (including those that were sub-tenants of the Essex estate) had to be sold, 
and at the same time; 
for anything to happen, one public agency had to have sole responsibility for the sale of 
all the estates - Cummins immediately set off to Dublin to meet both the Estates 
Commission and the CDB to get them to agree which it should be; 
- for Roscommon town to be regenerated - and Cummins had long had a keen involvement 
in the town's improvement - then the 'wilderness' and 'prairies' of grassland surrounding 
Roscommon had to be broken up and resettled. 
The comprehensiveness of these goals was a classic case of Cummins going, as he had put it 
to the District Council in September, the right way, the thorough way, the 'real genuine' way 
and the whole way. The first meeting of the new Associated Estates Committee, the RAEC, 
with representatives of urban and rural tenants from all the town's estates and with Cummins 
in the chair, was held at the end of November. 
For the next three years, the RAEC campaigned on the programme of comprehensive town 
and country purchase laid out by Cummins. Rents were withheld, estate owners and graziers 
visited by delegations, properties valued and grazing lands left unstocked. 84 The police noted 
the selective targeting of properties for attack, and in particular those of prominent townsmen 
who were graziers on the Essex estate and whose properties had rateable values in excess of 
f 100 (notably J. P. Mulligan, James Neilan and William Scally). 85 The RAEC also became a 
clearing house for minor, unrelated agrarian disputes in the locality, sometimes supporting the 
agitation; sometimes, as Cummins had already done as parish priest, mediating between both 
sides. 
86 
The RAEC secured two early successes - town properties would after all be included in sale 
of the surrounding Essex estate and this sale would be handled solely by the CDB - but made 
84 11'(ý,; tmeath Independent, I I"' November 1911; Roscommon Messenger, I" and 22 nd June 1912; 1 Ib January 
and 12'h April 1913. 
85 Roscommon Journal, 30t" September 1911: Roscommon Messenger, I' June 1912: monthly reports of the 
Roscommon county inspector, April and May 1912 (PRO CO 904/86 and 87). 
86 For example see Roscommon Messenger, 3 rd and 17th February 1912. 
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little headway thereafter. Routinely from 1912 onwards, the committee would lament the lack 
of co-operation between town and country tenants and the lack of response from landlords to 
its appeals to sell. Though a dispute on one farm, at Clonmurley, did lead to band parades, 
'hooting', a cattle drive and arrests, 87 Cummins was a consistent opponent of both driving and 
boycotting and Cummins remained the committee's driving force. In July 1912, the police 
reported that the RAEC nearly collapsed when he briefly stopped attending. 88 For three 
months in 1913, while he was in America raising funds for the town's church, it got nowhere 
and in July 1913 the police view of the RAEC was that 'it gave a good deal of trouble for a 
time, but it is not doing much at the present'. 89 Cummins himself gave voice to his view of 
the staying power of his followers in February 1913. On being told that a number of town 
tenants had dropped off the committee, he told his fellow members :' That is characteristic of 
the Irish. They are great for the spurt, but they are lacking in perseverance'. 90 
Leaving aside the specific land campaigning of the RAEC, the issue also has to be addressed 
of whether the committee provided a coherent, local political 'opposition' to the UIL. Some 
existing opponents of the UIL and/or the Haydens did gravitate to it; the former Sinn Fein 
supporter Michael Finlay, expelled from the UIL in 1907, became the RAEC's vice-chairman. 
The town's Tullys, father and son, were also regular attendees and the Roscommon Joui-nal 
provided detailed coverage and editorial support. However, other dissidents were not active 
participants. Neither George Geraghty nor John McGreevy attended regularly. Indeed 
McGreevy in January 1914 outraged Cummins's clerical dignity and allied with one of the 
RAEC's grazier victims, J. P. Mulligan, by getting the District Council to charge water rates 
on the Harrison Hall and on Cummins's presbytery. 91 The more formidable figure of Father 
Michael O'Flanagan, recently on the Sinn Fein national executive and soon to be a committed 
land radical, was actually one of Cummins's curates in the town from 1912-14. While he 
became particularly active in the town's Gaelic League, and was hailed in 1914 by Cummins 
as his 'dear ffiend', 92 he seems to have played no active part in the RAEC. 
87 Roscommon Messenger, 3d February 1912. 
Monthly report of the Roscommon county Inspector, July 1912 (PRO CO 904/87). 
Ibid, July 1913 (PRO CO 904/90). 
90 Roscommon Messený,, er, I I"' January 1913 
91 Ibid. 10"' and 24th January 1914. According to McGreevv, Cummins wrote 'bellicose and vituperative' letters 
to the District Council on the subject. 
()I At a Gaelic League reception to welcome O'Flanagan back from lecturing in Rome in May 1914 (Roscommon 
Journal, 16"' Mav 1914). 
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Other than Cummins, the RAEC's officers were all professionals and traders from 
Roscommon town. The vice-chainnan, Finlay, was a baker and the secretary, Thomas Larkin, 
was headmaster of the Roscommon Boys' School. The committee's legal adviser, Michael 
Moran, was a town solicitor and secretary to the District Council. The other two most active 
committee members, Hugh Flynn and H. Hynes, were a grocer/general trader and a draper 
respectively. Of these, only Finlay had 'form' as a committed opponent of the UIL. Larkin at 
least seems to have been close to Hayden, in that Hayden, unusually for the time, in 1912 
addressed him in a public letter as 'My Dear Tom'. 93 In March 1914, Larkin, Moran and 
Flynn all made donations to the Home Rule fund 94 (though support of the Irish party 
nationally was hardly conclusive proof of local unity and harmony, as has been seen already 
across County Roscommon). Cummins himself remained a public supporter of Home Rule 
and Redmond. Only once before the war did he let any exasperation with the Irish party 
above the level of the town branch come to the surface. In May 1914, the RAEC was 
discussing yet another disappointing statement from the CDB about what town purchases it 
could finance, triggering Finlay to call for a 'No Rent Manifesto'. Cummins remarked that 
the CDB could not be regarded as a democratic body and, when Finlay said that their 
4 representatives' were mocking them, added that it was almost impossible to get Fitzgibbon to 
do anything. 95 This remark triggered the observation from the Roscommon Messenger that 
nationalist unity was essential at a time when Home Rule was in danger, and in turn provoked 
the following Cummins observation at the RAEC's June meeting: 
If anyone of honest convictions tried to direct public attention to these things the old 
bogey was held up. "Hush! Do not embarrass the party and do not jeopardise Home 
Rule. " A little Home Rule of the genuine sort around Roscommon would be very 
desirable. 96 
As for Hayden and Fitzgibbon, they remained careful not to voice any opposition to the 
RAEC or public criticism of Cummins. Hayden actually chaired the first public meeting of 
"3 Roscommon Messenogv-, 20"' April 1912. Hayden had written a letter of regret that he could not attend an 
at the ti RAEC rally. Cummins, who chaired the rally, was also a 'Thomas', but normal practi line would have 
been for Hayden to send his apologies to the secretary. Larkin. 
"Roscommon Journal, 7th March 1914. 
9 -5 Roscommon Messengcr, 9thMay 1914. 
96 Sligo Nationalist, 27"' June 1914. 
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the RAEC's precursor, the Essex Estate Committee, in September 1911.97 His newspaper, the 
Messenger, gave as much coverage to the RAEC as did the Tullys'Journal - nearly always it 
was supportive. Fitzgibbon met early with the committee and in early 1912 took credit for the 
CDB's decision to take on the sale of the Essex and other estates. 98 The RAEC was 
sufficiently all-embracing that leaders of the town UIL branch, including H. I. McCourt and 
Charles O'Keeffe, were also members from December 1911 onwards. 99 However, there was 
also a succession of minor turf battles - more jostling for position than outright contests - 
between the UIL and the RAEC in the pre-war years. When in 1911 Hayden tried to have his 
ally John Heverin made solicitor to the Essex Estates Committee (Heverin was also secretary 
to the Town Tenants), this move was blocked by Cummins, who successfully promoted 
Michael Moran (Heverin's main rival as a local solicitor) to the role. ' 00 In January 1912, 
Hayden snubbed the RAEC in a public letter to H. I. McCourt, praising one Roscommon 
organisation for its work on the sale of the Essex and other town estates -the UIL. 
101 In 
January 1914, Cummins called for a public meeting to foster national unity in the town and 
this call was backed by the Tullys in the Roscommon Journal, which went further, urging a 
UIL/RAEC merger so that the UIL could be broader-based and not 'tending to privacy'. 
However, the initiative was quickly blocked in the Roscommon UIL by Charles O'Keeffe. 1 02 
Nationalist 'unity' had its limits, and while it would be going too far to say that the RAEC 
crystallised hostility to the UIL, it did provide a nucleus of independent campaigning activity. 
It took three years from the formation of the RAEC for the Essex estate to be sold to the CDB. 
When that happened, in November 1914, tenants of middlemen were still unable to purchase; 
the town's other estates were still largely unsold and its surrounding grasslands not 
redistributed. Had Cummins achieved much more than the old, discredited Town Tenants 
would have done? There is no doubt that he gave the RAEC energy, a comprehensive 
programme and coherence of purpose, but ultimately the RAEC was neither more radical in 
its methods nor more effective in its results than other town tenant campaigns (for example 
those of J. P. Farrell in Longford, George O'Reilly in Strokestown or even John Fitzgibbon in 
lqjlý 
97 d Roscommon Messenger, 2" September 1911. 
98 Ibid. 6hand 20'h January 1912. 
9'9 Ibid, 2 nd December 1911. Bizarrely, the grazier John Neilan. one of the prime targets of the committee. was 
also on the RAEC (Ibid, I' June 1912). 
100 Ibid, 23 rd September. Roscommon Herald, 30th September 1911. 
101 Roscommon Messenger, 20th January 1912. 
102 Roscommon Journal, I OhJanuary. Roscommon Messenger, 24thJanuary 1914. 
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Castlerea). Also, whereas Jasper Tully in his incessant campaigning provided a focal Point 
for many of the discontented across County Roscommon to come tog ether, Cummins's 
movement remained based only in Roscommon town and its immediate surroundings. When 
the RAEC had the opportunity to ally with other dissident 'town tenants' - the Castlerea 
opponents of John Fitzgibbon in May 1912 - Cummins blocked any public expression of the 
RAEC's 'sympathy' for them, saying that such an action might be misunderstood. ' 03 Nor did 
Cummins form any alliance with Tully and the county's 'ratepayers'. In early 1913 Cummins 
even became a trustee of the new county insurance society, 104 the potential costs of which so 
alarmed them. 
Unlike Tully, Cummins remained loyal to the leadership of the Irish party and - mostly - on 
bearable diplomatic terms with its MPs. However, like Tully, Cummins was a strong 
campaigner who tackled issues head on, without great consideration for the sensitivities of 
those against whom (or even with whom) he campaigned. Both men were dominant 
personalities who pitched into every aspect of small-town life. The 'inner wheels' of their 
pursuit of local influence and status, magnified by the campaigning of a competitive local 
press, generated sufficient animosities and tensions significantly to weaken the unity of the 
county's nationalists in the immediate pre-war years. 
War and Sinn Fein 
Though national and international issues inevitably dominated local political debate in the war 
years, many of the local allegiances formed in pre-war Roscommon persisted. Thus the Irish 
party's leading 'clique' figures (O'Keeffe and H. I. McCourt in Roscommon; Devine and 
Keaveny in Boyle, Heverin, Hayden and Fitzgibbon) all went down with the party ship in the 
elections of 1917 and 1918. By contrast many dissidents (Shanly and Maguire in 
Strokestown, George D. Tully and the former Sinn Fein supporters McGreevy, Geraghty and 
Finlay in Roscommon, many of the rebellious Castlerea town tenants of 1912) became Sinn 
Feiners. Two of the first newspapers to come out as pro-Sinn Fein in early 1917 were the 
Roscommon Joui-nal (inherited by George D. Tully when his father died at the end of 1915) 
and that 'ratepayers' ffiend' the Sti-okestown Democrat. 
103 Roscommon Journal, I 8'h May 1912. 
'04Roscommon Messeneer. 18'h Januarv 1913. 
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However, the correlation between pre-war dissidence and later Sinn Feinism must not be 
overstated. Of the prominent lay RAEC men, though none publicly supported the Irish party, 
only Finlay became an active Sinn Feiner. Thomas Larkin came to promote the cause of the 
ITGVVUý 105 while Flynn and Hynes seem to have dropped out of politics altogether. (Michael 
Moran died in 1917. ) Of the 'ratepayers', the same abstinence from all politics befell John 
Hanson in Castlerea and, more surprisingly, Patrick Webb. Three leading Strokestown 
dissidents, J. D. O'Farrell,, John Flanagan and J. J. Healy, stayed loyal to Redmond, the war 
effort and the party. When Healy left for Swansea in February 1918, his parting shot was to 
denounce those who now followed the 'rainbow flag' of Sinn Fein. 106 
The two most important adherents to the new cause were, nonetheless, Jasper Tully and 
Canon Cummins, though each came to be aligned with Sinn Fein by a very different route. 
Tully 
For Tully, local considerations were pushed aside by the overriding priority of the war, the 
outbreak of which vindicated his predictions of a coming clash between a resurgent, 
militaristic Germany and a decadent England. He revelled in the opportunity given to sound 
off on military strategy - every week with a hand-drawn map of the relevant 'front' - and 
boost the Herald'S circulation. The major part of the paper came to be taken up with war 
news and reports. His hostility to 'England', the Asquith government and the Irish party 
leadership was unabated. By the end of September 1914, the Herald was listed by the RIC 
inspector general as one of a handful of 'extreme' newspapers in Ireland. 107 
However, Tully was not overtly against the cause of the Allies. He strongly opposed 
'Prussian' militarism and lamented that 'Catholic' Austria had been dragged into the war by 
Germany. '()8 Moreover, despite the Herald'S being classed as 'extreme' in September 1914, 
Tully was careful to stay on the right side of the authorities, and successfully so. In 
September 1915, the Roscommon county inspector could report that 'the tone of the local 
105 Roscommon Journal, 12'hOctober 1918. 
106 Roscommon Messenger, 23d February 1918. 
107 Monthly report of the Inspector General. September 1914 (PRO CO 904194). The others, were the 
Enniscorthi, Echo, Leinstcr Leader, Irish I olunteer and Meath Chronicle 
108 Roscoin'mon Herald, 2 2nd August 1914. 
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press is moderate and in favour of the Allies in the War'. 109 The paper broke the habit of a 
lifetime and rarely carried a leading article. Instead, Tully's barbed criticisms were carried in 
comments, sometimes not very obscurely coded, attached to news pieces. The 1916 new year 
edition of the Herald was typical in this respect. Thus the paper carried the following remark 
about a visit by Redmond to the front line : 'Imagine Parnell going to the front to fire off a 
gun, in order to get a bit of cheap notoriety'. Other news stories featured a Liverpool riot 
against Irish emigrants and a claim that the Battle of Loos could have been won if only an 
English general had not fallen asleep. ' 10 This edition then devoted the most space to apiece 
on the O'Conors and the O'Connors - literally columns were devoted to the issue of one W or 
two. The reason for this became apparent when the article related the story told by one Mat 
O'Conor about 'Balldreag O'Donnell'. O'Donnell, 'the Redmond of his day', was a 17tb 
century soldier who switched sides to support William of Orange only to find that his soldiers 
did not follow him. "' Doubtless most of Tully's readers got the message. 
Tully's relentless but coded sniping against the government and Irish party did not stop him 
from being a bitter critic of the Easter Rising. The Herald'S immediate response to the Rising 
has been outlined by J. J. Lee. For Tully the Rising was a socialist plot. The rebels' 
proclamation was of a 'socialistic republic' which he likened to the Paris Commune. He 
reminded his readers that 'Portuguese Sinn Feiners' had killed priests and nuns in the 
revolution of 1910 and he dismissed the Dublin events as nothing more than another 'Red 
Week'. 1 12 Tully's views were widely disseminated. According to the Longford Independent, 
during Easter Week the Herald became close to the only source of information in the 
Midlands; a series of special editions were run off and close to 100,000 copies disposed of 113 
After the Rising, Tully remained in all other respects a bitter, advanced opponent of England, 
Lloyd George's Ulster initiative, recruiting and Redmond's party. When the North 
Roscommon by-election was triggered at the end of 1916, he initially stated that he had no 
desire to stand, having already had fourteen years of parliamentary life. ' 14 However, in the 
109 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, September 1915 (PRO CO 904/98). 
110 Roscommon Herald, I" January 1916. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 .- 
Politics and Society (Cambridge 1989), pp33--")4. 
113 Longford Independent, 13th May 1916. The report also claimed that because of the inflated cost of newsprint 
the Herald made no profit on its extra sales. 
114 Roscommon Herald, 6th January 1917. 
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end he could not resist standing as an independent and splitting the advanced nationalist vote. 
This may have been because he personally disliked, from years back, the Irish Nation League 
candidate, Count Plunkett, who, apart from being 'an amiable old Whig' was one of Tully's 
pet hates, a 'pl ace-hunter'. 1 15 Or it may have been that he was furious that he himself had not 
been selected instead of Plunkett. ' 16 Perhaps he felt that he had to stand personally against his 
old enemy in Boyle, the UIL candidate T. J. Devine. Perhaps it was simply that he had to keep 
bobbing up, 'to let the world know he is still with them'. Whatever his motivation, he now 
stated that he was not against 'Sinn Fein' and that he 'would always stand down in favour of a 
real Sinn Feiner' such as Eoin MacNeill. ' 17 The election over, Tully hailed the result as an 
'anti-Irish party' vote of 3,700 to Devine's 1,700118 (glossing over his own total of 608 votes). 
but he pledged himself now to be a supporter of Sinn Fein. Thereafter the Herald was the 
leading campaigning paper for Sinn Fein in counties Roscommon, Leitrim and Longford. 
Cummins 
For Cummins, the outbreak of war triggered two instinctive responses. First, he supported the 
moral purpose of the war; he particularly praised Catholic, independent and virtuous 
Belgium. ' 19 His second response was to organise, whether backing a collection for Belgian 
refugees or, in December 1914, chairing a meeting in the Harrison Hall to raise funds for the 
Connaught Rangers. ' 20 However, for Cummins war was also a terrible evil., a 'deluge of 
human blood' and in the same week that he raised funds for the Connaught Rangers, he gave 
voice to his disgust at the hypocrisy and false eloquence of much of the war's coverage, in a 
sermon preached at the Sacred Heart church. The lies, treachery, deceit and 'grab' of 
international diplomacy were the cause of this terrible war. Irish public life was now 
characterised by 'hypocrisy masquerading in the garb of patriotism', and the press and politics 
by 'torrents of frothy eloquence'. The press had been 'prostituted for party purposes' and the 
truth was lacking, 'even in small communities' It was now true that 'you could not believe a 
word that you hear'. I'll 
115 lbid, 27ýh January 1917. 
116 See Laffan, The Resurrection Qf Ireland, p. 80. 
117 Roscommon Herald, 27h January 19 17. 
"8 lbid, I O'bFebruary 1917. 
119 Roscommon Messenger, 28'hNovember 1914. 1 120 fbid, 19'h December 1914. 
12 1 Roscommon Journal, 19'hDecember 1914. 
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Cummins was not active politically for most of the war. His response to the Rising was more 
symbolic than outspoken. While prayers were said in the immediate aftermath for those 
killed, those said by him for the rebels were for 'misguided' men. However, he also made a 
point of visiting in their cells those local men detained by the authorities. ' 22 Two months 
later, moreover, Cummins presided at a High Mass for the souls of Irishmen who had lost 
their lives in the rebellion. One of his fellow priests at the mass was Michael O'Flanagan. 123 
Periodically Cummins let his frustrations show, usually on agrarian matters and especially 
concerning the county's politicians. One forum was the county agricultural committee. In 
February 1917, he lamented that nothing had yet been done concerning the land around 
Roscommon - the bullocks were still there. The RAEC had received nothing but hopeful 
promises and the MPs, particularly the representatives around Roscommon, had given little 
help. Five months later, he returned to the theme: politicians had always had 'pious 
platitudes' ready to respond to the RAEC, but had offered no aid or influence. ' 24 At the 
RAEC (which still met) he went further. He told about how the MPs had repeated the 
'hackneyed and illusive songs' of 'Home Rule is on the Statute Book', 'Trust the Liberals' 
and 'Depend on the Party'. He quoted the warnings of Father O'Flanagan that the people of 
Ireland would be allowed to starve before the people of England and Scotland felt the 
pinch. 
125 
Such observations indicated that Cummins was now seriously disenchanted with the Irish 
party, both locally and nationally, but while he was seen to attend some Sinn Fein meetings in 
the second half of 1918 (not speaking and not on the platform), he did not publicly declare for 
Sinn Fein until November 1918. When he did so, it was with all the decisiveness and energy 
that he had shown as the prime organiser of the town's public life. On November 24 th , 
he 
wrote a public letter, this time to a Sinn Fein rally for the South Roscommon candidate Harry 
Boland (the rally was chaired by Cummins's RAEC deputy Michael Finlay). Cummins stated 
that it would not have been proper for him to attend because of his work for victims of the 
influenza epidemic. However, Ireland had been doomed to wait for the 'weary and hopeless 
122 lbid, 13"' May 1916. 
123 lbid, 15"' July 1916. 
124 Roscommon Journal, 17'ý Februarv: 7hJuly 1917. 
125 Roscommon Herald, 13'hJuly 1917. 
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process of so-called constitutionalism'. Force was out of the question, but the Irish party 
could never again be effective in the British parliament. It was 'enfeebled and moribund'. It 
was now vital to unite Ireland's best elements with its younger generation, to make a 'new. 
virile Irish Party'. 126 
By 7 1h December, Cummins had sufficiently escaped his influenza responsibilities to speak 
publicly for Boland and thereafter was Boland's lead nominator, stump speaker and, 
predictably, campaign organiser. His November public letter to Boland had used an image 
that could just as easily have applied to his replacement of the Roscommon Town Tenants by 
the RAEC seven years earlier: 
Does a man continue to live in a house when its roof is battered in, because it sheltered 
him through the storms of many a previous winter? If he is wise he will put on a new 
roof. 
127 
It would be quite wrong to say that there was a significant 'Sinn Fein' movement in County 
Roscommon before the First World War. Instead, politics was dominated by purely local 
issues and personalities. Energetic priests, obsessively-bickering politicians, family feuds, 
newspaper rivalries, disappointed placemen and a bankrupt arsonist all played their part. 
Mass campaigns for 'The Land for the People' had given way to agitations about the rates, 
negotiations for the purchase of towns and attacks on whomever happened to form the ruling 
'clique'. As the RIC county inspector had noted at the time of the formation of the 
ratepayers' movement: 'The prospects of Home Rule are very little discussed. 128 
The pre-war Irish party may have been the only party political show in town, but its structure 
was fissured and weakened by a medley of local disputes. Some conflicts were long-running, 
traced back to the Ranch War, the brief revival of Sinn Fein in the mid-1900s, the Pamell split 
or , in the case of the 
Tullys, almost to pre-history. Others disputes sprang up from nowhere, 
were purely personal and often trivial. These incessant conflicts did influence the sides taken 
in the years 1917-18 (though the correlation was anything but perfect) and at the least reduced 
the number of those willing to stand by the Irish party locally when it came seriously to be 
126Rosconimon Jotu-nal, 30'hNovember 1918. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, February 1913 (PRO CO 904/89). 
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challenged. Wedged apart, in particular, by the activities of Tully and Cummins, the local 
fissures in the Irish party widened in the pre-war years. Even if the county was still 'so free 
from Sinn Fein and the rebellion taint', the party in Roscommon was poorly equipped to 
withstand the shocks which were shortly to fall upon it. 
169 
Chapter 6: Laurence Ginnell's Revolt 
Laurence Ginnell, the MP for North Westmeathý was expelled from the Irish parliamentary 
party at the beginning of 1910 and never readmitted. Throughout the years 1910-16 he 
sustained a separate party organisation in North Westmeath - the 'Independent UIL' set up its 
own executive in 1910 - and contested nearly all succeeding local elections against the North 
Westmeath UIL led by John Hayden. In the autumn of 1914 Ginnell became the first 
nationalist MP openly to side with the Sinn Feiners, condemning Redmond's pro-recruiting 
stance unequivocally and calling for Irish neutrality in the world war. In the autumn of 1916, 
he was the founder, in Westmeath, of one of the only branches outside Ulster of the Irish 
Nation League, which opposed the Irish party. In 1917 he became an active member of the 
reconstituted Sinn Fein party led by Eamon de Valera. His lieutenants in North Westmeath 
almost to a man became prominent local Sinn Feiners in 1917-18. Ginnell was easily elected 
MP and TD for Westmeath in 1918 and later became, briefly, Minister for Publicity in the 
first Dail. Re-elected TD he was sent to Argentina as an envoy and, staunchly anti-Treaty, he 
ended his days as a republican envoy in the United States. 1 
Ginnell's long association with individual Sinn Fein activists, his later prominence as a Sinn 
Feiner and the smooth transition of his local organisation into Sinn Fein In 1917 all support 
the belief that 'Ginnellism'. in the years 1910-14, was at least a precursor of advanced and 
even revolutionary Irish Nationalism. However, just as convincing a case can be made that 
the roots of Ginnellism lay not in any ideological difference from John Hayden's 
parliamentary nationalists, but rather in a realignment of the bitter local rivalries which had 
characterised North Westmeath politics for nearly 30 years. 
Nor was Ginnellism seen by contemporaries as synonymous with, or particularly linked to, 
Sinn Fein. Even as late as 1916, local observers as diverse as the strongly pro-Ginnell 
Midland Repw-ter and the RIC county inspector had no such perception. Instead, in that year 
1 Almost the only biography of Ginnell in this period is that by Charles Kelly, Laurence Ginnell -1852-1923, A 
Short Biogrqphýv (unpublished, written in 1970 and lodged in Westmeath county library, Mullingar). Kelly had 
access to hand-written transcripts of extracts from the shorthand diaries of Ginnell and his second wife. Alice. 
Though the original of these has since been lost, Mr. Kelly retained a photocopy which is now in the possession 
of the author. The provenance of these extracts is discussed in Appendix C. See also the brief biographical 
notes on Ginnell in Maume, The Long Gestation, p. 229 and in Jeremiah Sheehan, TT'Orthies qf Westmeath 
(Kilkenny 1978), pp. 44-46. 
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both observers were agreed that there was virtually no Sinn Fein movement in North 
Westmeath. After the Easter Rising, the Midland Reporter wrote of local Sinn Feiners that 
'they cannot be found'. The paper then mocked the Mullingar UIL for supposedly attacking 
local Sinn Feiners, for they had 'no existence, except in the minds of certain individuals'. '? 
Later, in a special report on the county at the end of 1916, the RIC county inspector stated that 
political societies were dormant, that there had been 'singularly little' activity by Sinn Feiners 
before the Easter Rising and that no more than a dozen people (nearly all in Athlone, in the 
south of the county) had openly identified themselves with the Sinn Fein movement. A 
section of opinion in the north of the county still supported Laurence Ginnell, he noted, but 
'chiefly on account of his advocacy of cattle driving some years ago'. 3 Both of these 
Westmeath sources, therefore, saw 'Sinn Feiners' as having almost no presence in the county 
in 1916. Ginnell's followers were seen, and in the case of the Midland Reporter saw 
themselves, to be something different. 
Even Ginnell's personal, pre-war road to Sinn Fein and separatism was circuitous and his 
breach with the Irish party was not absolute. As will be seen, his support for the Home Rule 
bill in 1912 was genuine if ambivalent, and he remained willing to act with other Irish MPs to 
secure its passage. Two years previously in 1910, after electoral victory had secured his 
position as the leading nationalist in North Westmeath, one of Ginnell's first actions was to 
seek readmission to the Irish party. When this failed and he changed tack to a policy of 
setting up a rival 'Independent UIL', his ally Christopher Lennon, who had wanted instead to 
unite with William O'Brien's All for Ireland League, insisted that Ginnell's new policy was 
one of 'sticking to the UIL'. Why, if the UIL was so dreadful, Lennon asked, should the dog 
'keep returning to its own vomit'9 4 
The Split: 1906-10 
Laurence Ginnell first stood for election in 1900 (unsuccessfully) and then in 1906 
(successfully) as the reunited UIL's parliamentary candidate for North Westmeath. His 
credentials were strong. Though he had been based in Dublin and London for many years, 
his family came from the small Westmeath town of Delvin and he had long been a prot&ge of 
2 Midland Reporter, 4b May 1916. 
Special reports of county inspectors on the condition of their counties, end- 1916 (PRO CO 904/120). 
4 Midland Reporter, 6th October 19 10. 
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both Michael Davitt and John Dillon, personal secretary to Dillon, 
5 assistant secretary of the 
national UIL and briefly, for 18 months from August 1904, national secretary. In the years 
before his election, his main political roles were as a UIL functionary and leading opponent of 
landlordism. He showed particular hostility to the 1903 Land Act (which he called the 
'Landlord Relief Act'), to the conciliationist policies of William O'Brien and to his particular 
personal bete noire and predecessor as UIL secretary, the O'Brienite John O'Donnell. 6 
In North Westmeath prior to Ginnell's election, the main political fault line was not, however, 
between party men and local O'Brienites, nor was it the one that would emerge later, between 
Ginnell and John Hayden. Instead, the county's nationalist politicians were divided between 
on one side the Catholic church and its political allies (mostly 'established' local men who 
became anti-Parnellites in the 1890s) and on the other side more radical nationalists, most of 
whom had been Parnellites. Both sides had battled continuously for office since even before 
the Parnell split, under the leadership of the then bishop of Meath Dr. Nulty (for the 
clericalists) and the owner of the Westmeath Examiner John Hayden (for what became the 
Parnellites). The Parnell split set the feud in stone, and saw the establishment of a clerically- 
backed rival (the Westmeath Nationalist) to Hayden's newspaper. Jasper Tully regularly 
travelled over from Boyle to help his brother George edit the paper, which later became the 
Midland Reporter. By this means the County Roscommon feud of the Hayden and Tully 
families was extended to Mullingar. The struggle climaxed in 1894, when Dr. Nulty decreed 
that reading the Westmeath Examiner was a sin calling for the refusal of absolution; 7 the paper 
for years retained the nickname of 'the mortal sin'. 8 This long fight remained centred on 
Mullingar and has been analysed by A. C. Murray, as an illustration of Hoppen's model of the 
pervasive localism of 19th century Irish politics. 9 As well as the wider, national issue of the 
Pamell split, matters contested by the two factions ranged from clerical control of party 
branches and funds to the bishop's proposals for local sanitation. At one stage the contest 
centred on a fight to control the town band's instruments. 
5 Kelly, Laurence Ginnell, pp. II- 12. 
6 Ibid, pp. 25-29. 
7 Lynch, 17-eland: 17tal How-, p. 153. 
8 Interview Nxith Nicholas Nally, retired editor of the Jfestmeath Examiner, II th October 1999. 
9 A. C. Murray, 'Nationality and Politics in Late-Nmeteenth Centur-v Ireland : The Case of Count-y Westmeath', 
Irish Historical Studies, Vol. XXV. November 1986, pp. 144-158. 
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Throughout the 1890's the clericalists and anti -P arn ellites maintained the upper hand in 
Westmeath politics, but the balance of power began to shift at the end of the decade. Dr. 
Nulty died in 1898, while Hayden was elevated to parliament in 1897 (albeit by inheriting his 
brother Luke's South Roscommon seat). Hayden built up his support in Westmeath by 
harnessing the Irish party's reunion, the new UIL and increasing land radicalism to his cause; 
he duly became president of the North Westmeath UIL. The UIL's adoption as its 1900 
candidate of the fierce, Westmeath-born Ginnell, protege of John Dillon and thus appealing to 
local anti-Parnellites to embrace reunion was not, however, a knockout blow. Many 
Westmeath anti-Parnellites were loyal not to Dillon, but to the fractious and clerically-allied 
Tim Healy. Hayden's local opponents - the clergy and, according to the Westmeath 
Examiner, 'leaders of public bodies' prepared to oppose the new UIL 10- put up their own 
candidate, P. J. Kennedy. The victorious Kennedy was then, moreover, admitted to the 
parliamentary party. However, when Ginnell came to stand again in 1906, Kennedy had 
retired, reunion had finally been accomplished in Westmeath and the UIL had expanded to 
encompass both the local clergy and their lay supporters. Thus in 1906 the residue of the old, 
local war was fought out within, rather than against, the UIL. At a UIL nomination 
convention in that year, attended by 19 priests under the bishop's administrator Rev. Daly, 
Hayden chaired the proceedings at which Ginnell, still with no clergy backing him, defeated 
the clerically-backed North Westmeath gentleman, Sir Walter Nugent, by 99 votes to 72.11 
Ginnell's election in 1906 - having beaten Nugent at the convention he was unopposed - was, 
therefore, the first parliamentary victory for supporters of John Hayden in North Westmeath 
since 1886. It was also to be their last and was almost immediately followed, from mid-1906, 
by suppressed political warfare between Hayden and his new MP. In part, this was an 
uncomplicated turf battle over which of the two was to be the leader of North Westmeath's 
nationalists, though the strength of Ginnell's personality, dogmatic to say the least, also 
ensured that he was bound to be a rather rampant bull in Hayden's reconstructed china shop 
of party unity. Ginnell's O'Brienite enemy and rival in the national UIL, John O'Donnell, 
considered him to be bad-tempered, mercenary and 'one step removed from lunacy', 12 while 
10 lVestmeath Examiner, 6'hOctober 1900. 
" Kelly. Laurcnce Ginnell, pp. 38-39, Tf'estmeath Examiner, 6"' January 1906. 
12 Quoted in Warwick-Haller, 1471liam O'Brien and the Irish Land War, p. 24' 3 
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his former mentor Dillon came to consider him 'a clever but quite wild man'. 13 Tim Healy, 
writing of Ginnell in the 1920's, could be almost charitable in describing Ginnell as 'so 
sincere, he was incapable of invention', " but went on to add that Ginnell's despatch to be an 
envoy in Argentina and the USA was due to his being 'hardly a workable colleague'. Healy 
described Ginnell thus : 'Afflicted with a harsh voice he had an unsympathetic manner, and 
9 15 was not good "to look upon" . 
For all that Ginnell may not have been good 'to look upon', the Ranch War of 1906-08 
dramatically enhanced his position in Westmeath. His uncompromising land radicalism made 
him the perfect standard-bearer for the campaign locally. As the first public advocate of the 
tactic of cattle-driving he was to acquire the title of 'the father of the hazel'; in the process he 
eclipsed the former radical Hayden and their rivalry became intense. According to his 
biographer Charles Kelly, Ginnell was by mid- 1906 already ill-disposed to Hayden, seeing 
him as a friend of local 'ranchers'. 16 In his book Land and Liberty, Ginnell put 'the land' at 
the heart of the dispute and alleged that as soon as they knew of his autumn 1906 meeting at 
The Downs, where he launched the idea of cattle-driving, the Mullingar UIL tried to sabotage 
it. 17 (Nevertheless the meeting went ahead in October with Hayden chairing it. ) 18 At the end 
of 1906, there was a heated confrontation at the North Westmeath UIL executive over who 
should be the representative on the UIL's national directory, Hayden or Ginnell; Hayden won 
comfortably by 84-36.19 However, both men publicly promoted the Ranch War in 1907, and 
it was not until October 1907 that their conflict again became public, when Hayden's brother 
Joseph (based in Roscommon town) was accused of land-grabbing by allies of Ginnell. 20 In 
early 1908 Ginnell achieved the enhanced status of being jailed but, shortly after his release in 
June, he fonned a National Democratic Club for his supporters in Mullingar. 21 In the same 
month his alliance with that perennial scourge of the Haydens, Jasper Tully, was cemented by 
13 Quoted by Scawen Blunt, My Diaries, 5h February 1911. Part 2, p. 337. 
T. M. Healy, Letters and Leaders qfAtv Day (London 1928), Vol. H p. 564. 
Ibid. p. 565. 
16 Kelly, Laurence Ginnell, p. 44. 
17 Laurence Ginnell MP, Land and Liberýv (Dublin 1908), p. 207. 
18 Seth Jones, Grazziers, Land Rqform and Political Coqflict in Ireland, p. 186. 
19 Westnicath Independent, 5b January 1907. 
20 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, p. 158. 
21 Kelly. Laurcncc Ginnell, p. 74. 
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his campaigning for Tully against UIL candidates in the Roscommon county council 
elections. 22 
One manifestation of Ginnell's disaffection, from 1906 onwards, was his open association 
with known Sinn Fein supporters, particularly at the annual August commemoration, at the 
bridge of Finea on the Westmeath/Longford/Cavan border, of the exploits of 'Myles the 
Slasher'. one of the Confederates of the 1640s. The event had been taken over by the IRB 
man and separatist Bulmer Hobson and in his memoirs Hobson related how he was 
approached by Ginnell, the night before the August 1906 rally, asking if he could also 
speak . 
23 At the rally Ginnell reiterated his support for the parliamentary party, but said that he 
would not put obstacles in the way of any other body of Irishmen who thought they could 
help Ireland by any other policy. 24 The response of the Mullingar UIL was to meet 
immediately and pass a resolution repudiating the Sinn Fein policy. 25 
Ginnell's association with Sinn Fein was therefore another causus belli from the start of his 
feud with Hayden. Ginnell repeated the offence of attending the Finea rally, with Hobson and 
figures such as the County Longford Sinn Fein supporter William Ganly, in 1907 and 1908. 
Ginnell was a personal ffiend of Ganly, staying at his house several times. 26 Moreover, 
Hobson was sometimes a fellow guest and on August 1908 Alice Ginnell recorded that while 
staying with the Ganlys : 'We had a long talk with Mr. Hobson last evening about the 
possibility of mutual action between Sinn Fein and honest UI Leaguers. L said that Sinn Fein 
should take up some practical question for the country and that the last thing that could 
happen would be a reorganisation of the national forces. ' 27 
Ginnell was right; 'reorganisation of the national forces' had not progressed by 1908, either 
locally or nationally, and his breach with the party, while real, had not widened. Specifically, 
he made no move to resign from the parliamentary party when other MPs did so in 1907. He 
focused instead on the promotion of the Ranch War and took no side in the 1908 'Sinn Fein' 
2-1 Western Nationalist, I' January 19 10. 
23 Hobson. Ireland, Yesterday and Tomorrow'l p. 27. 
24 Ibid. p. 28. 
25 Crime Special Branch report, August 1906 (PRO CO 904/117). 
26 Diaries of Laurence and Alice Ginnell. 9h- I O'h July 1906 (p. 44) 
70). 
27 Ibid., 3 rd August 1908, p. 7 1. 
6'hJanuary 1907 (p. -5 1): 2 
nd August 1908 (p. 
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election in North Leitrim. (He was, however, in jail in early 1908. ) When Irish party and 
Sinn Fein supporters held rival Finea demonstrations in August 1908 - the time of Ginnell's 
private debate with Hobson - the party rally attracted 6,000 (though according to the police 
'the vast majority were holiday sightseers') against Hobson's 200.28 Ginnell did appear at the 
Hobson rally, 29but actually spoke with Hayden at the UIL one getting, again according to the 
30 police, a mixed reception from the crowd . 
Ginnell made his mark as a dissident on a national stage in early 1909; he was one of those 
speakers shouted down at the UIL's national convention (known afterwards as the 'Baton' 
convention for the tactics used by its stewards), when he tried to move a resolution calling for 
abstention from parliament - the key 'Sinn Fein' demand of the time. In that month he was 
asked to leave a meeting of the parliamentary party when he persisted in calling for an 
enquiry into the workings of the parliamentary fund; his diary claimed that he was 'dragged 
out of the room and the door locked against me'. 31 Though he did continue to attend 
parliamentary party meetings until at least June, his breach with the local UIL became final. 
When in April 1909 the North Westmeath executive censured him by 40 votes to 4, he never 
attended it again. 
32 
In December 1909, the local UIL convention selected Patrick McKenna as its candidate for 
the January 1910 general election and party-supporting newspapers across the region 
predicted oblivion for Ginnell. However, Ginnell had by then accumulated a broadly-based 
coalition of support across North Westmeath and it was the Irish party which was solidly 
beaten in January 1910. Despite the personal campaigning of Hayden and a number of MPs, 
it was Ginnell's supporters who turned out the crowds and Ginnell claimed to have the 
support of no fewer than 32 local election committees. 33 Ginnell won by 1,993-1,373 votes 
on an 80% turnout. 34 The nationalists of North Westmeath thus reverted to their normal 
position since the mid- I 880s, of being fractured into warring factions and with Hayden and 
28 Crime Special Branch report, August 1908 (PRO CO 904/118) and August 1908 monthly report of the 
Westmeath county inspector (National Archives, 3/716 box 14). 
2Q ff'estmeath Examiner, 25bDecember 1909 
30 Crime Special Branch report, August 1908 (PRO CO 904/118). 
31 Diaries of Laurence and Alice Ginnell. II th February 1909 (p 74). 
32 Westmeath Examiner, 25hDecember 1909. 
33 lVestmeath Guardian, 28th January 1910. 
34 Westineath Independent, 29h January 1910. 
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his followers in the minority. Ginnell and his followers formed the majority, up to and 
beyond the Easter Rising. 
GinneIrs Suppoirt 
Over the years 1906-10, several strands of support had combined to give Ginnell his electoral 
victory over McKenna. First above all, Ginnell was undoubtedly the ranch warrior and land 
radical in Westmeath, comprehensively outflanking Hayden and his allies. As a result, the 
police were unequivocal that much of Ginnell's support came from 'small farmers and 
landless men'. 
35 Ginnell's rhetoric was unrelenting, and undoubtedly told against the former 
Parnellite radical Hayden, now portrayed by Ginnell as the owner of the 'Rancher's Gazette' 
36 
and of over 500 acres, riding to hounds in his red jacket . 
Secondly, Ginnell's following was 
boosted by the strength of the rural labour movement in Westmeath, a county polarised not so 
much between large and small farmers as between 'large', cattle-fattening 'ranchers' and 
labourers, with the latter agitating in the 1900s for the redistribution of land, the re-housing of 
rural labourers and the restoration of jobs driven out of the county by the 'ranches'. 37 
Branches of the Land and Labour Association (L & L) in North Westmeath almost all 
supported Ginnell in 1910 and William Gillivan of the Walshestown L&L had been a 
supporter of Ginnell from 1900 on. By July 1910 the police reported that L&L associations, 
now with eight branches in the county, still appeared to be gaining ground and to be 'pulling 
against' the UIL . 
38 The Clonlost L&L, under Joseph O'Neill, denounced not only the local 
UIL but the national leadership, and in particular inveighed against 'Toss Pot O'Connor'. 39 
Ginnell's followers consistently portrayed themselves as leaders of labour and working men. 
'All the working classes and fighting Nationalists', according to the Roscommon Herald in 
January 1910, 'are on Mr Ginnell's side'. 40 
Ginnellite rhetoric undoubtedly mirrored and promoted the 'class' basis of much of his 
popular support in North Westmeath. However, there remained a gulf between truth and 
verbiage. Thus, barring Gillivan, none of Ginnell's key lieutenants were 'small' men, but 
35 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector. December 1909 (PRO CO 904/79). 
30 Midland Reporter, 13th January 1910. 
37 Seth Jones, Graziers, Land Rc! fo? -n7 and Political Coqflict in Ireland, p. 202. 
38 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, June 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
39 Midland Reporter, 22 nd September 1910 . 
40 Rosconimon Herald, 15'h January 19 10. 
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rather came from exactly the same pool of Mullingar bourgeoisie and/or successful farmers 
and landowners as had produced the leading Haydenites. These included the Mullingar 
draper and cap manufacturer Patrick Brett, the Mullingar auctioneer James Donohue, the 
long-standing Mullingar rural district councillors and farmers Christopher Lennon and 
Joseph O'Neill (also president of the Clonlost L&L) and the county councillor Hugh O'Neill, 
owner of over 1 000 acres of land .41 
The 'labour' credentials of Ginnellite candidates could 
also be obscure. In the 1911 county council elections, the Ginnellite champion was the 
'fiiend of labour' and Mullingar plumber Richard Mullally, who claimed that he had the 
support of all 'artizans and labourers' because he had 'at all times paid the highest rates and 
given preference to Mullingar men'. 42 When he was defeated by another local employer, J. P. 
Dowdall, this was ascribed by the Midland Reporter first to the machinations of the Midland 
Great Western Railway, but secondly to 'the remains of the corrupt labour organisation'. 43 
Clearly, not every labour man in Mullingar was a Ginnellite. Even Ginnellite enthusiasm for 
labour had its limits. When in August 1913 Lennon appealed to the now strongly pro-Ginnell 
Mullingar RDC to support the Dublin strike leader Jim Larkin, not one member of the council 
supported him. 44 
Ginnell's support did have a clear geographic bias, in the north of the parliamentary division 
and in particular, according to the Westmeath Independent, in the large villages/small towns 
of Castlepollard, Delvin and Rathowen. 45 Delvin was, after all, Ginnell's home town and his 
relatives were active in his cause. Support seems also to have been spurred by resentment of 
Mullingar, and in particular of its 'clique' which, it was alleged, corrupted the UIL. Ginnell 
regularly contrasted the virtues of 'genuine' branches of the UIL - such as Delvin - with 
'bogus' branches manipulated by wire-pullers. 46 Hayden's key followers, William Barry 
(victualler), Christopher Corcoran (grocer), J. P. Dowdall (merchant), Robert Downes 
(lawyer), N. T. McNaboe (shopkeeper and farrher), P. J. Weymes (wool merchant) and Owen 
Wickham (town landlord), certainly provided a target for such rhetoric. With Hayden they 
were relatively well-off men, in trade, the professions and/or land-owning and all were 
41 Westmeath Examiner, 27bApnl 1918. 
42 Midland Reporter, 18'bMay 1911. 
43 lbid, 8h June 1911. 
44 Wcstmeath Examiner, 20'hAugust 1913. 
45 Westmeath Independent, 29h January 1910. 
46 Ginnell outlined his theories of 'perfect' and 'bogus' branches in Land and Liberty, pp. 187-195. 
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prominent in Mullingar's networking of societies and committees. In the 1910 election 
Ginnell abused them as 'the Rabbis 47 but they were more commonly attacked, as were their 
counterparts in many other provincial towns, as the 4 clique'. 
Again, however, the geographic split of support in North Westmeath may have been less 
clear-cut than supposed. In the January 1910 election, the popular vote In that supposed 
Haydenite bastion, Mullingar, was evenly split between Ginnell and McKenna. 48 Ginnell's 
followers also already formed a substantial presence on Mullingar RDC (elected in 1907) 
which in May 1910 divided 19-19 over whether to send delegates to the Irish party's national 
convention . 
49 Similarly, support for Ginnell was not monolithic in the north of the county, 
even in Delvin, where in March 1910 the RDC split only 12-11 in favour of an anti-party 
resolution. 50 
Ginnell certainly derived support from long-standing, clericalist anti-Pamellites, enemies of 
Hayden from fort-ner days. The most prominent of these were Jasper and George Tully and 
Christopher Lennon. The Tullys had quickly championed Ginnell in pursuit of their more 
than 20-year feud with the Haydens, thus providing him with a ready-made press platform. 
The church itself held aloof from the January 1910 election, but it was Ginnell, not Hayden, 
who publicly thanked the bishop of Meath, Dr. Gaughran, for this neutrality (which the 
Midland Reporter had also welcomed) .51 There was, 
however, no simple, clear-cut 
reallocation of old clericalist loyalties to Ginnell. By 1910, former leading clericalists such as 
P. J. Weymes and N. T. McNaboe were allied to Hayden, as was Sir Walter Nugent, the 
clergy's candidate for the 1906 UIL nomination and from 1907 MP for South Westmeath. 
For the bishop, Dr. Gaughran, the political neutrality of the church was quite genuine and he 
had no desire to emulate the political forays of his predecessors. In reply to an appeal for 
support from Redmond in March 1910, Dr. Gaughran acknowledged that Redmond's 
'position' was difficult, but was most unwilling to pursue an 'active part in matters political'. 
He was deten-nined not to interfere in politics 'except in so far as to safeguard the interests of 
47 Roscommon Herald, 15'hJanuary 1910. 
48 Westmeath Independent, 29h January 1910. 
49 Midland Reporter, 26hMay 1910. 
50 Wcstineath Examiner, 12'hMarch 1910. 
51 Westmcath Guardian, 28hJanuary 19 10: Midland Reporter, 31" March 19 10. 
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religion. ' 52 This position was maintained right up to the world war and Dr. Gaughran was 
equally even-handed when he denounced cattle driving (see Chapter 2), making no distinction 
between either side. 
The political neutrality of the church was matched, ostensibly, by that of the Mullingar family 
most closely tied to the clergy. The leading members of the Shaw family were the brothers 
Patrick (ironmonger, seed merchant and general store owner), Thomas (grocer), James 
(draper) and Edward (solicitor). Thomas Shaw, chair of the town commissioners for several 
years and prominent both in the Holy Family co-fratemity and the St Vincent de Paul society, 
had been one of the leading backers of P. J. Kennedy in 1900.53 When another brother, 
54 Richard, died in 1910,30 priests officiated at his funeral , and 27 priests attended his 
anniversary mass in 1911.55 The family was wealthy and well-connected. Richard for 
example left over 500 acres of land on his death at 39 and had been a member of the Catholic 
56 Commercial Club, the Golf Club, Poultry Show Comi-nittee and the Westmeath Hunt . 
Between them his surviving brothers, particularly Patrick, Edward and Thomas, were 
members of just about every society and public committee going. Fon-nally, in the phrase of a 
later biographical note on Patrick Shaw, they were 'not associated with any political 
movement' until Patrick's adherence to Sinn Fein in 1921,57 but their influence and status in 
Mullingar appeared to rise inexorably as Ginnell's political position strengthened and that of 
Hayden declined. The Midland Reporte7-, never a paper to hold back on its criticisms, spoke 
well of them, and when in 1910 Thomas and Patrick arranged a deferential address to the 
Liberal peer Lord Greville and his new wife on their return to the area, incurring the wrath of 
the supposedly reactionary Haydenites, they were defended by the Tullys against the 
4clique'. 58 Moreover, in January 1911, when six of the seats for the Mullingar town 
commission were up for election, the Ginnellites contested only five and did not oppose 
Thomas Shaw. After the election, in which the Ginnellites won four seats and control of the 
town commission, (the UIL won only one seat and Thomas Shaw the other), Patrick Shaw 
52 Dr. Gaughran to Redmond, I l'hMarch 1910, Redmond Mss., National Library of Ireland, Ms. 15188. 
5.3 Midland Reponer, 4'hOctober 1900. 
54 [Vestmeath Examiner, 30'hApril 19 10. 
55 ITestmeath Guardian, 28hApril 1911. 
56 Westmeath Examiner, 23 rd April 19 10 and 29hJuly 1911. 
57 See Sheehan, ffoi-thies of Westmeath, p. 114. Patrick Shaw joined Cumann na Gaedheal in 1922 and was a TD 
from 1922 to 193-33. 
58 Midland Repoi-ter, I Vh August 19 10. 
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was duly made chairman, to the pleasure of the Midland Reporter. 
59 More blatantly. it was 
Patrick Shaw who stood against, and defeated, J. P. Dowdall for his county council seat in 
1914, much to the dismay of the Westmeath Examiner and the delight of the TullyS. 
60 The 
Shaws' interests advanced steadily and their 'neutrality' was tilted distinctly towards the 
Ginnellites, even though they epitomised the land-owning, commercial, wealthy, Mullingar- 
based influence and conservatism against which so much Ginnellite agrarian and class 
rhetoric was directed. 
The rivalries and ambitions of Mullingar traders and shopkeepers shaped other alliances. 
Patrick Brett had been one of the founders, with Hayden, of the UIL in Mullingar. In the later 
1900s his personal project was the establishment of a cap factory in the town, on premises 
adjacent to the old jail. Only recently established, by 1910 the factory was already struggling 
and employing only 7 to 10 girls .61 From April 1910 his landlords the county council 
(particularly Dowdall, Downes and Wickham, who sat on the 'old jail committee'), who were 
keen to redevelop the site, tried to evict him from his premises. 62 A succession of court cases 
and county council initiatives alleging breaches of the terms of Brett's lease kept the issue 
63 
alive - with the factory still struggling on in situ - right through to the end of 1914 . The 
Midland Reporter and leading Ginnellites on the county council, notably Hugh O'Neill, were 
Brett's strongest supporters. Was it coincidental that from May 1910 onwards Brett appeared 
regularly on Ginnellite platforms, often punctuating his speeches with at least one reference to 
the persecution of his businesS? 64 It appears likely, however, that the county council's moves 
against Brett's factory followed rather than caused his disaffection from the UIL. Certainly 
his animosity to Owen Wickham dated back to 1906-07 (Brett was then chair of the Town 
Tenants), when he denounced Wickham as the most extortionate middle landlord in 
Mullingar. 65 There was also suppressed tension between Brett and Hayden in 1906, when 
Brett complained about lack of UIL support for the Town Tenants. 66 In 1908 another Hayden 
59 Ibid, 12'h and 26th January 1911. 
60 ff"estmeath Examiner, 2 nd , 16'h. and 23d 
May, Midland Reporter, 4'h June 1914. Dowdall retained the 
chairmanship of the county council, despite losing the election to Shaw, after being co-opted back on by his Irish 
party colleagues. 
61 ff"estmeath Guardian, 27th May1910. 
62 Midland Reporter, 26th May, 2 "d June 19 10. 
63 See TVestmeath Examiner, 5h December 1914. 
04 See Brett speaking with Ginnell at Rathconrath on I st May 19 10 (Midland Reporter, 5th May 19 10) 
denouncing the efforts of Wickham and Dowdall to kill the cap factory. 
65 Midland Reporter, I" August 1907. 
66 Ibid. 13th September 1906. 
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supporter, William Barry, and Wickham had him ejected from a Mullingar UIL meeting 
67 because he was said to lack a membership card . 
It was the spring of 1910, though, which 
saw the two clearly-related events of Brett's appearing on Ginnell's platforms and the 
initiation of over four years of moves against his business by the county council. 
One element of support for Ginnell conspicuous by its silence was that of Sinn Fein. 
Ginnell's attendance at the annual Finea rally, and his abstentionist proposal at the 1909 
'Baton' convention had both been highly public, but as Ginnell's split from Hayden widened 
there was no evidence of Sinn Fein supporters becoming active in Ginnell's organisation. 
Thus Mullingar's Sinn Fein supporters from 1906-07 (who had been centred on a short-lived 
branch of the 'AOH Irish-American Alliance' )68 were absent from Ginnell's movement in 
1909-10. Similarly, none of Ginnell's key local lieutenants were earlier Sinn Fein supporters. 
The only prominent Sinn Fein supporter to give public support to Ginnell in his 1909-10 
campaign was his friend, County Longford's William Ganly. 69 
Nor was there any public record of Ginnellites paying even lip-service to formal 'Sinn Fein' 
rhetoric - particularly on the key issue of parliamentary abstention - in their many speeches, 
and Ginnell's local rhetoric in the years 1909-10 did not label him as a Sinn Fein supporter. 
Of course, his speeches contained long passages devoted to the need to revive Irish culture 
and language, industry, sports and morals, the curse of emigration, the appalling evils of 
landlordism and English rule, and the need for a strong organisation to win Irish freedom. 
None of these themesl however, was unique to Sinn Fein and they were also regularly 
expounded from Irish party platforms. Where Ginnell differed from many Irish party 
speakers was in the sheer intransigence and consistency of his rhetoric - there was no trace of 
'Redmondism' and not even lip-service was paid to it. There was no advocacy of conciliation 
and no praise for English democracy. Ginnell's fullest local exposition of his views occurred 
at a rally at Rathowen, Westmeath in late-November 1909, which effectively launched his 
1909-10 campaign. The Roscommon Herald hailed his 'New Fighting Policy' and showed by 
67 Ibid, 14'h May 1908. Brett subsequently tried to have Barry and Wickham tried for assault. 
68 lbid, 28th June, 5h July. 27h September 1906; 3 rd October, 13'h December 1907. The 'AOH LAX leading 
lights were E. J. Gammons, P. J. English, O. McGovern and T. J. O'Boyle. Gammons was known as 'a prominent 
Sinn Feiner' NA, ho was ejected from a Home Rule rally for heckling William Redmond in September 1907. 
O'Boyle worked for the Midland Reporter. but that paper did not adopt a pro-Sinn Fein stance. 
69 Leitrim Advertiser, 30'h December 1909. 
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its headline that Ginnell's focus was still on the land ('The Hazel and the Plough'). After the 
meeting's first resolution had pledged 'full and implicit confidence in the Irish Party under the 
leadership of Mr. John Redmond', all the remaining resolutions were about the land. Ginnell 
spoke on the failure of Irish party co-operation with the Liberals, the defects of the new Land 
Bill, excessive taxation, the need to use 'the old methods' of resistance and organisation, the 
'naked tyranny' of landlordism, the cowardice of emigrants and a call to 'spoil' ranches now. 
He advocated a campaign by local young men to tour the county and plough up ranches and 
called for tenants to pool unpaid rents with 'trustees'. Having devoted the bulk of his speech 
to the need for a land campaign, he moved on to the lack of local industries, the virtues of the 
'Industrial Revival Movement', praise for Archbishop Walsh of Dublin and finally the 
betrayal of the Irish party by 'a few of its most worthless members' and 'lick-spittle' 
newspapers. 70 On the central 'Sinn Fein' issue of abstention, which he had last raised at the 
1909 national party convention, Ginnell was silent. 
As the election progressed, Ginnell varied his appeal only to make more explicit attacks on 
the 'cliques' of his opponents who had, he said, fought him for the last four years in both 
Mullingar and Dublin. Though Hayden did try to portray Ginnell as a Sinn Fein supporter 
through his association with the Finea rallies and with Ganly, 71 his Westmeath Examiner, on 
losing, admitted the lack of ideological difference when it declaimed 'they have preferred a 
person to principle'. 72 Why, lamented 'Observer' in a letter to the Midland Reporter in 
December 1909, was Patrick McKenna opposing Ginnell? On past public pronouncements 
their views were the same. 73 
The bases of Ginnell's support were, therefore, far more varied than the simplicities of his 
rhetoric suggested, and his support was energised as much by rivalries within the local 
Mullingar elite as by ideological, class and/or geographic challenges to that elite. Clericalists, 
the Mullingar bourgeoisie and squabbling local antagonists could be found on both sides of 
the divide. Only the church hierarchy was studiedly neutral. If his ferocity as a land warrior, 
intransigent rhetoric and dogmatism of personality made Ginnell distinctive and carried him 
70 Ginnell speaking at Rathowen, 28h November. Roscommon Herald, 4 Ih December 1909. 
71 Westmeath Examincr, 25h December 1909. 
72 Ibid, 29h January 1910. 
73 Midland Reporter, 2 -' )d 
December 1909. 
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to local electoral success in 1910, he equally could not have succeeded without an alliance 
with much of the county's Catholic, nationalist establishment, many of whom had opposed 
one another, one way or the other, for nearly thirty years. 
The Split Cemented 
On winning the election, Ginnell called for the ad hoc committees which had supported him 
74 
to fon-n themselves into branches of the UIL . Although 
his supporters on Mullingar and 
Delvin RDCs voted for various anti-party resolutions, Ginnell made no move to set up any 
organisation beyond the branch level. In the campaign he had pledged loyalty to the Irish 
party under Redmond's leadership. Of, course, he said, he would take the party pledge if 
elected . 
75 He was always careful to make a distinction between his loyalty to Redmond - 'a 
capable and shrewd man' 76 _ and the 'self-serving cliques' who manipulated the party. 
77 
Some peace feelers were put out. The Meath MP Patrick White approached Ginnell after the 
election to see whether he would return to the party fold if invited; the response was 'Oh 
certainly'. 78 In February, after a press interview by Ginnell in which he said that he could not 
believe that he would be kept out of the party, 79Dillon wrote to Redmond: 'I take Ginnell's 
interview as tantamount to an application for admission & his case might be dealt with on 
Tuesday'. 80 
However, no reconciliation occurred. Ginnell did not take the route of so many predecessors, 
including P. J. Kennedy in 1900, of first defeating the party's candidate and then taking the 
pledge to 'sit, act and vote' with the parliamentary party. The Roscommon Herald reported 
on 19'h February that Ginnell was being denied notice of parliamentary party meetings and 
Ginnell later claimed publicly that he was being kept out by only two MPs, both of whom 
lived in Westmeath (i. e. Hayden and Nugent). 81 Such a claim is quite credible, but Ginnell 
himself was hardly conciliatory to his county rivals. Though he called for new UIL branches 
74 Westmeath Guardian, 28th January 1910. 
75Ginnell speaking at Castlepollard on 9tb January, Midland Reporter, 13thJanuary 19 10. 
76 Ginnell speaking at Mullingar on I' January, Ibid, 6h January 19 10. 
77 See Westmeath Independent 8b January. Midland Reporter, 3rd February; Roscommon Herald, 5'h February 
1910. 
7'ý Kelly, Laurence Ginnell, p. 85 and the diaries of Laurence and Alice Ginnell, 25th February 19 10 (p. 79) . 79 Midland Reporter, 3dFebruary 19 10. 
80 Dillon to John Redmond, 4th February 1910. Dillon papers, TCD f 6748/435. 
81 Midland Reporter, 14th April 19 10. 
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to pool their subscription fees and send them direct to Redmond 
82 (rather than to the party 
organisation in Dublin), his offer was conditional on the local UIL executive being 
dissolved. 83 Ginnell can hardly have hoped that such a public humiliation of Hayden was 
possible, but he continued to pledge his loyalty to Redmond and in April publicly repeated his 
pledge that he would sit, act and vote with the parliamentary party. 84 From February to June a 
succession of supporting branches called for his readmission, as did at least one South 
85 86 Westmeath branch and also the executives of the South Longford and South Leitrim UIL. 
At the end of April Ginnell sent in the accumulated UIL subscription fees of his supporters, 
not as originally planned to Redmond, but to the party's standing committee. The party again 
rejected this approach and the cheque was returned by Joe Devlin within a week. 87 
At the end of July the idea was first floated, by Christopher Lennon, of starting a branch of 
the O'Brienite All for Ireland League in the area. A week later the Midland Reporter cited 
the conciliatory 'welcome home' address to landlords Lord and Lady Greville - organised by 
the Shaws and attacked by the Mullingar UIL - as the first sign that the All for Ireland League 
might come to Mullingar. 88 During September the Ginnellites were still debating whether to 
link up with William O'Brien, again with the initiative in public coming from Lennon. 89 The 
idea, though, did not build up any broad support and, given the Ginnelliýes' defining 
commitment to aggressive land agitation and Ginnell's own historic, bitter hostility to 
O'Brien and his followers, such a lack of enthusiasm is unsurprising. The issue of allying 
with anyone else - such as Sinn Fein - was never publicly discussed. 
In September, Ginnell tried a last stunt of leading a delegation from the county to 'attend' the 
UIL national directory meeting in Dublin. According to the Midland Reporter, the UIL men 
were ffightened of the Westmeath delegates and called for police protection to repel them. 
According to Hayden's Westmeath Examiner, one policeman asked the 'excited crowd' to 
move along - and they did. 
90 Finally, on 13ffi October, the Ginnellites abandoned the tactic of 
82 Roscommon Herald, 19'h February 19 10. 
83 Midland Reporter, 5h May 19 10. 
84 Ginnell speaking at Kilrush on 3 rd April: Midland Reporter, 7h April 19 10. 
85 Sir Walter Nugent to John Redmond, I' February 19 10. Redmond Mss., NLI, Ms. 1519 1. 
86 Leitrim Advertiser, 9"' and 16th June 19 10. 
87 Midland Reporter. 19t" May 1910. 
zust 
1910. 88 Ibid, 28h July and 4 th and I I'IAup 
89 Westmeath Examine7-, 24th September 1910. 
90 Midland RcI)ortcr, 22 nd September. Ji'estmeath Examiner, 24th September 19 10. 
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seeking readmission to the party fold, but kept the name 'United Irish League' (thus. 
according to Christopher Lennon. still retuming to their own 'vomit') by establishing an 
'Independent UIL' executive for North Westmeath-91 Nine months after Ginnell had defeated 
McKenna the organisational split in the county was formal. 
While Ginnell's revolt took root in North Westmeath, it was far more limited In the south of 
the county. He regularly had the support of 10- 15 'UIL' and L&L branches in the north, but 
of only two UIL branches in South Westmeath - at Tyrrellspass, where the president, James 
King, was Ginnell's father-in-law and at Milltown-Rathconrath, right on the border of the 
county's two parliamentary divisions. King had until recently been president of the South 
Westmeath UIL, but his successor was the Moate auctioneer Eugene Robins. just as fierce a 
land warrior and 'labour champion' as many Ginnellites, but loyal to the Irish party. Robins 
was not outflanked by Ginnellite agrarian radicalism in the way Hayden had been and 
remained at the head of the local land movement, assisted by Patrick McKenna who now 
became UIL 'national organiser' in South Westmeath and from 1911 a county councillor. As 
in the north, the Land and Labour movement continued to spread, but here it was more firmly 
anchored to the party. When in 1912 the Moate AOH was formed, the Moate L&L 
(president Eugene Robins) merged into it immediately. The new Hibernian division's first 
president was, unsurprisingly, Robins. 92 
Outside Westmeath, Ginnell's main support came from County Longford. His association 
with William Ganly has already been noted, but as Paul Bew has written, Ginnell's 'natural 
93 
ally' in the Ranch War years had been Ganly's enemy J. P. Farrell. Though Farrell, 
described by Bew as 'one of nature's loyalists' (i. e. to the Irish party) 94 did not publicly 
support Ginnell in the years 1910-14, unlike many local MPs he stayed neutral. Invited to 
Ginnell's Rathowen rally in November 1909, he missed it owing to a possibly diplomatic 
illness; his Longford associate Joe Callaghan, introduced as a 'political prisoner', attended in 
his place. 95 In the subsequent election campaign Farrell, unlike his Longford rivals John 
Phillips and Patrick McKenna, took no part against Ginnell. When the South Longford 
91 Midland Reporter, 20'bOctober 19 10. 
92 Westmeath Independent, 15'h June 1912. 
93 Bew, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 178. 
94 Ibid, p. 158. 
95 Roscommon Herald, 40' December 1909. 
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executive called in June 1910 for Ginnell's readmission to the party, the lead was taken by 
Callaghan and Farrell's chief lieutenant, Frank MacGuinness. 96 In October 1910, Farrell 
made his only public comment on Westmeath affairs, when he warned Ginnell that to support 
William O'Brien would mean that he followed O'Brien into obscurity at the next election. 97 
After October, with the Independent UIL formed, Farrell and his followers made no further 
comment on and played no public part in North Westmeath politics. 
The Haydenite UIL weakened steadily after the January 1910 election. Though its executive 
continued to meet, it was now rare for representatives of more than 3-4 branches to attend and 
only the Mullingar UIL continued to meet regularly. As already seen above (page 73), the 
number of affiliated, paid-up branches recorded for all of Westmeath in the UIL National 
Directory minute book fell from 35 in the year to the end of January 1910 to only 16 two 
years later. Ahead of the December 1910 general election, non-partisan newspapers (i. e. not 
owned by Hayden or the Tullys) reported that a UIL candidate could not even be found and 
that Ginnell was likely to be unopposed. 98 Though Hayden and Wickham subsequently 
organised a meeting to select McKenna, that meeting was interrupted by a telegram from John 
Redmond telling them to take no action; the telegram was debated for over two hours before it 
was obeyed. 99 Ginnell was therefore unopposed, but there is no reason to believe that he 
would not have won comfortably against McKenna. 
In 1911, many of Hayden's lieutenants stood down from their public offices : Weymes as 
chairman of the Mullingar town commissioners before his replacement by Patrick Shaw, ' 00 
Wickham as member and chairman of Mullingar RDC, 101 McNaboe as member and chairman 
of the Mullingar Guardians' 02 and Downes as member and chairman of the county council. 103 
96 Longford Leader, 18'b June 19 10. 
97 Leitrim Advertiser, 13'hOctober 1910. 
98 Jf'estmeath Guardian, 2 nd December, - ff 'estmeath Independent, 3dDecember 1910. 
99 Midland Reporter, 8h December; Westmeath Guardian, 9thDecember; Westmeath Examiner, lV'December 
1910. 
Ginnell's was not the only case in which Redmond ordered no action. There was no contest in South Monaghan 
against another lone independent nationalist, John McKean. Patrick Maume *in The Long Gestation, p. 114, 
notes that, 'even Ginnell and McKean were left undisturbed as the party concentrated on O'Brien and the 
Unionists'. 
'00 Westmeath Guardian, 276 January 1911. 
101 Ibid, 10th February 1911. 
102 Westmeath Examiner, 3 
rd June 1911. 
103 Westmeath Independent, 29th April 1911. 
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Their reasons for doing so were various, but each one stood down ahead of probable defeat by 
the Ginnellites. Even Sir Walter Nugent, long a North Westmeath county councillor, stood 
down, claiming lack of time and leaving his Ginnellite opponent unopposed. 104 As seen, the 
Mullingar town commission election in January 1911 was easily won by Ginnellites - and the 
Shaws - and both Mullingar RDC and the Guardians followed in June. The fight was not 
completely over, though, and the Mullingar county council seat was retained for the party in 
June 1911 by J.. P. Dowdall. The party's main stronghold continued to be the county council, 
where loyalists from South Westmeath provided a comfortable majority, allied to the few 
Haydenites elected, or co-opted, from the north. 
The one discernible attempt to rebuild the Irish party's organisation came in 1912, with the 
extension of the Hibernians into North Westmeath and the formation of the Mullingar AOH in 
May. The party stalwart P. J. Weymes presided at the inaugural meeting, 05 and the AOH 
county president was Michael Ronan, who had long been both a UIL land agitator and loyal 
to Hayden. Ginnell himself was critical of the AOH, as a 'secret society', in January 1912.1 06 
However, it did not expand far and though individual divisions were large, the local police 
counted only five in the whole county in January 1913 (the comparable police count of both 
party and Ginnellite 'UIL' branches at the time, though many were defunct, was 3 3). 107 In the 
north of the county there were only two AOH divisions. Moreover, the Order in Mullingar 
did not consist solely of Hayden-loyalists. The chairman of the town's division, T. F. O'Shea 
(a draper and tobacconist), was a Gaelic enthusiast who had played no part at all in recent 
disputes. He was not an active UIL man; his last political involvement had been as a Town 
Tenant with Brett in 1906 and he had been on the platform at the Bulmer Hobson-organised 
'Myles the Slasher' rally at Finea in 1907.108 
Though the Ginnellites were effective electorally, the impetus of their agrarian campaign 
faded away as the level of rural conflict in Westmeath declined (see Chapter 2). If there was 
continuing land campaigning in the county, it was more that of Eugene Robins around Moate 
than of Ginnell in the north. From the end of 1911 the number of disputes and agitations was 
104 fJestmeath Guardian, 5"' May 1911. 
105 lf'cvtmeath Examiner, I VhMay 1912. 
106 Midland Reportcr. I I'h Januarý, 1912. 
107 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, January 1913 (PRO CO 904/89). 
108 Midland Reporicr. 25tý January 1906 and 8th August 1907. 
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insignificant compared with previous years. Ginnell's personal involvement also declined, 
and while in 1910 he had addressed a succession of local meetings in his call for a 'hurricane' 
of drives, in later years his focus shifted almost entirely to Westminster. He would still return 
regularly to Mullingar to address his executive, and he did launch one brief campaign in 
October-November 1912, to secure a moratorium on land purchase annuity payments to offset 
the damage of foot and mouth restrictions. 109 However, other than this one campaign, his 
speaking activity at local public meetings, let alone any attempts to incite disorder, became 
sparse. 
In parliament, by contrast, Ginnell was outstandingly active, asking a huge number of 
questions on matters local and national, voting assiduously, repeatedly tabling private 
member's bills to give labourers the right to buy their cottages and, occasionally, staging a 
single-handed revival of the obstruction tactics of the 1880s and getting himself suspended for 
breaching the conventions of the House of Commons. In asking parliamentary questions 
Ginnell was head and shoulders above any other Irish MP. Thus the Leitrim Advertiser 
reported in October 1913 that in the last session Ginnell had asked 197 parliamentary 
questions. The next highest figure for an Irish MP, 123, was from the constitutional specialist 
J. Swift MacNeill (focused on the Home Rule bill). ' 10 Ginnell's parliamentary activities were 
reported at length in the Tully newspapers, and the focus of Ginnell's political life from 1912 
was away from North Westmeath. 
Ginnell did, periodically, associate himself conspicuously with separatists and Sinn Fein 
supporters in Dublin. In June 1911 he was one of the platfonn speakers at a Dublin anti- 
coronation demonstration against George V. His fellow speakers included John MacBride, 
Arthur Griffith, James Connolly and Countess Markiewicz. The police reported that 'the tone 
of the speeches was to demand independence and complete separation for Ireland, and 
denying the right of His Majesty to govem the Irish people. "" The Roscommon Herald 
reported that there were several 'exciting scenes'. 112 That Ginnell may also have maintained 
some ties to Bulmer Hobson may be inferred from his repeated questioning, in parliament, on 
109 Roscoininon Herald, 16"' November 1912. 
110 Learini Advertiser, 2-3)d October 1913. 
111 Crime Special Branch report. June 1911 (PRO CO 904/119). 
112 Roscomnion Herald, 24th June 1911. 
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the 1907 theft of the Irish Crown Jewels, with its allegations of government cover-ups, 
incompetence and debauchery in high places. When in November 1912 Ginnell named the 
brother of Sir Ernest Shackleton, the Arctic explorer, as one of the thieves, 113 or in December 
accused Birrell of covering up the affair to avoid sexual scandal , 
11 4 he was giving voice to 
allegations already made in a New York press campaign by Hobson. " 5 
In Westmeath, however, there was no public association with Sinn Fein supporters, nor were 
Sinn Fein ideas propounded locally by Ginnell. When the Home Rule bill was published, in 
April 1912, Ginnell told the Independent UIL executive of his qualified acceptance of it. He 
would do all in his power with other Irish MPs to amend the bill and if that failed he would 
still vote for it. Even a crippled Irish parliament would bring to the front 'the great virtue of 
self-reliance in the nation'. 116 Three days later he said that the bill answered 'to some extent 
the ambition of our lives'. There had to be 'cordial co-operation' to get it passed into law and 
even to pass it without amendment, 'because even as it stands it would be an improvement on 
our present position. '... 'Let there be no bickering and finding fault with Nationalists who are 
working for Home Rule. ' 117 In February 1913 his Westmeath executive praised him for his 
attendance at parliament and for his assiduous voting. " 8 
Political activity had slackened off considerably in the county in 1912. When, in April, the 
RIC county inspector reported that four UIL branches were active, he was referring to the 
whole county and to all UIL branches, both Haydenite and Ginnellite. 119 By July he would 
report of political organisations that 'none can be said to be at all active'. 120 
Cohabitation 
By February 1913, the Independent UIL executive was known as the 'Westmeath Nationalist 
Executive', but only its name had changed. It remained a broad nationalist alliance of 
113 Leitrim Obsei-ver, 23'6 November 1912. 
114 Roscommon Journal, 280'December 1912. 
115 See Hobson's account of the Crown Jewels affair. which does not, however, mention Gmnell. in Ireland, 
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Tomorroiv, pp. 85-90. Hobson was the Dublin correspondent of John Devoy's 'Gaelic American' 
and his source was the ex-Parnellite, ex-MP. Pierce O'Mahony 
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Independent, 20"' April 1 "' Long 
117 Midland Reporter, 25hApril 1912. 
118 Ibid, 2 7ffi February 19 13. 
119 Monthly report of the NA"estmeath county inspector, April 1912 (PRO CO 904/86). 
120 Ibid., July 1912 (PRO CO 904/87). 
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factions and individuals across North Westmeath, united in opposition under Ginnell's 
leadership to a not dissimilar but weaker alliance loyal to John Hayden. Ginnell's followers 
were still demonstrably 'parliamentary' and barring the Tullys (see Chapter 8), supported the 
Home Rule bill. The defining Ginnellite ideology was not Sinn Feinism but agrarianism and. 
with the end of the land wars, Ginnell's relentless agrarian rhetoric had at the least lost its 
edge. The ideological gulf between Hayden's and Ginnell's followers was now infinitesimal 
and the prime reason for a continuing split into two organisations was the residual momentum 
of grudges, rivalries and competition for office and influence. In this competition the 
Ginnellites were clearly the more successful, but politically they gave the appearance, had 
they not had Hayden and his 'clique' to attack, of not having very much to do. 
The Ginnellites remained, though, a successful electoral machine. They maintained their hold 
on the Mullingar town commissioners in each annual election. In the 1914 local elections 
they retained the district councils and, in alliance with the Shaws, went further and defeated 
the Haydenite J. P. Dowdall in the contest for the Mullingar county council seat. The old UIL 
limped along; still only 3-4 branches met at their executive, which in June 1913 had to 
adjourn its meeting because of poor attendance. 12 1 The number of fully paid-up UIL branches 
across the county held just about steady. When an agrarian dispute revived a handful of UIL 
branches in 1913, these were all in South Westmeath, under the direction of Robins. There 
was no such revival in the north. The AOH made no further significant progress in the 
county, growing from five to only six divisions in the two years 1913-14. 
The Ginnellites could rely on anything between eight and eighteen parishes and branches 
being represented at well-attended, quarterly executive meetings. ' 22 Nevertheless, when they 
were not fighting elections, the activities of the 'Westmeath Nationalists' were also minimal. 
The Westmeath county inspector in March 1913 commented of political organisations in the 
county. north and south, that they were 'generally nominal', while in August he remarked that 
(all political societies have only a nominal existence'. 123 
121 11estmeatli Examiner, 28h June 1913. 
122 See Midland Reporter, 27 th February. 213rd October 1913,12'hFebruary, 2-')TdApril 1914. 
123 Monthly reports of the Westmeath county Inspector. March and August 1913, (PRO CO 904/89 and 90). 
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In March 1912, Patrick McKenna had referred fancifully to a 6reign of terror' in North 
Westmeath 124 and in that year periodic faction fights did occur. In June, the UIL's William 
Barry tried unsuccessfully to unseat Joseph O'Neill as chairman of Mullingar RDC125 and in 
the same month Brett, in attendance at the county council, clashed again with his cap factory's 
persecutors. 126 However, there were also plentiful signs of peaceful coexistence between the 
two sides in the years 1912-13. These were relatively quiet, largely election-free years, 
characterised by the absence of both Hayden and Ginnell in Westminster for much of the 
time. In April 1912, the Mullingar town commissioners appointed representatives to an Irish 
party convention in Dublin - Patrick Brett and Patrick Shaw. 
127 In May, senior figures of both 
factions, with the bishop's administrator Rev. Duffy in the chair, shared the platform at a 
Mullingar Foresters' meeting to review the workings of the National Insurance Act. 128 In 
January 1913, the Mullingar RDC, chaired by Joseph O'Neill, that earlier scourge of 'Toss 
Pot O'Connor'. unanimously passed a resolution congratulating John Redmond for his 
achievements. 1 29 In February 1913, all Mullingar's leading figures collaborated, under the 
lead of the Shaws, in setting up a fund to alleviate temporary economic distress in the town. ' 30 
The biggest event in Mullingar in 1913 was the Gaelic League procession, rally and ceilidh of 
18'hMay, visited and addressed by the league's president Douglas Hyde (accompanied by 
Eamon de Valera). Ginnell, long an active Gaelic Leaguer and on the league's national 
education committee,, 1 31 made one of his now rare local public speeches, but the rally was 
very much an all-party affair and all sides collaborated in its organisation. The Hibernians, 
UIL, Foresters, Gaelic League, National Teachers' Association, Temperance Society, town 
commissioners and rural district council all turned out, together with 13 priests. Hibernians 
from across the county processed, led by the Athlone pipers' band, and heard Hyde praise 
'that great Order [i. e. the AOH] which had spread through the length and breadth of the 
world'. Hyde then appealed for a struggle on 'the battlefields of the mind', for Ireland's own 
124 Wevmeath Examiner, 30"' March 1912. 
125 Midland Reponer, 6h June 191 "' 
126 Westmeath Examiner, 15'h June 1912. 
127 Midland Reponer, I I'hApril 1912. 
128 Westmeath Examiner, 4hMay 1912. 
1 -)() Westmeath Examiner, 25bJanuary 1913. 
130 Wcwmeath Guardian, 7"' February 1913. 
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language, books, songs, music, games, tobacco, furniture, clothes and even shoe leather. His 
audience had, he said, to be self-reliant, but politics had to be left at the door of the Gaelic 
League and (possibly with his audience in mind) he emphasised that there was no room for 
faction. 'Faction' was certainly set to one side for the rally. Every major figure in Mullingar 
politics was there, with the exception of Hayden. Hyde's fellow speakers were Ginnell, Sir 
Walter Nugent and Dowdall. 132 
The emergence of a Home Rule crisis in September-October 1913 (see Chapter 9) appeared, 
briefly, to galvanise Ginnell locally. The realisation that a significant body of English Liberal 
opinion was now succumbing to the relentless 'bluff of the Ulster unionist campaign angered 
him. According to George Dangerfield, he was also one of the ffiends of Bulmer Hobson 
excited by the phantom Athlone 'Midland Volunteers', which sprang fully armed from the 
head of the editor of the Westmeath Independent in October. 133 When he met his local 
executive shortly afterwards he made an unequivocal call to arms. He still believed, be said, 
that Carson's followers would not fight, but they had 'succeeded in alarming a number of 
timid Englishmen'. It was now 'common prudence' he said, 'for us to be ready if they do 
renege ... it will 
be for us the Nationalists to adopt and put into practice those rights of 
rebellion and their rights which Sir Edward Carson has been loudly preaching in Ulster with 
impunity'. If the long struggle of Irishmen was to be frustrated, 'we must and will remember 
what is due at our hands to a cause that has survived fire and sword, pitchcap and jibbet [sic], 
through generations of privation and effort'. 134 
However, neither Ginnell nor any of his followers made any attempt to follow up such 
bellicosity for several months and the Mullingar Volunteer corps was not formed until April 
1914. When Ginnell met his local executive in February 1914 the subject did not come up. ' 35 
For Irish party stalwarts, such a delay was more commonplace and in many parts of Ireland 
132 Westmeath Independent, Westmeath Examiner, 24h May 1913. Hyde's, biographers, J. E. and G. W. Dunleavy 
(Douglas Iývde .-A 
Maker qfModern Ireland (Berkeley, 199 1), p. 32 1) state that Hyde, Mi a 1912 speech in 
Mullingar, was close to Patrick Pearse's position on the use of force. This assertion appears mistaken. First, the 
speech appears to have been the one made in 1913 and there is no record of a 1912 speech. Secondly, Hyde 
explicitly told his audience that they were not called upon to shed blood, as four nations of Europe (in the 
Balkans) had done that year. Instead they were fi,, htln,, 'in the realms of thought ... on the 
battlefields of the 
mind'. 
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the reluctance of the national leadership to endorse volunteering still provided an effective 
brake. For example, in Longford town the party loyalist Farrell in October 1913 displayed an 
enthusiasm for action comparable to Ginnell's, only to follow this with nearly seven months 
of silence on the subject (see Chapter 9). In North Westmeath both Ginnellites and UIL men 
were conspicuous by their lack of Volunteering until the spring of 1914, despite the fact the 
former remained an extensive, ostensibly militant, nationalist organisation operating outside 
the restraints of the Irish party. 
In addition, there was no discernible increase in tensions between the two sides in North 
Westmeath over the winter of 1913-14. Several different Shaws (brothers and sons, and 
including Patrick and Edward) chose to contribute publicly to the Irish party's Home Rule 
fund in January 1914.136 The Shaws were still ostensibly 'neutral', but the contribution to the 
Home Rule fund made at the same time by Joseph O'Neill (Ginnell's vice-president on the 
Westmeath Nationalist executive) was rather more startling. ' 37 O'Neill then went further, not 
only attending the Irish party's Home Rule rally in Moate in February' 38 (Joseph Devlin, 
Hayden and Nugent were the speakers), but calling on all his fellow Mullingar district 
councillors to support it. ' 39 In March, the Delvin RDC by 13 votes to 8 passed a resolution 
praising Redmond for his efforts to obtain Home Rule by consent. 140 
It was the Ginnellites who took the lead in volunteering in North Westmeath, but only in 
April 1914 after the Curragh mutiny. The first company was formed, fittingly, in Finea early 
in the month 14 1 and was followed on 16'h April by public calls for action when Joseph O'Neill 
and Christopher Lennon both appealed to Mullingar RDC for a corps to be fortned. Already, 
however, this call was bipartisan and the Haydenite William Barry strongly backed them .1 
42 
The public meeting to form a Mullingar corps, now with the enthusiastic support of all sides, 
followed only three days later. It was attended by the national Volunteer organiser, The 
O'Rahilly, with Joseph O'Neill in the chair and the Haydenites Barry, Dowdall, Ronan, 
136 ffy, 
cwtmeath Examiner, 17'hJanuary 1914. 137 Ibid. 
138 Westmeath Independent, 7'h February 1914. 
139 ff'cstineath Examiner, 17'h Januarv 1914. 
140 Midland Reporter, 12'hMarch 1914. 
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Weymes and Wickham all firmly on the platform, which pledged all present to resist any 
invasion from Ulster. 143 
The volunteering movement then spread across North Westmeath, as it did across nationalist 
Ireland, in the months leading up to the outbreak of war. Unity was not always perfect and 
the two opposing political factions continued to contest the local elections with, as seen, the 
Ginnellites winning. They also squabbled over who should take the credit for initiating the 
Mullingar Volunteers. Joseph O'Neill clashed publicly with McKenna over who had chaired 
the inaugural meeting - himself or Dowdall. 
144 However, the unity of the local Volunteers did 
bold, and when the Irish party supposedly took over the national movement in June 1914, 
Lennon put a resolution to the Mullingar Guardians, passed without dissent, endorsing 
Redmond's move. ' 45 On the outbreak of the world war, both Mullingar and Delvin RDCs 
praised Redmond's 3 rd August offer of the Volunteers for domestic war service in the defence 
of Ireland. 146 All turned out for the county Volunteer rally in Mullingar on 15 th August where 
over 2,500 Volunteers were inspected and the platform party included Sir Walter Nugent, 
Patrick Shawl) Lord Greville and, making his first platform appearance in Mullingar that year, 
Ginnell. 147 
War and Sinn Fein 
It was Ginnell who in September 1914 broke irrevocably with the consensus of support for 
the war and from then on was totally associated with the 'Sinn Feiner' opponents of 
recruiting, Redmond and Irish participation. In October, he spoke at a Dublin rally organised 
by Volunteers still loyal to Eoin MacNeill's Provisional Committee. For Ginnell, recruiting 
on behalf of Ireland's enemy, England, was a betrayal, and everything Redmond and his 
followers were saying was a betrayal of Ireland. 148 Ginnell reiterated his anti-recruiting views 
in a letter to the Midland Repoi-ter in December: Ireland could spare no more young men 
while the English practised 'business as usual' at the expense of Irish lives. 149 
143 Ibid. 25'ý April 1914. 
144 ffestmeath Independent, 27"' June 1914. 
145 Ibid. 20 11'June 1914. 
140 Midland Reporte7-, 6 th August 1914. 
147 Ibid, 200'August 1914. 
148' Midland Reporter, 15d' October. Roscommon JOU7-nal, 24th October 1914. 
149 Midland Reportcr, I 0"i' December 1914. 
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There were also public gestures of 'Sinn Feiner' dissent from some of Ginnell's followers in 
Mullingar. The Midland Reporter published another of its long series of polemics against the 
Irish party in early October. The Tullys, who were also strongly anti-Prussian, argued with 
some percipience that the Germans had lost their chance to win the war, were now stalemated 
and would ultimately lose. However the passing of the Home Rule Act was a 'hoax' and the 
men responsible for that hoax (the party) were now going round Ireland in 'Kitchener's red 
coats' recruiting for the British army. Going to the front was reserved for those 'mugs' who 
had confidence in Redmond and Dillon. ' 50 Patrick Brett also stood out from his fellow 
Mullingar burghers. At the Town Commissioners, he alone dissented from their approval of 
Redmond's September, pro-recruiting manifesto. ' 51 In November, he and James Donohue 
irritated their fellow commissioners by refusing to join in a vote of sympathy for the families 
of two Protestant officers killed in the war. This prompted the chairman, Patrick Shaw, to call 
their actions 'disgraceful' and William Barry to call Brett 'pro-German', while Brett 
reciprocated by calling Barry a 'very loyal Englishman'. The next week, Brett wrote to the 
Reporter to deny that he was pro-German and to affirm that his sympathies in the war were 
entirely with the Allies. He meant, he wrote rather disingenuously, no disrespect to the two 
dead men, but did want respect paid to the more than 20 soldiers formerly stationed in 
Mullingar who had already been killed. 
152 
The strongest, unambiguous expression of anti-war, anti-recruiting sentiment in Mullingar 
came from a source that was not traditionally Ginnellite, the church. In early October, the 
Holy Family co-fraternity heard its spiritual director, the Rev. Hugh Carpenter, preach in the 
cathedral. He believed that the war was not of Ireland's making and that she had no direct 
part in it. A few months ago, Ireland's blood would have boiled at being told to take the 
King's shilling - 'this criminal betrayal of Ireland's sons'. The patriots of England stayed at 
home and captured German trade while Irishmen fought. Ireland's sons were needed at home 
to till the fields. He ended by asking the Mother of God to be the mother of those 'brave lads' 
fighting in Flanders. The sermon was picked up by Eoin MacNeill's Irish Volunteer under 
150 Ibid, 8th October 1914. 
151 Ibid. 
152 11'estmeath Evaniiner, 7'h November and Midland Reporter, 12'b November 1914. 
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the headline 'Straight Talk by an Irish Priest'. 153 Though this appears to have been a lone 
outburst, there is no record of any public episcopal rebuke for Carpenter, who stayed attached 
to the cathedral. 
For all these expressions of individual hostility to the war - and Brett's was ultimately a 
qualified one - the Ginnellites did not follow their leader en masse. Following the publication 
of Redmond's overtly pro-recruiting manifesto in mid-September, it was unanimously praised 
by the Westmeath county committee of the Volunteers, chaired by Dowdall but including 
Patrick Shaw and Joseph O'Neill. 154 With only Brett dissenting, the Mullingar town 
commissioners passed their resolution supporting Redmond's manifesto - so too did Delvin 
RDC. 155 The Mullingar Volunteers were reorganised following the split of the movement 
nationally and certain individuals, none of them prominent Ginnellites (but including the 
Hibernian TF O'Shea) left the committee. Patrick Shaw and Joseph O'Neill, the latter still 
vice-president of Ginnell's Westmeath Nationalists, stayed on the committee. 156 Individual 
dissidents dropped out of the Volunteers, but no formal MacNeillite Volunteer branches were 
set up in North Westmeath. Leading figures on both sides of the old factional divide 
continued to cohabit on the town's War Distress Committee through to the end of the year. ' 57 
Even after the outbreak of war, it was, therefore, difficult to discern a real ideological gulf 
between many of Ginnell's followers and those of Hayden. Despite the clear break made by 
Ginnell himself, the factions remained the Tweedledum and Tweedledee of local politics. As 
already noted, the perception right through to 1916 was that there were no 'Sinn Feiners' in 
North Westmeath. That pattern was not fundamentally to change until 1917, when Ginnell's 
organisation was absorbed into the new, nationalist coalition represented by yet another 
incarnation of 'Sinn Fein'. Loyalty to Ginnell had, however, endured for many years, and the 
pre-war factional affiliations of North Westmeath became almost an exact predictor of which 
pre-war politicians would in later years embrace Sinn Fein and which would go down with 
the ship of constitutional nationalism. Thus every one of Ginnell's lieutenants - Brett, 
153 Midland Reporter, 80' October, Westmeath Examiner, I Oth October, Irish Volunteer, 17'h October 1914. 
Carpenter had been a leading light in the town's Gaelic League. His fellow Gaelic League activist. Rev. B. 
O'Farrell, took a different path and served as an army chaplain for the duration of the war. 
154 11'Cstmeath Independent, 19'h September 1914. 
155 Midland Reporter, 8th and 22 Id October 1914. 
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Donohue, Gillivan, Lennon, Hugh O'Neill and Joseph O'Neill - supported Ginnell and Sinn 
Fein in 1917-18. Almost all of Hayden's men - Downes, McNaboe, Ronan, Weymes and 
Wickham - stayed loyal to their leader. (Dowdall died in 1916 and the Hibernian TF O'Shea,, 
who did embrace Sinn Fein, was never one of Hayden's lieutenants. ) Even Patrick Shaw 
remained consistent in his 'neutrality', rising ever higher to become the vice-chairman of the 
Sinn Fein-dominated county council in 1920. 
Though few local Irish party activists made the transition from the party to Sinn Fein during 
the war, there was, therefoke, significant continuity in North Westmeath politics as a whole. 
The area's pre-war divisions hardly changed as political allegiances were re-labelled. 
Alliances formed in the years 1906-10 stayed in place right through to the War of 
Independence. In February 1917, the veteran nationalist Tim Healy wrote to his brother 
Maurice, discussing whether the Irish party could sustain its organisation after the North 
Roscommon by-election. Healy believed that the party would have more local durability 
where it had already fought an 'anti-Party organization', concluding 
q 158 'Where the Irish take sides they stay on that side. ' 
'5' Tim Healy to Maurice Healy. 7 th February 1917, quoted in Healy, Letters and Leaders of My Daly, Vol. 11. p. 
578. 
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Chapter 7: The Aldermen, the AOH and Labour in Sligo Town 
The Secret of Labour's Success 
The labour movement flourished in Sligo town in the years 1910-14. In those years its 
leadership passed from a medley of craft unions to the Larkinite, socialist, Irish Transport and 
General Workers' Union (ITGWU), which organised 'unskilled' labourers and which arrived 
in the town in 1911. So well organised did labour unions become in Sligo that they won 
major strikes in 1912 and 1913. Trades unionism spread throughout the town's unskilled and 
skilled workers and by 1914 the Sligo Trades Council could list among its achievements pay 
rises of 100% for asylum workers and 50% for Corporation workers, the virtual end of night 
work for bakers, a successful cabinet makers' strike, action against tailors' work being sent 
out of town, better conditions for women workers and triumph for the dock workers. ' Two 
months later, in April 1914, the RIC county inspector could write that 'the Transport Union is 
now in complete control of the quays'. 2 This industrial power also found political expression. 
Labour candidates won almost all of the Sligo Corporation seats up for election in 1913 and 
1914. In 1914, according to the historian Arthur Mitchell, their success contrasted sharply 
with the failure of labour candidates elsewhere in Ireland : 'only in Sligo did labour score a 
significant success, when a labour man and Transport Union member was elected mayor. ' 3 
Traditionally, the Irish labour movement has been portrayed as increasingly distinct from, and 
hostile to, the Irish party and as one of the new nationalist political forces which cast the party 
aside in the years after 1916. This hostility went back many years. Larkin's fellow ITGWU 
organiser James Connolly, while still in the USA in 1908, proclaimed the political goal of 
taking 'the control of the Irish vote out of the hands of the slimy seoinini who use it to boost 
their political and business interests to the undoing of the Irish as well as the American 
4 
toiler' . Such 
feelings were often mutual, and John Dillon could thus in 1913 privately 
describe the founder of the ITGWU, James Larkin, as : 
Sligo Nationalist, 2 Is' February 1914. 
1o county Inspector, April 1914 (PRO CO 904/93). 
1 
Monthly report of the SI t-: 1 
Arthur Mitchell, Labour in Irish Politics .- The Irish Labour Movement in an Age ofRevolution (Dublin 1974), 
p. 5 3. 
4 Connolly in The Haip, 1908, quoted in W. P. Ryan. The Irish Labour Movement: From the 'Twenties to Our 
Own Da, v (Dublin and London 1919), p. 157. 
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a malignant enemy - and an impossible man - he seems to be a wild international 
syndicalist and anarchist - and all along he has been doing his best to bust up the Party 
and the National movement. 5 
The Dublin strike and lockout of 1913-14 triggered particular antipathy between the strike 
leaders and the AOH. AOH men fought strikers over the issue of whether strikers' children 
should be 'deported' to England, while furious accusations of AOH strike-breaking were also 
made. A notable bete noire of labour was J. D. Nugent, the Hibernian national secretary and 
later an Irish party MP. In 1915, Connolly's newspaper the Workers 'Republic would write of 
Nugent that he was 'the ready agent of every evil thing that sought to darken the National soul 
and sully the character of the race'. 6 
Such alienation has been reflected in histories of the labour movement. Thus C. Desmond 
Greaves wrote that at the 1912 Irish trades union congress there was 'bitter resentment against 
the policy of Redmond's party' 7 and described 'the alienation of Irish labour' and 'the 
movement towards an independent [labour] party' from that time on. 8 Even though later 
writers have portrayed a more subtle labour-Irish party relationship, with increased focus on 
the industrial, rather than the political, role of the trades unions, emphasis has still been placed 
on the withering of the old 'La b/Nat' alliance and the subsequent re-energising of the labour 
movement, on more advanced nationalist lines, by the ITGVV'U. 9 In relation to Sligo, Michael 
Farry's narrative history of the years 1914-192 1, while it mentions that individual Hibemians 
did become 'labour' councillors, essentially treated the labour movement as a phenomenon 
quite independent of the Irish party. 10 John Cunningham, in his Labour in the West of 
Ireland, wrote of the Sligo labour movement in industrial and social terms. He did give credit 
to the initial support of the nationalist mayor of Sligo, Daniel O'Donnell, for the ITGVvV in 
1911,1' but in contrasting the success of the Sligo quay workers to that of a parallel movement 
5 Dillon to TP O'Connor. 16'h October 1913. Dillon papers, TCD, f 6740/207. 
6 Quoted in J. Dunsmore Clarkson, 'Labour and Nationalism in Ireland', Columbia Univershý-, Studies in 
Histoi-v, Economics and Public Law, Vol. 120 (New York 1925), p. 306. 
7C 
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in Galway, Cunningham wrote solely of non-political factors :a greater sense of grievance 
among Sligo workers, a focus in Sligo upon controlling the conditions of work rather than just 
pay levels and greater organisational support from the national ITGWU. He also noted 
profound class divisions, concluding that Larkinite trades unionism was quite unacceptable to 
employers in both towns and that 'any but the meekest type of trades unionism would have 
been quite unacceptable to the ma ority of Irish merchants'. 12 In 1919 W. P. Ryan wrote more 
graphically that sympathy strikes and the refusal to handle tainted goods were, to employers, 
on a par with conspiracy and assassination. The press, professions, clerics and nearly all 
politicians agreed, according to Ryan, that Larkin and his kind 'should be treated as 
outlaws'. 
13 
Yet the industrial and political success of labour in Sligo was startling and in stark contrast 
not only to Galway but especially to the failure of the Dublin strikes of 1913-14. The reasons 
for this success can be glimpsed from newspaper accounts of the February 1914 funeral of 
Daniel O'Donnell, 14 proprietor of the Imperial Hotel, alderman and mayor, Sligo guardian, 
Connaught provincial director and national trustee of the AOH, friend of Joe Devlin and the 
only speaker from the region at Redmond's great Dublin Home Rule rally of 1912. The 
bishop of Elphin, Dr. Coyne, and 19 priests officiated. 15 1,000 Hibernians, including J. D. 
Nugent, that 'ready agent of every evil thing', paraded. So too, however, did the ITGWU 
band and John Lynch, the Larkinite leader of the Sligo ITGVVU, republican and, possibly, a 
long-standing IRB man. 16 Lynch, by now himself a member of the Corporation, gave the 
epitaph to O'Donnell - 'the greatest friend the workers of Sligo ever had'. 
17 
The Lab/Nat Alliance and the Arrival of the Transport Workers Union 
It was the Sligo Trades Council which in September 1911 invited the socialist Walter 
Carpenter (the unionist Sligo Times sneered at 'this paid English agitator' with his 'Cockney 
accent') 18 to speak in the town and launch a branch of the ITGWU. The Trades Council had 
been in existence since 1895 and had pursued a pragmatic agenda of defending the interests of 
12 Ibid, pp. 171-172. 
13 Ryan, The kish Labour Movement, p. 195. 
14 Roscommon Herald, Sligo Independent, 21 Feb. 1914; Leitrim Observer, Sligo Champion, 28 Feb. 1914. 
15 Dr. Coyne succeeded Dr. Clancy as bishop of Elphin at the beginnirig of 1913. 
16 Cunningham, Labour in the IT"est qf Ireland, p. 160. 
17 Sligo Independent, 21" February 1914. 
18 Sligo Thnes, 300' September 1911. 
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the town's various craft trades. 19 Moreover, it was also closely allied to the AOH and UIL. 
The council's president and the man who invited Carpenter, the house-painter Henry Reilly, 
was both an active Hibernian and the vice-president of the North Sligo executive of the UIL. 2( 
North Sligo's MP, P. A. McHugh, had been until his death in 1909 a noted champion of 
worker's rights, and it was the Trades Council which in 1910 took the lead in raising funds for 
a memorial to him. 
This Lab/Nat alliance was unsurprising, given that for many years the common enemy of 
labour and nationalists had not been Catholic merchants and employers - of whom there were 
many - but the Protestant, unionist, commercial establishment which dominated the docks (the 
harbour commissioners), shipping (the Sligo Steam Navigation company) and the mills 
(Pollexfen's). A letter from 'Disgusted' to the Sligo Champion in 1913 iternised the extent of 
Protestant commercial and official influence in the town and claimed that Catholics were still 
oppressed. The following were all claimed by 'Disgusted' to be Protestant : the Lord 
Lieutenant, his deputy, the high sheriff, the resident magistrate, the clerk of the crown and 
peace, his deputy, the RIC county inspector and district inspector, the senior inspector of 
national education, both Local Government Board inspectors, the postmaster and his deputy 
(and at least 10 other GPO staff), the superintendent of the railway station, the harbour board 
chairman (plus the harbour clerk and engineer), the managers of the Provincial, Ulster and 
Belfast banks (and most of their clerks), the clerk of the asylum, the clerk of the Agricultural 
Society and the head of the Model School. For good measure, six magistrates on the town 
bench were Protestant, plus 90% of the officials at Pollexfen's Mills and the holders of all the 
best jobs at Lyons's drapery emporium. 21 
Protestants in Sligo were self-confident, socially active and politically assertive, not only 
through unionism (though there was only one unionist on Sligo Corporation, Robert Smyllie 
of the Sligo Times), but also though a barrage of 'ratepayer' criticism of the appalling finances 
of the nationalist Corporation. Sectarian, nationalist/unionist antagonism was always close to 
the surface. When ratepayer objections secured a local plebiscite on yet another 
parliamentary bill to restructure the Corporation's finances in 1911, the Ratepayers 
19 Cunningham, Labour in the TT'Cst of Ireland, p. 67. 
20 Sligo Champion, 1-3 )h May 1911. 
21 Jbid, 22 nd February 1913. 
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Association was called a 'gang of slum landlords' by Thomas Scanlan and 'a gang of narrow 
22 Orange bigots' by John O'Dowd. Just before the plebiscite (the ratepayers lost by 744 to 
433), the future alden-nan and mayor John Jinks brought the sectarian leitmotif firmly to the 
fore. Publicly. Jinks thanked God that Sligo still had a 'Catholic' Corporation and asked, 'are 
the Tories in this town to walk upon the Catholics of Sligo?, 23 
The alliance of craft labour and nationalist politicians had been enhanced by the rapid growth 
of the Catholic AOH in the town in the mid- I 900's. Here,, the leading figure was Daniel 
O'Donnell, an active supporter of the Trades Council and agitator for better labourers' 
housing. O'Donnell was assisted by Jinks (post-house owner, undertaker, auctioneer, grocer 
and publican) and by P. N. White (chemist, bottler of 'Holy Cross' mineral water and mill- 
owner). All three men were seen as 'strong' nationalists, occasionally rocking the boat. In 
1906/07 they had fallen foul of both the then bishop of Elphin, Dr. Clancy, and P. A. McHugh 
for being privately over-assertive of lay control of the Catholic AOH. 24 Moreover, White, 
endorsed by O'Donnell and Jinks, had the temerity to make a public assault on the local 
church . 
25 However, all three men rallied behind the Irish party at the time of the 'Sinn Fein' 
North Leitrim by-election in 1908. They were firmly part of the town's nationalist, business 
leadership, whose key figure had for years been McHugh, the owner of the county's 
nationalist mouth-piece, the Sligo Champion. The other leading nationalist politicians in the 
town, all active UIL men, were John Connolly (one of the town's richest merchants), Thomas 
Flanagan (provision and coal merchant), James Higgins (owner of several bakeries, groceries 
and general stores) and Edward Foley (owner of the town's brewery). Three of these men had 
at one time or other been mayor of Sligo, while Higgins was mayor in 1910. All four were 
alden-nen (Connolly had been on the Corporation since 1878). The three most influential 
politicians in the town after McHugh's death were Higgins, Jinks and O'Donnell. 
The unity of the Catholic establishment was, however, fragile in 1911. Jinks and O'Donnell 
(who was elected mayor in 1911) were increasingly rivals for the mantle of being 'the next 
P. A. McHugh' and McHugh's death also spawned a division in the nationalist media. 
111 -- lbid, 13ý'h May 1911. 
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Bernard McTernan, manager of the Sligo Champion, left that paper in late 1909 to found the 
Sligo Nationalist, competing for readers, advertisers and public contracts (though the 
Nationalist remained a 'party' paper, and McTernan was secretary of the North Sligo UIL 
executive). Tensions among Sligo's nationalists were building up, with the main disputes 
relating to renewed labour unrest and the award of public contracts to the town's newspapers. 
The summer of 1911 saw a rash of labour disputes, including a national railway dispute and 
local strikes by gas workers, workers at Pollexfen's mills and even boys at the Marist School. 
Secondly, a number of politicians (particularly White, still allied to O'Donnell), persistently 
attacked the award of advertising contracts to the Champion. In this climate, in September, 
the Trades Council invited Walter Carpenter to launch the ITGWU in the town. 
Nationalist Feuds and Opponents of the New Unionism 
O'Donnell, now mayor of Sligo, identified himself with the ITGYVU from the start. As 
mayor, he offered the town hall free of charge for Carpenter's meeting and chaired it himself, 
while he, Henry Reilly and Carpenter were the main speakers. 26 Despite strong criticism from 
the strongly anti-socialist (and still anti-O'Donnell ) Bishop ClanCY27 and from typographical 
union leaders, several hundred men joined the union which quickly affiliated itself to the 
Trades Council. O'Donnell soon came under personal attack, and in the best party tradition 
was ambushed at a committee meeting - of the county's agricultural and technical committee - 
on 17thOctober. Here, the pretext for war was the annual award to rival newspapers of the 
coiTunittee's advertising contract. John Jinks led the case for the Sligo Champion, even 
though its quoted rate was twice as high as that of any other paper, while O'Donnell argued 
against. Jinks was supported both by town oligarchs such as Alderman Flanagan and by 
&county' politicians such as O'Dowd (in the chair) and Peter Cawley, the UIL organiser for 
South Sligo. Jinks soon called O'Donnell a 'b.... liar' and was in turn threatened with 'a 
good kicking'. Cawley brought in the issue of 'labour' by referring repeatedly to O'Donnell's 
ties to Walter Carpenter, asking what O'Donnell had got for chairing Carpenter's meeting and 
shouting out : 'Carpenter! Carpenter! Look at the Nationalist Mayor of Sligo! ' This earned 
the riposte from O'Donnell that Carpenter was a considerably more respectable man than 
26 Sligo Champion, 23, dSeptember 1911. 
27 According to the Roscommon Herald, Dr. Clancy said that he would drive the ITGVvU out of Sligo 'at the 
sacrifice of mv life if necessary' (Roscommon Herald, 28'bOctober 1911). 
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Cawley. O'Donnell, the 'bushwhacker', lost the vote to Jinks, the 'next P. A. McHugh'. The 
Roscommon Herald carried the story as 'An Insult to Hibernian, sm'. 
28 
O'Donnell did not, though, lose his grip on the Corporation and it rapidly passed a resolution 
condemning the insult to its mayor. 29 Moreover, however bitter their rivalry, both O'Donnell 
and Jinks (with Aldennan Foley, Henry Reilly, P. N. White, Bernard McTernan and John 
Treacy of the town's new Gaelic Club) turned out to fete the IRB man Major John MacBride, 
'that gallant soldier 00 for the annual November commemoration of the Manchester Martyrs 
(see also page 120). O'Donnell chaired the proceedings and a large crowd escorted MacBride 
to his stay in the Imperial Hotel. Jinks and Reilly gave the vote of thanks. It was on this 
occasion that MacBride said that he did not have a regard for the promises of the English, but 
also that he 'did not want in any way to hamper the work of Mr. Redmond'. The Irish party 
would, so far as he was concerned, be given a chance. Of course, if Home Rule failed, other 
means would have to be considered .31 The RIC Crime Special Branch report of the meeting 
noted that 'some of the old IRB party attended the lecture, but were not satisfied with it; they 
considered he was milder than his name'. 32 
In January 1912 another nationalist/labour fault line opened, this time between the Sligo 
guardians under Alderman Higgins and the Trades Council. Again it was Jinks who led the 
charge, angrily objecting to allegations of improper contract-tendering. These were made 
against the guardians by the secretary of the Trades Council, James (Seamus) McGowan, an 
advanced nationalist and journalist on the Sligao Nationalist. The row culminated in the 
guardians rescinding all resolutions ever passed at the request of the Trades Council, 
including a long-treasured 'fair wages' resolution. 33 Meanwhile, the ITGWU continued to 
organise, and its local leader John Lynch became vice-president of the Trades Council. 
Lynch's standing was if anything enhanced when he was jailed for seven days by the town 
magistrates. Lynch had refused to put up bail on a charge of intimidation of another quay 
worker -a charu probably engineered by Arthur Jackson, manager of the Sligo Steam 
28 Sli go Champion, Sligo Independent, 21" October 1911; Roscommon Herald, 4th November 1911. 21) Sli go Champion, 4hNovember 1911. 30 Ibid. 18"' November 191 L 
31 Ibid, 2 nd December 1911. 
32 Crime Special Branch precis. November 1911 (PRO CO 904/119). 
33, Sligo Champion, 13th January, 20th January and 17'h February 1912. 
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Navigation Company. 34 O'Donnell chaired the magistrates who jailed Lynch - the mayor 
declined to stand down even though he was himself an ITGVY'U member and he emphasised 
that he was not one of the majority in favour of jailing Lynch. When Lynch was freed, a 
crowd and bands marched to the Imperial Hotel to thank O'Donnell for his support. 35 In the 
Corporation elections in January 1912 two labour candidates, William Gibbons and Ned 
Harte, easily defeated two independent nationalists in the west ward. Both the victors were 
craft union men; Gibbons was a plasterer while Harte, a carpenter, was now president of the 
Trades Council (replacing Reilly, who had become clerk of the new Sligo labour exchange). 
Both men claimed that they represented the ITGVV'U in the election and Harte thanked the 
AOH, among others, for their support. 36 
Nationalist hostility to the new unionism was, however, again manifested with the arrival of 
no less than James Larkin in the town on 24'hMarch. This visit moved Bishop Clancy to 
issue a public letter denouncing socialism and concluding: 
I therefore expect and hope that no respectable citizen of our town or county, and no 
faithful member of the Church, will take part in the meeting at which this man is 
advertised to speak. 37 
The Sligo Chainpion was moved to write its first anti-Larkin leader, denouncing Larkin's 
wildness and stating that he cared nothing for the men of Sligo. However the paper was 
careful to state that it did not oppose labour, only Larkin. 38 This time', even O'Donnell and 
the Trades Council leaders did not attend the meeting, which though attracting a large crowd 
was held outside the town hall. 
A range of divisions had been widened in Sligo nationalist and labour politics by the arrival of 
the ITGVVU - merchants vs. workers, AOH men vs. UIL men, town vs. county, church vs. 
socialists, Sligo Nationalist vs. Sligo Champion and Jinks vs. O'Donnell. The nationalist 
movement in the town appeared to have divided on class lines, with many traditional Irish 
party leaders taking the side of reaction. Most notably, when a major ITGVvU-Ied strike did 
erupt in June 1912, the leading UIL aldermen Higgins, Connolly and Flanagan all joined the 
34 Cunningham. Labour in the Wcst QfIreland, pp. 156-157. 
35 Sli, (, o Independent, 24hFebruary. 2 "d March 1912. 
36 lbid, 200'January 1912. 
3 "1 lbid, 30"' March 1912. 
Sligo Champion, 30'hMarch 1912 
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Employers' Federation set up by the Protestant businessman Arthur Jackson. Higgins became 
a vice-president. 
39 
jinks and O'Donnell - Unity Restored and 'Labour' Triumphant 
However, this model of nationalist-labour polarisation did not take account of John Jinks. At 
some stage at the end of January 1912 Jinks made a temporary peace with O'Donnell. By the 
beginning of February, Jinks was openly nominating O'Donnell for office on the North Sligo 
UIL executive 40 and by mid-February was trying, unsuccessfully, to make peace between the 
Sligo Guardians and the Trades Council .41 Thereafter, though he still occasionally sniped at 
O'Donnell, Jinks was publicly alongside him on the issue of supporting labour. O'Donnell 
was, without any hint of a contest, re-elected mayor and remained the town's leading local 
nationalist politician. As seen in Chapter4, it was O'Donnell who led Sligo nationalists to the 
Dublin Home Rule rally of 3 I't March and was the only Connaught platform speaker at that 
rally (speaking on Joe Devlin's platform). 42 
When the dock workers went out on strike in June, in a dispute between the ITGVVU and the 
Sligo Steam Navigation Company, the union was able to rely on consistent support from a 
substantial body of nationalist opinion led by O'Donnell, Jinks (now an alderman) and P. N. 
White - all of them still leading Hibernians - and from virtually all the craft unions on the 
Trades Council. The ITGYVU organiser P. T. Daly was sent up from Dublin to run the strike. 
Daly was emphatically not an Irish party man; he was secretary of the Irish TUC, a member 
of the Socialist Party of Ireland and of Sinn Fein, a fon-ner long-standing IRB man and an 
alleged embezzler, who always appeared in 'the black felt sombrero and costume affected by 
dock leaders'. 43 Daly, together with Jinks, Harte and Gibbons, led a march out of the town to 
Rosses Point to support the UIL branch there in stopping strike-breaking. 44Most importantly, 
the Sligo Champion came out in support of the strikers, praising their admirable conduct, 
saying that the stevedores held too much power, noting that the men should not be bilked of 
their wages by middlemen and demanding a quick compromise settlement. 45 An ailing Dr. 
39 Sligo Independent, 15'h June 1912. 
40 Sli go Champion, IOhFebruary 1912. 41 Ibid, 17'hFebruary 1912. 
Sligo Champion, 6hApril 1912. 
'3Sligo Times, 22 nd June 19 12. 
44 Sligo Independent, Sligo Times, 15'hJune 1912. 
45 Sliao 
,., Champion, 15'hJune 1912. 
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Clancy (he was to die in October) made no public comment on the strike, which was over in 
just over a week with the union winning virtually every concession it had demanded. 
During the second half of 1912 and into 1913, O'Donnell concentrated on the still-atrocious 
finances of the Corporation, on ineffective schemes to raise funds for steam-rolling and 
housebuilding and on consolidating his power base in the town. When Larkin revisited Sligo 
in July, Dr. Clancy was silent and Larkin's meeting was this time held inside the town hall, 
with all the leading Trades Council men and P. N. White on the platform. 46 Tom Scanlan. the 
MP, indicated his solidarity with labour at a presentation to O'Donnell at the Sligo Trades 
Club on 8'ý' September; McTeman, Reilly, Harte, Gibbons and Lynch were all present. At this 
presentation, O'Donnell said that his cause was always that of the worker, that the spoils of 
the world had not been fairly divided and that they were branded as socialists because they 
demanded for labour the right to a decent life and a fair wage. Scanlan's contribution to the 
evening was to claim that he too was a trades unionist as a member of the legal profession ! 47 
On 8 th December, O'Donnell and P. T. Daly were the speakers at an ITGVVU meeting at which 
O'Donnell called for 'one solid phalanx' at the forthcoming Corporation elections, and for 
more workers to be co-opted onto public boards. 48 At an election meeting for the Corporation 
in January 1913 O'Donnell, speaking with Lynch, said that his critics accused him of trying to 
boss the town and promote the Hibernians. Let them say what they chose - he was not afraid 
of them. He called on the men of Sligo to vote for 'his candidates'. 49 This they duly did and 
the elections resulted in a clean sweep for a labour-AOH slate which won all six seats being 
contested. Lynch was elected a councillor, as were two Hibernian proteges of ODonnell, 
Henry Monson (a furniture retailer) and Harry Depew (a carpenter and director of the 
Hibernian brass and reed band). Monson, the vice-president of the town AOH, was 
particularly close to O'Donnell, who described him as a man 'who has been under my 
particular care". 50 O'Donnell's election for the third time as mayor was crowned by a public 
pledge of fTiendship and loyalty made by Alderman Higgins. (The long-running dispute 
4o Sligo Times, 27h July 1912. 
47 Sligo Independent, Sligo Times, 14'h September 1912. Scanlan remained closely associated with Jinks, who 
acted as his election agent until 1918. Both men had originally come from the same village. Drumcliffe, and the 
, same school class 
(Hennessy. The Lýfe and Career ifJohn Jinks, p. 4). 
48 Sligo Champion, 14'h December 1912. 
49 Sligo Timcýy, 18'h January 1913. 
50 Sligo Independent, 25th January 1913. 
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between the Higgins's Sligo guardians and the Trades Council had been resolved in 
November. ) Higgins, only seven months previously the vice-president of the Employers' 
Federation, was hereafter regarded as a staunch labour man; a year later in January 1914, 
Lynch was so effusive in his praise for Higgins as to say: 'If it were in my power I would not 
hesitate to put the crown of Ireland on his head. . 
51 
As. for Jinks, throughout 1912 he sat on a plethora of public committees and maintained close 
relations with the senior nationalist aldermen - Connolly, Flanagan, Foley and Higgins. 
While O'Donnell continued to use the AOH and the trades unions as his main political base, 
Jinks focused on meetings of the town and North Sligo UIL. He also developed a role as 
patron of Irish-Ireland initiatives in the town. He unsuccessfully backed John Treacy of the 
Gaelic Club for the job of headmaster of the Technical Schools in July, 52 after the previous 
incumbent, a Protestant, had effectively been hounded out on sectarian grounds by 
O'Donnell . 
53 Jinks was vice-chairman of the Gaelic Club from January 1912 and supported a 
number of meetings to revive the town's Industrial Development Association. His rivalry 
with O'Donnell again surfaced at the end of the year and it was he, with Lynch, who spoiled 
the overall impression of perfect harmony at O'Donnell's 1913 mayoral election. Lynch went 
out of his way to attack Alden-nan Flanagan for aiding and abetting 'the robbers of Sligo in 
the past', while Jinks, pushing the case for the rotation of the mayoralty and, backed now by 
Flanagan and Foley, first lobbied hard for his own elevation and then withdrew when it was 
obvious O'Donnell would win. 54 While both Jinks and Foley were publicly pro-labour 
throughout 1913, both would continue to snipe at O'Donnell over the next six months on 
issues such as market tolls, the siting of the McHugh memorial and/or the mayor's pay. 
Conspicuously though, the extent of Jinks's support within the wider, county UIL was shown 
in February when he defeated O'Donnell (who had only attended twice in the last year) for 
the position of deputy vice-president of the North Sligo UIL by 17 votes to 3.55 
51 Ibid, 31" January 1914. 
52 Roscommon Journal, 27h July 1912. 
53 O'Donnell alleged anti-Catholic prejudice in the Technical Schools, saying that the headmaster, G. H. Smith, 
should no longer 'think 
he is man and master here' and that he must show more consideration for 'my co- 
religionists' (Sligo Champion, 20th April; Sligo Independent, 4 th May 1912). 
54 Sligo Times, Sligo Independent. 25h January 1913. 
55 Sligo Champion, 8h February 1913. 
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In the first half of 1913, the defining issue in Sligo town politics continued to be 'labour' 
rather than Home Rule. Local circumstances - the organisation of the town's dock workers 
and the jostling among the town's nationalists to fill the gap left by the death of McHugh - 
counted for far more than 'national' political issues. The town's Lab/Nat alliance was 
undoubtedly cemented by there being a Protestant economic 'commanding height' to assault. 
Local figures simply did not speak much about Home Rule at this time, let alone define 
themselves relative to their allies and rivals by reference to it. Nor was there any significant 
gulf between advanced and 'party' nationalists in the town. The town's known advanced men 
and/or Gaelic enthusiasts - 
" the linguists Patrick O'Donnellan and John Treacy, 
" the new head of the Technical Schools D. A. Mulcahy, 
" the linguist, temperance man and chronic organiser of clubs Rev. Crehan, 
" the GAA enthusiasts J. J. Clancy and Owen Healy and 
the journalist Seamus McGowan 
nearly all maintained close ties to the town's Catholic, nationalist leadership. Treacy, as 
noted above, came into the orbit of Jinks, while Donnellan was persuaded to appear with 
Jinks and O'Donnell on a Home Rule platform in 1912.56 Crehan was the president of the St 
John's UIL branch, 57 while Clancy, the nephew of the late bishop, in February 1913 secured 
the job, supported by all the leading town politicians, of secretary to the county agriculture 
and technical committee. Only Healy, a long-standing IRB man, appears to have become 
relatively marginalised, though McGowan, standing in the Corporation elections of 1913, 
came almost at the bottom of the poll. 
The balance of power in the conflict of Catholic labour and nationalism against Protestant 
capital was largely resolved by the next, long, transport workers' strike from March to May 
1913. This strike was effectively the second round of the conflict, between the Steam 
Navigation Company and the ITGVvU, which had erupted in 1912. It was marked by its 
length, its violence and a general disruption of trade in the town. Nationalist political support 
for the strikers, however, did not weaken and was expressed most vocally by Jinks and P. N. 
White. Jinks called on his 'fellow workers' to stand up and win their fight, and urged 'a long 
56 Sligo Independent, I 33hApril 19 12 
57S/igo Champion, 7hMarch and 25b Juhl' 1914. 
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pull and a straight PUII. 558 He also stressed that as a UIL man he would press the employers to 
give way to 'the people of Sligo'. 59 O'Donnell was quieter, though he did lead a delegation of 
workers to 'attend' on the employers. Many of the strikers' meetings were chaired by White, 
and the main speakers were usually Jinks and P. T. Daly, up from Dublin throughout the strike 
and rapidly blaming it on Orange and Masonic influences. 60 
The strike was violent and unrest persisted for several weeks after the death of one of the 
strikers, Patrick Dunbar, who was killed in a fight triggered by strike-breakers brought on to 
the quays from Liverpool. Subsequent violence included an assault on Colonel Wood-Martin, 
one of the town's leading Protestants, attacks on Pollexfen's clerical workers, and window- 
smashing across the town. The strike involved seamen, dockers, carters and mill-workers, 
triggering a wave of sympathy actions when other businesses took delivery of 'blacked' 
goods from the docks. The violence was deplored by all parties, disowned in public by the 
strike leaders and bitterly criticised by the unionist press. The Sligo Times described the sight 
of 'women with hatchets' on the streets, deploring their language as 'filthy of the filthy'. 61 
However, it did not cause anything like the wave of nationalist, anti-Larkinite rhetoric 
unleashed months later by events in Dublin. The Sligo Champion was admittedly more 
neutral than in 1912, but the RIC county inspector was wrong when he wrote that 'the local 
press of all shades of politics is against the strike'. 62 WMle the Champion repudiated the 
violence, it emphasised that recent attacks had not been by the strikers but by 'irresponsible 
rowdies'. 63 It did regret the strike, lamenting lost trade and the costs of all the extra police 
drafted in. It asked for concessions by both sides, but specifically called on the employers to 
abandon their right to employ, non-union men, 64 the key union demand. Nationalist papers 
outside Sligo refrained from attacking the strikers. The pro-labour J. P. Farrell's Longford 
Leader blamed the violence on the employers' importation of strike-breakers and asked why 
the authorities could not put the same energy into protecting Belfast Catholics that they put 
into repressing Sligo strikers. 65 Even the rabidly anti-Larkinite Jasper Tully in the 
58 Sligo Times, 5'h April 1913. 
59 Sligo Independent, 12'h April 1913. 
60 Sligo Times, 5h April 1913. 
61 lbid, 29"' March 1913. 
62 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, April 1913 (PRO CO 904/89). 
63 Sligo Champion, 29b March 1913. 
6A Nd, 12"' April 1913. 
65 Longford Leader, 29th March 19 13. 
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Roscommon Herald, while he was convinced that Larkin was an anti-national agent in the pay 
of Dublin Castle, thought the employers had acted with great unwisdom in provoking the 
strike and attacked Arthur Jackson for trying to bring in English workers. He added, 
nonetheless, that the entire government of the country, from the lord lieutenant down, backed 
the strike! 66 The church, in the form of the new bishop of Elphin, Dr. Coyne, made no public 
statement on the strike, though the administrator of Sligo Rev. Doorly, acting with O'Donnell, 
tried to initiate settlement talks. The strike ended, again, with victory for the union, which 
won its key demand of a closed shop across the quays. Union closed shops, with the 
Corporation itself adopting the principle, subsequently spread across the town. 
New Strains in the Alliance. 
The Lab/Nat alliance may have withered in Ireland, but the 1913 strike represented in many 
respects the greatest success of the still-thriving partnership in Sligo. Was this another 
instance of the Irish party acting as a 'vampire' to assimilate and control other movements? 
Certainly the key, aspiring nationalist politicians - O'Donnell and Jinks - attached themselves 
and their AOH, UIL and craft union followers to the new mass union. By doing so they 
maintained both the vigour of their political base and the pursuit of their own personal 
rivalries. Individual union leaders were in turn only too willing to ally themselves to the 
party's leaders in Sligo and worked in close harmony with them, both industrially and 
electorally, for a number of years. Many of their followers were also members of the UIL and 
AOH. 
Despite this, the key union leaders, whether local men such as Lynch or organisers sent into 
the town such as Daly, were not party men. The town's Trades Council came increasingly to 
be dominated by Lynch and the ITGVvTU and its rhetoric was resolutely 'labour' throughout 
the period. Even though elections were fought by candidates on a joint AOH/labour slate, 
they were almost invariably described as 'labour', 'workers' or even 'Larkinite'. Other than 
briefly in August 1913, when he served with Jinks, Foley and Monson on a nationalist 
committee organising an autumn rally (which improbably discussed getting John Dillon and 
P. T. Daly on the same platform)67 Lynch played no part in any party organisation or meeting. 
The Transport Union neither affiliated to the Irish party nor sent delegates to party meetings. 
'6Roscommon Herald, 290'March and 12'bApril 1913. 
67 Sli go Champion, 16th August 1913. 
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As elsewhere in Ireland, it set up its own range of social organisations, whether a band, an 
approved insurance society or Sligo's own 'Liberty Hall'. 
One particular impetus to the localism of Sligo Politics - the contest of O'Donnell and Jinks to 
succeed P. A. McHugh - appeared to be resolved at the end of June 1913 when O'Donnell 
became seriously ill. O'Donnell played no further active part in politics until his death in 
February 1914. While O'Donnell was incapacitated, Jinks and Higgins took over the running 
of the Corporation. It was Jinks, as rather more than Arthur Mitchell's 'labour man and 
Transport Union member' and now regularly supported by Higgins and Foley, who 
succeeded O'Donnell as mayor in January 1914. However, Jinks did not succeed O'Donnell 
as leader of the AOH in either town or county. That role passed to Henry Monson, who now 
ran the Sligo town division and the AOH county board, and in 1914 was elected one of two 
Connaught regional directors. Monson's main Hibernian associates were his fellow 
councillor Harry Depew and the new secretary of the town division, Michael Nevin, a young 
grocer's assistant. Even with O'Donnell stricken, intra-party tensions Persisted and at the end 
of 1913 the police reported 'increasing jealousy' between the UIL and AOH, 68 though 
whether this was within the town or elsewhere in the county is not clear. Certainly outside 
Sligo town there was resentment at the extra police costs being levied on the rest of the county 
because of the town's protracted strike. 69 
Both the Lab/Nat alliance and the loyalties of the Hibernians came to be tested during the 
Dublin strike and lockout. The Trades Council and Corporation were initially as one, with the 
fon-ner denouncing the Dublin tram company's lockout and the latter condemning police 
violence, but as the dispute became protracted cracks began to show. By early October a 
prominent clerical lecturer, Rev. Coleman, was in town publicly attacking socialism and 
syndicalism. On the county council, 'county' UIL men such as Peter Cawley successfully 
passed resolutions against Larkinism. Though the Sligo Nationalist refrained from any 
condemnation of the Dublin strikers and called from the start for conciliation, 70 the Champion 
wrote that the grievances of the workers did not warrant this level of paralysis, attacked the 
4 sinister' support of the English TUC for the strikers and opposed any attempt to 'deport' the 
68 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, December 1913 (PRO CO 904/9 1). 
6" Sligo Champion, 29hNovember and 20'hDecember 19 1 3. 
70 Sligo Alationaliv, 30'hAugust 1913. 
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strikers' children to England .71 Later comment 
by the paper condemned the bitter class 
struggle launched by the union leaders and said that they were guaranteeing nothing but the 
instability and destruction of Irish industry. 72 In this respect the Champion was in line with 
the anti-union line taken by most of the nationalist press in the five counties outside Sligo. 
It was the issues of the 'deportation' of strikers' children and alleged AOH 'scabbing' in 
Dublin, rather than insignificant attempts at sympathy strike action in Sligo, which strained 
loyalties most. In early November, Daly came back to town to address two pro-striker 
meetings at the new Liberty Hall and at the Town Hall. Lynch was a fellow speaker and P. N. 
White chaired both meetings. At the Town Hall meeting, attended by 500, White publicly 
praised Larkin, saying that he would do for capitalists (presumably not including White 
himself) what Davitt had done for landlords. Daly went out of his way to attack J. D. Nugent. 
He knew, he said, that he was speaking in front of many AOH members, in the hope that they 
would see that justice was done. The Hibernians, Said Daly, were paying Nugent E600 pa, 
and for this Nugent should not be supplying scabs to run Dublin trams. 73 The response of the 
town's Hibernians under Monson two days later was, however, to pass a resolution 
congratulating Nugent on his 'heroic' stand against the deportations and his defence of the 
church in Dublin. The Champion'S headline was 'Hibernians Protest Against Larkinism'. 74 
The Alliance and Home Rule Crisis 
For all the tensions generated by the Dublin strike, the alliance did not fracture. Its unity was 
if anything confirmed by the new, external threat materialising in the shape of successful 
Ulster unionist opposition to Home Rule (see Chapter 9). For the first time in the pre-war 
period, a national crisis came to dominate political alignments and developments in the town. 
The first local manifestation of this came at end of November. Unionists from across County 
Sligo sent an address to a Dublin rally addressed by the Conservative leader Andrew Bonar 
Law. Monson at the AOH and Jinks at the UIL took the lead not only in criticising the 27 
Unionist townsmen who had signed the address, but also in organising what was effectively a 
71 Sligo Chanipio", 25' October 1913. This cry of 'deportation' related to a plan to send strikers' children to 
stay with English families. 
72 Ibid. 15'h November 1913. 
73 Sligo Independent, 15'h November 1913. 
74 Sli go Chainpion, Sligo Independent, 22 
nd November 1913. 
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75 ant boycott. The Sligo Nationalist wrote of the intolerance and exclusiveness of Protest 
traders in the town, who imported assistants from the North and relied in turn on the 
'tolerance' of their Catholic customers. 76 The Champion supported the campaign by listing 
77 
all the local unionists who bad signed the address . Then, at the beginning of 1914, Jinks and 
Lynch jointly promoted the Irish Volunteers in the town. Through the Corporation, they 
summoned the first public meeting to form a Volunteer corps. UIL men, Hibemians and 
labour men all collaborated in the establishment of Sligo's corps, one of the first in the 
country, on I't February. Shortly afterwards, almost the whole nationalist and labour 
movement of the town came together to pay their respects at the funeral of Daniel O'Donnell. 
The Lab/Nat alliance was also quite solid in the January 1914 Corporation elections. 
'Workers' candidates were elected across the board. Lynch, Foley and Higgins were all 
elected unopposed as aldermen in what the Sligo Independent called the quietest elections in 
years . 
78 In early 1914, the alliance under Jinks was almost as all-encompassing as it was ever 
going to be. Advanced Nationalists such as O'Donnellan, Treacy, Healy and McGowan 
enthusiastically promoted the Volunteers, as did Monson's Hibernians, the Trades Council' 
and the ITGVýTU. Higgins and Foley were Jinks's right-hand men on the Corporation. Jinks's 
organisation was itself extended in March when a branch of the Town Tenants was revived in 
the town, run by UIL men, headed by Jinks and with Depew and Lynch as enthusiastic 
participants. Even the church now had benign relations. One leading cleric, Rev. P Butler 
had become chaplain of the town AOH and at the new mayor's celebratory dinner Canon 
Doorly, the Sligo administrator, said that the church was well pleased with the appointment. 
Rev. Murphy pronounced that the church and municipality had always got on well and never 
better than under Daniel O'Donnell. 79 It was at this dinner that Lynch, the new alderman, 
announced his wish to offer the crown to Higgins. 
There was a small if not very coherent nationalist opposition to this united front. If anything 
it was characterised by hostility to the dominant power of the unions, increasing distaste for 
the Corporation's cronyism and alarm at its still ruinous finances, which had prevented any 
75 Sligo Times, 60'December 1913. 
76 Sligo Nationalist, 6h December 1913. 
77 sli(yo Champion, 29b November 1913. 
78 Sligo Independent, I O'h January 1914. 
79 Ibid, 31' January 1914. 
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real progress on plans for new housing or road surfacing. Individuals such as Sam Tarrant, a 
cantankerous,, 'loner' lawyer and Thomas Fitzpatrick, a chemist, both tended to such views 
and were at the least semi-detached from Jinks's machine. In April Fitzpatrick caused an 
upset, as an independent nationalist, by defeating an AOH candidate in an alden-nanic by- 
election. 80 Nor were some of the town's elderly Catholic grandees integral to the ruling 
group. One was Alden-nan Connolly, though he remained on the Corporation and on friendly 
personal terms with Jinks, who promoted his cause in the June County Council elections. 
Another, Alderman Thomas Flanagan, quit the Corporation in January and failed to be elected 
to the County Council in June. If this 'tendency' had a leader, it was the builders' merchant, 
councillor and newly-appointed magistrate Dudley Hanley, who clashed with Jinks and Lynch 
on a number of occasions in early 1914. Thus it was Hanley, alone on the Corporation, who 
opposed Lynch being made a Harbour Commissioner in place of the departing Flanagan, 
arguing that the 'labour party' (in the form of Jinks, Foley and Higgins) already had too much 
81 representation. Such opposition was not driven, however, by the issue of nationality and 
neither Hanley nor any of the men listed above displayed any 'advanced' nationalist 
tendencies at this time. Indeed, Hanley opposed the early launch of the Volunteers in Sligo 
in January he criticised Jinks and Lynch for using the Corporation to launch the Volunteers, 
arguing that none of those associated with the Irish Volunteers had won anything for 
Ireland. 82 It was presumably such opposition which led the RIC County Inspector to report 
'The formation of this body [the Volunteers] has caused great apprehension among the better 
classes of both sides [i. e. nationalist and unionist] of politics'. 83 Lynch's response to Hanley 
was more caustic. At leastl he said, the Volunteers could give the builders' merchant Hanley 
an order to supply wooden guns. 84 
The dominating rhetoric of the alliance in the coming months was that of nationality; its 
leading organisation the Irish Volunteers. Jinks and Lynch had started the Volunteers and 
Jinks, Monson and Foley now took the lead in attending parades, public oratory and the 
promotion new companies, first in North Sligo and later across the south of the county, 
Leitrim and into North Roscommon. Throughout the Volunteering upsurge, the town's two 
80 Farry, Sligo 1914-21, p. 8. 
81 Sligo Independent, 7b February 1914. 
82 Sligo Times, I O'h January 1914. 
' 83 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector 
84 Sligo Times, 10th January 1914. 
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nationalist newspapers provided voluminous coverage and enthusiastic support. The effect of 
this was to make Jinks and his associates the leading figures not just in Sligo town but light 
across the county, as more and more rural companies were mobilised. In the work of forl-ning 
companies and stump speaking, they were assisted by Patrick O'Donnellan and two young 
party speakers, James McGurrin, a Leitrim-born 'orator' recently returned from the USA and 
Michael O'Mullane, a Sligo-born Hibernian and now president of a Dublin AOH division. As 
has been seen in Chapter 4 and will be seen in Chapter 9, the language of the leading 
Volunteer speakers, particularly Jinks, Monson and O'Mullane, was uncomplicatedly 
nationalistic and made no bones about the future use to which the Volunteers would be put. 
Their speeches were not those of 'weak', constitutional politicians trying to rein in hot- 
blooded followers, but of men whose nationalist instincts had been aroused by the events of 
1914, in Ulster, London and Dublin. As Jinks put it at the end of July 1914, 'the enemies of 
our country' must now feel the force of Irishmen's protests and while Sligomen 'were up for 
peace', they could be 'sure that if there was a war [i. e. with unionists] the men and women of 
Sligo would be at the fTont'. 85 
Cemented by nationality, the burgeoning Volunteers and a sense of crisis, the labour- 
nationalist coalition in Sligo town held firm for much of 1914. The government's concession 
of Ulster exclusion, the Curragh mutiny, the Lame gun-running, the Amending bill, and 
Bachelor's Walk did not rupture it. Jinks, Monson, Foley, Higgins and Lynch all voted and 
spoke together on a range of committees. Jinks and Monson, with Lynch, still backed 
common candidates for appointments and co-options. In July, the Corporation approved a 
union closed shop for all its employees. In June, However, Lynch reaffirmed his separate 
'labour' identity when he called for a formal labour party in SligO86 and this was repeated by 
Daly as late as 17'hAugust, when he called for a separate labour organisation under the Home 
Rule bill, which he anticipated would soon pass. 87 There were also 'wobbles'; Depew and 
Lynch clashed in April over Lynch's support for Larkin's offer to stand against Asquith in the 
East Fife by-election. 88 Later, Lynch was angered when the Sligo guardians co-opted 
Alderman Connolly to their ranks rather than a labour candidate, Ned Harte (though Lynch 
85 Sligo Independent, I' August 1914. 
86 Ibid, 20th June 1914. 
87 Sligo Champion, 22 nd August 1914 
88 Ibid, 4"' ApnI 1914. 
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thanked those, including Jinks and Monson, who had supported Harte) . 
89 Neither of these 
upsets endangered the alliance and nor, even, did the outbreak of world war. When the 
Corporation debated Redmond's offer of August 3 rd , for the Volunteers to serve alongside the 
Ulster Volunteers in Ireland's defence, they were unanimous in their praise. 90 John Lynch, 
now an alderman and a harbour commissioner, served on the town's War Distress Committee 
in August and September, not only with his usual allies but also with almost all the leading 
Protestants of town and county. As late as 16'hSeptember, Jinks and Lynch were still voting 
together on the Corporation to promote a labour man for the job of steam-rolling clerk. 91 
War and Sinn Fein - Divorce and Remarriall 
The alliance finally broke up over the issue of recruiting for the war. Following the Irish 
party's forinal endorsement of recruiting to the British army and service 'in the firing line', 
Thomas Scanlan returned to Sligo on l9thSeptember for what was meant to be a triumphant 
celebration of the achievement of Home Rule. Instead, heckling and fisticuffs broke out when 
Scanlan referred to the empire and was met with the cry of 'you are a d.... d liar Scanlan'. 
Another voice called 'to Hell with the Empire'. 92 The heckling was led by Lynch, and his 
main collaborators were those long-standing councillors and Trades Council men William 
Gibbons and Ned Harte. 93 Initially, a majority of the Trades Council, with Lynch absent, 
repudiated their actions, but at the next week's meeting, with both Lynch and P. T. Daly 
present, the repudiation was itself reversed. 94 Thereafter, the Trades Council remained under 
the control of Lynch's men. 
Paul Bew has concluded concerning this incident : 'In short, the nationalist sub-culture of 
Sligo labour had made its point and stood its ground. 995 However, the Lab/Nat alliance had 
not been part of Sligo's nationalist 'sub-culture'; rather it had been central to the politics of 
the town throughout the pre-war period. The demonstration on 19 th September marked the 
end of that alliance. 'Nationality' rather than 'labour' was now the defining issue in Sligo 
politics. Lynch went on to crystallise his opposition by organising, with Daly, a public anti- 
89 fbid, Sligo Independent, 4h July 1914. 
90 Sligo Champion, 8bAugust 1914. 
91 lbid, 16"' September 1914. 
Q2 Irish Times, 22 nd September 1914. 
93 Sligo Independent, 26hSeptember 1914. 
94 lbid, 26hSeptember, 3'dOctober 1914. 
95 Bew, Idcolo&n- and the Irish Questi . on, p. 12 1. 
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recruitment meeting for 120 people in the town on I" October. 
96 The number of outright 
dissidents, however, remained small, though they did include many of the town's pre-war 
Irish-Irelanders - Treacy, O'Donnellan, D. A. Mulcahey, J. J. Clancy, Owen Healy. and 
Seamus McGowan. For some weeks, dissidents and Irish party stalwarts vied for control of 
the town's Volunteers (see Chapter 10). The Irish Volunteer newspaper in Dublin, under the 
control of the MacNeillite Volunteers, claimed that the Sligo Corps was for MacNeill and the 
Provisional Committee. 97 Whether this was a real attempt to defeat the local Irish party, or 
existed only in the mind of a 'MacNeillite' sending 'Sligo Notes' to a Dublin newspaper is 
unclear, 98 but a reformed National Volunteers corps under Jinks could not meet until I O'h 
November and on 27 th November, Rev. Butler - firmly loyal to the party - reminded a 
National Volunteer audience of the 'daring attempt' recently made by 'factionists' to get 
command of the Sligo Volunteers. 99 
In the autumn of 1914, the majority of the former Lab/Nat alliance's leaders remained loyal to 
the Irish party - in the words of Henry Monson, 'right behind Mr. Redmond'. Monson, 
Depew, Nevin, Jinks, Higgins, Foley, P. N. White, Henry Reilly, McTernan, and a minority of 
the Trades Council all identified themselves with the new, reformed National Volunteer 
corps, of which Jinks was duly made the president. Monson and Nevin formed a 'Joe Devlin' 
AOH National Volunteer company, ' 00 with similar companies coming from the temperance 
society and the Foresters. Both of the town's nationalist papers also remained loyal to the 
party and, by November, the Sligo Champion had moved to an overtly anti-labour stance, 
devoting several columns to a detailed expose of the ITGVVU's affairs by James Stanford, its 
former Sligo secretary. Essentially, Stanford made new, thinly-veiled allegations of 
embezzlement against Daly as head of the Transport Union's insurance section. Stanford 
went on to accuse Lynch and the union of first covering this up and then blaming Stanford. ' 01 
The gloves were now off. 
96 Crime Special Branch report, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/120). 
97 Irish 1"olunteer, 3'dOctober and I O'hOctober 1914. 
98 Sligo Champion, 21" November. 
9') fbid, 5thDecember 1914. 
100 Farry, Sligo 1914-21, p. 50. 
101 Sligo Champion, 14'hNovember 1914. 
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The effect of this became apparent in the January 1915 municipal elections. There was no 
AOH/labour slate and labour candidates stood alone. In the north ward the editor of the now 
defunct Sligo Times, Robert Smyllie, retained his single unionist seat, and in the north and 
west wards three nationalists were easily elected (including Hanley, who was unopposed). In 
the east ward, the two Trades Council stalwarts and hecklers of Scanlan - Harte and Gibbons - 
faced two UIL members : Sam Tarrant, who stood on an explicitly anti-labour platform, and 
Jordan Roche, an auctioneer who represented the Town Tenants. The result was an easy win 
for Tarrant and Roche. ' 
02 
An alliance of labour and nationalists had been a feature of Sligo town politics since the 
1890s. Its later variant, between the ITGWU and the Irish party, had lasted almost exactly 
three years, from Walter Carpenter's launch of the union in September 1911 to John Lynch's 
heckling of Thomas Scanlan in September 1914. The achievements of the later alliance were 
substantial and relied throughout on the active support and encouragement of senior local 
Irish party figures, initially Daniel O'Donnell, and later O'Donnell, Jinks, White, Higgins, 
Monson and Foley. At first under O'Donnell, the lead was taken by Hibemians and in Sligo 
town this organisation appeared vigorous, aggressive and self-renewing throughout. By 
contrast, the UIL seemed initially to be challenged by the arrival of the ITGWU and contained 
a number of 'merchant' members who were semi-detached from, and even hostile to, the new 
alliance. However, as Jinks came to committ himself, in his rivalry with O'Donnell, to a pro 
rather than an anti-labour stance, and as successive town grandees and later the church got 
aboard the bandwagon, so the UIL itself recovered vigour and its meetings saw the active 
participation of trades unionists, Hibernians and in 1914 the newly re-formed Town Tenants. 
In Sligo town there was not a sense that the Irish party was in structural or irreversible 
decline. 
It was the circumstances of Sligo town, and particularly the residual economic and political 
strength of the town's Protestant commercial elite, which gave common cause to the Irish 
party and labour. This challenge generated a vigour and popular interest in Sligo politics that, 
ahead of the belated breaking of the Home Rule crisis in late 1913, was lacking elsewhere as 
'localism' again became the driving force behind almost all provincial politics. This is not to 
102 Sli,,,, o Nationalist, 2-3)d Januw-y 1915. 
-)-)0 . m- - 
say that such localism was not also a recurring theme in Sligo. Newspaper contracts, job 
patronage, the Corporation's finances, feuds between societies and, above all, the leadership 
vacuum created by the death of P. A. McHugh were perennials throughout the period. 
However, as the Lab/Nat alliance went from success to success, the key leitmotif, of conflict 
between the town's Protestant minority and Catholic majority, and thus between unionists and 
nationalists, was played throughout. When the Home Rule crisis finally broke, this conflict 
intensified further, with the alliance of labour and party activists still holding firrn. 
Certainly, the new trades unionism had a defined 'labour' consciousness and retained 
sufficient institutional independence not to fall victim to vamPir, isation. However, though 
many labour activists sided with Lynch in September 1914, and thereafter formed a nucleus of 
Sinn Feiner opposition to the Irish party, the nature of Sligo's Lab/Nat alliance prior to this 
does not leave any impression that labour was a new, vital force which in due course would 
sweep away a decayed, conservative and weak Irish party. The success of labour in Sligo 
would have been impossible without vigorous Irish party leadership. That local party 
leadership held together as the national movement split after September 1914. However, it 
was subsequently to fracture under the pressures of recruiting, uprising and government 
repression, together with the inexorable progress of Sligo Corporation towards bankruptcy. 
When there was next an alliance of labour and nationalist politicians in the town, it was under 
the leadership of Sinn Fein. 
However, the new alliance looked remarkably similar to its 1911-14 predecessor. When Sinn 
Fein swept all before it in Sligo town from the beginning of 1917 onwards, its ranks contained 
not just trades unionists and former Irish-Irelanders, but also a substantial body of Hibernians, 
shopkeepers, merchants, professionals, Corporation members, aldermen and clerics. Among 
their ranks were Monson, Depew, Nevin, P. N. White (now an alderman), Rev. Crehan, 
Thomas Fitzpatrick, D. M. Hanley and, in 1918, Sam Tarrant and Jordan Roche. With 
Connolly and McTernan dead, only Jinks and Higgins remained consistently loyal to the 
party. Even Edward Foley 'wobbled' and was seen to campaign for Count Plunkett in North 
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Roscommon. 1 03 By early 1917, 'Brother Hanley' and 'Brother Lynch' were both members of 
the Sligo town division of the AOH, together with the soon -to-b e-expell ed Monson, DepeNA- 
and Nevin 104 and in January 1917 Dudley Hanley became the first Sinn Fein mayor of Sligo. 
In the case of Sligo town, the old pre-war alliance of merchants, Hibernians and labour had 
revived and old wine had definitely been decanted into new bottles. 
103 So Sam Tarrant alleged in a letter, 'Who's Who in Sligo Politics', to the Sligo Champion of 24th March 1917. 
Tarrant also related that a new town councillor, Charles Connolly, had sung 'The West's Awake' first at a 1916 
recruiting banquet for a Major Murphy. then at a dinner for Redmond when he unveiled the P. A. McHugh 
memorial and finally at the reception for Count Plunkett when he got the freedom of Sligo! 
'04SUgo Champion, I O'bFebruary and 24'h March 1917. 
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Chapter 8: 1910-13 - Before the Home Rule Crisis 
The beginnings of the 'Home Rule crisis' have been dated variously to the general elections 
of 1910. the September 1911 launch of the 'Ulster campaign', the publication of the Home 
Rule bill in April 1912, that summer's Belfast riots, the Ulster Covenant of September 1912 
or the fon-nation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in January 1913. All or any of these 
events have been seen as initiating a deepening crisis, in which the issues of Home Rule and 
'Ulster's' resistance to it dominated political life and alignments in Ireland. This was a 
period, according to one of the first biographers of Redmond, Warre B. Wells, in which 
parliamentary democracy became 'an impolitic fiction' and the Irish lost 'their habit of 
obedience and respect towards parliament'. ' More recently, George Boyce has written that in 
the years 1912-14 there was a sense that constitutional politics were failing, with Home 
Rulers paralysed and uncertain in the face of unconstitutional opposition, while the exclusion 
of Ulster was seen as an uni-nitigated wrong and Home Rule as being in jeopardy. 2 The 
unionists' inexorable Ulster campaign has been chronicled by many 3 and across Ireland there 
was certainly by 1914 what David Fitzpatrick has called an 'extraordinary outburst of mimetic 
militarism'. 4 with over 250,000 Irishmen participating to varying degrees in paramilitary 
organisations. Nationalists, as Fitzpatrick wrote, saw private armies acting with impunity in 
Ulster and also the propaganda value of backing constitutional demands with the threat of 
violence. Their response to Ulster developments was a mixture of 'outrage, admiration and 
envy, culminating in imitation'. 5 According to the Irish party MP and writer Stephen Gwynn, 
'the political effect of their [the UVF's] existence was so great that it inevitably called out a 
counterpart'. 6 
Despite this, studies of nationalist opinion during the crisis have been conspicuous by their 
ýU absence. Where the nationalist response has been described, the focus has been primarily on 
'Wells, John Redmond, p. 15. 
2 Boyce, 'One Last Burial - Culture, Counter-Revolution and Revolution in Ireland, 1886-1916' in Boyce (ed. ), 
The Revolution in Ireland, p. 133. 
3 For example see A. T. Q. Stewart, The Ulster Crisis : Resistance to Home Rule 1912-1914 (London 1967). Bew, 
Ideology and the Irish Question and Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998, pp. 215-244. 
4 Fitzpa trick, 'Militarism in Ireland, 1900-22' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds. ), A Military Histon7 of 
Ireland (Cambridge 1996). p. 383. 
5 Fitzpatrick. The Two Irelands, pp. 47-48. 
6 Stephen Gwynn, The Irish Situation, p. 28. 
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the rich source material of the papers of Redmond and Dillon, outlining their negotiations, 
fears and setbacks, rather than on the popular mood. This focus on the nationalist leadership 
is understandable; their reactions (and by inference those of their followers) to the menacing 
words and actions of unionist politicians and paramilitaries appeared distinctly muted. 
Trapped by their alliance with the Liberal government, they responded almost passively to 
events not in their control, believed that the Ulster paramilitary movement was a charade and 
a bluff, and were then caught in a series of humiliating climb-downs. 7 
There may, however, be another explanation for the limited analysis of the crisis outside 
Ulster. If, for much of the period, there was not a sense of crisis among southern nationalists, 
there would not be a popular 'response' to it. Contemporary writers instead wrote regularly 
of 'apathy' and nationalists routinely had to rebut unionist charges that their quiet meant they 
were apathetic. As late as September 1913, Redmond still had to deny publicly that there was 
apathy, conceding that nationalists had been silent, or nearly so, but seeing this as proof that 
8 
they had been 'law abiding and orderly'. Contemporaries often described a lack of ardour 
rather than a sense of crisis. In mid- 1912, the pro-Home Rule English journalist Sydney 
Brooks confessed that he was sometimes troubled by doubts as to whether the Irish really 
wanted Home Rule : 'they show none of the ardour and determination of the Poles or the 
Finns'. 9 In the summer of 1913, Patrick Pearse voiced his discontent with Irish complacency 
to his former pupil Denis Gwynn (later a historian and biographer of Redmond). Pearse told 
Gwynn that he would rather see Dublin in ruins than that the 'existing conditions of 
contentment and confident security within the British Empire' should continue. ' 0 Gwynn's 
father, Stephen, wrote later of the years 1910-13 : 'In point of fact Ireland had at this time the 
good humour which comes of prosperity. "' 
For nationalists in the five counties the 'Home Rule debate', until the autumn of 1913, was 
with one exception a spectator sport. That exception was the response triggered by rioting in 
7 For example, see three narrative histories : Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998, pp. 164-9; Lee. Ireland 1912-1985, p. 
15; Charles Townshend, Ireland in the Twentieth Centuri-, (London 1999). pp. 59-60. See also Patrick 
Maume's perceptive analysis in The Long Gestation, pp. 129-132. 
8 Redmond speaking at Cahirciveen, County Kerry, 'Home Rule Notes from the Campaign', Western 
Nationalist, 4 1h October 1913. 
9 Brooks, Aspects of the Irish Situation, pp. 205-6. 
10 Denis Gwynn, The Lýfe ofJohn Redmond (London 1932). p. 36 1, Pearse made this observation to Gwynn 
'fully a year' before the Great War. 
" Stephen Gwynn, The Irish Situation, p. 18. 
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Belfast in the summer of 1912. Political activity relating to any sense of 'Ulster crisis' was 
minimal, and even the flurry of activity sparked by the Belfast riots was relatively short-lived. 
For long periods there was a paucity of news coverage, oratory and comment, let alone 
debate, about Ulster or the threat to Home Rule. Mostly, there was little for the locals to 
contribute until Home Rule had actually been achieved, while there was equally little 
perception that Home Rule was endangered. Complacency and Stephen Gwynn's 'good 
humour' could still be seen in Roscommon in August 1913, when the Roscommon Journal 
wrote: 'Now at last we rest somewhat contented, with the long lost goal appearing in view. ' 12 
Elections and the Balance of Power : 1909-10 
At the end of 1909 the imminence of a general election did little to stir political enthusiasm in 
the five counties. In only one parliamentary division was there a contest - in North 
Westmeath where the long-standing disunity of nationalists climaxed in a straight faction 
fight between Laurence Ginnell and Patrick McKenna (see Chapter 6). Here, though 
Ginnell's previous flirtations with Sinn Fein supporters were cited as one of his many 
'defects' by Irish party campaigners, Home Rule - let alone any advocacy of more radical 
separation from Britain - was not a campaign issue. Elsewhere, more suppressed rivalries and 
tensions were likewise not about Home Rule. As already outlined in Chapter 2, the feud in 
Longford between the county's two MPs, J. P. Farrell and John Phillips, was patched up 
temporarily. In North Roscommon there was brief speculation, doubtless encouraged by 
Jasper Tully, as to whether the invisible J. J. O'Kelly would actually stand. 13 In South 
Leitrim, as noted on page 63, T. F. Smyth used his speech on his unopposed election to attack 
those who disagreed with his stance on the Cavan and Leitrim light railway. 14 Only in North 
Leitrim did James Dolan, brother of the defeated Charles (the Sinn Fein MP and candidate in 
the 1908 by-election) attempt abortively in November to revive the idea of a Sinn Fein 
candidacy. 15 
The declaration by the prime minister, Asquith, in London's Albert Hall in December 1909 
(that the hands of a Liberal government would be 'entirely free' to propose 'full self- 
12 Roscommon Journal, 16th August 19 1 _3 )- 13 JY(ýwcrn Nationalist, I I'h December; Roscommon Messenger, 18'h December 1909. 
14 Leitrim Adivi-tiser, 20'h January 1910. 
'-'Sligo Champion, 4h December 1909. 
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government in regard to purely Irish affairs') attracted less local press coverage than the 
various faction fights across Ireland, notably Ginnell's in North Westmeath, Tim Healy's 
against the party man Richard Hazleton in North Louth and the O'Brienite John O'Donnell's 
against Conor O'Kelly in South Mayo, all three of which were won by the 'factionists'. Such 
fights and the just-passed Land Act were the main national stories covered in the local press. 
Admittedly, prior to the campaign, Orange disorder in Ulster had been reported. Several 
papers carried the story of the August- September intimidation of Catholics by Protestants in 
Portadown. The most coverage was supplied by the Sligo Champion which displayed a 
menacing 'conciliation' by opining that 'the King Billyites of Portadown will, sooner than 
they anticipate, realise Catholic ornnipotency and its attendant conciliatory results'. 16 
However,, no Ulster political discontent, threats or disorder reached the press in the five 
counties during the election campaign itself In what was supposed to be the roughest general 
election nationally since 1892 - i. e. between nationalist factions - the RIC Inspector General 
could still report 'less popular interest than in former years'. 17 At the end of 1909. ) 
he wrote 
that there was 'much excitement among Unionist societies in Ulster', but added that 'the 
Nationalists are sitting on the fence, waiting'. 18 
Nationalists did not,, however, have that long to wait and the result of the election - effectively 
a tie between Liberals and Conservatives/unionists with the balance of power held by the Irish 
and Labour parties - led to a genuine upsurge of coverage of Westminster politics by the local 
press. For the first time since the mid- I 880s, Irish nationalist MPs held the parliamentary 
whip hand. The press reported in detail on the Irish party's 'No Veto, No Budget' policy, 
whereby if the government failed to act against the House of Lords veto there would be no 
Irish support for its budget. Thereafter, the death of King Edward VII, the resulting Veto 
Conference between the British political parties and Redmond's apparent espousal/denial of 
'Home Rule All Round' were all major news stories. Local newspapers' 'own' 
correspondents, syndicated reports and items culled from the Dublin, Belfast, London, 
English provincial or US press covered the unfolding events. In early 19 10 in particular, and 
for the first time since Parnell, Irish politicians were seen to be winning against 'English' 
ones. Though Ireland's alliance with 'the English democracy' was praised, the statesmanship 
16 Ibid. 9"' October 1909. 
17 Monthly report of the Inspector General, November 1909 (PRO CO 904/79). 
18 Ibid., December 1909 (PRO CO 90479). 
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and firmness of Redmond was repeatedly contrasted with the weakness of the Liberal cabinet. 
Thus in March the Westmeath Independent could write of a 'Straight Fight', with Redmond .s 
determined attitude the one redeeming feature in the present crisis and set against 'the many 
equivocations' of Asquith. The Irish and democratic forces in England wanted a straight fight 
against the Lords and luckily Asquith's views did not count, as the Irish held the balance of 
power. 19T. P. O'Connor summarised the mood in March, writing to the Master of Elibank, 
the Liberal chief whip. For O'Connor, Redmond had to: 
pick his steps very warily owing to the feverish excitement in Ireland - not on the Budget 
- but on what they consider the bold tactic R has advised. Don't make the mistake of 
thinking R's attitude is due to the Budget. I believe by this time the Irish people are quite 
well informed about the Budget... But they cling to the Idea that No Veto, No Budget is 
the true, the courageous, the only policy. 20 
In this period, Redmond's status in Ireland was undoubtedly high and possibly as great as it 
was ever going to be. As the Hibernian national secretary J. D. Nugent put it to a Sligo rally in 
April, Redmond stood 'in the interests of Ireland and a united Irish race all over the world at 
his back, master of the situation and controlling the British Empire (cheers) 21 
Only two local papers, those controlled by Jasper and George W. Tully, refused to give 
Redmond any credit and instead slated him, after April, for throwing away his control of the 
balance of power. The deal then made with the Liberals over the budget was a corrupt one, 
secured on the promise of government jobs and brokered by Jasper Tully's pet hate, T. P. 
O'Connor., the supposedly true controller of the Irish party. 22 After the King's death led to a 
'Truce of God' between the two main British parties and the following 'Veto Conference' 
excluded the Irish party, the Tullys pushed this line repeatedly. The rest of the press followed 
London events from the same sources as before, speculated on what was going on behind 
closed doors, called for unity ahead of what they saw as an imminent election and bulled up 
the prospects of Redmond's forthcoming US fund-raising tour. However, Redmond's public 
espousal in New York in October of 'Home Rule All Round', for both the United Kingdom 
and the wider empire, led to the marked contrast in coverage noted in Chapter 4. The Tully 
19 ff'(ý,; tmeath Independent, 19'h March 19 10. 
nd 2" T. P. O'Connor to the Master of Elibank. 22 March 1910, Elibank papers, National Library of Scotland, Ms. 
8802 fl 8. O'Connor added: 'As you know, I don't agree wholly with them in actual conditions'. 
21SI 
03 
rd ig Champion, 2) Aprill910. 
22 Midland Reporter, 9th June 19 10. 
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brothers' papers reported Redmond's Daily Express interview and O'Connor's related 
Canadian speeches in detail, reprinted attacks on them and themselves denounced a betrayal 
of Ireland. The rest of the local press was by contrast much more muted and neutral, and not 
one local paper wrote in support of Redmond or O'Connor. As seen above (pages 113-16), 
only when Redmond disavowed the Daily Express interview did the bulk of the local press 
take up the issue, denouncing the 'fake'. 
Police reports and press leaders indicating that there was only muted local political interest 
began to reappear in the second half of the year. In July, the Sligo county inspector reported 
that there was 'no stir in local politics', 23 while in September the Longford Leader lamented 
the current 'laxity and apathy'. Likening the Irish to 'the Jews in theirjourney through the 
desert' it wrote that 'our people forget their ideals and past history almost at every moment'. 24 
In October the Roscommon Journal declared in a leader on the House of Lords : 'The county 
has never been so quiet as during the past year. Why? Because the people thought that the 
battle had been won'. 25 
The collapse of the veto conference and the renewal of British party warfare led to a chorus of 
local press calls for unity ahead of the predicted general election, but coverage of the second 
1910 election was more perfunctory than of the first. No seat was contested in any of the five 
counties, and during the election campaign a succession of RIC county inspectors reported on 
the lack of any interest locally. The Cl for Leitrim reported 'little interest in the Election'; his 
Sligo opposite number stated that the UIL was less and less active; the Westmeath inspector 
noted that his county was completely quiet and in Roscommon, the inspector was specific 
when he wrote: 'The General Election did not cause any excitement in the county and little 
interest was evinced therein'. 26 Though the rematch of Tim Healy and Richard Hazleton in 
North Louth was reported, coverage of contests elsewhere in Ireland was small. The 
Westmeath Independent commented : 'Here at home we have little more to do than to wait 
and see'. 27 This clearly reflected the lack of any local contests and the relative anti-climax of 
23 Monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, July 19 10 (PRO CO 904/8 1). 
24 Longford Leader, -')dSeptember 
19 10. 
25 Roscommon Journal, 23'dOctober 1910. 
26 Monthly reports of the Leitrim, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath county inspectors, December 19 10 (PRO 
CO 904'82). 
27 9,7estmeath Independent, 26b November 19 10. 
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a predictable election following all the events of the year. It was assumed that the new 
parliament would see a renewed 'coalition' whose first priority would be a Parliament bill, 
while Home Rule would have to wait. The unionist Sligo Independent quoted the opinion that 
the Home Rule bill would not even be tabled until 1912 and that the whole of that year would 
28 be needed for it to pass . 
Jasper Tully said the same and already attacked the delay 
involved. 29 
The impact of Ulster events on the local press was sporadic in 1910. Coverage was mostly 
focused on the actions of the 'carrion crows' in parliament (Ulster unionist MPs) on matters 
such as the new King's accession oath. In February though, the Roscommon Herald noted 
briefly that the cry of 'Ulster will fight' had revived 30 and, two weeks earlier, the Sligo 
Champion carried a piece headed 'Grave, Silent Fellows', reporting a London paper's 
prediction that Home Rule would trigger civil war in Ulster. The formation of rifle clubs and 
the transformation of Orange lodges into 'military units' were cited. The Champion derided 
this, saying that Ulster opposition was a 'cipher' and 'bluster', but adopted the tone of its 
September 1909 Portadown piece: 'When the sweeping process is completed we shall have, 
in that part of the country, Christian toleration, and civilisation instead of bigotry and 
barbarism. ' It noted that Ulstermen had not died in the ditch when the (also hated) University 
bill had passed - 'More's the pity'. 
31 
Barring reports on the 'carrion crows', the local press was, however, then silent on 'Ulster' 
for over nine months, until December. 'At that time bellicose threats from unionists during the 
second election campaign, notably James Craig's Lisburn speech on the need to train men and 
acquire arms, did percolate through to the five counties. The Western Nationalist and Sligo 
Champion both attacked such rhetoric; the latter was also irate abou t the audacity of Sligo's 
local unionists in daring to hold a public meeting and carried aggressive leaders almost 
throughout December. 32 The unionist Longford Journal reported that 'there is a strong 
feeling at present that Home Rule should be resisted with force and sensible, level-headed 
28 Sligo Independent, 24h December 19 10. 
29 Roscommon Hei-ald, I 7h December 19 10. 
. 30 Ibid, 5h February 1910. 
31 Sligo Champion, 22 d January 19 10. 
32 Wcwtci-n Nationaliv, 31" December. Sligo Champion, -3, 
rd. I O'b, 17'h and 31" December 19 10. Craig spoke at 
Lisburn on 24"' December. 
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men have advocated the use of arms! ' The paper went on to say that it could not for one 
moment envisage the religious persecution that would justify such a stance . 
33 At the end of 
the year, the Roscommon Messenger and Westmeath Independent reported a thoughtful letter 
to a London paper from Stephen Gwynn, saying that Craig, though he was being encouraged 
by men who would not risk their property or persons, was courageous, not a fool and not a 
joke. Gwynn predicted that both sides would arm and that one day the arms might go 0 ff . 
34 
Coverage of Ulster threats spilled over into January 1911. The unionist Sligo Times carried a 
report on the ballooning unionist clubs, saying they would soon have over 200,000 
35 
members. Sir Walter Nugent in Athlone publicly called for forbearance and toleration, 
arguing that nationalists must let Ulster unionists damn themselves. 36 However, the tone of 
post-election press coverage rapidly turned to mockery. Henceforth, said the Western 
Nationalist, 'the "war in Ulster" will be associated in our minds with Rip Van Winkle'. 37 The 
Roscommon Herald dismissed tales of the North arming as just 'talk, talk'; 38 the Sligo 
Champion called stories of Ulster mobilisation 'clap trap'. 39 The Leitrim Observer reported 
'It is said the Ulster Orangemen are drilling all over the province, but a Northern farmer 
writing to the daily press says he sees them engaged only in drilling turnipS., 40 Had Ulster's 
bluff already been called? 
'The usual monotonous story of a peaceful country' - 1911 
After the election-related flourish of Ulster coverage, press interest in both Ulster and the 
progress of Home Rule almost vanished. Admittedly, Redmond made it clear on 18'hJanuary 
that the whole year would be taken up with private negotiation, while the Roscommon 
Messenger now expected Home Rule to become law only at the end of 1913.4 1 London- 
sourced reports on the passage of the Parliament bill persisted, but later in the year the main 
'British' news stories of interest became the many strikes and the passing of Lloyd George's 
national insurance legislation. 
33 Longford Journal, 31' December 19 10. 
. 14 Roscommon Messenger, Westmeath Independent, 31" December 19 10. 
35 Sligo Times, 21' January 1911. 
36 Westmeath Independent, 14'hJanuary 1911. 
37 Wcstern Nationalist, 7h January 1911. 
38 Roscommon Herald, 21" January 1911. 
39 Sligo Champion, 28h January 1911. 
40 Leitrim Observer, 14'h January 1911. 
41 Roscommon Messci7gcr, 21" January 1911. 
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Biographers of Redmond and Dillon have described the lack of political activity of both men 
in 19,142 and Patricia Jalland has also described the government's lack of focus on Home 
Rule in that year . 
43 Things were little different in provincial Ireland. After a poorly-attended 
Roscommon county meeting of nationalists in April, Hayden expressed surprise that the 
(6advent of Home Rule' had not awakened greater interest in the county. 44 His Roscommon 
Messenger wrote in August of the need to fight 'faction and apathy in the last days of the 
national fight ý. 45 The triennial local elections aroused little interest and the Leitrim Advertiser 
wrote that interest had been 'never at such a low ebb,. 46 In October, the Westmeath 
Independent wrote: 'There is a an apathy of organisation all over the county which is simply 
surprising where there are so many interests at stake. 47 As land tensions continued to 
subside, so quarterly assizes saw a rash of white gloves presented to judges to celebrate their 
'crimeless' conditions. Reading repetitive monthly police reports at Dublin Castle obviously 
got to the 'JBD', the Under-Secretary Sir James Dougherty, who wrote to Augustine Birrell 
on one cover sheet in October: 
There is a distinct note of improvement in the more disturbed counties [meaning Clare 
and Galway]. As for the rest it is the usual monotonous story of a peaceful country. 48 
Concerning Ulster, there was sporadic reporting of the Papal 'Ne Temere' decree (denounced 
by Ulster unionists as invalidating mixed-faith marriages) and on the McCann case (involving 
the messy end of one such marriage in which a Catholic husband deserted his Protestant wife) 
ftom January to April 1911, but only by four papers in total over the four months. 49 More 
general articles from the London press by John and William Redmond, saying that unionists 
would not make civil war and that they did not speak for 'Ulster', were reproduced even less; 
in two papers 50 for the first article and one 51 for the second. When John Redmond wrote 
p. 322. Both Dillon and Redmond were 42 Wells, John Redmond, p. 95 and Lyons, John Dillon (London 1968). 
also injured in car crashes during the year. 
43 Patricia Jalland, The Liberals and Ireland: The Ulster Question in British Politics to 1914 (Brighton 1980). 
pp. 56-58. 44 H'estmeath Independent, 22 nd April 1911. 
45 Roscommon Messenger, 12th August 1911. 
46 Leitrim Advertiser, 256 May 1911. 
47 Hestmeath Independent, 70' October 1911. 
48 Monthly report of the Inspector General, September 1911 (PRO CO 904/85). 
49 Sligo Champion, 4thFebruary, LongfiordJOUrnal, II thFebruary; ffestmeath Examincr, Sligo Times, 4th March 
1911. 
50 Tfestern Nationalist, 7"' January: Sligo Champion, 140'January 1911. 
5'Roscommon Messenger, I' June 1911. 
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another London piece in March ('Does Home Rule Mean Rome Rule? ) it was reproduced in 
only the unionist Sligo Times. 52 Though further sporadic reports covered the more outrageous 
remarks of 'carrion crows' or minor disturbances after the 'Twelfth', until September there 
was no perceptible sense of a rising tempo of Ulster events. The Sligo Champion in June 
53 
pronounced that the Orange drum had ceased to roll , while Hayden's Westmeath Examiner 
in July saw nationalist 'faction' as the main threat to Home Rule. 54 That obsessive factionist 
and commentator on world and Irish affairs, Jasper Tully, carried no Ulster stories in the 
Roscommon Herald between January and September. 
Increased Ulster coverage from September onwards was undoubtedly triggered by the launch 
of the unionist Ulster campaign at the end of August and by Sir Edward Carson's rally at 
Craigavon, with its explicit threat of an Ulster provisional goverm-nent. Though there was 
virtually no coverage of the Craigavon rally itself, threats by unionist politicians, scare stories 
in the London papers and a November arms seizure at Leith were reported across much of the 
local press. Belligerence and mockery were displayed towards such stories, both in leading 
articles and by local MPs. While Fitzgibbon responded to Carson's threat of marching to 
ý 55 Cork by saying that if Orangemen came 'we would be ready for them (cheers) , Scanlan 
said that he thought Carson had no more desire to lead a rebellion than he had to commit 
suicide by leaping into Lough SWilly. 56 Sectarianism in Sligo town resurfaced when the Sligo 
Times wrote of a threatened 'creed boycott' against Protestants. 57 The Champion retorted by 
claiming that any boycott would be of Ulster Catholics by Protestants, but then threateningly 
argued that if the army could not compel Protestants to accept Home Rule, neither could it 
compel Home Rulers to accept Protestants. Nationalists would fight 'their ill gained and ill 
used supremacy'. 58 
A recurring theme of press coverage was that the unionist campaign was seen as political, not 
military, designed from the outset to sway parliamentary and English opirnion. Though 
clearly there were Ulster unionist 'enemies', as the Ulster campaign got under way their 
52 Sligo Times, 4h March 1911. 
53 Sligo Champion, 17'h June 1911. 
54 Wevtmeath Examiner, 22" July 1911. 
55 Fitzgibbon speaking at Williamstown, Galway. Roscommon journal, 18 th November 1911. 
56 Scanlan speaking at Glasgow. Sligo Champion, 14th October 1911. 
57 Sli .o nd Se ý, Times, 2 P, tember 1911. 
8 Sligo Champion, 9" September 1911. 
232 
chosen battlefield was in England and their weapons were those of speeches, propaganda, 
'lies' and 'bluff. In December, the Westmeath Independent noted that there was 'no 
appearance of a Northern rebellion' 59 and the Sligo Champion reported on the 'utter failure' 
of the unionist campaign to shift English opinion. The English cared nothing for Irish 
unionists noW. 60 The Roscommon Journal dismissively summed up the campaign as 'a purely 
artificial adjunct to party politics'. 61 However, while in the past two years the local press had 
responded only sporadically to individual Ulster news stories, there was now an awareness of 
a continuing campaign against Home Rule. In late 1911, local coverage of that campaign had 
expanded materially and this coincided with renewed interest in the forthcoming Home Rule 
bill. 
The Advent of the Home Rule Bill 
Once Redmond had disowned his New York interview and made it clear that Irish Home Rule 
had to precede any more general federalism, there was, with one exception, minimal debate of 
the 'contents' of Home Rule during 1911; from the beginning of that year, as Redmond 
indicated in January, the bill disappeared into a drafting limbo. The exception was, however, 
important : finance. At the heart of this discussion was the degree to which Ireland would 
have the power to raise and collect taxes, a key yardstick of just how independent she would 
be. Nationally, books published in 1911 by Tom Kettle, Erskine Childers and J. J. Horgan all 
stressed the importance of the finance issue. 62 Locally, debate was triggered in April by the 
disclosure of the composition of the 'Primrose Committee' set up by the government to 
investigate Home Rule finances. In Roscommon, Jasper Tully was quickly on the attack, 
considering it a scandal that the veteran financial expert Thomas Sexton was not on the 
committee. Two key party-supporting papers, the Westmeath Independent and Sligo 
Champion, also criticised the committee's composition and demanded the maximum financial 
powers for Ireland. However, both papers then conceded that if the committee had the 
benediction of the party leadership they would trust it. 63 The issue died away rapidly. 
50 Westmeath Independent, 9th December 1911. 
60 Sligo Champion, 30th December 1911. 
61 Roscommon Journal, 30th December 1911. 
62 R Erskine Childers, The Framework ofHomc Rule (London 1911). J. J. Horgan, Home Rule: A critical 
consideration (Dublin 1911): T. M. Kettle, Home Rule Finance: An experiment 1. nj . Usti . ce (Dublin 1911). 
63 Roscommon Herald, JI estmeath Independent 15'h April, Sligo Champion, 291h April and 6th May 1911. 
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The broader financial issue resurfaced in the autumn, coinciding with the launch of the Ulster 
unionist campaign. The Dublin Irish Independent called for 'full' taxation powers for Ireland 
and a series of leaks appeared in the London press that the bill would, after all, cede control of 
customs and excise to the Irish parliament. The Roscommon Journal, Longford Leader and 
Westmeath Independent all carried this story in October, while the Sligo Champion repeated it 
in December. 64 John O'Dowd also gave it currency in September, when he assured the South 
Sligo UIL executive that Ireland would have the same financial powers as Australia and 
Canada. 65 Despite Dillon pouring cold water on the idea in October and Redmond playing it 
down as 'pure speculation' in November, 66 the story did not die. Jasper Tully fulminated on 
the subject and Hayden's Roscommon Messenger was moved to criticise the 'pitiable 
spectacle' of the issue being used by factionists to undermine the bill. 67 However, the story 
was promoted most by the non-factionist Westmeath Independent, which reiterated that full 
financial powers were necessary: 'We do not want to have a gas and water Bill ,. 68 
Discussion of the finance issue persisted as the Home Rule bill's publication became 
imminent at the beginning of 1912. Certainly, debate persisted in Dublin and the Irish 
Independent continued to campaign. Dillon wrote to Redmond of his considerable unease 
about the financial clauses and the Independent's attacks . 
69 Locally, the Longford Leader, 
saying that bill would stand or fall on the strength of English public opinion, denounced in 
tortured prose those who continued to demand financial 'impossibilities' in order to make the 
'possibilities' of the bill impossible. 70 However, the Westmeath Independent recanted its 
previous views early in 1912, saying that a lack of control of customs and excise did not mean 
that the bill would be a bad one. 71 Discussion of the subject in the local press dropped away 
after February. 
64 11'cstmeath Independent, RoscommonJOUrnal, 7'hOctober; Longford Leader, 2 8h October; Sligo 
Champion, 30"' December 1911. 
, 
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67 Roscommon Messengcr, 28'bOctober 1911. 
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69 Dillon to Redmond. 14'h January 1912, Redmond Mss., National Library of Ireland, Ms. 15182. 
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The impression that Denis Gwynn later described, of a 'feeling of hopefulness and excitement 
pervading the country' in early 1912,72 is hard to substantiate. The mood reported in the 
papers had more in common with that described by the historian Charles Townshend, in 
73 h 
which Irish opinion was relatively inert and unconcerned . On 6t January, the Westmeath 
Independent asked whether it was because Home Rule was at hand that unionists cited Irish 
quietness as apathy and a week later its column 'In Gaeldom' called on the young to cast off 
their apathy. On 20th January the paper wrote of 'a very culpable apathy and indifference', 
continuing : 
We know the hearts of the people ring as true to the national cause as they ever did, but 
being filled with confidence in the nearness of a great victory they are apt to take things 
political easy. 
These were not the musings of just one paper. In February, the Sligo Champion accused 
nationalists of taking things too easy, as if Home Rule were a matter of concern for the 
Orangemen alone. 74 
The great Dublin demonstration of 3 I't March, for all its size, showed as many signs of a 
quiet popular mood outside Dublin as of the 'enthusiasm' claimed by its organisers. Certainly 
the event was massive, with the only confusion about numbers being whether 100,000 or 
200,000 attended. Sixty-four special trains were laid on and 150 or so bands played. It was 
covered extensively in almost all the local papers. However, the Roscommon county 
inspector wrote that very few Roscommon people went to the rally: 'They care a great deal 
more about getting land than about government'. 75 Local dignitaries from the five counties 
went up to Dublin, but only one was a platform speaker, Daniel O'Donnell of Sligo. Several 
papers carried the embarrassing revelation, derived from the Irish Independent's tour of the 
Dublin railway termini, that the special trains laid on by the MGVV'R to carry 6,000 from the 
midlands and the west carried only 1,369 . 
76 The Westmeath Independent pointed out that no 
more than 5,000 of the 20,000 around each platform could hear a word being said 77 and, as 
72 Denis Gwynn, The Lýfe qfJohn Redmond, p. 197. 73 Townshend. Political Vioicnec in Ireland. - Government and Resistance Since 1848 (Oxford 1983). p. 237. 
74 Slioo Champion, 17"' February 1912. C' 75 Monthly report of the Rosconinion county inspector, March 1912 (PRO CO 904/86). 
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already noted on page 13 6, the Midland Rep07-ter gleefully reported on the event's 'Boetian 
dullness'. 
The demonstration was followed, almost immediately, by the publication of the Home Rule 
bill. The full gamut of nationalist responses to this bill has been described by historians, 
ranging from wild enthusiasm to deep disappointment. John Hutchinson has written: 'As the 
Third Home Rule was introduced a feverish excitement gripped even the revivalists'; 78 R. F. 
Foster in his biography of Yeats that 'mainstream nationalist opinion was wildly 
enthusiastic'. 79 In stark contrast, J. J. Lee concluded : 'The measure was so limited that it 
required all the persuasive powers of the Home Rule leader, John Redmond, to allay the 
chagrin of his followers'. 80 Alvin Jackson described the bill as the foretaste of a succession of 
later humiliations, and wrote of a sense of disappointment already having set in. 8' Overall, 
however, the response nationally seems to have been significantly more positive than 
negative. The previously nervous Dillon could write to C. P. Scott that there was an 
overwhelming feeling of 
enthusiastic acceptance of the Bill and of whole-hearted desire to make peace with 
England without any reserves. I confess that I have myself been quite taken by surprise 
by the universality of this feeling. 82 
Both extremes of response, for and against, could be seen in the local press of the five 
counties. Hayden's Westmeath Examiner was particularly enthusiastic, hailing 'A Nation's 
Triumph', financial provisions well in advance of Gladstone's and Ireland being placed on a 
par with Australia and Canada. 83 The Western Nationalist said that all 'honest' Home Rulers 
would favour the bill, which was an enormous advance on previous ones. 84 It was these two 
papers, in Mullingar and Boyle, that faced head-on the vehement denunciations coming from 
Jasper and George W. Tully. 'This is not liberty', wrote the Roscommon Herald. Nations 
that had freedom 'conferred' on them never thrived - it had to be fought for. 
85 The Midland 
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Reporter wrote that 'this sham Home Rule' would disgust the country 'beyond all bounds'. 
'T. P. ' was 'really selling the people like bullocks in Smithfield to the Saxon. 
86 Specifically, 
they focused on three defects - the finance clauses, the nominated Senate and the lack of 
powers to redistribute land - and unreservedly condemned the bill as grossly inadequate. 
87 
In the rest of the local press, the response was far more measured and attempts to categorise 
the broad popular response as either wild enthusiasm or disappointed chagrin both appear 
wide of the mark. Thus, Hayden's second paper, the Roscommon Messenger, was relatively 
terse in calling the bill 'good', said that many details would require careful attention and was 
confident Ireland's representatives would protect her interests. A 'very genuine attempt' had 
been made to satisfy the national demand. 88 The Longford Leaderwas positive and said that 
everyone in Longford had been 'well pleased', but the emphasis of its leading article was to 
urge over-vehement critics in Ireland not to reject it and to trust the party. The paper's owner, 
Farrell, later emphasised that while the finance clauses were still unsatisfactory, there 
remained enormous scope both to practise financial economy and to develop Ireland's 
resources. 89 The Roscommon Journal was relatively low key and factual in its report, noting 
Redmond's support, but a week later thought that an amendment to include powers over the 
land issue was desirable. 90 The Westmeath Independent, that earlier opponent of a 'gas and 
water' measure, summed it up as 'adequate and generous'. 91 One Westmeath party supporter, 
J. P. Dowdall, chairman of Westmeath county council, broke ranks publicly to criticise the 
finance clauses, but Dowdall appears to have spoken on the subject locally only once and 
stayed loyal to the party. 92 The Sligo Champion wrote that the bill, as Mr. Redmond had said, 
was not a perfect one but not as imperfect as at first sight. The only issues of controversy 
were the nomination of the Irish Senate and the financial clauses. Ireland would trust the 
parliamentary party to handle any amendments as it saw fit. 93 It was the Champion which 
86 Midland Reporter, II thand 18'h April 1912. 
87 Roscommon Herald, 20th April 1912. 
88Roscommon Messenger, 13'bApril 1912. 
89 Longford Leader, 13"' and 27th April 1912. 
90 Roscommon Journal, 13 th and 20'hApril 1912. 
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epitomised the generally positive but pragmatic (rather than rapturous) response to the bill, 
seeing it as 'far and away the best measure we have ever had a chance of obtaining ,. 94 
Of the party's opponents, the local unionist press was strongly critical and, as already seen, 
Jasper Tully's two papers were categorical in their denunciations. However, Tully was quite 
alone in the five counties in voicing total nationalist opposition. As noted in Chapter 6, even 
his closest ally, Laurence Ginnell, was equivocal in his reception. Just after the bill was 
published, Ginnell met with his Independent UIL executive in Mullingar. Like Tully he 
attacked the provisions for finance, the Senate and land, and on the last of these said that a 
parliament without adequate powers would be a 'hopeless object of contempt'. (He also said 
that a nation with no power to arm her sons was a nation in slavery. ) But, he then went on, he 
would do all in his power with other Irish MPs to amend the bill and if that failed he would 
still vote for it. 95 It was three days later that he pledged 'cordial co-operation' to get the bill 
passed into law and called for 'no bickering and finding fault with Nationalists who are 
working for Home Rule'. 96 
There was, therefore, considerable local interest in the publication of the bill, but the overall 
response was rather more prosaic than could be associated with any great sense of excitement, 
let alone crisis. In addition, with the exception of Ginnell's reference to the right to carry 
arms, discussion of its contents had concentrated solely on the issues of finance, the Senate 
and land. None of its many other restrictions on Irish freedom of action 97 received any public 
attention. By May, debate on the contents of the bill had almost vanished and coverage had 
shifted to the practicalities of its parliamentary progress. Interest subsided and at the 
beginning of May the Roscommon RIC county inspector was already writing: 'The Irish 
Government is not much discussed by the people who seem to care little where Parliament is 
if only they could get the land'. 98 A month later, the Inspector General wrote that 'outside 
94 Ibid, 13th April 1912. 
95 Longford Independent, 20'bApnl; ffestmeath Examiner, 27'h April 1912. 
96 MidlandReporter, 25thApril 1912. 
97 See O'Day, Irish Home Rule, pp. 248-50. The Irish parliament would have no jurisdiction over matters of war 
and peace, the armed forces, the police (for six years), pensions, national insurance, Post Office savings or public 
loans, as well as having none over customs and excise or land legislation. A judicial committee of the Privy 
Council could vet all Irish-made laws and the Lord Lieutenant also retained a veto. A Joint Exchequer Board 
would have only two Irish representatives against five British. 
98 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, April 1912 (PRO CO 904/86). 
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Ulster the measure appears to be regarded with apathy', citing in his support reports from 
Kerry, Kilkenny, Queen's County, Mayo, North Tipperary and Roscommon. " 
Resistance to the Bill and the Ulster Campaign - 1912 
The local press, from the autumn of 1911, had begun to cover the prolonged Ulster unionist 
campaign against Home Rule and during 1912 its aggregate level of coverage was far higher 
than in preceding years. The key events of the Ulster campaign were all reported, but to 
hugely varying degrees. They included the upsurge in drilling over the winter of 1911-12, the 
Ulster Hall crisis of February, the great rallies at the Balmoral Show Grounds in April and 
Blenheim Palace in July (with Bonar Law's distinctly unconstitutional language), the 
Castledawson riot in June, the Belfast riots and shipyard expulsions and finally the Ulster 
Covenant. Four events were covered in considerable detail, three of them in Ulster (the Ulster 
Hall, the Belfast riots and the Covenant) and the fourth in parliament (a 'snap vote' defeat of 
the Home Rule bill's finance clauses in November). Others were barely mentioned in 
passing. 
What is clear from the local press's coverage of events in 1912 is that there was no sense of a 
mounting crisis in which each event cast a darker pall than the last. Nor was there a sense of 
an impending Ulster military juggernaut, getting larger all the time. Instead, if Ulster events 
were seen as part of a pattern, that pattern was one of a purely political campaign to sway, 
threaten, lie to and bluff 'English' opinion, so that the government's cohesion and/or Home 
Rule's parliamentary and electoral support would crack. 100 As each event occurred, so its 
capacity to change English opinion was assessed and, as it was perceived not to have worked, 
dismissed. Only in July and August, with the crisis caused by direct, physical attacks on 
Ulster Catholics, did this pattern not apply. 
The Ulster Hall 
In January and February 1912, Winston Churchill was forced by Orange Order threats to back 
down from speaking, with Redmond, at a political rally on unionist terTitory in the Ulster 
99 Monthly report of the Inspector General, May 1912 (PRO CO 904/87). 
100 Maume in The Long, Gestation writes that the Irish party's leaders saw the Ulster campaign as a bluff to 
unnerve English opinion, as, the only issue that could unite Tories demoralised by defeat and divided by Tariff 
Reform, and as a defence of priNilege. The campaign was in many respects 'a triumph of well-orgalused 
publicity'. See pp. 131-2. 
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Hall, Belfast. This was the first great 'set-piece' of local press coverage, with almost every 
paper carrying the story. Tension first mounted as Orange threats to disrupt or prevent the 
rally were made and then subsided as Churchill changed his plans. The reported purpose of 
this 'thuggish' Orange stunt was to scare English opinion, and it was seen as backfiring by 
instead alienating support. In Reynolds's Newspaper Redmond dismissed 'Orange 
bellowings' as 'simply insolent bluff 101 and the Western Nationalist leader, 'The Orange 
Drum Burst, was typical, with its emphasis on the loss of English support for Ulster. ' 02 Even 
unionist and independent papers were sceptical. The Longford Independent asked whether the 
Orange dog had the courage to bite as well as bark - 'It is very doubtful' - while the Sligo 
Times believed that though the Orangemen were not merely bluffing, the threat was 'not the 
wisest possible' and gave ammunition to the English Liberals., 03 The exception to all this 
was, predictably, Jasper Tully, who believed that the crisis had been provoked deliberately by 
Churchill, in order to pose as a hero defying Ulster bullies and thus disguise a climb-down on 
the financial clauses of the bill. Once Churchill moved the meeting away from the hall, Tully 
then had his cake and ate it by denouncing this 'shameful surrender'. 104 The overall response 
was, though, summarised by the Westmeath Independent. In a leader, 'As Good As Won - 
Home Rule', it praised Churchill's speech and pronounced that 'the Orange opposition has 
broken its back'. 105 
The Belfast Riots 
That the next major burst of reporting on Ulster did not occur until July is itself significant. 
For over five months,, events that received only perfunctory coverage in less than a handful of 
papers included the drilling upsurge, the Balmoral Show Grounds demonstration and the 
Castledawson fracas and arrests; 106 nor was there any coverage of Ulster responses to the 
publication of the Home Rule bill. Only two papers covered the Balmoral rally, and for these 
two, the Sfigo Champion and Sligo Independent, the news angle was not what was said but the 
attendance of the Sligo unionist, Colonel Wood-Martin, 100 or so Sligo men and the YMCA 
101 Roscommon Messenger, 27h January 1912. 
102 Western Nationalist, I O'hFebruary 1912. 
103 LongfordIndependent, Sligo Times, 27h January 1912. 
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brass band. The Champion's lurid headline was 'Sligo Orangemen on the Rampage'. 107 
There was virtually no mention of Castledawson, not just in the party- supporting press, but 
also in the unionist and 'Tully' papers. The Home Rule-related events most covered - i. e. in 
three to four papers for each - were the June parliamentary defeat of the Agar Robartes 
amendment to exclude Ulster from Home Rule (dismissed as a failed tactic to kill the bill), 
and a visit by Asquith to Dublin in July. 
It took the Belfast riots and expulsions of Catholic workers significantly to re-ignite local 
press interest. This was comprehensive over several weeks, during which the papers wrote of 
attacks on Catholics and the sufferings of those expelled. This time, the newspapers reported 
not just the Ulster events, but actions being taken in nationalist Ireland in response to them. 
For the first time, Ulster events were not just a spectator sport. Local responses included 
raising relief funds, boycotting Ulster traders and, to a much lesser extent, threatening 
reprisals and calling for rifle clubs. Far and away the most common was the first. 
Newspapers reported a plethora of ad hoc relief funds and public bodies resolving to support 
the dispossessed. In addition, a widespread if imperfect boycott of Belfast goods took place, 
only petering out in February 1913.108 In the five counties, the boycott was widely reported 
and promoted by figures as diverse as Fitzgibbon in Castlerea, 109 Jinks in Sligo, ' 10 Farrell's 
lieutenant Frank MacGuinness in Longford"' and Father Michael O'Flanagan in 
Roscommon, who preached in the Sacred Heart church that: 'The time for retaliation has 
comeý. 112 The full impact of the boycott cannot be gauged. Police reports indicated that 
though the AOH nationally may have circulated a list of Belfast-owned firms, that list was 
later disowned and the boycott was not co-ordinated. 113 
Discussion of reprisals and rifle clubs was much less commonplace. The Western Nationalist 
threatened the former, in early July, pointing out that vacant jobs in the Belfast shipyards 
could be filled by southern unionists who could no longer live in the south under Home 
107 Sligo Independent, 13'hApn*l: Sligo Champion, 20'bApril 1912. 
108 Monthly report of the Inspector General. February 1913 (PRO CO 904/89) . 109 Roscommon Messenger, 17'b August 1912. 
'10 Sligo Champion, 13 th July 1912. 
111 Longfoi-d Leader, I Oth August 1912. 
112 Roscommon Journal, 24th August 1912. 
113 See Inspector General's Monthly report-,,, September, October, November, December 1912 (PRO CO 904/88) 
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Rul e. 1 14 The Westmeath Independent called for the latter. Preparations were under way in the 
north, it said, for extensive armed resistance. 'If aggression is threatened in one end of the 
country, the means to resist and suppress it must be at the command of the rest of the 
country. " 15 Such calls remained distinctly isolated, however, and neither press nor police 
carried reports of local politicians taking them up, nor of any reprisals actually happening. 
Many papers blamed the inflammatory language of unionists for stimulating the riots and the 
syndicated 'Home Rule Notes from the Campaign' provided factual coverage of the Blenheim 
rally and Law's notorious 'No Lengths' speech. However, only two local papers commented 
on Law's speech at the time. The Midland Reporter saw it as part of a Tory game, with Law 
and Carson seeking to provoke civil war to gain their political ends; Catholics should not play 
this game and must avoid reprisals. 116 The Longford Leader directly linked the 'treason and 
disorder' called for by Law to the Belfast 'murder campaign' now under way. ' 17 
The Belfast riots, as a direct attack on Catholics and nationalists, generated more coverage 
than any other Ulster event in 1912, in addition to being the only event that provoked any 
positive action by southem nationalists. For the first time there was a sense of Ulster crisis. 
As Ulster's autumn campaign loomed the Westmeath Examinei-, a month after Blenheim, 
picked up on the 'No Lengths' speech of Law and feared 'an epidemic of lawlessness'. 118 
The Western Nationalist predicted the seizure of post offices in Ulster in order to force the 
government to make arrests. 119 The Sligo Champion gloomily wrote a leader on 'The Holy 
War', citing the many rumours of 'decisive' actions in Ulster and the whipped-up sectarian 
mood there. The climax, it believed, would come with the proposed 'Ulster Day'. 120 
The Covenant 
Ulster Day and the Covenant formed the third major episode of local press coverage of Ulster 
events in 1912. However, quite unlike the Belfast riots, the Covenant was not seen as 
creating a crisis but as defusing one, as a climb-down by unionists, even a subject of mockery. 
114 JVestern Nationalist, 60' July 1912. 
115 Tfestmeath Independent, 24h August 1912. 
1 lo Midland Reporter, 8h August 1912. 
117 Longford Leader, P August 1912. 
118 ff'cwtmeath Examincr, 24"' August 1912. 
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It may well be, as Paul Bew has written, that 'a logic of confrontation flowed from Ulster 
Day', 12 1 but not in the perception of the local press. To the Westmeath Independent the 
Covenant was instead 'The Carson Squib'. 122 
From the end of August, Carson made it clear that the unionists' autumn campaign would 
climax with the Covenant. This was immediately hailed by the Roscommon Messenger, 
which wrote that instead of armed resistance Ulstermen were now to have a 'Covenant'. 
Their actions would be passive resistance and a refusal to pay taxes. The pot had boiled down 
and the previous threats had been all a bluff. They had let the rowdies loose, but backed 
down when they saw the consequences; they were after all only lawyers and merchants who 
had to protect their own interests. ' 23 This tone was sustained across the press over the next 
month, right up to and beyond Ulster Day. The Leitrim Observer emphasised the sense of 
4anti-climax', 124 while the Sligo Champion discussed the Covenant's 'safe and non- 
committal' language. After all the warlike talk, it was a 'milk and water affair'. 125 The 
Midland Reporter's 'Gaelic Notes' described the 'bellowers' as 'servile, crawling things'. 126 
The Roscommon Hei-ald noted that Carson's 'mad campaign' had passed without violence, 
claiming that the whole purpose of the campaign had been to whip up British anti-Catholic 
prejudices. 1 27 
It seems unlikely that this was just the press whistling to keep up their readers' spirits, or 
taking a pre-set Irish party propaganda line. The universality of the view taken, even by the 
Tullys, suggests that the Covenant was genuinely seen as the end of the crisis of violence 
which had begun in July. By mid-October, the Longford Leader wrote that Home Rule was 
again safe and that 'in a sign of returning good sense', the Ulstermen appeared to have 
changed their tactics. ' 28 Nor had the local unionist press played up a sense of crisis. The two 
Sligo unionist papers confined themselves to factual if detailed news coverage of Ulster Day 
and the run-up to it, but made no comment, while in November the Longford Journal wrote 
Bew, Ideologi, and the Irish Question, p. 70. 
122 11'estmeath Independent, 28h September 1912. 
123Roscommon Messenger, 3 1' August 1912. 
124 Leitrim Observer, 19'hOctober 1912. 
125 Sli go Champion, 28thSeptember 1912. 126 Midland Reporter, I Oth October 1912. 
127 Roscommon Herald, 5'h October 1912. 
Longford Leader, 19'hOctober 1912. 
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that 'moderate counsels' among the unionist leaders had prevailed, though this 'restraint' was 
now being tested by renewed Liberal mockery of Ulster's bluff. 129 The perceived moderation 
of the Covenant was reaffirmed by the Sligo Champion in May 1913 
Nothing could be more vague, harmless and capable of any interpretation its authors wish 
to put on it than the so-called "Ulster Covenant". 130 
The Snap Vote 
As the Ulster campaign was generally seen as a device to bluff English opinion, symptoms of 
English 'wobbling' were watched closely. In early October, the Midland Reporter'S leader 
was 'Sold Again! ', after pieces in the Liberal Daily News and London Star (including a 
signed piece by the leading Liberal journalist Hugh Massingham), called for a general 
election before Home Rule could become law. ' 31A week later, the Sligo Champion cited 
these articles, and a speech from Winston Churchill calling for United Kingdom devolution, 
as the reason for there being 'for some weeks a vague feeling in the public mind that all is not 
right with Home Rule'. In this case, a robust speech from Asquith stating that the government 
would not seek an election and would secure the passage of the bill ended the upset. 1 32 
However, a surprise parliamentary defeat in November, the result of a tactical ambush by 
unionists and a mini-revolt by some Liberal MPs, led to the final 1912 set-piece of coverage 
by the local press. 
The 'snap vote' on November II th was against the bill's financial clauses. The whole weekly 
nationalist press reported the vote, though by the time it came to print the government's 
ability to reverse the vote was also known. This did not prevent initial excitement; the 
Longford Leader reported that newsagents in Edgeworthstown had been besieged, with daily 
papers sold out in a few minutes. ' 33 By the time the local weeklies reported, the vote was 
seen as a nuisance rather than a disaster, and coverage focused on scenes of parliamentary 
disorder and an inquest into which Irish MPs had missed the vote. Locally there were three 
offenders - Smyth, Nugent and Fitzgibbon - and all came under criticism and had to justify 
themselves. Smyth made it clear that he had returned to Westminster, had been delayed and 
129 LongfordJoui-nal, 2d November 1912. 
130 Sligo Champion, 24"' May 1913. 
131 Midland Reporter, -3 )'dOctober 
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had only just missed the vote. 134 Nugent argued that he had been in Dublin on party business 
with Redmond's knowledge. ' 35 Fitzgibbon was on weaker ground and came under attack in 
both Mayo and Roscommon. He claimed that he had been in Castlerea on CDB business, but 
(a Castlerea man' in the Roscommon Herald could not resist pointing out that Fitzgibbon had 
been seen working in his drapery shop for most of the II th . 
136 
Jasper Tully, who alone locally had unreservedly attacked the bill, was now the sternest critic 
of those MPs who by missing the vote had endangered it. He also drew attention to the loss 
of the Irish parliament's powers to vary local taxation by 10% when the defeated clauses were 
crestored', calling this move 'most disheartening to Irish reformers'. (Ginnell also attacked the 
new financial clauses in the Irish Independent. ) 137 However, the local party press took this 
change quietly. Most did not even cover it. Whether this was from lack of interest (the 
ending of nomination to the Senate also went almost unreported) or because of the party's 
habit of self-censoring unpleasant topics (see Redmond's 1910 Daily Express interview) 
cannot be said. The Roscommon Messenger insisted that Ireland would still retain the 
produce of taxation, 138 while the Westmeath Independent was relaxed, accepting that the 
finance clauses' cloth had been 'cut very fine' in the first place and that reversal was an 
acceptable price to secure the bill's progress. 139 
By the end of 1912, there was no sense of crisis in the local press. The real unease of July and 
August had dissipated by October, and the threat in November that the government's majority 
could crack had proved to be a short squall. English opinion had not, apparently, been 
shaken. In December the Westmeath Independent wrote that twelve months ago 'the Ulster 
bogey' had been the stock in trade, but now that weapon had been dropped as useless. 140 
Many papers now portrayed the unionists as demoralised by the utter failure of their tactics 
and again split over tariff reform. Carson's year-end Ulster 'exclusion amendment' in 
134 Leitrim Obse7-ver, 16'h November 1912. 
135 Midland Reporter, 21" November 1912. Nugent's explanation did not stop '67' writing to the paper 
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parliament was dismissed by the Sligo Champion as just another failed trick to waste time: 
'The new year for us is one of hope'. 141 
The flip side of such confidence was that other unionist 'bogey', nationalist apathy. In 
November, the Leitrim Observer said there was a danger of being too contented and too 
conciliatory. Unionists were citing the rash of white gloves still being awarded to judges as a 
sign not of peacefulness but of apathy. 142 In December, the Western Nationalist wrote of 
'these quiet days of peace, with Home Rule so near', in suggesting that 'the smug man might 
ask what need is there for a [United Irish] League'. 143 At the beginning of December, the RIC 
inspector general observed that 'in rural Ireland generally political enthusiasm is not very 
marked'. 144 His year-end report did note that Belfast traders were still complaining of a loss 
of trade, but excluding the Ulster counties there was 'little manifestation of political feeling 
throughout the country'. 145 
Still No Crisis : January-August 1913 
Local press coverage of Ulster events in the first eight months of 1913 was at a significantly 
lower level than in 1912. For all the reality of the formation, drilling and arming of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), coverage of this was minimal. No local paper in the five counties, 
nationalist or unionist, reported the formation of the UVF in January 1913, though there were 
during the year derisory references to 'mock drills' and dummy rifles. The Roscommon 
Messenger in February reported that all the 'make believe' activity in Ulster of six months 
ago had now stopped. 146 In March the Westmeath Independent said that it did not even hear 
the cry that 'Ulster will fight'. 147 Unionist papers carried more reports of drilling than 
nationalist ones, but the Long(ord Journal in May had to ask its readers not to imagine that 
Ulster opposition had slackened, even 'if Ulster has not largely figured in the public press of 
I ate'. 
148 
141 Sligo Champion, 4h January 1913. 
142 Leitrim Obsei-ver, 9'h November 1912. 
143 Western Nationalist, 14'h December 1912. 
44 Monthly report of the Inspector General. November 1912 (PRO CO 904/88). 
145 Ibid. December 1912 (PRO CO 904/88). 
14o Roscommon Messenge7-, 15'h February 1913. 
147 Westmeath Independent, 29b March 1913. 
14' Longford Journal, I O'h May 1913. 
246 
Only three Ulster events received any detailed coverage across the local nationalist press. The 
first was a nationalist victory in the Londonderry by-election at the end of January. The 
election of an elderly Protestant was said to demonstrate Catholic tolerance, Protestant 
support for Home Rule and, according to the Westmeath Independent, that 'the Ulster 
difficulty is as dead as Julius Caesar'. 149 Secondly, after the official seizure in June of some 
500 rifles destined for the UVF, the rifles were portrayed as 'Italian' and obsolete; their 
discovery was said to be a publicity stunt by unionists who had tipped off both press and 
police. 150 Thirdly, rioting recurred in Ulster in August, this time in Londonderry. Again, as 
in 1912, attacks on Catholics were significant news. The Westmeath Independent asked if they 
were a foretaste of Orange actions after the passage of Home Rule. ' 51 
That Ulster was not a pressing news story for much of 1913 was most obvious in the papers of 
the Tully brothers. Ever ready to spot a conspiracy, attack the Irish party and cover news 
from around the world, Jasper Tully gave almost no space to 'Ulster' through to June. Instead 
he wrote repeatedly on the power and ambition of Germany, the decadence of England, the 
Balkan wars, the suffragettes, French conscription and above all the Marconi scandal and 
what he perceived as Jewish and 'money-ring' corruption at the heart of government. (He 
also believed that Carson acting for Lloyd George in his Marconi libel action would result in 
Carson's disgrace in the eyes of 'out and out Tories' . )152 In June, when Tully 
finally 
editorialised on Ulster, he wrote that if Carson were serious in wanting to finish the 
government, he would never have acted for Lloyd George. The one thing that could be safely 
predicted, said Tully, was that there would be no rebellion in Ulster. ' 53 
In the rest of the press, it took until June for any paper to carry a remotely worried piece on 
the subject of Ulster. Then, in a leader 'The Siege of Belfast', the Sligo Champion argued 
that Tory leaders were allowing themselves to be taken over by 'Carson's project'. It could 
not know how civil war would break out. ) or whether 
it would be confined to Ulster. 
However, the siege of Belfast (i. e. a boycott of Ulster trade) could be started any day in Sligo 
149 Westmeath Independent, I I'hJanuary 1913. 
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or any Irish town; it might be all the better if it were to start at once. 
154 The Champion did not 
return to the subject and no Ulster boycott resumed, even after the Londonderry riots in 
August. However, later military gestures by the UVF did finally arouse the ire of one local 
journalist. When in July the UVF 'raided' outside Ulster and planted flags across the River 
Boyne, Jasper Tully was prompted to call for volunteers. If Ulster could arm and prepare, 
what was the rest of Ireland doing? 'It is time something should be done to give them an 
effective reception when they do come. ' 155 
One other paper, the Westmeath Independent, was increasingly agitated, as in August 1912, 
by violence in Ulster. On 5'hJuly, it wrote of 'Orange bullies' and of men who had attempted 
to roast innocent Catholic girls alive in factory yards! It stated that imported arms would be 
used against Catholics and predicted trouble over the forthcoming month. 156 The paper's 
coverage of the Londonderry riots emphasised both the involvement of Orange rifle clubs and 
the retaliation of Ulster Catholics. 157 However, it was not consistent. Only two weeks after 
its 5hJuly piece, and following a quiet 12'hJuly, it had again dismissed threats of an Ulster 
provisional government as impossible, a bluff. 158 
Concerning the contents of the Home Rule bill there was still only minimal discussion. In 
May, two papers appeared to catch a sniff of 'compromise'. Both the Longford Leader and 
Westmeath Independent denounced this, the former saying that any compromise would make 
the bill no better than the Irish Council bill of 1907; the latter that as it was already the 
minimum acceptable there could be no compromise. ' 59 Nothing came of these rumours and 
the matter dropped, but in the same week the Roscommon Journal launched an isolated attack 
on the bill's financial clauses, claiming that they were fair to neither England nor Ireland and 
directly criticising Redmond, asking why he would not take the Irish people into his 
154 Sli go Champion, 14'h June 1913. 
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confidence. 1 60 The paper's unusual, direct attack on Redmond was not followed up and it 
quickly returned to the fold. By the end of the month, it was calling for strict adherence to the 
agitation which had brought so many benefits to Ireland and in June wrote that it was plain 
that the people would stand behind Redmond and the party. 161 Other than this, the contents of 
the Home Rule bill were given no serious mention, though there was debate as to its timing. 
In particular, though it was believed that the bill would become law, there remained doubt as 
to whether it would come into operation before the next general election. T. P. O'Connor and 
the party's constitutional expert, J. G. Swift MacNeill, both wrote reassuring pieces in the 
British press, reproduced locally, predicting an Irish parliament sitting by early 1915 
(O'Connor) 162 or even the autumn of 1914 (MacNeill). 163 
If there was a threat to Home Rule, it was still seen to come from the impact of unionist 
campaigning on England. In early 1913, the political 'battle' was being fought at 
Westminster and at a succession of mass meetings in Great Britain. The local MPs were 
virtually absent from their constituencies for much of 1913, either 'whipped in' at 
Westminster (there could be no repetition of the snap vote defeat) or on British speaking 
tours. The party's Home Rule fund was explicitly designed to support this British campaign. 
When Hayden returned to Ireland to speak at his first local meeting of the year in September, 
he announced : 'I have come straight from where the battle is being fought and where the 
battle is being won'. 164 In November, at his second Irish rally, he announced that he had just 
addressed a dozen British meetings in a fortnight, and asked his audience not to press too 
much for MPs to address meetings in Ireland. Where they were needed now was Great 
Britain. 165 
This emphasis on British campaigning was reinforced by the press, whose focus was on the 
parliamentary tactics of passing the bill, on speeches made in Britain by local MPs and on 
Carson's British speaking tour - matched city for city by Redmond. With the exception of 
actual violence against Catholics, events in Ulster were still assessed as part of unionist 
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propaganda, the 'bluff of 'English opinion'. For all its alarm at Ulster violence, even the 
Westmeath Independent could in August emphasise that the next great Home Rule campaign 
would be in England. This was where the 'real theatre of war' would be; the task of the party 
was to stop the English democracy being duped by lies-' 66 
Any threat to the stability of the government was still monitored closely. It had to stay in 
office for Home Rule to pass and Irish MPs had to keep voting for it. A succession of 
government by-election defeats was explained away by the unpopularity of national insurance 
or by Labour splitting the anti-Tory vote. The Marconi scandal was seen as part of the more 
general, unionist assault on the goverm-nent. In June, writing on Marconi, the Longford 
Leader said that Ulster gun-running and by-election defeats were 'of no moment besides the 
defeat of the present mean and unscrupulous Tory campaign'. Two weeks later it could assert 
of the Tories : 'They are a dead duck in the political pit and they know it'. 167 Again and again 
the message was reiterated : the unionist campaign was not working, the government was 
united, its parliamentary majority secure and English opinion solid. This confidence was real, 
even if it had to be reasserted after each 'failed' unionist stunt. The Roscommon Messenger in 
June wrote of Carson: 'In truth, he is a beaten man. He has failed in the House of Commons; 
he has failed in the country'. 168 It was thus that in August the Roscommon Journal could 'rest 
somewhat contented'. 
A study of the local press, both nationalist and unionist, indicates that there was no 'Home 
Rule crisis' in the five counties from the 19 10 elections up to the autumn of 1913. Only the 
outbreak of mob violence - in Belfast in the summer of 1912 and to a lesser extent 
Londonderry in August 1913 - triggered perceptible unease. For the rest of the time, the 
publication and passage of the Home Rule bill generated a considerable volume of press 
coverage, but few great passions either for or against. Uster's' campaign against the bill, 
which only became apparent in the autumn of 191 I, was not seen as a looming and ever- 
gTowing physical threat, but as a political and propaganda campaign, 'a bluff to undermine 
British support for the bill before it could pass. For a long time, nationalists' confidence in 
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their ability to defeat this political challenge remained intact and there was no sense of 
imminent defeat. Confidence, complacency, quietude and even apathy were more typical 
characteristics of local debate than wild enthusiasm, chagrin, disappointment or alarm. That 
complacent mood did not change until the autumn of 1913. It was then that Ulster's 'bluff of 
England seemed suddenly to be working, undermining the resolve of Liberal politicians and 
making Ulster exclusion a serious prospect. Only then did the Home Rule crisis, in 
provincial, nationalist Ireland, become a reality. 
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Chapter 9: Crisis and Voluntee 
When, finally, the Home Rule crisis broke it transformed local politics. 'Parish pump' 
rivalries and considerations were subsumed into the pervasive, national issue of whether the 
Home Rule bill would fail. Large numbers of people formerly quiescent were mobilised into 
political and paramilitary activity through their participation in the Irish Volunteers. In the 
words of Tom Kettle: 
From time to time a great wave of emotion and action sweeps through the life of a 
people, stirring it all, shallows and depth. Such is volunteering. ' 
The response of the Irish party to this new movement was wholly ambiguous. On the one 
hand, its national leadership was hostile to mass paramilitary activity and attempted to hold it 
back; party discipline remained sufficiently firm to slow the formation of new Volunteer 
corps until policy changed in April 1914. On the other, local party support remained essential 
and was forthcoming, right from the start, for those corps that were formed. In the five 
counties, even in the 'slow' period of Volunteer formation up to the end of April 1914, 
seventeen corps were formed. The change of official party policy at the end of April, to 
public encouragement and participation, triggered a rush of new companies, but not the 
commonly-supposed 'vampirisation' of the new movement by the party's leadership. The 
Irish Volunteers in mid- 1914 were not just the Irish party dressed up in slouch hats and 
bandoliers. As a public manifestation of a significantly more intense political activity, they 
represented a rather large tiger which the Irish party leadership held, barely, by the tail. 
The Crisis Breaks : September-November 1913 
The change of mood from confidence to crisis, and ftom political analysis to calls for military 
mobilisation, was rapid. From the beginning of November onwards, when Professor Eoin 
MacNeill in Dublin published his article 'The North Began' in the Gaelic League journal An 
Claidheainh Soluis, the local press either commended MacNeill's article, advocated 
Volunteering. reported the Dublin formation meeting of the Volunteers, covered the formation 
1 Kettle speaking at Ardee, 24h May 1914, quoted in Lyons, The Enigma of Tom Kettle, p. 246. 
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(sometimes phantom formation) of local companies, or all four. 
2 The new mood of alarm and 
bellicosity was summed up by a late-November leading article in the Sligo Champion, still 
firmly loyal to the Irish party and the mouth-piece of Sligo's bourgeois, Catholic 
establishment. It called, as it had over several weeks, for a Volunteer corps to form. The time 
was ripe for the Volunteers, to protect the people's rights and enforce their will. Ireland was 
supposed to live under the protection of the British constitution, but an English party had now 
substituted force for the ballot box. The demands of four Ulster counties were being heeded 
because they had taken up arms. Ireland had to show that she was prepared to defend her 
rights by weapons which were the only methods her opponents said they would respect. 'Our 
rights as men are threatened, our national interests disregarded, our votes are to be of no 
avail. 
0 
It was not, however, the development of 'Carson's army' in Ulster which triggered this 
change of mood. Indeed, in this period only one Ulster event attracted significant coverage in 
the local press, the formation of the 'Provisional Government' in Belfast at the end of 
September. This had been announced by its organisers well in advance in July 4 and, though it 
was certainly well-covered in September by both unionist and nationalist papers, was 
anything but a surprise. Like so many other unionist initiatives of the previous two years, it 
was treated by nationalists as a publicity stunt. The Sligo Champion noted the increased 
tempo of Carson's martial press publicity in recent weeks which, it said, only embarrassed his 
fellow unionists and was one of the greatest forces behind the success of Home Rule. 5 Forthe 
Sligo Nationalist, 'vicarious revolution of this kind is going to frighten no one', while for the 
Western Nationalist all this resistance was still 'rot'. 6 Even Jasper Tully, who had called on 
nationalists to match the UVF in July (see Chapter 8), still opined in the Roscommon He7-ald 
that Carson was 'making civil war with his tongue' and that as a lawyer he was always keen 
2 See Sligo Champion, I st, 22 d and 29b November: Roscommon Herald, 81b, 22 nd 2911 November; Midland 
Reportcr, 20"' November; Western Nationalist, 22 nd November and 13'h December; Leitrim Observer, 29"' 
November, 20 th December; Longford Leader, 296 November; Westmeath Independent, 29th November, 6th and 
13"' December; Roscommon Messen 
'ger, 
6b December, Longford Independent, 6b December 1913. 
Sligo Champion, 29"' November 1913. 
4 The formation process was announced in July at a Craigavon, Co Armagh rally. See Mac Giolla Choille (ed. ), 
Intelliucnce Notes 1913-16, p. 24. 
th ý'Sligo Champion, 27 September 1913. 
6 Sligo Nationalist, 27"' September: Western A'(1tionalist, 27'h September 1913. 
253 
7 
to 'keep on the windy side of the law' . 
Thereafter there was virtually no other coverage of 
events in Ulster before December, in any local paper. 8 
There was another news story which increased tension among provincial nationalists at this 
time, but it originated not in Ulster but in Dublin. The 'great lockout', with its succession of 
'Larkinite' strikes, 'deportations' of Catholic children and street violence was covered, with 
Larkin nearly always denounced, right across the local press. 'English' interference in the 
strikes was commented on by a range of papers (see Chapter 4), which also lamented the 
damage done to Irish trade and industry. Parallels were drawn to Ulster events and several 
papers, notably the Longford Leader and Westmeath Independent, compared events in Dublin 
(the violent police treatment of demonstrators) to those in Belfast (the free rein given to 
Carson's followers). 9 As the strikes continued, some began to see more sinister plots against 
Home Rule. Hayden's Roscommon Messenger condemned the Dublin workers as 'innocent 
pawns' of men allied to Tories. Ireland's religion was now reviled and its nationality mocked. 
The Irish strikers were in effect acting to 'strike the cup of victory [i. e. self-government] from 
our lips. " 0 Jasper and George W. Tully seized the opportunity to denounce a conspiracy to 
destroy Ireland's capacity for self-governinent. Larkin, the 'Englishman', was working hand 
in glove with 'the English' and Dublin Castle to undermine Home Rule. 11 In the Midland 
Reporter leader, 'English Over All', the Dublin strike leaders were tied to 'the lowest forrns 
of English socialism', tainted by English ideas and no doubt by English money as well. The 
Hannsworth yellow press, in backing the strikers, knew that if Larkin won Home Rule would 
be impossible. Both Larkin and Carson could be installed as 'dictators' in Dublin and Belfast 
and in the meantime Irish industry was being killed. 12 
However, the events that most triggered nationalist alarm occurred in Britain where, for the 
first time, Home Rule appeared to be seriously endangered. Starting in September, a 
7 Roscommon Herald, 27b September 1913. 
8 The Sligo Champion did carry a Press Association story on 15th November about arms shipments to Ulster from 
Birmingham, but was alone in doing so. 
tb gU 9 Lonagford Leader, 23rd August. Westmeath Independent, 30 Au st 1913. 
10 Roscommon Messenguer, 15ýh November 1913. 
11 Midland Reporter, 28th August; 4h. I PhSeptember, Roscommon Herald, 30tb August; 6h, 13'b and 20 1b 
September; 4 th and I It" October; 15 th and 22 nd November 1913. The relentless coverage and tirades of the 
Tullvs were at least enlivened by their denunciation of George Russell ('AE'. a supporter of the strikers) as 'this 
dipthong of an editor' in the Roscommon Herald of II thOctober. 
11 - Midland Reporter, I VhSeptember 1913. 
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succession of speeches and initiatives by Liberal politicians indicated a failure of government 
resolve and a risk of the bill being at best mutilated and at worst lost. The first such 'wobble,. 
indicating that the Ulster bluff really was working, was a letter to the London Tinies from the 
former Liberal Lord Chancellor, Lord Loreburn, published on II th September. Loreburn 
called for an all-party conference and compromise with the unionists. Locally, the danger 
posed by Loreburn's letter was immediately identified by John Hayden, who at a Strokestown 
rally - his first in Roscommon that year - noted that for all the talk of compromises, 
concessions and conferences it was inconceivable that either Asquith or the government could 
'destroy' their work of the last several years. Hayden's newspapers noted that Ulster's bluff 
had now worked, albeit in only one case, but that there could be 'no surrender'. 13 Coverage 
across the local press was comprehensive, with every nationalist commentator bar one 
opposing Lorebum who, it was argued, did not speak for the government. They also took 
comfort from Carson's immediately rejection of Loreburn's initiative. His lone local defender 
was, unsurprisingly, Sir Walter Nugent, who argued that a well-meaning Loreburn had held 
out an olive branch to an embittered minority, only to see it rejected. 14 
For all the assurances that Loreburn's proposals had been spurned, press speculation persisted 
right to the end of the year that his key call, for a conference, would be taken up by the 
English parties. Sometimes almost daily, the Dublin papers carried such stories and the local 
press was also peppered with rumours of 'conversations'. 15 The next major development, 
moreover, was the initiative not of an ex-minister but of a serving one, Winston Churchill, 
who in a speech in Dundee on 8th October stated that there would have to be a general election 
before the Home Rule Act, after its parliamentary passage, could come into operation. In 
addition Churchill supported special treatment for North-East Ulster. This was a major news 
story locally and aroused strong and polarised opinions. Some, like the Western Nationalist, 
described Churchill's speech as a ploy to wrong-foot unreasonable, rejectionist unionists. 16 
Several papers were far more uneasy, lamenting Churchill's 'ambiguity' and 'hazy attitudes' 
without attacking a sen, ing minister outright. The Sligo Champion flip-flopped between the 
13 Roscommon Messenger, 20th September 1913, and Roscommon Messenger and Westmeath Examiner, 27"' tl 
September 1913. 
M Nugent speaking at Tang, Longford Leader, 4b October 1913. 
15 See Sligo Independent, 20'h September and 27h December; JJ, "estmeath Independent, 27h September: Sligo 
Champion, 4"' October; Leitrim Advertiser, 3 O'h October; Long/brd Journal, I' November, Midland Reporter, 
20"' November, Roscommon Herald, 22 nd November 1913. 
16 11'cstern Nationalist, II th October 1913. 
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two stances in the course of a week, first praising Churchill's 'able and conciliatory' speech, 
but then. ) in a leading article 'No Partition of Ireland', calling it 'strange and ambiguous at the 
17 
time' . There was no ambiguity for Tully. Churchill's speech was 'A Stab in the Back' and 
part of a deep intrigue against Ireland. ' 8 Such hostility was not confined to the party's 
opponents. For J. P. Farrell, Churchill was now a 'shuffler' and any minister who betrayed 
Ireland would have on his tombstone the undying hatred of the Irish race. 19 Nor was the 
significance of the speech lost on unionist papers, who saw it as an undoubted climb-down by 
the government and a signal of forthcoming Ulster exclusion. 20 The political mood had 
clearly changed, and for the Roscommon Messenger, worried by Churchill's 'ambiguity' and 
by 'timid' Liberal talk of compromise and conference, Home Rule was now 'the chief and 
almost only topic of discussion' in Ireland and Great Britain. 21 
The mood was intensified by a succession of speeches, reported locally, by British and Irish 
politicians. While still leaving the door open to any compromise consistent with 'the 
principles' of the bill, Redmond was moved to make explicit rebuttals of first Loreburn (at 
Cahirciveen, County Kerry on 29th September) and then Churchill (at Limerick on 12'h 
October, where he famously declared that the 'Two Nations' theory of Ireland was 'an 
abomination and a blasphemy'). These two speeches were reported in detail, almost right 
across the local nationalist press, and hailed at the time for their removal of 'fear and doubt'. 
They formed, however, only part of a process of oratorical ping-pong in which new fears were 
created by Liberal and unionist speakers such as Grey, Birrell, Haldane, Law, Carson, Smith, 
Churchill and Asquith. Their public utterances, reported locally and in the Dublin dailies, 
provided a cocktail of firm statements of principle, appeals to compromise, new proposals, 
robustness, legal ambiguity and shiftiness. Grey became the leading public advocate of 
'Home Rule within Home Rule' for Ulster. 22 Churchill at Manchester on l8thOctober 
repeated his sins of Dundee and went further, saying that 'the genuine needs and legitimate 
aspirations' of Ulster had to be met. In a coded advocacy of temporary Ulster exclusion, he 
went on to say that there could be no solution 'destructive of the permanent unity of Ireland'. 
17 Sli go Champion, I Ph and 18'b October 1913. 
18 Roscommon Herald, I Vh October 1913. 
19 Farrell speaking to the South Longford UIL executive on 26b October, Longford Leader, V November 19 13). 
20 Sligo Independent and Sligo Times, I Vb October 1913. 
21 Roscommon Messenger, 18'h October 1913. 
22 Roscommon Herald, I' November-, Westmeath Examiner, 8b November 1913. 
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Commenting on this, the Sligo Champion noted that 'he has a way of saying things that are 
perplexing and ambiguous'. 23 
The master of ambiguity cloaked in apparent precision was, however, Asquith, and his speech 
at Ladybank on 25 th October was taken by some to be reassuring and by others as alan-ning. 
At one level, Asquith firmly rejected the notion of a 'conference', affirmed that the 
government would assert the authority of the law and proclaimed that there would be no 
betrayal. For the Westmeath Independent this meant that Home Rule was again, in the words 
of Redmond at Cahirciveen, 'full steam ahead'. 24 This was the line taken by most of the 
party-supporting local press, taking its cue from the syndicated 'Home Rule Notes from the 
Campaign' and from the Freeman's Journal. In the same mindset, the unionist Sligo 
Independent lamented that Asquith had missed the chance to be conciliatory. 25 However, 
Asquith's speech also stressed that the goverm-nent would look at any reasonable and 
honourable proposal for peace and used almost the same weasel words as Churchill at 
Manchester: that 'nothing is to be done which will erect a permanent or insuperable bar in the 
way of Irish unity'. For Jasper Tully, this use of the word 'permanent' was clearly indicative 
of an intention to kill Home Rule by exclusion. 26 Farrell's Longford Leader, having 
denounced Churchill and billed Asquith's speech in advance as a specific refutation of 
Churchill, could only reproduce Asquith's speech verbatim with no news reporting or leader 
comment whatsoever. 27 The Western Nationalist, a supporter of Asquith's speech, 
nevertheless noted the volume of press comment in Ireland and London saying that provision 
would now have to be made for Ulster exclusion 'for a time'. 28 The Leitrim Advertiser, 
Longford Journal, Midland Reporter and Roscommon'Herald all went on to report new 
predictions of talks, a conference or 'interchange of views' between the British parties. 29 
The result, in the language of the Westmeath Independent, was that the public mind was 
'disturbed' and that 'for some little time back we rather felt in a somewhat querulous 
23 Slio 0 Champion, 25'hOctober 1913 
't, 24 Westmeath Independent, I" November 1913. 
25 Sligo Independent, I" November 1913. 
20 See the leader, 'English Intrigues' in the Roscommon He7-ald, I" November 1913. 
27 Longford Leadew: Roscommon Herald, I' November 1913. 
28 J Vcstern Nationalist, I' November 1913. 
29 Leiti-im Adveniser, 30th October; Long-ford Jout-nal I' November; Midland Reporter 20 th November; 
Roscommon Herald, 22 nd November 1913 
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position'. 30 On the acid test applied to all the initiatives of the Ulster campaign since 1911 - 
bow would they impact on English opinion? - the Home Rule bill was for the first time seen 
to be failing. On 16 Ih October, Ginnell addressed his Westmeath Nationalist Executive and 
made the call to arms already outlined in Chapter 6, exhorting his listeners 'to adopt and put 
into practice those rights of rebellion ... which 
Sir Edward Carson has been loudly been 
preaching in Ulster with impunity'. 
The Volunteers Form 
During November, it was events in Dublin which inspired local press coverage of the Irish 
Volunteer movement. The fonnation meeting of the Irish Volunteers at the Dublin Rotunda, 
at the end of November, was of major importance to local editors and writers. In Athlone, 
however, volunteering pre-dated events in Dublin. Indeed the fon-nation of Athlone's 
'Midland Volunteers', in mid-October, seems to have acted as a spur to Dublin figures such 
as D. P. Moran, Sir Roger Casement and MacNeill, rather than the other way around. 31 
Though by later standards a pathetically small number, who seem only to have drilled twice 
and then given up (according to the police, 54 men drilled on 22 nd October; 24 on 29h 
32 October), the Midland Volunteers were nevertheless the first to drill publicly in nationalist 
Ireland and were hailed as such. That their example fired the imagination of some nationalists 
locally and in Dublin was not just because of the reality of their very limited activities, but 
rather the result of an almost ludicrous exaggeration of their numbers and capability by the 
editor of the Westmeath Independent, Michael MacDermott-Hayes. In his fantasy world, the 
Westmeath Independent reported that over 5,000 men were parading, with buglers, drums, 
cavalry and formed into twenty companies. 33 It was this myth which was reproduced in the 
press locally as well as in Dublin. 34 
30 Westmeath Independent, I' November 1913. 
31 Martin, 'MacNeill and the Foundation of the Irish Volunteers' in Martin and Byrne (eds. ), The Scholar 
Revolutionwý,, P. 123. 32 lbid, p. 128. 
33 Westmeath Independent, 25"' October 1913. 
3' Irish Independent, 25th October: Leitrim Advertiser, Roscommon Journal, Westmeath Examiner, I" November 
1913. Interestingly, Tully's papers did not carry the story, for all his active promotion of Volunteering soon 
afterwards. It is not clear whether his non-coverage of Athlone events was due to the participation of party men 
such as M acDermott-H ayes (secretary of the South Westmeath UIL) or because he simply d id not believe the 
ff"estmeath Independent reports. 
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One leading local figure who took Athlone events seriously - whether real or fantastic is not 
known - was J. P. Farrell, the only party MP then locally resident, having recently recovered 
from a serious illness. in a series of Longford speeches, Farrell cited Athlone as an example 
to be followed. On 26th October he addressed first the South Longford UIL executive and 
subsequently a public meeting. He was of course 'solid at the back of Redmond' and what he 
called Redmond's policy of 'no conciliation or compromise' with Orangemen, made clear at 
Cahirciveen and Limerick. 'We hear they began to drill over in Athlone last week, and you 
would find we could get a few drill masters around Longford too. I am not too sure it would 
not be a very good thing to learn the "goose step" on a bit of an evening and show these 
44patriots" or rather Loyalists in the North of Ireland that they are not going to have it their 
own way (cheers). 05 He did go on to add, 'but we are gaining it [Home Rule] without that, 
gentlemen', but the message was repeated at another Longford public meeting, to 
commemorate the Manchester Martyrs, on 24 th November. Here he noted that the efforts of 
the English democracy were being undone by the 'wooden guns' of Ulster 'patriots', but was 
glad that a movement had grown up among younger men to counter this. 'I think, boys, we 
may give it a turn in Longford too (cheers). ' He then carried the debate to a level not heard 
from any local Irish party figure in recent years. Should the threatened German invasion 
come and denude Ireland of English troops, 'then we would know the benefit of drilling'. 
The Government would not dare stop Irishmen if they emulated Carson and they (the 
government) were now conniving in a plan to carve out Ulster. 'I hope that when we open a 
recruiting station you will all turn up and drill. 36 
Farrell's calls for drilling were echoed locally. 37 The political rationale was that the example 
of 'Carson's army', backed by what Farrell and others still called 'wooden guns', had to be 
copied. The effect of Ulster's volunteering on the government and 'English' opinion had to 
be emulated by nationalists. According to Jasper Tully, Carson had unwittingly taught 
nationalist Ireland that it was possible to arm and drill. The three other provinces of Ireland 
could surely raise treble the 80,000 men raised by the Ulster Volunteers. 38 'A man with a rifle 
35 Roscommon Herald, I" November 1913. 
36 Ibid, 29h November 1913. 
37 Though few others predicted a German invasion. This was referred to only by the anti-Prussian Jasper Tully 
and even he did not see such an invasion as an opportunity for Ireland. but rather called for Volunteers to prevent 
the Irish becoming 'the slaves of the Germans'. See Roscommon He, -ald, 29th November 1913. 
38 Ibid. 
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always commands respect from the rulers of a country' and an armed Orangeman. however 
stupid, was more formidable than a clever nationalist armed only with a resolution or a figure 
ofspeech . 
39 As the Western Nationalist put it, Orangemen now believed that their threats 
would work, and an Irish 'enlistment' would be a powerful antidote. Preparation for war ',, X, as 
the greatest surety of peace (this theme of preserving peace by preparing for war was also 
taken up by the Westmeath Independent). 40 
However, in addition to this political role of 'antidote' to the Orange bluff, the Volunteers 
were now seen to have an explicit military purpose. The Sligo Champion's advocacy of the 
use of weapons, 'the only methods our opponents say they will respect' has already been 
noted on page 253. For the Westmeath Independent the upsurge of volunteering was seen by 
many as evidence that nationalists were taking Ulster's threat of war serioUSIY. 4 1 The most 
constant refrain was that local nationalists had to be defended against an Orange/Carson/UVF 
attack on the south of Ireland, whether in the form of 'Carson's march south', an 'Ulster 
onslaught' or even a 'looting expedition'. 42 Admittedly, this military role was seen as 
defensive; there was no reference to any offensive role away from home, whether in aid of 
Ulster's nationalists or to enforce Home Rule across all Ireland. The Sligo Champion could 
say that the role of the Volunteers was to 'take such steps as are necessary to enforce the 
rights of the people by law and equity', but it was also quite explicit that the Volunteers were 
not embodied as a force to suppress Carson, but as a 'protective and defensive force'. 43 
Despite support from much of the press and the advocacy of drilling by a number of more 
junior politicians, 44 Farrell was, apart from the independent Ginnell in October, the only local 
MP publicly to advocate volunteering in 1913. For most of October and November the Irish 
party leadership was, apart from Redmond's set-piece speeches, relatively silent both on 
39 Midland Reporter, 20'h November 1913. 
40 Western Nationalist, 22 nd November-, Westmeath Independent, 29h November 1913. 
41 11 r estmeath Independent, 29h November 1913. 
42 See Midland Reporter, 20'h November; Western Nationalist, 22 nd November, Roscommon Herald, - Westmeath 
Independent, 29h November 1913. The Roscommon Herald envisaged the need to defend against both 
Ulstermen and Germans. 
43 Sli go Champion, 296 November 1913. 
44 For example John Lynott at Manorhamilton UIL (Longford Leader, 25th October); John Keaveny at Carriaska 
UIL (Wcwtern Nationalist, I' 3h December 1913). 
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'Ulster' and the Dublin strikes, possibly to avoid increasing tensions. 
45 It is also known that 
the leadership were alarmed at the launch of the Volunteers in Dublin and enforced a policy 
of restraint on their followers. In December 1913, Dillon's associate John Muldoon MP 
wrote to the Cork party man J. J. Horgan that 'Redmond does not like this thing, neither does 
Devlin, but they are loath to move at present ... Dillon 
is much more against it., 46 According 
to Stephen Gwynn MP, then head of the Irish Press Agency and responsible for distributing 
the syndicated 'Home Rule Notes' to the press, the Volunteers were 'a development which 
47 Redmond on his part neither willed nor approved' . However, apart from a condemnation of 
the Volunteers on 17 th December, by the MP Richard Hazleton in a letter to the Freeman's 
Journal, public attacks were rare. Sir Roger Casement, recruiting for the Volunteers in 
Galway, summed up the party's ambivalence in mid-December: 
The official Home Rulers are against the movement locally but rather nonplussed by the 
fact that their leaders are silent. And it is clear if they condemned it they would speak 
out. Therefore there is a sense of tacit approval that is felt and naturally used by the 
promoters. 48 
In the five counties there were no open attacks on volunteering from public figures, but the 
advocacy of drilling and the use of arms did abate. The net result was that the initial wave of 
support for Volunteering was not often translated into the formation of Volunteer companies. 
In Longford, Farrell ceased publicly to advocate Volunteering and no company was formed 
until late-May 1914. Even in Mullingar, where Ginnell's followers, unlike Hayden's were not 
bound by party loyalty, a corps was not started until April. 
When they did publicly address the subjects of Ulster and Home Rule, party spokesmen 
provided a diet of constant reassurance : the government was firm, the inter-party conference 
would not happen, the whole bill would pass, Ulster resistance would fold. Bonar Law's 
confirmation at Bristol on 15 th January, that there had indeed been British inter-party talks and 
that they were over, was then presented as a victory. 49 The message of Redmond, speaking at 
45 T. P. O'Connor was critical of this policy, feeling 'strongly and violently' that the Irish party's silence had 
created 'a situation of intense difficulty'. (T. P. O'Connor to Dillon, 17th October 1913, Dillon papers, TCD, f 
'108. ) 67402 
46 Muldoon to Horgan 16th December 1913, quoted in Horgan, From Pai-nell to Pearse, p. 229. 
47 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 9 1. 
48 Casement to Col Maurice Moore. I Ith December 1913, Col Maurice Moore Papers, NLI, f 10561(3). 
49 See Westei-n Nationalist, 17'h January 1914. 
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Waterford on 25th January, was that (we have fought and we have won'. 
50 Farrell told the 
Longford UIL that the government was secure and would go on until the end of 1915.51 The 
restraint of the party in Leitrim was particularly striking, given that there were Orange lodges 
in the county and a UVF parade in January, in which four corps and 300 men were inspected 
by the unionist Lord Farnham. 52 Party discipline appears a more credible explanation for this 
than F. E. Meehan's formulaic assurances that there was no danger of civil war and that all 
Irish dissension would disappear with the passing of Home Rule. 53 In Longford and 
Westmeath party activists focused their tactical energies on organising major AOH rallies, 
addressed by Joe Devlin, to be held in February. In Roscommon town, the opposite tactic 
was used; the town's UIL kept things quiet by preventing more independently-minded figures 
such as Canon Cummins from holding a grand public meeting (see Chapter 5). 54 At the end 
of January 1914, the party nationally announced that the Home Rule Fund would close, 
except for late subscriptions due from 1913. As Fitzgibbon put it, 'we must be very confident 
the battle is over when we are not appealing for fresh ammunition'. 55 However, despite all 
this restraint, four Irish Volunteer corps did form locally in early 1914, in the towns of 
Athlone, Granard, Boyle and Sligo. 
Athlone 
At the end of 1913, the Midland Volunteers met to reform and affiliate to the national 
movement. As discussed in Chapter 3, there was in Athlone a core of advanced nationalist 
support independent of the Irish party and dating back to before the formation of a Sinn Fein 
branch. Though that branch collapsed in 1910, advanced views in the town became centred 
on the Athlone Pipers' Club and, from 1911, the only Fianna company in the five counties. In 
November 1913, though the Midland Volunteers were no longer drilling, there was sufficient 
advanced nationalist support for there to be an anti-recruiting demonstration against the band 
of the Leinster regiment. As it paraded through the town, a crowd headed by the Pipers' Band 
and the Fianna followed singing national songs. Rival crowds cheered and booed each other 
50 Roscommon Journal, 31 'January 1914. 
51 Longford Leader, 17'h January 1914. 
52 Monthly report of the Leitrim ounty Inspector, January 1914 (PRO CO 904/92). 
53 Meehan speaking at Drunikeeran, Sligo Champion, 10 1h January 1914. 
54 Roscommon Messen. -, -er and Roscommon Journal, I O'h January: 1914. It is not clear whether Cummins and 
others (see page 1522) wanted such a meeting for its own sake, to launch the Volunteers, to merge the town's UIL 
and RAEC, or all three. 
55 Fitzgibbon speaking at Fairyinount, Co Roscommon. Roscommon Messenger 24h Januw-,,,, 1914. 
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and the Pipers' Band continued to play outside when the Leinsters returned to barracks .5" For 
all their hostility to recruiting, the town's advanced nationalists had in October joined with a 
number of army reservists and Irish party activists (notably MacD ermott-H ayes) to inspire the 
original Midland Volunteers. 57 Advanced nationalists again formed the core of the town's 
Irish Volunteers at the beginning of 1914. Their leaders were Sean O'Mullaney, who worked 
in the Westmeath Independent's print works, James Gough and Seamus MacSwiney, Gaelic 
Leaguer, Fianna instructor and bandmaster of the Pipers' Band. 58 
However, the support of Irish party figures, notably MacD erm ott-H ayes, dropped away. 
When at the end of January 1914 the Pipers' Band refused to play at the grand AOH rally to 
be held at Moate, they were duly attacked by the Westmeath Independent. 59 Without party 
support the town's Volunteers made little headway. According to a Cabinet paper prepared 
by Birrell in April 1914, there were only 40 Volunteers in Athlone . 
60 Even by June there 
were still only 75 .61 Though the original plan was to drill twice a week with the Pipers' 
Band, 62 there were no police reports of drilling after March. 
Granard 
In Granard, the Volunteers were far more vigorous, even though the core of their leadership 
was also independent of, and indeed hostile to, the party. The leading lights were : 
e John Cawley, creamery manager and the former Sinn Fein supporter of William Ganly 
when Ganly split from Farrell in 1907/08. According to the later IRA guerrilla Sean 
MacEoin, Cawley was the IRB 'centre' who recruited him and Sean Connolly to the IRB 
in 1914 ; 63 and 
56 Strokevtown Democrat, 15'hNovember 1913-, Crime Special Branch report, November 1913 (PRO CO 
904/119). 
57 Oliver Snoddy, 'The Midland Volunteer Force 1913', Journal qf the Old Athlone Society, Vol. I No. 1.1969. 
p. 43. Indeed, six of the original committee of nine were army reservists who later served in the British army in 
the war. 51 Ibid. 
59 Westmeath Independent, 24h January 1914. 
60 Cabinet paper April 1914, 'Irish Volunteers', Birrell Mss., Bodleian Library. Oxford, Dep. 301. 
"' Westmeath Independent, 20'hJune 1914. 
62 Ibid, 3 1" January and 28hFebruary 1914. 
ggraphy. quoted in 
Coleman, County Longford 1910-. ', 63 P. 33 of Sean MacEoin's unpublished autobio 73, p. 115. 
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Paul Dawson Cusack, medical student, son of a Granard Sinn Fein-supporting draper and 
cousin of the Kitty Kiernan who was later to be the fiancee of Michael Collins. Kitty's 
brother, L. D. Kiernan, was treasurer of the initial Volunteer committee. 64 
However, unlike in Athlone, the new corps retained the support and encouragement of Irish 
party figures throughout. Its activities were regularly reported in Farrell's Longford Leader 
and its formation was first mooted in November 1913, when Farrell was still active publicly 
in promoting the Volunteer cause. Granard's Urban District Council - well stocked with party 
figures - gave pennission for the Town Hall to be used to form the first company. 
65 At the 
formal inaugural meeting in January the chairman was John Ledwith, a publican and former 
county councillor who, though he had been close to William Ganly before the 1907 split, had 
stayed loyal to the Irish party. 66 The corps flourished from the start and the town, with a 
population of 1,531 in 1911 (in the UDC area), saw 100 men enrol at the inaugural meeting. 67 
By February the Longford Leader reported that some 200 men had enrolled and that they had 
paraded with pikes at the County Longford AOH rally addressed by Joe Devlin. 68 
Nevertheless, political friction between Cawley and the Irish party was always close to the 
surface. In April, Cawley publicly called for Volunteers to force England to buy Ireland's 
ffiendship 'for a far higher price than the present Bill '. 69 From late-April he was in open 
dispute with the party (and was later taken to court) when supporters tried to engineer his co- 
option to Granard UDC against the wishes of the local UIL . 
70 Such tensions did not, 
however, stop 150 Volunteers parading through the town to celebrate the progress of the 
Home Rule bill in May. 71 Locally they continued to be backed by a broad coalition of 
nationalist support, drilling actively throughout the early months of 1914. 
Boyle 
Moves to set up the Volunteers came later in Boyle, with the first meeting to agree their 
formation held at the beginning of February. Unlike the companies in Granard and Athlone, 
64 Midland Reporter, 8'h January 1914. 
65 Longford Leader, 22 nd November 1913. 
66 Midland Reporter, 31" October 1907. 
67 Leitrim Advertiser, 8h January 1914. 
68 Longford Leader, 10February 1914. 
69 Ibid, I VhApnI 1914. 
70 ]bid, 25hApril and 18'hJuly 1914. 
71 Ibid. WhMay 1914. 
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the Boyle Volunteers were led from the start by Irish party stalwarts, notably the leading 
Boyle merchant and long-standing enemy of Jasper Tully, T. J. Devine. Indeed Devine's role 
was so prominent that Tully's Roscommon Herald, despite advocating Volunteering for 
months and reporting on Volunteer companies elsewhere, refused to publish any report of the 
Boyle corps until May. With the exception of Tully, there was a broad coalition of local 
support for the new corps. The inaugural meeting in February was led by Devine, attended by 
the local clergy, Gaelic Leaguers, Gaelic athletes and Hibernians and addressed by Devine's 
cousin Charles, a 4returned American' and local hotelier. 72 The Western Nationalist claimed 
that 800 men enrolled at the first public meeting of the corps on 8th March. Hibernians, plus 
their bands, were prominent and T. J. Devine called for Hibernians across Ireland to be in the 
vanguard of the Volunteers. 73 Later that month, the paper reported that the town companies 
were drilling three times a week. 74 If the initial membership of 800 proclaimed by the 
Western Nationalist seems fanciful, the lower numbers reported by the police were still high 
for a town with a 1911 population of 2,69 1. Their estimate was that 700, of whom 400 
enrolled, attended the initial corps meeting on 8thMarch, while about 300 were present at 
each of several parades in April. 75 
Sligo 
As seen in Chapter 7, politics in Sligo town at the end of 1913 were dominated by an alliance 
of the Irish party and trades unionists. The key dividing lines in Sligo politics were still 
confession-based rather than class-based and nationalists were still united in challenging the 
Protestant 'commanding heights' of the town's economy. At the end of 1913 Sligo's politics, 
for the first time in this period, became focused explicitly on the issue of the Home Rule bill. 
At this time, tensions were running sufficiently high for local nationalists to organise a 
boycott of twenty-seven unionist town merchants who had signed a public address from the 
county to Bonar Law (see page 214). The boycott, to the dismay of the Sligo Times and Sligo 
Independent, was connived at by the Sligo Champion which published the names of all the 
76 
signatories. Henry Monson called on all Hibemians to note the names of the signatones, 'to 
72 Western Nationalist, 14 th February 1914. 
73 Ibid, 14"' March 1914. 
74 Ibid, 28h March 1914. 
75 Monthly report of the Roscommon county mispector, March 1914 (PRO CO 904/92); RIC Crime Special 
Branch report, April 1914 (PRO CO 904/120). 
76 See Sligo Champion, 29th November and 6h December: Sligo Independent, 6th December, Sligo Times, 6th 
December 1913. 
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whom Home Rulers'money must be as equally objectionable as Home Rule itself' John 
Jinks denounced men who had pretended friendship with their Catholic customers. If 
Catholics confined trade to 'their own', the minority could not live for twenty-four hours in 
Sligo.,, 
In January 1914, Jinks enhanced his leadership of the town's politics when the Corporation, 
on his initiative and that of his fellow alderman and ITGVVIU boss John Lynch, agreed to 
promote the Volunteers. 78 As in Boyle, the leadership of the Sligo Volunteers came from 
party men, notably Jinks, Monson (the leading Hibernian) and Edward Foley (alderman and 
UIL man). Though a broad coalition supported the Volunteers, their early membership seems 
to have been derived from those Hibernians and ITGWU members who had, in political 
alliance, dominated elections to Sligo Corporation for over two years. This class bias was 
noted in the RIC county inspector's end-February report that there was 'great apprehension 
[about the Volunteers] among the better classes of both sides of politics'. A month later he 
noted that while the AOH were active in the Volunteers the UIL tended to stand aside. ' 79 
However, Jinks, Monson and Foley were all successful businessmen and Foley, who owned 
the town's brewery, was one of Sligo's richest men. All three were leading lights in the UIL 
and the spread of support for the Volunteers under Jinks was broad. It certainly embraced the 
Sligo Champion and its. rival the Sligo Nationalist (whose owner, Bernard McTernan, was 
secretary of the North Sligo UIL). At the inaugural Volunteer meeting at the beginning of 
February it encompassed language enthusiasts, former IRB men, Gaelic athletes and the 
clergy. Over 460 men enrolled at that first public meeting 80 and a collection for an equipment 
fund, with Jinks and Lynch among the collectors, was launched two weeks later. 81 Birrell's 
Cabinet paper of April 1914 estimated that there were 530 members, drawn primarily from 
the AOH, the GAA and the Foresters. 82 By late-February, the corps was organised into five 
companies, under eight ex-army drill instructors, with one company drilling each night of the 
week and the whole corps parading on Sundays. 83 It was one of the largest and most active 
Irish Volunteer corps in the country. 
77 Sligo Times, 6hDecember 1913. 
78 Ibid, 7h January 1914. 
79 Monthly reports of the Sligo county inspector, February and March 1914 (PRO CO 904/92). 
80 Sligo Chanipion, 7hFebruary 1914. 
" S, Ibid. 21" February 1914. 
82 Cabinet paper April 1914. 'Irish Volunteers'. Birrell Mss., Bodleian Library Oxford, Dep 301. 
83 Sligo Nationalist, 21' and 2 8'hFebruary 1914. 
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The reasons for the forination of these four corps, when so many towns in the five counties 
did not yet drill, differed greatly. In Athlone and Granard, leadership came from advanced 
nationalists outside the Irish party's control. The Granard corps was in addition backed by the 
town's Irish party leadership and was formed at time when its local MP still publicly endorsed 
the movement. His mouthpiece, the Longford Leader, continued to give it publicity. Firmly 
under party leadership from the start, the Boyle corps may simply have stemmed from the 
enthusiasm of local Hibernians and party men. However, it also had the effect of boosting 
their status relative to their foe Jasper Tully. The formation of the Sligo corps, in a town 
whose politics had been more explicitly sectarian than elsewhere, enhanced both the local 
Lab/Nat alliance and the position of John Jinks as its leader. 
The progress of the Volunteers in these four towns demonstrated that a corps could not 
flourish without the encouragement of 'leading' men and local Irish party figures. With the 
exception of Athlone, large numbers of men mobilised for regular drills, lessons, route 
marches and parades. Both the numbers of participants and the level of activity implied a 
new, heightened level of political mobilisation, but only where there was local party support. 
The contrast between the two largest towns in the five counties - between the movement's 
stagnation in Athlone and its blossoming in Sligo - was stark. Proportionate to its population, 
the party-led corps in Boyle was even more successful than that in Sligo. Advanced 
nationalists, and even outright opponents of the Irish party, could flourish in the Volunteers in 
early 1914, but only in those places where local party leaders took their feet off the brakes. 
Restraints Removed - The Volunteers Take Off 
Though the first wave of volunteering was limited, the sense of political crisis remained 
pervasive in the local press and intensified during 1914. News reports and leading articles, 
speeches and a succession of public resolutions focused on the events - the climb-downs, the 
'betrayal' of Ulster exclusion, parliamentary manoeuvres, army mutiny, gun-running, all- 
party conference and finally bloodshed - which weakened the case of those who argued that 
Home Rule could be won in parliament. Only the recurrence of foot and mouth disease, with 
its attendant economic disruption (and itself another source of alarm, gloom and paranoia 
against England), provided a news story of remotely comparable impact. Specifically the 
events, all of them setbacks, which triggered detailed coverage and intense speculation were 
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9 Asquith's announcement on 9th February that an offer to Ulster's unionists would be 
forthcoming, 
9 Asquith's announcement on gth March of that offer, of 'temporary', county-by- county 
Ulster exclusion, and the Irish party leadership's reluctant agreement to it, 
* the Curragh mutiny of I 81h -20th March, seen as risking the collapse of the government 
and making government coercion of 'Ulster' next to impossible, 
9 the Lame gun-running of 24h/25"' April, seen as a major accession of strength to the UVF 
and as, at best, colossal negligence by the goverm-nent, 
9 conciliatory moves by Churchill and Carson, with Churchill on 28 th April saying that if 
Carson would put up his terms for a federal settlement the goverm-nent would be bound to 
consider them and Carson replying that he would run risks for peace, 
* the government's announcement on 18th May that there would be an Amending bill re 
Ulster's exclusion (tabled subsequent to the Commons 'passage' of the Home Rule bill, 
which came a week later), followed by two months of rumour and speculation, 
s the Buckingham Palace all-party conference of 21 "-24 th July, the announcement of which, 
though it quickly failed, was greeted with alann, 
the Irish Volunteers' gun-running at Howth, County Dublin, on 26 th July, and 
the Bachelor's Walk killings on the same day, when three Dubliners were killed by men 
of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. 
All of these were major news stories for the local press, but its editorial response was not 
uniform, and if anything became more polarised during 1914. At one extreme the Tully 
brothers continued to denounce what they saw as a succession of betrayals and plots by a 
corrupt government, while at the other John Hayden's two papers regularly voiced whatever 
rationale was being advanced by the Irish party leadership to justify its latest reverse. 
Meanwhile the Westmeath Independent oscillated wildly in its views, between a January 
prediction that anyone proposing the division of Ireland would be regarded as a traitor and a 
March paean of praise for Asquith ('The Occasion - The Man'). who was now proposing just 
such a division of Ireland, and whom the paper hailed as 'conspicuously the greatest 
statesman of the age ,. 84 
84 ,d3 Westmeath Independent, ý January and 14'hMarch 1913. 
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The other nationalist papers, while all still professing loyalty to the party, gloomily charted 
the reverses. Sometimes they put a brave face on them : at least the county opt-out proposal 
had been killed in March after Carson rejected it; at least Asquith had got a grip on the 
government after the Curragh; or at least the parliamentary party could block acceptance of an 
Amending bill. Often, however, the papers gave expression to outbursts of alann or rage. 
Thus, for the Leitrim Observer, the March county opt-out proposal was 'gall and won-nwood 
to the mind of every patriot ... 
bitterly humiliating' and it was bad 'that we must parley with 
plunderers'. 85 The Western Nationalist after the Curragh reported a belief that a government 
so lacking in backbone could only last a short time. If a 'white paper' were to propose the 
reinstatement of the mutinying officers, 'nobody would be sorry for its [the government's] 
86 departure' . Lame,, 
for the Strokestown Democrat, confirmed 'the majority of discerning 
Nationalists in their suspicions of the government'. The government had sought permanent 
Ulster exclusion and the Curragh bungle was 'permitted or contrived'. Now it permitted the 
arming of Ulstertnen. Irish Nationalists had to realise that 'they are being sold'. 87 By June, 
even Hayden's papers adopted a tone of rising alarm. The Westmeath Examiner predicted 
that 'the people are in eamest and will secure freedom at any cost'. In July, conceming the 
Buckingham Palace conference, it wrote that a last trick was being used by unionists to revive 
the veto of the King, who was himself using Tory language of the threat of civil war. This 
was the earthquake that could delay Home Rule . 
88 These outbursts were best exemplified by 
the despair of Farrell's Longford Leader in March. It believed that Ireland, a Catholic and 
nationalist nation, was hated by the whole ascendancy class of Great Britain. Its Catholic 
religion was the obstacle to its freedom and now Asquith's govenunent had succumbed to this 
feeling. Though the Irish party had with the deepest reluctance accepted the county opt-out 
proposal, 'it is moments like these that try men's souls'. 89 
Against this background, with local opinion at the least 'somewhat querulous' and despite a 
national Irish party leadership which still hindered the movement, more Volunteer companies 
were formed across all of the five counties during March and April. At the end of April there 
were seventeen, most of which were satellites of three of the corps formed earlier in the year. 
8-5 Lein-im Obso-vo-, 14'bMarch 1914. 
86 [Vestern. Vationalist, 28hMarch 1914. 
S7 Sn-okestown Demoo-at, 9hMay 1914. 
88 Westmeath Examiner, 27hJune and '15h July 1914. 
89 Lo7? gfo7-d Leader, 14'h March 1914. 
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Jinks and Foley radiated out from Sligo to lead the establishment of three new companies in 
North Sligo and three in Leitrim. 90 The Boyle corps was imitated in Cootehall in North 
Roscommon, with many of the Boyle Volunteers at the Cootehall formation meeting (but with 
the company inactive until 'spring fanning operations' were over). 91 Cawley and Cusack 
helped to clone the Granard corps at Columbkille in North Longford. 92 The most significant 
event, though, was the formation of a corps in Mullingar in mid-April. As noted in Chapter 6, 
supporters of both Ginnell and Hayden participated in forming the corps. As in Sligo, Boyle 
and Granard, it drew upon the full range of nationalists in the town and by early May had 
around 400 enrolled members. 93 Two other North Westmeath companies were set up in Finea 
and Castlepollard. 94 
Given the pressure of events, the succession of threats and setbacks to Home Rule and the 
accrual of Volunteer members and companies, a change in the party leadership's policy was 
only a matter of time. Writing about his ffiend John Dillon, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt stated that 
'it was the Curragh incident that convinced him that the National Volunteer movement should 
95 be openly supported' . An AOH memorandum in favour of the Volunteers was said to be 
circulating in Longford from mid-April. 96 Elsewhere, however, the first sign of an overt 
change in party policy did not come until after Lame, at the end of the month. In 
Roscommon, AOH divisions from 27thApril were receiving a circular from the national 
secretary, J. D. Nugent, calling on Hibernians to make themselves available for Volunteer 
dri 11.97 This latter timing fits with John Redmond's own statement, in a public letter of 9tb 
June, that it was 'six weeks ago' that the party told its 'friends' to support the Volunteers. " 
On II "' May, William Redmond went public in a letter to the Westminster Gazette, lauding 
90 Monthly reports of the Sligo and Leitrim county inspectors, March and April 1914 (PRO CO 904/92 and 
904/93). 
91 Monthly reports of the Roscommon county inspector, March and April 1914 (PRO CO 904/92 and 904/93). 
92 Longford Leader, II "' April 1914. Oddly, the paper on 4th April had reported 'Brothers' Cawley and Cusack 
forming an AOH division at Aughnacli ffe/Columbki Ile, but there is no other indication of either man having an 
AOH role. 
93 ff'estmeath Examiner, 9dMay 1914. 
94 Monthly reports of the Westmeath county inspector, March and April 1914 (PRO CO 904/92 and 904/93). 
The other three corps in the five counties, making seventeen in total, were Athlone, Ballyfarnon (County 
Roscommon) and Ballaghadereen (technically within the Roscommon county boundary but part of the East 
Mayo parliamentary constituency). 
9S Blunt, Ati, Diaries, Part Two, 20'b June 1914. p. 427. 
9" Monthly report of the Longford county inspector, April 1914 (PRO CO 904/193). 
97 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, April 1914 (PRO CO 904193). 
98 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 116. 
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the Volunteers and predicting results 'quite as unfortunate as any- thing which might 
conceivably happen in Ulster' should Home Rule fail. 
99 The party was now placing itself in 
the vanguard. 
The net result was that in May and June the pace of what the police called 'branch' fonnation 
accelerated rapidly. By the end of June there were 26 'branches' in Leitrim; 15 in Longford; 
20 in Roscommon; 15 in Sligo and 20 in Westmeath, making 96 in all. ' 00 The grand 
formation meeting in Longford town, led by Farrell, was on 27 th May; Roscommon town's 
with Hayden was on I't June. Both mirrored the meetings that had taken place before in 
towns such as Boyle, Granard, Sligo or Mullingar. The full gamut of nationalist society was 
present - in Roscommon town leading figures of the UIL, town tenants, RAEC, Gaelic Club, 
the clergy and the town commissioners all played their part. Those long-standing enemies 
George Geraghty (the former Sinn Fein supporter) and Charles O'Keeffe (the town's UIL 
'fixer') jointly moved Canon Cummins to the chair. Hayden's fellow speakers were 
Cummins and his curate, Gaelic Leaguer and former member of the Sinn Fein national 
executive Michael O'Flanagan. The monster crowd also watched a Roscommon-Athlone 
football match and were played to by the Athlone Pipers' Band. George Geraghty, soon 
leading the Roscommon corps, later reported that 250 men had attended its first parade. 101 
Vampirisation? 
Volunteering undoubtedly became a mass movement in the five counties during the summer 
of 1914. In July and August, the total of police-recorded 'branches' ballooned from 96 to 
208, with an estimated membership of approximately 20,000.102 To put the scale of this 
mobilisation in context, the total male population of all five counties in the 1911 census was 
just under 176,000. Substantially fewer than half of these would have been of an appropriate 
age to 'volunteer'; for example, just under 30% of the Irish male population in 1911 was of 
the 'military' age of between 19 and 38, the recruiting age limits for the regular army. It is 
99 Wcstmeath Examiner, 16'h May 1914. 
100 Collated from monthly county inspectors' reports for the five counties for June 1914 (PRO CO 904/93). 
101 Roscommon Journal, 60'June; Roscommon Messenger, 6 th and 13th June 1914. 
102 Collated from monthly reports for the RIC county inspectors for August 1914. The county numbers were 
Leitrim 48 Volunteer 'branches' and approx 4,000 members; Longford 23 branches: Roscommon 56 branches 
and 5,583 members; Sligo 38 branches and 4.536 members and Westmeath 43 branches and 4,152 members. To 
reach the approximation of 20,000 Volunteer members for the five counties, it was necessary to add the first 
Longford figure for membership cited by the county mspector, of 1,917 members in January 1915 (August 1914, 
CO 904/94, January 1915, CO 904/96). 
271 
clear that the Volunteers mobilised anything between 25% and 35% of local young and 
middle-aged men. Moreover, unlike the local membership of the UIL, which was also still, 
nominally, recorded by the police at over 20,000, the Volunteers were active. Most 
Volunteers not only enrolled but drilled and paraded week after week. There is no doubt that 
the change of the Irish party's policy towards the Volunteers spurred this mushroom growth, 
but it remains unclear just how far the party, using David Fitzpatrick's imagery, successfully 
acted as a 'vampire' towards the movement. 
Fitzpatrick himself considered that 'the party vampire' was at 'its most incisive' when it took 
control of the Volunteers in mid- 1914.103 Already at the end of April, the Dublin IRB man 
Thomas Ashe could lament to John Devoy of the American Clan na Gael : 'I am informed by 
men whose integrity I can vouch for that the Volunteers are practically ruled to-day by the 
AOH Board of Erin'. 104 Tom Kettle in mid-April had written to Stephen Gwynn about party 
supporters that 'they have already come into the movement so heavily that there is a danger of 
their swamping the ship. ' 105 According to Fitzpatrick, when Redmond publicly forced the 
Dublin-based provisional committee of the Volunteers to accept twenty-five Irish party 
nominees, this reflected a fait accompli in the countryside. ' 06 In the five counties, party 
stalwarts were nearly always prominent in the wave of new companies and Redmond's 
national take-over of the Volunteers' provisional committee in June generated barely a local 
murmur. Out of nearly a hundred local corps at the time of Redmond's takeover, resistance to 
his demands was mooted in only three. In Coolarty, County Longford, Mr. Keohane (a 
creamery manager) was removed from the chair of the corps because of his anti-Redmond 
stance and the neighbouring Columbkille company promptly elected him president. 107 In 
Roscommon town, George Geraghty and Michael Finlay (both 'Sinn Fein' opponents of 
Hayden in 1907) used a meeting of only five out of twenty-eight committee men to pass a 
resolution attacking Redmond's move. This was rapidly rescinded, and did not even find 
support from Father O'Flanagan, who called the move 'untimely'. 108 The nationalist press 
universally backed Redmond, with even Jasper Tully calling Redmond's support for the 
103 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lffie, p- 10 1- 
104 Ashe to Devoy. 27thApril 1914, in William O'Brien and Desmond Ryan (eds. ). Devo. vs Post Bag 1871-1928, 
Vol. Tvo (Dublin 1953), p. 427. 
'05 Kettle to Gwynn, 15th April, quoted in Lyons, The Enigma qf Tom Kettle, p. 243. 
106 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lffie 1913-21, p. 105. 
107 Longford Lcadcr, 2 7'h June and 4 
th July 1914. 
108 Roscommon Journal, 12'h June. Roscommon Messen,! -)er, 20'hJune 1914. 
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Volunteers 'the one redeeming feature of the present situatIon'. 'With Redmond on thelr side, 
the rest is easy, now that he has thrown his weight on the side of the Volunteers. ' The Leiti-im 
Observer hailed : 'Redmond, the Leader, the real general'. 109 
In Athlone, the process of party take-over was plain to all. At the end of May, O. J. Dolan 
(grocer, publican, auctioneer, town councillor and Chief Ranger of the Foresters) put his name 
to a circular calling for the town's corps to be put 'on a sound footing' at a public meeting. 
When held in June, it was attended by over 700 with, according to the Westmeath 
Independent, fifty to sixty of the 'Sinn Fein element' interspersed. A motion to adjourn this 
'political' meeting received only II votes, and the meeting was then run by Dolan, a 
succession of party men (including MacDennott-Hayes) and half a dozen priests. Conn 
O'Frighil, the current president of the town corps, stated that though he opposed Redmond's 
takeover of the Dublin 'provisional committee' he was prepared to hand local leadership to 
'more influential people'. ' 10 
However, with the possible exception of the departure of Keohane from the Coolarty 
Volunteers, there was no purge and Athlone was the only other instance locally in which there 
was an actual change of leadership. The Sligo corps continued to be a very broad church of 
all nationalists, and the Granard corps remained firmly with Cawley and Cusack. In County 
Roscommon, Tully had already pitched in as an active reporter and supporter of Devine's 
Boylecorps. "' In new corps such as Roscommon town, the leadership was just as broadly- 
based. Indeed, George Geraghty, despite his abortive anti-Redmond coup, rose to greater 
prominence as the town's representative on the first Volunteer district committee. " 2 In 
Manorhamilton, James Dolan, brother of the defeated Sinn Fein candidate in the 1908 by- 
election, joined the newly-formed Volunteer committee with F. E. Meehan MP, 113 who had 
changed his tune to believe that if Home Rule had to be won by physical force there were 
600,000 Irishmen who were fighting men. 
114 Alex McCabe, one of less than a handful of IRB 
109 Roscommon Hcrald, 6h and 13'h June; Leitrim Obsei-ver, 27h June 1914. 
110 11'estmeath Independent, 23d May and 20'h June 1914. 
1" So much so that there was even a temporary reconciliation between Tully and T. J. Devine. In June, Tully 
went so far as to support Devine's co-option to the county council (Roscommon Messenger, 20th June 1914). 
12 Roscommon Journal, 25th July 1914. This was in the same week that Father O'Flanagan departed for 
Cliffoney in Sligo. 
113 SIju Champion, 30`h May 1914. 
114 't, nd Leitrim Obsei-ver, 2 May 1914. 
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men in County Sligo (see Chapter 3), became a leading Volunteer organiser across the county 
as company after company was fon-ned. 
Not only did Sinn Fein supporters and other advanced nationalists remain, or become, 
prominent, but a significant number of men emerged, some party men and some not, who had 
played no local political role in the past. These included : 
Michael O'Mullane, Sligo-born, a Hibernian from Dublin and now, on his 'holidays', 115 one 
of the most passionate orators at Sligo and Leitrim Volunteer parades, 
C. H. Devine, T. J. Devine's cousin and the 'returned American% who fulfilled a similar role 
across North Roscommon and South Leitrim, 
PJ Neilan, solicitor, active across the South Roscommon companies, 
James McGurrin, another returned-American, an 6 orator' who spoke at inordinate length at 
North Leitrim rallies and parades, 
Michael O'Connor Maguire, the best singer in Mullingar, a Gaelic Leaguer who became 
secretary of the town's corps, and 
Arthur Leylan , 
joint secretary of the Boyle corps, who spoke for the first time ever on a 
public platform in May. ' 16 
According to Stephen Gwynn, the Volunteers enabled 'a new section of the community' to 
come into power before the war. 'Men began to count in Irish life who had counted for 
nothing before. ' 117 The sheer numbers parading, drilling, being lectured and raising funds 
were on a scale not seen in recent years. In terms of organised commitment, week after week, 
they exceeded any popular mobilisation since the height of the Land War at the beginning of 
the 1880s. 
Reports of drills, training, lectures, fund-raising, committee meetings and parades proliferated 
in the pages of the local nationalist press, which often devoted up to a page to to 'Volunteer 
News'. Particularly comprehensive coverage of companies in Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo 
was provided by the Roscommon Herald and Sligo Champion. As these two papers also 
reproduced copious reports of UIL and AOH meetings in 1914 (in the case of the Herald 
primarily AOH meetings) the names of participants in Irish party meetings in 1914 can be 
115 Sligo ATationalist, 181h Julv 1914. 
116 Wcvtern Nationalist, WhMay 1914. 
117 Stephen Gwynn, The Irish Situation, p. 29. 
274 
compared with those of leading Volunteers in the same year. This analysis is described in 
Appendix A. 
From the reports in the Sligo Champion, the names of 643 Irish party and 478 Volunteer 
activists have been compiled (mostly from County Sligo and North Leitrim); from the 
Roscommon Herald 634 party activists and 649 Volunteers (mostly from County Roscommon 
and South Leitrim). In compiling these names, the number of Volunteer activists has if 
anything been understated relative to the number of those in the party. First, party names 
were compiled from reports published over the whole of 1914, whereas Volunteer names 
were effectively published on a large scale only from May to November. Secondly, to 
compare like with like, only activists' names have been collated : primarily officers, speakers, 
those attending committee meetings, those on platform committees at rallies and proposers 
and seconders of resolutions. In the case of the Irish party, these named individuals could 
reliably be said to cover the vast ma ority of political 'activists', but in the case of the 
Volunteers the names of many who were 'activists', simply by virtue of their enrolling, 
parading and drilling, were rarely reported in the press. Nevertheless, a comparison of 
named Irish party activists and named Volunteer leaders showed that : 
of 643 party activists in the Chainpion an estimated 26.8% had an equivalent Volunteer 
role, 
2. of 634 party activists in the Herald 23.8% had an equivalent Volunteer role, 
3. of 478 Volunteer leaders in the Champion 36.8% had an equivalent party role, 
4. of 649 Volunteer leaders in the Herald 23.2% had an equivalent party role. 
The 'outlier' of these results is the third - the percentage of Champion Volunteer leaders who 
were also party activists - but the results are clear. Of party activists in three of the five 
counties, some 25% took on a similar role in the Volunteers. Of reported Volunteer leaders, 
between 63% and 77% did not come from the party. The Volunteers' leaders were not just 
Irish party men with wooden rifles. 
There are also some indications that 'vampirisation' worked in reverse - it was the Irish party 
rather than the Volunteers which was losing blood. This was particularly apparent in the UIL 
where, as already noted in Chapter 2, the stimulus to activity from land disputes and agitation 
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had largely receded. The party's termination of the Home Rule fund early in 1914 removed 
another major prop - fund-raising - to branch activity. RIC 'Crime Special Branch' reports of 
UIL fund-raising indicated that the effect was dramatic, as shown below: 
Table 11 : Funds raised by the UIL by county, 1913-14 (is) 118 
Leitrim Longford Roscommon Sligo Westmeath 
Q1 1913 25 54 68 43 37 
Q2 84 44 144 166 46 
Q3 33 20 191 117 84 
Q4 87 186 120 227 68 
Total 1913 E229 L304 E523 L553 E235 
Q1 1914 96 52 106 124 128 
Q2 17 21 48 18 19 
Q3 8 10 32 39 2 
Q4 4 7 10 0 4 
Total 1914 El 25 E90 L196 E181 E153 
Though the series was erratic from quarter to quarter, the change of trend was consistent 
across all five counties. The decisive downturn in fund-raising came in the second quarter of 
1914, after the closure of the Home Rule fund and during the 'lift-off of local volunteering. 
There are no equivalent police records of Volunteer funds raised, but it seems almost certain 
that some funds not raised by the UIL went instead to the Volunteers. 
The UIL's future role after Home Rule, in contrast to the explicitly confessional AOH, had in 
any case been in doubt. Several political figures made it clear that the UIL would soon 
become obsolete. Annual branch 'reorganisation' meetings (i. e. AGMs) were punctuated by 
comments that they would be the last held. When the South Westmeath executive reorganised 
in January 1914, 'many realised that they were meeting for the last time for reorganisation'. 
T. F. Smyth had told the Mohill UIL in May 1913 that this should be their last annual meeting 
and Farrell expressed the same sentiments to the North Longford executive in January 
118 RIC Crime Special Branch Quarterly reports, 1913 and 1914 (PRO CO 904,120). 
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1914.119 Fitzgibbon at the end of 1913 made his prediction (see page 109) that the UIL 
would soon have done its work and that its place would be taken by the Gaelic League. 
As the future of the Home Rule bill became progressively less secure, the message was 
instead put out that the UIL would have to keep up the struggle. As Farrell expressed it in 
May 1914, the party had saved the bacon of the government time and again over four years 
and would keep them in office for the necessary time. The UIL would keep going until there 
was a parliament on College Green. However, Farrell went on to tell his audience that they 
now also had the chance of an Irish army, which they must take. They should be doubly 
armed, 'first by the vote and then by our guns'. 120 A key weapon in the hands of nationalists 
to gain Home Rule and then to protect it was now seen to be the Volunteers. As Farrell put it 
at another meeting on the same day, it was the Volunteers who would ensure that 'what we 
have got we shall keep'. 121 
Physically, the sheer proliferation of Volunteer drills and meetings pushed the more humdrum 
work of the UIL out of the limelight, clashing with the routine of branch committees and 
resolution-passing. With little land agitation, minimal fund-raising and the completion of the 
county council elections at the beginning of June 1914, there was very little for UIL branches 
to do. In her work on County Longford, Marie Coleman noted the sharp fall in the number of 
UIL branch meetings reported in the second half of 1914 122 and this pattern was also seen in 
other counties. As was done for earlier years in Chapter 3, reports of UIL and AOH meetings 
in the Roscommon Messenger, Roscommon Herald, Sligo Champion and Western Nationalist 
have been counted for the years 1913-1914. To these have been added reports published in 
the Longford Leader, the preserved series of which, unlike that for 1910-11, is complete. The 
frequency of UIL and AOH reports in counties Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon and Sligo can 
thus be analysed : 123 
119 Wastmeath Independent, 10"' January 1914; Leitrinl Obser-ver, 15'h May 1913; Longford Leader, 7h February 
1914. 
120 Farrell speaking to Clonguish UIL on 30'h May, Longford Leader, 6h June 1914. 
121 Ibid, Farrell speaking to Longford UIL on 30'h May. 
122 Coleman, County Longfi)rd 1910-23, p. 62. 
123 As with the analysis for 1910-13 in Chapter 3, trends 'in party activity *in Westmeath in 1914 cannot be 
analysed from UIL/AOH reports, given the scarcity of party reports in the county's newspapers. The UlLwas 
already seriously damaged in North 'A"estrneath, while the fEestnieath Independent was not at this time a 'paper 
of record' for the U1L/AOH in the south of the county. Moreover, the number of AOH divisions in the whole 
county in the years 19 1 -3 - 
14 was barelv a handful. 
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Table 12 : UIL and AOH reports in local newspapers, 1913-1914 
Q1 
1913 
Q2 
1913 
Q3 
1913 
Q4 
1913 
Q1 
1914 
Q2 
1914 
Q3 
1914 
Q4 
1914 
Longford Leader UIL 37 29 33 35 31 33 19 13 
AOH 45 46 32 44 45 54 37 46 
Roscommon Herald UIL 42 43 42 33 51 47 17 13 
AOH 123 91 107 123 105 111 84 94 
Roscommon Messenger UIL 35 31 19 17 23 17 11 7 
AOH 16 11 7 20 15 16 8 12 
Sligo Champion UIL 88 113 104 128 132 105 64 30 
AOH 64 75 69 100 116 91 70 85 
Western Nationalist UIL 21 21 13 20 24 13 7 6 
AOH 16 13 6 19 21 21 12 10 
A clear shift to lower levels of party activity occurred in the third quarter of 1914, the period 
of maximum Volunteer activity. The brunt of the fall was borne by the UIL; the AOH saw a 
much smaller dip. It was not seasonal and, barring the smaller samples of the Roscommon 
Messenger and Western Nationalist, there was no comparable downturn in 1913. Nor was 
this shift triggered by the outbreak of war in August. UIL activity for the middle months of 
1914 is shown below: 
Table 13 : UIL reports in local newspapers, April-September 1914 
1914 April May June July Aug Sept 
Longford Leader 13 13 7 9 5 5 
Roscommon Herald 11 25 11 6 9 2 
Roscommon Messenger 8 3 6 2 4 5 
Sligo Champion 36 48 21 25 23 16 
Western Nationalist 3 8 2 3 1 3 
This analysis shows that the fall in branch activity preceded the war, though the smaller series 
for the Roscommon Messenger and If"estern Nationalist do not show a clear trend. A sharp 
fall of activity came in June in the case of the Longfiord Leader and Sligo Champion, in July 
278 
at the latest for the Roscommon Herald. These two months witnessed the climax of the Home 
Rule crisis and the most rapid rate of Volunteer company formation. 124 Reporting of the 
Volunteers in the press also dwarfed that of the UIL. For example, the Longford Leader 
carried 55 Volunteer company reports against 16 UIL reports in June and July; the Herald 92 
against 17 and the Champion, less dramatically, 57 against 46. In the third quarter there were 
859 170 and 133 Volunteer reports in these three papers respectively, against 19,17 and 64 
UIL reports. 
In February 1915, the UIL National Directory reported, and had to justify, a nationwide 
collapse in the number of branches sending in subscription fees over the previous year. (For 
the five counties only 65 branches were paid-up against 121 in the year before. ) The 
Directory's rationalisation was that: 
In order to give an opportunity to the better organising of the National Volunteers, the 
work of organisation in connection with the United Irish League was not pressed during 
125 
the year.. .. 
The hypothesis that the Irish party 'vampirised' the Volunteers at the local level in the spring 
and summer of 1914 is not, therefore, supported by the evidence, whether nationally or in the 
five counties. ' 26 Though the party's change of policy towards the Volunteers greatly 
accelerated the Volunteers' fan-nation,, and though party men took a prominent role in nearly 
all companies, the movement mobilised many activists, and enrolled thousands of members, 
who had not recently been politically active. Its leadership was anything but just party hacks 
playing soldiers and continued to be drawn from all local societies and organisations. If any 
one movement weakened from loss of 'blood' it was the party (in particular the UIL), not the 
Volunteers. 
124 This is not to say that the war had no impact. Table 12 shows that UIL activity fell further after the outbreak 
of war. though AOH activity, if anything, recovered (see also Chapter 10). 
125 UIL National Directory Minute Book 1915, p. 442. National Library of Ireland. Ms. 708. 
126 At the national level, Redmond's takeover was also mieffective. Bulmer Hobson considered it to be 
ficompletely illusory' and control of both central staff and funds was kept entirely away from Redmond's 
nominees (Hobson, Ireland, Festerda. i- and Tomorrow, p. 5 1). The restructured Provisional Committee of the 
Volunteers, with Redmond's representatives, did not even meet until 14th July (Western Nationall'St, 25h July 
1914). 
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'Playing With Fire' 
John Dillon, though he now called himself 'strongly in favour', described the Volunteer 
movement as 'playing with fire' in a letter to his friend Wilffid Scawen Blunt at the end of 
May, continuing : 'And unless it is kept under reliable control - it might at any moment 
utterly ruin the National movement - and repeat the disasters of 1798'. 
127 According to a 
series of reports, 'The State of Ireland', prepared for Dublin Castle by district magistrates in 
the summer of 1914, the 'reliable control' desired by Dillon was lacking. Though the 
magistrates considered their localities relatively crime-free and relations between the public, 
police and magistrates to be good, the ballooning Volunteer companies had, according to 
Captain Owen in Roscommon, 'no responsible leaders' and if armed were 'a menace to the 
public peace'. There might also be retaliation against local Protestants if Ulster Catholics 
were attacked. 128 Elsewhere, the Volunteers were consistently seen as dangerous : 
The National Volunteer force may in time become a source of danger to the public peace. 
In its ranks are many undesirables. (Castlerea), 
The Volunteer movement is popular with young men, but it is doubtful if it will last. As 
there are no responsible leaders there is a danger that the men might easily get out of 
hand. (Mullingar), 
National Volunteers disloyal, and if they become roused, would get out of hand and 
become a dangerous rabble. (Sligo). 129 
In Roscommon the RIC county inspector, after 'moving quietly about' during June, believed 
that the UIL and AOH were the chief organisers of the county's Volunteers, but went on 
The corps have no proper leaders and are under no Proper control ... These bands of 
young men coming together are beginning to feel their strength and when they get arms 
their existence looks like being a serious menace to the peace of the county and to the 
liberty and security of the minority who hold different political views. ' 30 
The rhetoric fed to the 'bands of young men' had moved on from the political role, and even 
the locally-defensive military role, advocated for the Volunteers in the autumn of 1913. 
Again and again the justification was now for 'Ireland's army', the purpose of which was 
127 Dillon to Blunt 21" May 1914, Blunt Mss., West Sussex Record Office. Chichester, Box 16 Vol. 6. 
12' Report of Captain Owen, Roscommon District ('The State of Ireland'. CO 904,227). 
129 Reports of Mr. Rice, Castlerea; Mr. Moore. MullMigar; Captami Fitzpatrick, Sligo ('The State of Ireland'. CO 
904/227). 
110 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, June 1914 (PRO CO 904/9-3)). 
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either to ensure the arrival of Home Rule or to enforce it after it had been passed. To call this 
rhetoric 'radicallsed' would, however, be misleading. References to more separatist goals 
than 'Home Rule', such as the one made by John Cawley in April (see page 264), remained 
infrequent. 1 31 However, the language used was now significantly more violent and bellicose. 
Rather than just matching Ulster's bluff, the objective was to resort to arms. For Patrick 
McKenna, speaking at the formation of the Strearnstown, Westmeath company, the carrion 
crows had declared for the 'arbitrament of the sword', and the only choice for those who 
'believed in constitutional government' was to meet force by force. Orange fanatics sought 
for the blood and murder of Roman Catholics, and not so much as a sod of soil could be taken 
from the Irish government. 1 32 For C. H. Devine in Boyle, the Home Rule bill had been too 
dearly bought to be trifled with and if it came to guarding it by force, 'they had the men, and 
they would get the guns to shoot down every man who opposed them (renewed cheers)' .1 
33 
That most diligent of Irish party organisers, the co-regional director of the AOH John 
Keaveny, could only 'hope' that the soon-to-be Lady Carson would not be left a widow, her 
husband shot by 'Nationalist troops'. 134 It was at a Highwood, County Sligo, Volunteer rally 
that Henry Monson, Keaveny's fellow AOH director, made his speech about the 'mighty pent 
up volume of water restrained by but a flimsy dam' of constitutional agitation (see page 127). 
Monson also declared that the AOH had fought and were fighting for Ireland, 'aye and with 
the rifle too (loud applause)'. Alden-nan Foley at the same rally hoped that the 'army' would 
wipe out the stain of the battle of the Boyne. ' 35 On the same day, Michael O'Mullane 
pronounced that if Ireland did not get Home Rule: 'You will give English rule in Ireland a 
hotter time than it ever had since the cursed foot of the Saxon first trod our soil (loud 
cheers)'. 
136 
At greater length, John Hayden's Westmeath associate Michael Ronan wrote for the 
Westmeath Examiner on 'The Irish National Volunteers - Why Are They FormedT 
According to Ronan, the military had shown that they could not be relied upon to defend the 
13 ' Farrell, interestingly. again went further than his colleagues and looked to goals beyond Home Rule. when he 
said of Home Rule that 'we had to begin, we had to get our step on the ladder'. He was speaking to the 
Longford UIL on 31" May 1914 (Roscommon Herald, 6'11 June 1914). 
132 Ifestmeath Independent, 23 rd May 1914. 
133 Western Nationalist, 30th May 1914. 
1.14 Keaveny speaking at Fuerty, Roscommon Messenger, 30thMay 1914. 
135 Sligo Nationalist, l8d'July 1914. 
Bo Ibid, (O'Mullane speaking at Geevagh, Count-v Sligo). 
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Constitution and property. The police in Westmeath were also 'a military force'. Orangemen 
were now organised and had arms - who were they to fight? It had to be the 'papists and 
nationalists'. The British democracy could not be expected to turn aside from their business 
to defend Ireland. Only the Volunteers, the rising generation, a new force to support the 
parliamentary organisation, could do so. All freemen had a 'born right' to defend their 
freedom. ' 37 Another writer of extended articles at this time was Jasper Tully. Tully became 
convinced of the reality rather than the bluff of 'Carson's Armed Menace', which would fight 
rather than come under the rule of Catholics, after he and his brother had motored across 
Ulster in April. 138 His leading articles were thereafter consistently belligerent. The 
Volunteers must be armed. The Tories had not counted on 'the uprising of Nationalist 
Ireland'. With the Volunteers 'in action', no general election or Amending bill could deny 
'Ireland a Nation'. Arms and the ability to use them were the supreme test of a nation. 'The 
uprise of the Volunteer movement has amazed both ffiend and foe. ' 139 
The bellicosity of nationalist rhetoric climaxed at the end of July in response to the killings at 
Bachelor's Walk in Dublin. There were, of course, still some instances of relative restraint, 
notably Hayden's two papers and the Westmeath Independent, 140 which blamed the killings 
on Dublin Castle officials (albeit acting in a conspiracy) and called for an enquiry. Though 
focusing on the same target, the Longford Leader's tone was different. Dublin Castle and the 
'ascendancy gang' were 'the enemy at every turn of Irish race and sentiment'. The blood 
shed would 'cry to heaven for vengeance on the heads of our national enemies, and will not 
cry in vain. ' 141 In almost every local town the Volunteers led marches to rallies to hear 
denunciations of the killings. In Roscommon town they heard George Geraghty denounce 
'the dirty hacks of the English government', cowards and murderers. After 'the English' (i. e. 
the King's Own Scottish Borderers) were beaten all they could do was shoot women and 
children. An English visitor to the town was threatened by a Volunteer. 142 Elphin in 
Roscommon was said to be 'panic stricken' and Strokestown showed 'a grim determination of 
137 Westmeath Examiner, 25b July 1914. 
138 Roscommon Herald, 16'h April 1914. This article prompted a letter from Tom Clarke to the paper a week 
later. Clarke wrote that he handled over 50 weekly provincial papers and that 'Carson's Nation' was the best 
piece he had read in any provincial paper. 
139 Ibid, 30'h May and 6th June 1914. 
140 Roscommon Mcýyscnlger, 11e. stmeath Examine'-, ff 'estmeath Independent, I" August 1914. 
14 1 Long(ford Leader, I" August 1914. 
142 Roscommon Journal, Roscommon Messenger, Is' August 1914. 
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revenge . 
143 At the Sligo meeting, organised by Jinks and led by 300 Volunteers and the 
Hibernian band, O'Mullane denounced the blood shed by the 'cursed dogs of England' (and 
the 'cursed Scottish hounds') and said that if the government did not act then Ireland must 
take it into her hands to punish them. Ireland must have Home Rule, and 'if any English party 
tries to stop us then the rifle must speak at last (cheers)'. For Henry Monson, the blood of the 
victims cried for vengeance and the killings showed that Ireland could depend only on her 
right arm - the Volunteers. If there was to be a war, said Jinks, the men and women of Sligo 
would be at the front. 144 jinkS, that pillar of Irish party influence, machine politics and 
respectability and one of Redmond's twenty-five nominees to the Volunteers' provisional 
committee, 145 later declaimed to the Sligo Guardians: 
Ireland has been governed by the heel and the boot, but I will say here publicly, in the 
presence of the press, that Ireland is out for blood and murder - if murder is required. We 
will not stand any nonsense in the future ... 
if a shot is fired at our people in the North we 
are prepared to meet them. 146 
The eve of the World War saw provincial opinion almost totally absorbed in the Home Rule 
crisis, experiencing a mass political mobilisation, militarism and a bellicosity of language 
unseen in recent times. For the Sligo Champion it was 'the healthiest and most significant 
manifestation of the National spirit that has been seen in Ireland in the lifetime of most of 
, 147 us . The Irish party, erratically and inconsistently, had on balance gone along with Tom 
Kettle's 'great wave of emotion and action'. However, though the goal of the Volunteer 
movement was still Home Rule, the Irish party did not create that movement, was partly 
marginalised by it and could not be said to control it. Faced with the 'great wave', the Irish 
party was, not surprisingly, swept along if not yet, as after Easter 1916, swept away. 
143 Tfcstcrn Nationalist, Is' August 1914. 
144 Sligo Independent, Is' August 1914. 
W Roscommon Messenger, 4h July 1914. 
146 Western Nationalist, 8thAugust 1914. 
147 Sli go Champion, 6"' June 1914. 
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Chal)ter 10 : War, Takeover and Dissent 
With just one exception, the local press at the end of July 1914 seemed oblivious to the 
imminence of European war. Leading articles over the weekend of 1 "-2 nd August focused 
almost exclusively on Irish affairs. Specifically, the Howth arms landings, Bachelor's Walk 
killings and the local anger the latter inspired were by a long way the major story. The 
exception, as so often, was provided by Jasper Tully's Roscommon Herald, whose leader was 
instead 'The War Drums! '. For Tully, millions were now marching in Europe and England 
was on the edge of a precipice that might mean 'the end of the Empire as we know it'. The 
plotting of 'Servia', 'one of the most contemptible nations on earth', had triggered the crisis, 
but 'for Ireland, all this is profoundly interesting'. In this Tully saw an opportunity, however 
imprecise, for Irish nationalists and concluded : 'if we are men, and are prepared to act up to 
the call of destiny, Ireland may yet rise triumphant out of the ashes of her own past'. ' 
'Bravo EnWand! ' 
Within two weeks, the impact of war had indeed changed the political mood in Ireland, 
though in anything but the direction anticipated by Tully. By the end of August, local police 
reports were unequivocal that popular opinion had taken England's side in the war. In 
Leitrim, the county was 'to a man' for Great Britain in the war. In Roscommon: 'The war is 
the absorbing topic of interest now. Nothing else is discussed and there is a fine spirit of 
Loyalty in evidence. Germany is hated and France loved. ' Public sympathy in Sligo was said 
to be entirely pro-British, while in Westmeath: 'The sole topic of interest among all classes is 
the War in Europe. ' Here there was a 'marked consensus' that 'England is right to join the 
wari .2 As Augustine 
Birrell was to write in 'The State of Ireland', a November 1914 Cabinet 
paper : 
The Irish have changed, and their attitude today, north, south, east and west towards 
England in her tTemendous struggle with Germany and Austria is, speaking of Ireland as 
a whole, one of great friendliness. 
1 Roscommon Herald, I" August 1914. 
2 Monthly reports of the Leitrim, Roscommon, Sligo and"estineath county inspectors, August 1914 (PRO CO 
904/94). 
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There was still a 'disloyal minority', but the 'old Fenian strain' was worn 'very thin indeed in 
Ireland'. This change of Irish opinion was 'unprecedented and calls for notice'. 3A member 
of what Birrell called the 'disloyal minority', Desmond Fitzgerald, recalled in his memoirs 
that his immediate reaction to the outbreak of war, one of rejoicing at England's difficulty, 
soon gave way to despair as Germany rather than England became the popular enemy and 
Ireland's martial spirit was 'canalised' for the defence of England. 'Our castle of dreams 
toppled about us with a crash. 94 
From its outset, the impact of war dwarfed everything else in importance and the local press, 
of whatever political hue, immediately responded to the needs of its readers for news, not just 
about battles and campaigns but about how the war directly affected them. The key local 
stories of the first weeks related to panic buying, price rises, the call-up of reservists, arrests 
of 'spies', booming cattle exports and the workings of numerous war relief committees. The 
Western Nationalist wrote of the 'shivering' of bank accounts and of 'food traitors' increasing 
their prices. The Leitrim Advertiser noted that all local banks shut from 3rd-7h August. The 
Westmeath Independent inveighed against 'food harpies' and, with undimmed anti-Semitism, 
against the 'Jew harpies' who had profiteered in the South African war and were now doing 
so again. 5 There was undoubtedly a sense of excitement and, as army reservists left the 
region, it was reported that they were seen off by local bands and cheering crowds. 6A 
'general dread of a Gen-nan invasion' 7 triggered arrests of suspicious foreigners. Two 
'Russian Jew peddlars' were arrested in Boyle, whether for spying or profiteering is not clear. 
Two foreigners arrested in Tarmonbarry, County Longford - again Russian - were said to be 
studying the village's bridge over the Shannon. In Sligo town, a spy scare led to the 
8 
movements of all visitors to the town being watched . 
Some news stories were undoubtedly short-lived; panic buying and knee-jerk price rises had 
subsided by the third week of the war, 9 the reservists had all gone by mid-August and the 
3 Birrell Cabinet paper, 'The State of Ireland'. November 1914 (PRO CAB 3 7/122 Document 17 1). 
4 F. Fitzgerald (ed. ). The Memoirs ofDesmond Fitzgerald, 1913-1916 (London 1968). p. 46. 
5 ff 'cstern Nationalist, 8'h August: Leitrim Advertiser, 6hAugust; Hestmeath Independent, 8, h August 1914. 
Monthly report of the Sligo county Inspector. August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94); Longford Leader; Roscommon 
Messenguer; Sligo Champion; Westmeath Independent, 8th August 1914. 
7 Monthly report of the Inspector General August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
sWestern Nationalist, l5th August. Leitrim Observer, 29thAugust: Sligo Independent, 29thAugust 1914. 
9 Leitrim Advertiser, 13'h August. Westmeath Independent, 15 th August; TVestmeath Examiner, 22 nd August 1914. 
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chances of invasion, as the Midland Reporter noted on I OthSeptember, were now remote. 10 
Other stories were much more persistent. Week after week the meetings of war relief 
committees (primarily to support soldiers' dependants) were written up and regular reports of 
labour shortages began to appear. The Roscommon Herald wrote of the latter, in Longford, as 
early as mid-August and in mid-October the Westmeath Independent, reporting no lack of 
employment locally, predicted significant labour shortages in the coming spring. " The 
economies of garrison towns such as Athlone and Mullingar benefited from the arrival of 
thousands of troops in training. Horses were bought up by the army and cattle exports 
boomed. The Mullingar Westmeath Guardian revived itself to inveigh against the folly of 
farmers exporting breeding cattle too early. ' 2 The overall increase of food prices was large 
even though the initial panic buying had subsided. The Board of Trade estimated that in the 
UK they had risen by between 15-17% up to I't December. 13 The Roscommon county 
inspector reported at the year-end that 'farmers are well pleased with themselves'. 14 
Other war news was less 'good'. Duties on tea and beer went up in the first wartime budget 
in November. (The Western Nationalist attacked the burden being placed upon Ireland's 
teetotallers. ) 15 Government finance for local public works - Board of Works loans under the 
1881 Land Act, housing loans from the Treasury, Local Government Board support for the 
proposed Athlone water works - was Cut Off . 
16 Belgian refugees appeared in Mullingar and 
Sligo from mid-November and shipping in and out of Sligo was disrupted from the end of 
October by German mine-laying, with one steamer sunk and fourteen men drowned. 17 By 
November, the publication of letters home from local men serving in the army was 
supplemented by notices of war deaths. 
As for the newspapers themselves, they commonly carried one to two pages of war news from 
outside Ireland, but they were constrained by what the Sligo Champion called the 'famine 
10 Midland Reporter, I O'b September 1914. 
11 Roscommon Herald, 15'h August: Westmeath Independent, 17'h October 1914. 
12 Wcstmeath Guardian, 140'August and 16'h October 1914. 
13 Lcitrim Advertiyer, 31" December 1914. 
14 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. December 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
'-' Westcrn Nationalist, 2 Is' November 1914. 
16 lVestineath Independent, 21" November; 5th and 19 1h December 1914. 
Sligo Independent, 31" October 1914. 
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levels' of newsprint prices. 18 Several papers shrank in size as a result. Concerning the tone of 
their war coverage, the historian Patrick Maume has written of 'the propagation of British war 
hysteria I in the Irish press and of rising agricultural prices heightening 'war euphoria' in this 
period, ' 9 but in the five counties, after the initial two to three weeks, the press showed few 
signs of either hysteria or euphoria. From the outset the horror of the war and the damage it 
th 
would cause were stressed. For the Roscommon Messenger on 8 August, the war would be 
the most appalling in history. If it was short, it would be so only because 'its own awful 
weight must break it own. ' 20 The Messenger's sister paper the Westmeath Examiner a month 
later emphasised the barbarities, horror and sorrows resulting from the war, while for the 
Leitrim Advertiser it was 'the Armageddon'. 21 The grim public statement of Lord Kitchener 
at the end of August, after thousands of casualties had already been incurred, was widely 
commented upon. Kitchener predicted the need for at least thirty army divisions and that the 
war would last two to three years. The Longford Leader now predicted 'a long war', while 
the Sligo Champion warned that England would need many more than the number of recruits 
currently being organised, possibly as many as 600,000.22 
In addition to the inevitable popular focus on the impact of the war, there was a genuine 
sympathy for 'the Allies' and in particular hostility to Germany. Anti-German views were 
expressed by almost all the press. Jasper Tully voiced his aversion to Prussian militarism (see 
Chapter 5). Farrell's Longford Leader made it clear that Ireland could not exchange English 
for German rule, 'the most autocratic, bureaucratic and tyrannical in the world'. First the 
German 'war tide' had to be rolled back; then the Irish race would pursue its destiny of Home 
Rule. 23 For the Roscommon Journal, responding to Kitchener's gloomy prognostications at 
the end of August, Ireland would have to bear every sacrifice rather than bow down to the 
'Moloch of German iniquity'. The Journal feared not only Gen-nany's militarism but its 
Protestantism, for it went on to stress that if Ireland did not resist, she would not only be 
9 24 dominated but 'Lutheranised .A week 
later, the Westmeath Independent, with splendid 
18 Sligo Champion, 22 nd August 1914. The paper noted that pulp prices had already doubled since the outbreak 
of war and that normal stock levels of ten weeks' usage had fallen to six. 
19 Maume, The Long Gestation, pp. 150-15 1. 
20 Roscommon Messengei-, 8b August 1914. 
21 Westmeath Examiner, 5th September. Lelti-im Advenisei-, 3d September. 
22 Longfoi-dLeadei-, - Sligo Champion, 29 th August 1914. 
23 Longfoi-d Leadei-, 8h August 1914. 
2' Roscommon Joui-nal, 5 th September 1914. 
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inaccuracy, appeared to return to the theme of religion when it wrote of : 'fighting for the 
supremacy of our common civilisation against the hordes of Nuns now bearing down on the 
comity of nations'. 25 
That the Home Rule crisis was temporarily defused was, however, due not just to the 
overriding needs of war, nor to the general belief, as the Sligo Champion rather tamely put it, 
that 'appearances are against Germany' concerning the rights and wrongs of the fight. 26 
There was also the political initiative taken by John Redmond: his parliamentary offer, right 
at the outbreak of war, that the Irish Volunteers would serve alongside the Ulster Volunteer 
Force in Ireland's defence, freeing army units to serve overseas. This statement has been 
exhaustively analysed, and was far fi7om just the simple, from-the-heart affair later described 
by the journalist Harold Spender ('... for once he let himself go. He trusted England. '). 27 In 
particular, the historian George Dangerfield has emphasised the degree of political calculation 
involved, with Redmond keen to outflank Carson (who had already offered 'a large body' of 
the UVF for home defence) and pressing immediately for the quid pro quo of royal assent for 
the Home Rule bill. 28 Locally, the response of John Hayden's Roscommon Messenger 
29 (Hayden was one of the handful of MPs consulted by Redmond before his offer), was 
consistent with this analysis of Redmond's calculation. Though the Messenger believed the 
outcome could be good for Ireland and the empire, its key point was that Redmond had 
6 entirely outmanoeuvred Sir Edward Carson'. The government would in return make 
concessions to the Volunteers on arms and training. 30 
In another commentary on Redmond's statement, Oliver MacDonagh has argued that to Irish 
ears Redmond sought to rekindle the spirit and role of the Volunteers of 1778, while to British 
ears he was simply offering support for the war effort. This produced, according to 
MacDonagh, 'a gross, almost comic, divergence of interpretation'. 31 However, such a 
divergence was not apparent in the local, Irish, nationalist press. Here, Redmond's assertion 
of the rights of Ireland and of the Volunteers was more than matched by his offer of 
25 Ij estmeath Independent, 12'hSeptember 1914. 20 Sli go Champion, 8th August 1914. 
n 27 Harold Spender, 'John Redmond - An Appreciation, Contemporary Review (April 1918), p. 376. 
28Dangerfield, The Damnable Question, p. 122. 
29 Stephen Gwynn. John Redmond's Last Years, p. 13 1. 
30 Roscommon Messenger, 8th August 1914. 
31 MacDonagh, States qfMind, pp. II- 12. 
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'fiiendship' to England. The Sligo Champion noted the profound impression created by 
Redmond's speech among unionists. Though it believed that from Ireland's perspective the 
war could result in 'much good', its conclusion was that it welcomed 'the comradeship of a 
defensive alliance' with England. The Longford Leader, normally more bellicose and 
anglophobe than other 'party' papers, was in this case even more welcoming. All Irish 
opinion backed Redmond, who had offered the hand of fiiendship to England in her greatest 
difficulty. It was the Westmeath Independent (often the most 'Redmondite' of the local 
papers if also the most erratic), which was the most effusive. The loss of the war was too 
horrible to contemplate, while Redmond's 'great and gracious' offer ended an antagonism that 
had lasted for centuries. The paper's headline was simple: 'Bravo England! 32 
Redmond's statement had an immediate effect in reducing local tensions. As elsewhere in 
Ireland, unionists became conspicuous in joining the Volunteers : en masse at a public 
meeting in Athlone; 33 forming a 'unionist' company of some 70 Irish Volunteers in County 
Sligo. 34 Several ex-army officers now offered their services. Redmond's offer was also 
endorsed by a deluge of nationalist resolutions passed by public boards, party executives and 
Volunteer companies. Sligo Corporation was typical. Under the mayor, John Jinks, who only 
four days before had told the Sligo Guardians that 'Ireland is out for blood and murder' (see 
Chapter 9), the AOH/Labour-led Corporation on 5th August unanimously backed Redmond's 
offer. Jinks was happy that Redmond had held out the hand of fiiendship, offering an 'olive 
leaf to the English government. He was also happy to take part in 'preserving the entirety 
and the power of the British Empire'. 35 A Volunteer muster in Mullingar in 15'hAugust 
exemplified the new mood. Some 2,600 Volunteers from 27 companies (including 450 from 
Mullingar and 200 from Athlone) paraded to be reviewed by their national commanding 
officer, Colonel Maurice Moore, watched by over 2,000 spectators. On the platform were 
eight priests, the Liberal grandee Lord Greville, members of the unionist Boyd-Rochford, 
32 Sli go Champion: LongfOrd Leader, - Westmeath Independent, 8 
th August 1914. 
33 TT"estmeath Guardian, 7t" August 1914. The meeting ended with three cheers for the King, Redmond and the 
Volunteers. 
34 11'estmeath Independent, 8flAugust 1914; monthly report of the Sligo county inspector. August 1914 (PRO 
CO 904'94). 
35 Sligo Champion, 8th August 1914. 
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Tottenham and Featherstonehaugh families, the town's leading politicians (both Ginnellite 
36 
and Haydenite), Sir Walter Nugent and no less than Laurence Ginnell . 
Unease and Dissension 
Public expressions of sympathy for Britain remained the norm for many months, but the new- 
found mood of Irish unity which had come into being so rapidly and mercurially was already 
dissolving by the end of August, with mounting grumbling, unease and political dissension. 
Central to this gloomier mood was a persistent belief that the government was spurning 
Redmond's offer; that the Volunteers were receiving no official support, that unionists were 
still manoeuvring to frustrate Home Rule and that royal assent for the bill was being deferred. 
At the end of August the RIC inspector general noted that 'a feeling of mistrust set in pending 
the disposal of the Home Rule Bill'. 37 Repeated parliamentary adjournments coincided with 
the first war casualties and Kitchener's predictions of a long war. On 29th August, the 
Longford Leader described Ireland as 'almost bereft of patience'. 38 In the first week of 
September, Redmond gave a public, but vague, warning of 'infinite mischief and resentment 
should Home Rule be denied . 
39 The Roscommon Messenger and Westmeath Examiner both 
40 
exhorted their readers not to panic and to trust Redmond , while the Longford Leader 
became more menacing. Surely something, declared Farrell's paper, should be given in return 
for Redmond's open and unasked avowal of sympathy with Britain. The Tories were still 
quite hostile to granting any 'relief for Ireland, and the government had shown 'an 
extraordinary want of decision and fin-nness'. Ireland wanted peace ardently, but 'there will 
be a heavy reckoning sooner or later to be paid for by those who now simply despise us'. 41 
The tone of John Jinks's language, which had already moved from predicting 'blood and 
murder' to 'preserving the entirety and the power of the British Empire', duly shifted again. 
Nationalists would now go no further than defending their own shores until the English 
parliament had conceded the national demand. Men should join only the Volunteers, and only 
36 Maurice Moore, Accoiint qf the Irish T -olunteers, pp. 297-98 (Moore Mss., National Library of Ireland, File 
8489/5). Midland Reporter, 20th August; Westmeath Independent, 22 nd August 1914. There is, however, no 
record of Ginnell having spoken at the rally. 
37 Monthly report of the Inspector General, August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
38 Longford Leader, 29th August 1914. 
39 Leitrim Observcr, 5h September 1914. 
40 Roscommon Messenger, - Westmeath Examiner, 5th September 1914. 
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for a defensive role. 42 That most orthodox of party newspapers, the Sligo Champion, week 
after week gave voice to the sourer mood. On 22 nd August, it derided the 'soft talk' of the 
previous two weeks : 'to pretend that we are profoundly interested in the fortunes of the 
Empire is manifestly absurd'. A week later, its conclusion, post-Kitchener, was that 'if 
England wants more Irish blood and sinew in the line, as she certainly will, she must deal 
squarely with Ireland'. On 12th September, the paper declared that England had 'failed to rise 
to the occasion' of Redmond's offer. Ireland had already contributed more than her fair share 
to the carnage of the past month. 'We hold emphatically that this is not the time for recruiting 
propaganda to receive any countenance fTom Nationalist quarters'. 43 
This sense of dissatisfaction was expressed by a broad range of the party's press and 
followers, but more distinct opposition was also being voiced by some who openly attacked 
the whole policy of support for the Allies. A person's attitude to the war (and particularly 
support for 'England') quickly became the issue defining political allegiances, and divisions, 
among Irish nationalists. Admittedly, there were still only isolated instances of outright local 
dissent. On the Delvin (Westmeath) district council, when the obligatory resolution was 
proposed supporting Redmond's August offer, one councillor, Tom Kelly, asked what Ireland 
had ever got from England : 'we have no enemy only England'. Even he, however, then 
acquiesced in a 'unanimous' vote for the offer. 44 In Roscommon the Gaelic athlete Michael 
Brennan tried to circulate 'seditious' leaflets in mid August, though he was, according to the 
police, 'condemned by everyone'. 45 The most vocal 'opposition' came from the Boyle and 
Mullingar newspapers of the Tully brothers. 
The Tullys wrote no early leaders attacking Redmond's offer outright, but it was clear, as the 
RIC inspector general's September report noted, that the Roscommon Herald at least was 
seen as an 4 extreme' paper. 46 Both the Boyle and Mullingar papers carried American 
newspaper extracts critical of the war, and the 'Herald's first leader, of 22"d August on the 
death of the Pope, lamented the number of Catholics opposing the Allies and dreaded the 
42 Jinks speaking to the Easkey Volunteers, 6d' September (Sligo Champion 12'b September 1914). 
43 Sli go Champion, 22 d and 29th August, 12th September 1914. (These leading articles have also been discussed 
in Farry, Sligo 1914-192 1, p. 39 and Thomas Hennessey. Dividing Ireland : World War I and Partition (London 
and New York 1998). p. 50). 
44 U76vtmeath Guardian, 14th August 1914. 
45 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
4(, Monthly report of the inspector General, September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
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prospect of an Eastern Orthodox - i. e. Russian - victory over Catholic Austria. The 'Gaelic 
Notes' of 5 th September reproduced the poem 'Who is Ireland's Enemy? ' (no prizes for 
guessing) from the IRB's journal Irish Freedom, while Tully lamented that Ireland was to 
become a 'recruiting ground' for its Volunteers to be blown to pieces while lordly 
Englishmen stayed at home. The closest both papers came to attacking Redmond's offer was 
at the end of August, when they ran an expose 'The Mask Off The Volunteers', combining 
Kitchener's bearish predictions for the war with the rather incautious statement by Sir Walter 
Nugent's old ffiend, the ex-unionist Gerald Dease (now a Volunteer officer), that the 
Volunteers would be supplied with English uniforms. Now, claimed both papers, it was clear 
why the Volunteers had been offered in parliament : 'to wear red coats, and come under 
Kitchener'. The Midland Reporter contrasted Ireland's sacrifices in the war with the 
'400,000' playing golf in England and the '200,000' watching football in Glasgow alone! 47 
However, the Tullys were no longer alone. From the end of August the Carrick Leitrim 
Observer, which had always hitherto been a party paper if hardly Redmondite, adopted much 
the same tone as its Boyle rival. On 29th August, a report reproduced from the American 
Advocate stated that Irish-American sentiment was more pro-German than pro-English; the 
Observer's headline was 'Where Our Sentiments Should Be'. Another story, 'Why England 
Went to War', reproduced a statement issued by Herr von Haimhausen of the German 
Washington embassy. A piece published on l2thSeptember renewed the old nationalist attack 
on English 'penny dirties', this time because of their publication of 'German atrocity' stories. 
Why not come over to Ireland and see worse ruins? How many Louvains had been destroyed 
in Ireland? The paper was not yet absolute in its opposition - its 12 
th September piece stated 
that though it hated English hypocrisy it wanted, 'of course', to see England victorious - but 
48 
an editorial line had undoubtedly been crossed . 
In late-August/early-September, fissures were opening among the Volunteers. One Volunteer 
company, Ballycarnagh in Westmeath, was publicly urged by a local publican, James Drew, 
not to accept the King's arms and uniforms. He added that he did not dislike Germany and 
his remarks were cheered . 
49 The Sligo journalist, Seamus McGowan, wrote to the Sligo 
47 Roscommon Herald, 22 nd and 29hAugust. 5hSeptember 1914; Midland Reporter, 27b August 1914. 
48 Leitriin Obsei-ver, 29th August. 12th September 1914. 
49 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector. August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
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Champion attacking the Volunteers' 'betrayal' of disavowing the now anti-war Irish 
Volunteer newspaper. 50 Increasingly, such outright opponents of the war were labelled as 
'Sinn Feiners'. The inspector general wrote at the end of August of 'Sinn Feiners and other 
extremists' opposing the war. 51 On 29hAugust the Longford Leader accused 'the Sinn Fein 
element' of playing Carson's game and undermining Home Rule, while on the same day the 
Roscommon Herald could note that 'Sinn Feiners' in the Volunteers were 'fluttering the 
dovecots'. 52 Some party papers counter-attacked. The Roscommon Messenger criticised those 
Volunteers who still attempted to run the movement independently of the Irish party. There 
could be no toleration of tactics that disrupted the national movement. Major Gerald Dease, 
the butt of the 'Red Coats' scare, wrote to the Freeman's Journal denouncing Sinn Fein 
'blatherskites'. 53 
The mood in early September was summed up by Dillon in a letter to T. P. O'Connor. For 
Dillon the situation in Ireland was 'bad'. caused by government shilly-shallying. 'Now the 
country is seething with suspicion and disappointment ... You can see how the Sinn Feiners 
are prospering on the ground. Our fhends are disheartened and bewildered. -ý54 It was against 
this background that the Irish party finally 'won' Home Rule. 
I 
Home Rule and Takeover 
Home Rule, in the form of the Government of Ireland Act, finally received the royal assent on 
18'hSeptember. It was accompanied by a Suspensory Act, effectively delaying Home Rule's 
implementation indefinitely during the war, and by the promise of amending legislation 
concerning Ulster's exclusion. This package of measures, giving what Stephen Gwynn later 
called 'a post dated cheque for a limited freedom', 55 did not come as a complete surprise. 
Tully on 12'h September had predicted that 'sham' Home Rule would be passed only for it to 
be 'hung up' for the duration of the war. On the same day, the Longford Leader denounced 
the prospect of a Suspensory Act as another concession to the Orange party: the government 
was more afraid of Carson than of the Kaiser, but the paper could see no alternative. Five 
50 Sli, 0,0 
, 
Champion, 12th September 1914. 
51 Monthly report of the Inspector General, August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
'2 Longford Leader, - Roscommon Herald 'Gaelic Notes'. 29 th August 1914. 
53 Roscommon Messenger, 22 nd August-, ff`estmeath Examiner, 29 th August 1914. 
54 Dillon to O'Connor, 5bSeptember 1914. Dillon papers TCD, f 6740'225. 
55 3 Stephen G,, Nynn, The Irish Situation, p. 54. 
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days later the Leitrim Advertiser remarked that no one in Ireland wanted an Amending bill 
and hoped that it would not prove necessary. 56 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, such a qualified passage of Home Rule generated only patchy 
manifestations of spontaneous popular support. The Westmeath county inspector did note a 
demonstration in Moate and the Leitrim Advertiser reported on illuminations and a torch-light 
procession in Mohill. J. P. Farrell addressed a crowd of 600 in Longford town. However, the 
Leitrim county inspector reported that the passage of the Act caused 'very little excitement' in 
his county, while his Sligo counterpart noted that there was 'very little demonstration'. The 
Westmeath Independent wrote that compared with the town's celebrations of May (when the 
bill passed its third reading in the Commons) there were no large demonstrations in Athlone. 57 
The passage of Home Rule was, nevertheless, a major news story and the press response to it 
was polarised. Some party papers were enthusiastic, notably John Hayden's two 
newspapers. 58 e unionist Sligo Independent corroborated such nationalist praise for the Act 
by attacking its passage as a betrayal of unionist sacrifices. 59 At the other extreme, the Act 
was denounced as 'A Scrap of Flypaper' by the Tully brothers, who linked the Act's passage 
to the imminence of calls for recruitment to the British army. This linkage was also explicit 
in the Leitrim Observer, which saw Home Rule as 'a bill for the promotion of recruiting for 
the English army in Ireland'. 60 Moreover, yet another local nationalist newspaper now joined 
the opposition, making four in total. For the Roscommon Journal, which only two weeks 
before had taken a stand against 'the Moloch of German iniquity', its 19th September leading 
article firmly linked Home Rule to recruiting with the headline 'Home Rule and Red Coats'. 
The legislative package was 'simply hanging Home Rule in a glass case until the war is over' 
and the Irish people had been treated with 'humbug and flapdoodle'. 'Perhaps' it wrote, 'we 
are too enraptured over this Bill. It might be like the past in the old wars when the Irish 
Catholics brought England in her battles out on top. After that there was little regard for 
them. 61 
56 Roscommon Herald; Longford Leader, 12'h September; Leitrim Advertise7-, 176 September 1914. 
57 Monthly reports of the Leitrim, Longford. Sligo and Westmeath county mspectors, September 1914 (PRO CO 
904/94). Leitrim Advertiser, 24th September; Westmeath Independent, 26 1h September 1914. 
58 See Roscommon Messenger and TVestmeath Examiner, 19'b September 1914. 
50 Sligo Independent, 19th September 1914. 
60 Roscommon Herald, 19'b September; Midland Reporter, 8h October; Leitrim Obser-ver, 19th September 1914. 
61 Roscommon Journal, I 9th September 1914. 
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Between the two extremes of joy and denunciation, the Sligo Champion, just as it had when 
the bill was first introduced 2 V2years previously, adopted a measured, cautious tone : 'This is 
probably as much as could be expected at the moment. ' 62 J. P. Farrell defended the legislative 
package in detail. If the government had been thrown out, he argued, Home Rule would have 
been lost for years. No reasonable man could object to the Suspensory Act, as Home Rule 
could not come into immediate operation anyway. As for the Amending bill, no more than 
two Ulster counties would vote to stay out. 63 John Fitzgibbon, speaking at Fairymount, 
Roscommon on the same day, perhaps summed up the popular mood. He 'believed that 
Ireland as a whole did not yet realise or recognise to the full what the present Home Rule Bill 
64 contained' . 
The passage of Home Rule was now joined hip and thigh to the issue of recruiting. The 
Westmeath Independent's first leader on 19th September might have given only a measured 
welcome to the Act, but its second was 'Recruiting in Ireland' and a week later it wrote on 
'The Call to Arms'. 65 For the Irish party this was not accidental. Its shift from supporting the 
defence of Ireland to exhorting men to fight 'in the firing line' was first announced publicly 
by Redmond in parliament on 15 th September 66 , confin-ned in a 'Manifesto' published on 16 
th 
September 67 and again by Redmond's supposedly chance remarks to a Volunteer muster at 
Woodenbridge, County Wicklow on 20thSeptember. The motivations behind this policy shift 
have been dissected by historians and, as with Redmond's statement of 3rd August, reflected 
both a genuine, principled support for the war effort and an array of political calculations. 
The political case for recruitment was far more than an outburst of quixotic anglophilia or 
imperialism. As J. J. Lee has summarised, active endorsement of the war effort would secure 
the operation of Home Rule, woo British opinion ahead of a likely 1915 general election, 
unite nationalists and unionists in shared wartime comradeship and surely secure better an-ns 
and training for the Volunteers. By contrast, any move to 'neutrality' in the war would play 
68 into the hands of unionists, confirm Ireland's partition and forfeit British support . Ireland 
62 Sli go Champion, 19'h September 1914. 
63 LongfordLeader, 26"' September 1914. 
64 Roscommon Messenger, 26tb September 1914. 
65 Westmeath Independent, 19'11 and 26'h September 1914. 
"" See 'Home Rule Notes' in the ff"estern Nationalist, 19 th September 1914. 
67 Hennessey, Dividing Ireland, p. 86. 
68 Lee, Modern Ireland, p. 2 1. 
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may well have had a moral duty to participate in the war, but the alternative, of spitting in the 
face of English (and Ulster) opinion in the midst of a terrible war would also be politically 
disastrous for the post-war implementation of Home Rule. Redmond's personal beliefs had 
for years been significantly more conciliatory and imperialist than those of his party. Several 
times he had been forced to curb his enthusiasm to retain party support. In 1904 he had been 
forced to pull back from support for Irish devolution; in 1907 for the Irish Council bill and in 
1910 for federal 'Home Rule All Round'. Now, again, his beliefs were clearly on display. 
Soon he would be singing 'God Save The King', drinking the loyal toast and flying the Union 
Jack alongside the Green Flag at his summer home Aughavanagh . 
69 However, in supporting 
recruitment his party appeared, this time, to be 'right behind' him. 
Party justifications for the new policy were articulated in the local press in the ensuing weeks. 
The Westmeath Independent leader of 26h September ('The Call to Arms') stated that Ireland 
had been won to the empire by the restoration of her freedom. She was now bound by honour 
to support England, defend the rights of small nations and fight barbarism by raising an 'Irish 
Brigade'. The best way for Irishmen to woo Ulster and defend Ireland's rights after the war 
was to 'play their part well' now. For the Sligo Champion on the same day, recruiting was 
vital for the successful implementation of Home Rule. The war had created a 'real 
opportunity' to forget old quarrels (i. e. between north and south), while if Ireland did her 
duty, the government could hardly forget the work of nationalist soldiers, 'whose bones are 
bleaching from Mons to Paris'. 70 Of the local MPs, the most whole-hearted and conciliatory 
support for the war effort came John Fitzgibbon, who in November would make his 'proudest 
boast' that his youngest son was volunteeiing for the army to fight at 'the front ,. 71 
By contrast, John Hayden showed some of the less conciliatory views underlying support for 
recruiting when he told a Volunteer review : 'when the war is over then Sir Edward Carson 
will be in possession of trained, drilled and equipped soldiers ready to menace the freedom 
which we have gained for you. ' According to Hayden, Redmond's wanted an Irish brigade in 
the British army trained and ready to meet this (post-war) menace. Admittedly, Hayden 
69 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond's Last Years, p. 182. 
70 ff, `estmeath Independent; Sligo Chanipion, 26hSeptember 1914. 
7' Fitzgibbon speaking at Caramore. County Mayo, Western Nationalist, 14'h November 1914. Two of 
Fitzgibbon's sons eventually joined up, one as an army chaplain. and both died in the war. 
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stated that with Home Rule Ireland would be a united and loyal part of the empire, but he 
went on to emphasise the conditionality of such loyalty : 
We did hate England in the past and we hate today the things that England did to Ireland 
in the past. And if she were to do these things tomorrow we would hate and fight and 
72 
struggle against her just as we did in the past (cheers) . 
Whether stemming from principle, political calculation, a desire to conciliate Ulster, the fear 
of an armed and trained post-war UVF, or any or all of these, the party's advocacy of 
recruiting to fight for England was the immediate cause of the Volunteer split which now 
occurred. The passage of Home Rule effectively fired the starting gun for an open, political 
fight between the Irish party and its 'factionist' and 'Sinn Feiner' opponents, waged, as in 
previous nationalist splits, with gusto. Nationalists were compelled to take sides, with support 
for recruiting the touchstone of whether they were loyal to Redmond. Given the scale of the 
Volunteers' popular mobilisation, the party's less-than-perfect control of them and the 
number of dissidents active in them, the Volunteers were the obvious focus for the conflict. 
The degree of co-ordination and organisation now shown by the party suggests that the split 
was anticipated in advance and that the party was only too keen to force the issue. Virtually 
all of the party's local leadership were organised to lead a succession of rallies, 
demonstrations, parades and committee meetings to pledge support for Redmond and his 
policies. Companies were made to declare themselves for or against; Dublin daily papers kept 
tallies of which companies took which side. 73 Even loyal companies had their committees 
restructured and dissidents demoted. Above the hitherto largely independent companies, 
county committees were created and superimposed. As the RIC inspector general put it : 'Mr 
John Redmond assumed leadership of the Irish Volunteers. He with Mr J. Devlin MP and 
others are now advocating a reorganisation, with the result that Sinn Feiners are being turned 
out of the force. ' 74 This time the Irish party vampire really was out for blood. 
In taking control of the Volunteers, the party was engaged in a straight, political fight and its 
propaganda combined high principle with all the traditional invective of fights, factions, 
'2 Hayden speaking at a Lanesborough, County Roscommon Volunteer review. Roscommon Messenger, 17th 
October 1914. 
73 See Irish Independent, 1.2 nd 3 rd 6 th 7 th . 
8h. 10h. 13'h. 14'b and 20th October 1914. 
74 Monthly report of the Inspector General, September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
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wreckers and unity. For the Westmeath independent a6 great campaign' had been fought, the 
country had been tested and found to back Redmond. The 'revolters', barring a few in 
75 Dublin, had been left utterly isolated . The 
Longford Leader saw Redmond as having had to 
fight 'one of the most desperate fights of modem times' (to win Home Rule) while still some 
carped. It would be insane to hurl defiance at England now. Ireland was now threatened with 
a Sinn Fein split, engineered by a 'small and mostly unknown knot of men'. 76 Forthe 
Roscommon Messenger an attempt to wreck the Volunteer movement' by a 'tiny knot of 
worthy, unknown politicians' had been thwarted. The clique of factionists and malcontents 
had been seen off by the 'National movement ... under the leadership of the chosen general of 
Irishmen the world over'. 77 
In the five counties, the party's takeover was most complete in Roscommon and Leitrim. 
Opponents formed only small minorities at company meetings and their leaders either 
resigned from or were voted off Volunteer committees. The size of the vote might be 
contested - at Castlerea, Fitzgibbon reckoned that no more than six voted against him, while 
the Roscommon Herald reported fifteen 78 - but the result was almost always the same. The 
closest contest was at Gortletteragh, Leitrim, where 45 backed Redmond, 24 were against and 
30 neutral . 
79 No companies defected to support MacNeill's Provisional Committee and only 
one non-defecting company, Upper Arigna, showed signs of collective sympathy for it; the 
company briefly stuck to a neutral stance before coming out for Redmond . 
80 The main 
nucleus of opposition seems to have been in Roscommon town; at the takeover meeting there 
the party loyalist Michael Heverin referred to 'certain parties' briefly getting control and of 
'Sinn Feiners who have crept in again'. 81 In November, a group of forty such dissidents met 
in a private house to commemorate the Manchester Martyrs, led by the GAA man Michael 
Brennan and by George Geraghty, who was still chairman of the Roscommon town 
commissioners. 82 Nevertheless, they were a small minority. In his October report the 
75 TT'estmeath Independent, 10th and 17'h October 1914. 
76 Longford Leader, 3d October 1914. 
77 Roscommon Messenger, 3d October 1914. 
78 Fitzgibbon to Dillon, 12'h October 1914, Dillon papers TCD, f 6754/480; Roscommon Herald, 17'h October 
1914. 
79 Monthly report of the Inspector General, November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
80 Roscommon Herald, 17 th and 31' October 1914. 
81 Heverin speaking at a meetin(,,, to organise a district battalion as part of the new county corps. Roscommon 
Jow-nal 3rd October 1914. 
82 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
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Roscommon county inspector wrote of fifty extremists and fifty Sinn Feiners enrolled in the 
Volunteers' across the whole county, though he added that 'the latter are increasing in 
number'. By the end of November he had cut his estimate of 'Sinn Feiners and extremists and 
pro-German' dissidents' to 'around 1 1/2%' of the Volunteers (i. e. approximately 75-80), 'but 
they are afraid to say much openly'. 83 In the same month, the Leitrim county inspector 
reported no open 'pro-German' feeling in his county. 84 
In Westmeath, though all the main Volunteer companies came under party control, the split 
was more pronounced. In mid-October, the Westmeath Examiner could still fulminate against 
some dissidents 'skulking or even actively promoting dissension'. 'Malcontents' were said to 
be at work in the Killucan area, even reviving 'the methods of secret conspiracy' there. 85 
Two small Westmeath companies, Drumraney and Ballykeeran, declared their allegiance to 
the Provisional Committee. 
86 The Tang company, led by the president of the Tang UIL and 
87 Gaelic Leaguer Father O'Reilly, stayed obstinately neutral and refused to back Redmond . 
In Mullingar, the president of the town's AOH, T. F. O'Shea, was excluded from the town's 
reconstructed committee. 88 In Athlone a rowdy meeting, which each side claimed was packed 
by the other, declared for Redmond by a two-to-one vote on 18th October. The dissidents then 
set up their own, though small, rival company. 89 Overall, the police estimated that some 150 
of the county's 3,350 Volunteers (probably not including those from Tang) actively opposed 
Redmond. 90 
The primary focus for opposition in Westmeath was the MP for North Westmeath, Ginnell, 
who effectively became the sole parliamentary mouthpiece for the Sinn Feiners. In Dublin, 
speaking at a rally organised by the Provisional Committee of the Volunteers, Ginnell 
denounced his fellow 102 Irish MPs as the IRB, the 'Irish Recruiting Brigade'. The enemies 
of Ireland were not Germans, but alien rulers, place hunters, West Britons and land agents. 
The so-called 'bond that we must honour' to England was a forgery, amounting to 'treachery' 
83 Ibid, October and November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
84 Monthly report of the Leitrim county inspector, November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
85 Westmeath Examiner, 17th October 1914. 
86 RIC Crime Special Branch precis. November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95); Irish Volunteer, 3rd October 1914. 
87 Sinn Fcin, 31 s' October 1914. 
88 Westmeath Examiner, 26th September 1914. 
89 Monthly reports of the NA, estmeath county inspector, October and November 1914 (PRO CO 904'95). Leitrim 
Advertiser, 22"d October. [Jestmeath Independent, 24 th October 1914. 
90 Monthly report of the Westmeath county inspector, November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
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to Ireland. Alien rule was still sapping Ireland's life blood and soon there would be no Insh 
manhood left to resist the Ulster conspirators. The maggots on the continent would be 
feeding on Irish corpses. 91 The Midland Repoi-ter gave the speech five columns of coverage. 
The party faced a still hardeTfight to control the Volunteers in Longford, with the police 
92 
estimating that six pro-Sinn Fein companies had to be restructured in favour of Redmond 
Most significantly, Farrell failed to win control of the Longford town company - his own 
home base - and had instead to fonn a rival, loyal company as well as a county command 
structure. Moreover, the fault line in Longford town lay not between the party and existing 
'factionists', but right down the town's party organisation. Farrell's principal opponents were 
now: 
- his chief strong-arm man in the 1909 fight against John Phillips, Joe Callaghan, 
- the secretary of the town's AOH division, Michael Cox and, above all, 
his political lieutenant for over twenty-five years, Frank MacGuinness. 93 
As Farrell reported to Dillon: 'MacGuinness our secretary for years and staunch supporter of 
the Party in all weathers up to this has gone against us and is using all his influence here 
against the Party and policy of its leader in fact he is quite Sinn Feiner'. 94 Apart from 
Longford town, the party failed to establish effective control in Ballymahon or Granard. In 
Ballymahon, despite the Longford Leader reporting loyalty, the Longford Independent later 
noted an anti-Redmond force in 'vigorous training' there. 95 Concerning Granard, the 
Longford Leader again claimed in early October that the corps was loyal, apart from a few 
'Sinn Fein cranks'. but in mid-November it also reported that only the Granard corps had not 
pledged loyalty to Redmond. 96 
9' Ginnell speaking at a Dublin rally organised by the Provisional Committee on II th October, Midland Reporter, 
15'h October; Roscommon Journal, 24h October 1914. 
()2 Monthly report of the Longford county inspector, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
93 Roscommon Herald, I O'h October; 14'h November 1914. At the South Longford UIL executive meeting on 4th 
October, Callaghan turned up with a rifle and heckled his old mentor Farrell. MacGuinness, still there as 
secretary, was challenged to speak by Farrell but declared that he was not on speaking form. 
94 Farrell to Dillon, 8th October 1914. Dillon papers TCD f 6753/430. It was 'in this same letter that Farrell 
denounced his old enemy John Phillips MP as 'pro-German mad' and 'fiercely denouncing Redmond in all 
directions'. As seen in Chapter 2 (footnote 116), there is no evidence to back up this claim. While Phillips took 
no part in the party's autumn 1914 campaign, he continued to participate 'in the local UIL and supported 
recruiting later in the war. 
9-' Longaford Leader, I Oth October. Longford Independent, 24th October 1914. 
96 Longford Leader, I Oth October; 14 1h November 1914. 
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The party's organisation also fractured in Sligo town and (see Chapter 7) the Lab/Nat alliance 
that had controlled the Corporation split apart. O'Dowd and Scanlan, returning to speak in 
the town after the passage of the Act, were publicly heckled and the town's Trades Council 
see-sawed between condemning and backing such opposition. After two contested meetings, 
the Trades Council came down, under the control of John Lynch and the ITGVVU, against 
Redmond. 97 The dissidents appeared briefly to control the town's Volunteer corps and 
announced their pro-MacNeill allegiance in the Irish Volunteer. 98 Long-standing dissidents 
such as Seamus McGowan and the GAA man Owen Healy were joined not only by many 
labour men but also by a number of teachers and Gaelic Leaguers who had not recently been 
active in party politics : notably the linguist Patrick O'Donnellan and the principal of the 
town's Technical Schools D. A. Mulcahy. Jinks re-established party control at a public 
meeting on 30 th September, but the town's corps had later to be extensively restructured into 
three new companies representing the Hibernians, the Foresters and the temperance club. 99 
Outside the town, Jinks addressed a succession of company meetings and then, pledging that 
4we are at the back of the Irish parliamentary party', chaired the county-wide meeting on 29 th 
September (see Chapter 1) attended by leading party men, clerics and both MPs. It was here 
that Henry Monson pledged that the Hibernians would be 'right behind Mr. Redmond. ' As 
elsewhere, a large majority of companies was whipped into line. However, one company, 
Tobercurry, openly sided with the MacNeillite Provisional Committee while in Keash, where 
the AOH took control of the local corps, a new MacNeillite Volunteer company was formed. 
In a third location, Grange, the established company while not defecting was openly 
sympathetic to MacNeill. ' 00 At the end of October, the police estimate was that there were 
280 Sinn Feiners in the county, out of just under 5,000 Volunteers. 101 
97 See Farry, Sligo 1914-1921, p. 43; Bew, Ideologv and the Irish Question, p. 121 and Sligo Champion, 26h 
September and P October 1914. At the second Trades Council meeting the radical P. T. Daly, who came from 
Dublin to attend, asked for 'politics' to be kept out of Trades Council affaliTS! 
98 This was not reported locally at the time, but in late November Rev. Butler reminded a Volunteer meeting of 
the daring attempt by factionists two months previously to command the town's Volunteers (Sligo Champion, 5 th 
December 1914). The Irish Volunteer editions of 3d and 10th October had claimed that Sligo town was loyal to 
MacNeill. 
99 Sligo Champion, 5h December 1914. Rev. Crehan having moved on to Cliffony, the temperance club was 
now run by the chaplain to the town"s Hibernians, Rev. Butler. 
100 RIC Crime Special Branch report, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/120); 'The Keash/Clufodda Volunteer 
Movement' in The Corran Herald, I' July 1987; monthly report of the Sligo county inspector, October 1914 
(PRO CO 904/95). 
101 Monthlyl report of the Sligo county inspector, October 1914 (PRO CO 904195). 
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By the end of October the battle to control the Volunteers was largely over with the Irish party 
victorious. The party still led the large majority of nationalists, popular opinion was on 
England's 'side' in the war and Birrell's November cabinet paper, emphasising the 'great 
ffiendliness' of Irish opinion to England, was substantially correct. However, when in late- 
October the Westmeath Examiner hailed the outcome of 'Ireland's Uprising Against 
Worthless Would-Be Wreckers' as an 'extraordinary manifestation' of popular regard for 
Redmond, it still felt it necessary to attack those who 'look after themselves and apply to 
9 102 themselves the words "Sinn Fein" . The war, recruiting and the battle 
for control of the 
Volunteers had had the effect of crystallising a more numerous opposition, now identified by 
many as 'Sinn Feiners'. 103 These dissidents were not simply a reincarnation of the 'cranks', 
'disappointed men' and isolated advanced nationalists who had so irritated the party locally in 
the immediate pre-war years. First, a number of those pre-war 'factionists' were not yet 
active opponents of recruiting. Several prominent Ginnellites (see Chapter 6) remained 
officials of the new, party-controlled National Volunteers and some Roscommon 'ratepayers' 
(see Chapter 5) openly supported the war and recruiting. Secondly, such losses to the ranks of 
'faction' were more than offset by pre-war party supporters who now decided that they could 
not go so far as to back fighting for England. Former party-supporting newspapers (the 
Roscommon Journao, officers (MacGuinness, Callaghan and Cox in Longford, O'Shea in 
Mullingar), clerics (O'Reilly in Tang) and allies (labour in Sligo) broke with Redmond's 
policy and party at this time. While the party could still proclaim its leadership of the 
'National Movement', its claim to that leadership was challenged. 
Just before the Home Rule Act passed, the Boyle party boss T. J. Devine, who had led the 
Boyle Volunteers from their inception, described the Volunteers as 'the organisation behind 
the League', 104 and in the coming weeks the importance of the Volunteers was re-emphasised 
by party speakers. For Farrell, they would dominate the Irish political situation in the near 
term, while for Fitzgibbon they were 'the guardians of Ireland - placed on the housetop to 
102 Westmeath Examiner, 24'hOctober 1914. 
103 The Tullys again provided an exception and did not see themselves as 'Sinn Femers'. By 24th October, the 
Roscommon Herald's Gaelic Notes was already writmi- of what had been 'wrongly styled ... the Sinn Fein revolt' 
in the Volunteers. 
104Westei-n Nationalist, 19'hSeptember 1914. Devine also lamented that the difficult task of organising the UIL 
and AOH was made 'herculean' by the additional burden of the Volunteers. 
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guard the honour and liberty of our country'. 105 In mid-October. the Westmeath Independent 
stressed that with a proper organisation in place, committees restructured and headquarters 
established, the Volunteers had a great chance to be a national force : 'As Mr Redmond 
explained last Sunday the Volunteer organisation has now been reduced to a business 
proposition'. 106 Just how far the Volunteers had been 'reduced', if not to a 'business 
proposition', would imminently be seen. 
Collapse 
The Irish party effectively took over the Irish Volunteers at their nominal peak; certainly in 
terins of membership, which hit its national high point of 19 1,000 in mid-September. 1 07 
Thereafter, Volunteer membership fell steadily and, though it was still nominally counted by 
the police at well over 100,000, the organisation was nearly moribund by the end of the year. 
In his December report the RIC inspector general could almost write it off : 'There is at 
present no enthusiasm in this force, which has neither organisation, nor officers, is utterly 
untrained, and practically unarmed. 9108 
Did the party's takeover trigger the Volunteers' decay? Some indications of Volunteer 
decline were already evident in August, before the takeover and before the membership 
peaked. While police reports for that month showed Sligo's companies still growing in 
number and the Westmeath companies busy drilling, the inspector general was noting 
nationally that 'this force makes no headway in organisation'. His inspector's report from 
Leitrim indicated a 'recent' fall of drilling while that from Longford noted a distinct fall since 
the outbreak of war. ' 09 Reports written at the end of September were more consistent and 
damning. The inspector general stated that 'the Irish Volunteers displayed little or no 
activity', while the county inspectors saw significant falls in both drilling and attendance at 
parades in Longford, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath. The Crime Special Branch report 
completed the set by remarking on a similar pattern in Leitrim. ' 10 It is perfectly conceivable 
105 Farrell speaking at Lanesboro, Roscommon, Roscommon Jow-nal, 17'hOctober 1914; Fitzgibbon speaking at 
ge Knockcroghery, Roscommon, Roscommon Messeno, r, 7th November 1914. 106 Westmeath Independent, 17'h October 1914. 
107 Fitzpatrick, 'Militarism in Ireland' in Bartlett and Jeffery (eds. ). A Militai-i7 Histoi3, qfIreland, p. 386. 
108 Monthly report of the Inspector General. December 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
th ty 109 Monthly report of the Inspector General and of the Leitrim, Longford. Sligo and Westmea coun 
inspectors, August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
110 Monthly reports of the Inspector General and of the Longford, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath county 
inspectors, and Crime Special Branch (for Leitrim). September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
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that the party's takeover, by increasing dissension and driving out some of the earliest 
activists, weakened the Volunteers in late September/early October, but for the sudden 
downturn recorded for September as a whole to be caused by the takeover, its negative effects 
would have had to be both devastating and instantaneous. Moreover, the takeover's 
mechanics, relying on a succession of meetings and parades, if anything temporarily boosted 
Volunteer 'activity'. 
Taking the same newspapers used to analyse the frequency of UIL and AOH reports in 
previous periods (see Chapters 3 and 9), the volume of Volunteer reports in the local press - 
of parades, company meetings and committee meetings - is another indication of the timing 
and scale of the Volunteers' decline : 
Table 14. Volunteer reports in the local Press, July-December 1914111 
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dee 
Longford Leader 26 44 15 18 15 8 
Roscommon Herald 61 76 33 21 5 2 
Roscommon Messenger 17 19 10 13 2 1 
Sligo Champion 38 68 27 45 17 11 
Western Nationalist 10 8 5 2 - - 
Total 152 215 90 99 39 22 
The pattern of reports is clear - activity peaked in counties Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon 
and Sligo in August and slumped in September. Having recovered marginally in October 
(perhaps bolstered by the number of political, takeover meetings still going on), it collapsed 
again in November and once more, to derisory levels, in December. Again, the suddenness 
and scale of the fall in September indicates that it was already under way before the middle of 
that month. The takeover was not the trigger for the Volunteers' decline; the 'great wave' 
was already receding in the weeks of uncertainty and growing dissension that preceded the 
passage of Home Rule. 
111 Longford Leader, Roscommon Herald, Roscommon Messenger, Sligo Champion, ff estern Nationalist, July- 
December 1914. The number of Volunteer reports published in the Western Nationalist was small (the 
Roscommon Herald appeared to have had a near monopoly of such reports around Boyle) and the paper did not 
report Volunteer meetings after October. However, the paper has been *included here to provide a source of data 
consistent with the analyses of UIL and AOH reports in Chapters 3 and 9. 
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Several explanations have been advanced, then and later, for this decay : the lack of arms, 
boredom, inadequate drilling facilities, shorter evenings, internal dissension and the lack of a 
raison d'etre after the passing of Home Rule. ' 12 One of the most common, however, was that 
local companies were decapitated by the removal of the many army reservists who had 
provided military skills and, specifically, competence in drill instruction. Nationally, 7,331 
reservists, or 41 % of reservists called up, came from the Irish Volunteers. 113 This must have 
had some impact and was commented upon locally by sources such as the Leitrim RIC and 
the Westmeath Independent. ' 14 However, virtually all these reservists departed during the 
first week of the war while Volunteer activity peaked some weeks later. If there was an 
effect, it was delayed. 
A more powerful reason for the Volunteers' decline was advanced consistently by observers : 
a distinct aversion to being called up by the army and a persistent fear that publicly taking part 
in Volunteering, particularly in drilling, would increase the chances of that happening. Such 
fears were evidenced early in the war. In mid-August, the Roscommon Messenger noted that 
although Redmond's initial 'defensive' offer was supported, the general body of men were 
said to have 'strong objections' to fighting with regular or reservist army troops. " 5 At the 
end of August, the Longford county inspector noted : 'the fear of many [Volunteer] members 
who are not anxious to take part in the field that they may be commandeered to do so by the 
Government'. 116 Thereafter, virtually every police observer cited the fear of being called up 
for foreign service as the primary cause of falling Volunteer activity. This is hardly 
surprising, given that the issue of Volunteers being trained and armed, under the authority of 
the War Office, was openly debated by both the Dublin and local press in the first two months 
of the war. The gloomy public prognostications of Kitchener at the end of August also 
triggered discussion of conscription. Farrell then told the Longford Leader that he had been 
'privately informed' that on any serious reverse in the war conscription would be introduced. 
The Sligo Nationalist predicted that there would now be a 'hysterical howl for the dragooning 
112 See monthly report of the Inspector General, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95), and McEvov. A Studi, of the 
United Irish Lea(,, ue in King, s County, p. I 10. 
113 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish LifC, p. I 10. 
114 Crime Special Branch report (Leitrim), September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94); Westmeath Independent, 24tý 
October 1914. 
115 Roscommon Mevsen( , cr, 15'hAugust 1914. 
116 Monthly report of the Longford county inspector. August 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
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of a peace-loving country' (i. e. Ireland) and only voluntary enlistment in the army would see 
off the conscription threat. ' 17 
Redmond's recruiting campaign, from mid-September onwards, produced the paradox that 
while most local Volunteers endorsed support for England in the war, their fears of having to 
fight in it were also reinforced. Therefore, the defining issue of the party's autumn campaign, 
its advocacy of recruiting, must have acted to accelerate the decline of Volunteer activity and 
may well have inflicted the coup de grace to the already-fading movement. Some, at the end 
of September, saw the danger. Colonel Maurice Moore, notionally the Volunteers' 
commanding officer, wrote to Joe Devlin asking for the subject of recruiting not to be raised 
at Volunteer meetings : 
... 
it is essential that there should be no reference to recruiting or any such contentious 
subjects; the Country will break away from us if we do. ' Redmond 'ought not to make a 
speech about recruiting at a Volunteer inspection; it should be at a political meeting after 
the Volunteer parade is dismissed; & he ought not to tell Volunteers to enlist more than 
any other Irishmen... The anti recruiting feeling runs very high & the fear that 
Volunteers will be taken to fight whether they wish it or not. Absurd as it may seem it is 
believed by many & the idea is fostered by Sinn Feiners. 11 8 
Such caution was sometimes shared locally. Playing down recruiting, several MPs and party 
speakers addressing Volunteer meetings placed a greater emphasis on unity, discipline, 
affirming loyalty to Redmond and support for the Volunteers. Speakers would emphasise that 
Redmond was not saying that every man should go to the front; a recurring phrase was also 
that they and/or Redmond were 'not recruiting sergeants'. ' 19 F. E. Meehan MP went so far at 
one Leitrim rally as to cancel the award of prizes for the drill competition, 'so as not to give 
the impression that we were encouraging young men to join the army wholesale, and that the 
meeting was not to fill up the ranks of the British army with Volunteers'. 120 In mid-October, 
117 Longford Leader, - Sligo Nationalist, 29 th August 1914. 
... Moore to Devlm, 28h September 1914 (Col Maurice Moore Mss., NLI, file 10651/ 8). 
"9 See for example Smyth speaking at Dromahair, Leitrim Observer, 31' October; Farrell speaking to the North 
Longford UIL executive. Longford Leader, 26th September; McKenna speaking at Mullmigar, Westmeath 
Examiner, - 170' October. O'Dowd speaking at Sligo, Sligo Champi . on 3 
rd October 1914; and Jinks speaking at 
Sligo, Sligo Champion, 21" November 1914. 
120 Meehan speaking at Dromahair, Leitrim Observer, 31' October 1914. 
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the Longford Leader concluded a leading article on the war (which had emphasised Ireland's 
role in the United Kingdom's 'just war against German barbarism'): 
We do not write this for the purpose of urging any man who does not wish to do so to 
give up his occupation and go to the front. But we do most urgently and most strongly 
urge all our young men to at once join the Volunteers. 121 
The evidence is that such urgings were almost entirely ineffective. In Roscommon in 
September, members of no fewer than twenty-two companies refused to sign Volunteer 
enrolment forms, fearing that to do so would make them liable for foreign service. 122 By the 
end of October, a full-scale slump of activity was manifest. The Leitrim county inspector 
reported two companies collapsing completely, while the Longford inspector wrote of the 
organisation having crumbled away. In Roscommon and Westmeath drilling had 'practically 
ceased' and in Sligo companies were 'totally inactive'. The inspector general concluded that 
nationally there was 'no drill worth mentioning and general apathy appears to have set in'. 123 
There was no revival before the end of the year. 
As for the Irish party itself, UIL activity also slumped in the autumn of 1914, accelerating the 
decline which had set in June and July during the initial, pre-war Volunteer boom (see 
Chapter 9). Measured by reports submitted to the local press, the decline was acute : 
Table 15 : UIL reports in the local press 1913-14 
Q4 1913 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Longford Leader 35 31 33 19 13 
Roscommon Herald 33 51 47 17 13 
Roscommon Messenger 17 23 17 11 7 
Sligo Champion 128 132 105 64 30 
Western Nationalist 20 24 13 7 3 
Total 233 261 215 118 66 
,,,, ordLeader, 
17thOctober 1914. 121 Lonaf 
122 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector, September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
123 Monthly reports of the Inspector General and of the Leitrim. Longford. Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath 
county inspectors. October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
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By the final quarter of 1914, UIL meetings were running at only 25% of their first quarter rate 
and 28% of the comparable 1913 level. In late September and early October, local party 
leaders were almost entirely focused on attending, and controlling, Volunteer meetings and 
rallies. A monthly breakdown of press reports shows that UIL activity, like that of the 
Volunteers, fell in September, but that unlike the Volunteers did not recover in October. Both 
organi sations were inactive by December: 
Table 16 : UIL reports in the local press, July- December 1914. 
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dee 
Longford Leader 9 5 5 6 1 6 
Roscommon Herald 6 9 2 4 5 4 
Roscommon Messenger 2 4 5 3 3 1 
Sligo Champion 25 23 16 10 12 8 
Western Nationalist 3 1 3 1 2 - 
Total 45 42 31 24 23 19 
Both the party vampire and its Volunteer victim were now haemorrhaging, but the party 
showed few signs of awareness of this, even dismissing some of its national organisers : 
'It is stated that since the passing of Home Rule some United Irish League organisers have 
received notice that their services will not be further required, and that they may look out for 
other employment. ' 124 Fund raising was minimal. According to police returns, all UIL 
branches in the five counties (including Ginnell's followers) raised the princely sums of f-91 
in the third quarter of 1914 and E25 in the fourth (the comparable 1913 numbers were E445 
and E688). 125 In December, Farrell observed with regret that Longford's branches had been 
falling away for some time, with only three or four now maintaining any semblance of 
activity. He urged branches at least to hold their annual reorganisation meetings and send in 
their f3 affiliation fees - 'and the thing is done'. 
126 Some Longford branches seem to have 
followed his advice, but even this simple task seemed beyond the means of many: 
124 Monthly report of the Inspector General, September 1914 (PRO CO 904/94). 
1 -25 RIC Crime Special Branch quarterly reports, 1914 (PRO CO 902'20). 
12' Farrell speaking to the Longford town UIL. Longford Leade7-, 19'hDecember 1914. 4n 
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Table 17 : UIL Branch subscriptions paid to the National Directory (years ending 
approx. end-January)' 27 
1913-14 1914-15 
Leitrim 31 8 
Longford 15 11 
Roscommon 24 30 
Sligo 34 12 
Westmeath 17 4 
Total 121 65 
For the five counties, the number of paid up branches nearly halved during 1914 and the fall - 
dramatic in Sligo, alarming in Leitrim and Westmeath - would have been even greater without 
the ability of many Roscommon branches just to pay their E3. 
It would be wrong, however, to focus only on Irish party decline. Local, day-to-day, political 
activity seems to have shrivelled more generally and the cessation of activity was also felt by 
the party's 'Sinn Feiner' opponents. The new MacNeillite Volunteers, like the National 
Volunteers, struggled to maintain membership, let alone drills and parades. At Ballinamuck, 
County Longford after the split 'there was nothing doing again until 1917'. 128 The Granard. 
Volunteers languished, ostensibly for the lack of drill instructors, 129 while in Longford town 
the dissident leaders were 'standing aside' to see how the new company (formed by Farrell) 
got along. 130 In Athlone, sixty-eight Sinn Feiners may have marched through the town to 
commemorate the Manchester Martyrs, but the Volunteer company soon shrank and only 8-10 
men were drilling at the Pipers' Club. 13 1 Dissident political organisations also found the 
going hard. Announcing a forthcoming meeting of Ginnell's Westmeath Nationalist 
Executive, the Midland Reporter at the year-end noted that for some time past, and especially 
with Home Rule on the statute book, there had been an impression that there was little need 
for organi sati on. ' 32 
127 Minute Book of the UIL National Directory (National Library of Ireland, Ms. 708). 
128 Interview with Francis Davis, Ernie O'Malley Notebooks (UCD Archives, P l7b/121 p. 1). 
129Lon, g-ford Leader, 24'hOctober 1914. 
130 Rosconinion Herald, 14'hNovember 1914. 
131 Crime Special Branch precis, December 1914 (PRO CO 904/95); Sean O'Mullaney, 'Athlone Started the 
Volunteer Movement'. Athlone Annual, 1963 (in Athlone public library). 
132 Midland Reporter, 31" December 1914. 
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If the autumnal slump of activity was not confined to the Irish party, neither was it unifon-11 
across the party's affiliated organisations. Just as the Hibernians had proved significantly 
more vigorous than the pre-war UIL, so now they appeared relatively inu-nune to UIL's 
wartime malaise: 
Table 18 : AOH reports in the local press, July-December 1914. 
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Longford Leader 14 15 8 19 13 14 
Roscommon Herald 27 27 30 30 31 33 
Roscommon Messenger 3 2 3 5 5 2 
Sligo Champion 29 22 18 30 28 27 
Western Nationalist 2 3 7 4 3 3 
Total 75 69 66 88 80 79 
This sustained level of local Hibernian activity appears flatly to contradict the end-November 
observation of the RIC inspector general : 'It is reported that the United Irish League and the 
Ancient Order of Hibernians (Board of Erin) have had merely a nominal existence'. 133 
However, it is possible that the Order, quiet in party political terms, was bolstered by its 
social functions, halls, sports, music and national insurance role, still meeting locally and 
sending reports of its meetings to the press. 
Given the comparative resilience of the Hibernians, the 'Irish party' overall was, therefore, 
more alive than the Volunteer movement it had worked so hard to capture. However, if after 
the takeover the party locally was meant to have three main affiliates - the UIL, AOH and the 
National Volunteers - two of these were looking decidedly rickety. The inescapable 
conclusion has to be that before the first Christmas of the war the aggregated Irish party was 
experiencing a rapid local decline. 
13., Monthly report of the Inspector General. November 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
310 
Fight or FlijZht 
That there was no general surge of recruiting to the British army, either before or after the 
passage of Home Rule, was acknowledged in the local press. The Leitrim Observer carried a 
news piece 'Ireland and the New Army' on 12' September, noting the poor response to 
recruiting calls in Ireland and that the I O'h Division was only half filled. A week later the 
Westmeath Independent cited the dissatisfaction with Irish recruiting of no less an authority 
than Kitchener. In October, the Sligo Nationalist's authority on the failure of Ireland to 
M il. 134 recruit was the London Daily a Police perceptions tallied with those of the press, with 
the inspector general noting at the end of October that the response to appeals so far had been 
6 very poor'. ' 35 Local police reports substantiated this view from September onwards. In 
Longford, there was little or no disloyalty, but 'there appears little inclination on their part to 
come forward in response to Lord Kitchener's appeal for men'. In Sligo recruiting was 'very 
slack'. In Roscommon, 'Mr Redmond's appeal has not had the slightest effect upon 
recruiting; the fanning class of the Volunteers are selfish and they have no idea of fighting for 
anyone'. ' 36 
Pauline Codd, in her study of recruiting in Wexford, described the pattern of recruiting there 
as 'traditional and sporadic' with the strongest enlistment stemming from family, class and 
geographic ties. 137 The same seems to have applied in the five counties. Urban labourers, 
from families with traditional army ties, in garrison towns such as Mullingar or Athlone, were 
more inclined to join up. Sometimes, financial inducements produced temporary bursts. In 
Longford in early September, enlistment was accelerated by a bounty paid by Lord Granard to 
the first forty men to join his regiment. ' 38 In Sligo in November recruitment was brisk, with 
so many dock workers joining up that 'the port is practically closed'. Here, ex-soldiers were 
enticed by the promise that if they re-enlisted, the whole of their former army service would 
count towards their pension. ' 39 By contrast, as the inspector general put it, 'young farmers, 
shop assistants, clerks, school teachers and others of that class ... 
in this country rarely ever 
134 Leitrim Obsei-ver, 12'h September; ffestmeath Independent, 19'h September, Sligo Nationalist, 10 th October 
1914. 
135 Monthly report of the Inspector General, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
136 Monthly Crime Special Branch reports, Longford, Roscommon and Sligo, September 1914 (PRO CO 
904195). 
137 Pauline Codd, 'Recruiting and Response to the War in Wexford' in David Fitzpatrick (ed. ), Ireland and the 
First Iforld Mar (Mullingar 1988), p. 20. 
138 Longford Leader, 12'h September 1914. 
139 ff, estei-n Nationalist, 7h November. Sligo Independen t, 21' November 1914. 
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join the army'. In November, the Westmeath county inspector discussed the apathy of 
farmers' sons. The Roscommon inspector noted some months later that since the start of the 
war the towns of Boyle and Roscommon had done 'fairly well', but 'the country districts have 
not yielded a man'. 140 
By far the highest proportionate recruitment seems to have come from Roscommon town. In 
mid-November, the Roscommon Messenger claimed that 140 men had left the town and that 
this was a higher percentage of the population (1911 census pop. 1,858) than any other town 
in Ireland. 14 1 However, such claims look odd when the town's experience is compared to 
that of Castlerea (1911 census pop. 1,244). By the end of November - it was by then claimed 
that 160 men had left Roscommon town - only eight had left Castlerea. 
142 The difficulty was 
that figures for recruitment from individual towns were hugely unreliable. Sometimes 
6recruits' meant just that; sometimes they included reservists already called up and sometimes 
even regulars as well. In addition, the men quoted as joining up from a particular 'town' 
sometimes incorporated the neighbouring district, sometimes not. Moreover, official statistics 
for a 'town' or 'county' could include men travelling to that district to enlist; 143 those 
enlisting in 'Boyle' included men from Sligo, Leitrim, and Mayo. ' 44 In Roscommon town, 
however, a handful of families with traditional army connections were the main contributors 
to recruiting. William Daire, from the front, wrote to the Messenger claiming that nine first 
cousins were serving with him. 145 M. Hoare, in the Connaught Rangers, had five sons and six 
cousins in the same regiment. Patrick Ward's four sons were all at the front, together with 
three brothers, two brothers-in-law, three cousins and a nephew. 146 On balance, therefore, the 
town's recruiting probably was abnormally high. When the county councillor John Galvin 
claimed in early November that 120 'men from the 'town' were 'fighting', he was possibly 
including men from surrounding districts and almost certainly both regulars and reservists. 
140 Monthly reports of the Inspector General, October 1914 and of the Westmeath and Roscommon county 
inspectors - November 1914. June 1915 (PRO CO 904/95 and 97). 14 1 Roscommon Messenger, 14'hNovember 1914. 
142 Leitrim Advei-tiser, 10 December 1914. 
143 See the Cabinet paper, 'Recruiting in Proportion to Population', dated l2thNovember 1914 (PRO CAB 
37/122 Document 164). 'If a Scotsman, residing in London, goes to Reading and enlists 111 the Black Watch, he 
is recorded as a recruit taken in Berkshire. ' 
144Roscommon Herald, 19"' September 1914. 
145Roscommon Messengaer, 14'h November 1914. 
146 Roscommon He, 7-ald, 26thSeptember 1914. 
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However, when he went on to claim that these included twenty-seven men from one street. he 
was probably not exaggerating. 
147 
There were other pockets of 'traditional and sporadic' recruiting across the five counties, but 
the overall out-turn was still, from the government's perspective, dismal. It was summed up 
in statistics provided in a Cabinet paper, 'Recruiting in Proportion to Population', in mid- 
November. The paper showed those who had enlisted as army recruits from 4 th August to 8 th 
November, and as Territorials from I" July to 4thNovember, as percentages of eligible males 
(defined as men aged 19-3 8 from the 1911 census). By country the figures were : 
9 England and Wales 13.8%, (10.0% excluding Territorials); 
9 Scotland 16.7% (11.9% excluding Territorials); and 
s Ireland 5.7% (no Territorials). 
Some historians have argued that the pattern of Irish recruiting was not, despite such data, 
fundamentally different from the rest of the UK, at least until 1916. Rural counties outside 
Ireland were also said to have experienced low recruitment levels, while the UK as a whole 
saw a falling trend of recruitment over the first eighteen months of the war. As Keith Jeffery 
put it, 
recent research (by Patrick Callan, David Fitzpatrick and others) has shown that Ireland 
was not so dramatically out of kilter with other parts of Britain and the empire as has 
sometimes been assumed. 148 
However, the November 1914 Cabinet paper provided returns on rural recruiting in England, 
Scotland and Wales that were dramatically at variance with those from Ireland. English 
counties such as Cornwall, Devon, 'Hampshire & the Isle of Wight' and 'Cumberland & 
Westmorland' showed returns of 7.7%, 12.7%, 8.6% and 9.2% respectively. 149 In Scotland 
the figures for Inverness and 'Aberdeen, Banff & Kicardine' were 10.4% and 10.0%. In 
Wales, the figure for six rural counties combined was 8.9%. 150 The contrast of these rural 
147 Galvin speaking to Knockcroghery Volunteers on I' November, Roscommon Messenger, 7 th November 1914. 
148 See Keith Jeffery, Ireland and the Great If 'ar (Cambridge 2000), p. 6; Patrick Callan, 'British Recruitment in 
Ireland', in Revue Internationale dHistoire Militaire, No 63, pp. 41-5 1, - Fitzpatrick, 'Mitlitarism in Ireland' In 
Bartlett and Jeffery (eds. ). A Military Historl, of1reland, p. 388. 
14() Including new Territorial recruits. 
150 Flint, Denbigh. Merioneth. Carnarvon. Anglesey and Monvgomený. 
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percentages with those for the middle and west of Ireland was still startling, even 
remembering that Ireland had no Territorials : 
e the Midlands (King's, Queen's, Meath, Longford and Westmeath combined), 1.9%; 
9 Connaught (Roscommon, Leitrim, Sligo, Mayo and Galway combined), 1.5%. 
The trend of Irish recruiting over the coming months of the war may have had more in 
common with that of the rest of the UK, but it started from a totally different, and radically 
lower, base. For the ten Midlands and Connaught counties analysed in the Cabinet paper, the 
total number of army recruits to early November came to all of 2,014.151 
The local press generated a succession of rationalisations for the poor level of recruiting. It 
was alleged that recruiting generally, across the UK, was poor. ' 52 Specifically in Ireland, the 
lack of cooperation from the War Office, hindering Catholic recruitment and favouring the 
UVF, came under attack. By late-October, the Westmeath Independent would attack 'an 
unwise [War Office] policy that is discouraging recruits'. John Hayden in early November 
could say. that the Volunteers now had two enemies, Sinn Fein and the 'reactionary' War 
Office. 153 Alternatively, it was argued that the Irish could not furnish many recruits because 
emigration had left a disproportionate number of the old and infirm. 1 54 A variation on this 
theme was that a farming country could not afford to lose its young men, while a grazing 
country, denuded of population, had few to lose anyway. As the Roscommon Messenger 
wrote, only three weeks after lauding the level of recruiting in Roscommon town, Irish 'flocks 
and herds do not produce soldiers'. 155 Recruiting was poor and people locally knew it. 
In mid-October, enlistment numbers in the midlands and west were temporarily dwarfed by 
those of young, male emigrants who left Ireland for fear of conscription. Prior to then, there 
had been no great wartime surge in emigration, which in August and September had 
151 Cabinet Paper on Recruiting, 12thNovember 1914 (PRO CAB 37/122 Document 164). For other parts of 
Ireland the returns were: Dublin (incl. city). Wicklow, Kildare & Carlow 7.1%; Antrim & Down 16.4%. 
Donegal, Londonderry. Fermanagh & Tyrone 4.0%; Louth, Monaghan, Cavan & Armagh 2.8%; Tipperary, 
Waterford, Kilkenny & Wexford 2.9% and Clare, Limerick. Cork (incl. city) & Kerry 2.6%. 
152 Leitrim Advertiser, 1201 November 1914. The Advertiser was an enthusiastic supporter of recruitmg. 
153 TVestmeath Independent, 24th October; Hayden speaking at Knockcroghery. Roscommon Messenger, 7 th 
November 1914. 
154 Leitrim Advertiscr, 8'hOctober 1914. 
155 Roscommon Mcssenger, 5"' December 1914. lc> 
314 
continued the pattern of the earlier months of 1914 : consistently about one-third down, 
month by month, on prior-year levels-' 56 However, during September, there was increasing 
speculation that the government would bring into operation the Militia Ballot Act. This Act, 
dating from 1882, had made service in the militia voluntary, but left in reserve a power to 
reintroduce compulsory 'balloting' for recruits which could be revived by an Order in 
Council. 157 The scare story that this antiquated, obsolete power would be revived was 
promoted by Griffith's Sinn Fein in Dublin 158 and by other dissidents during September. In 
Sligo, the IRB man Alex McCabe wrote to the Sligo Champion of l2thSeptember alerting its 
readers to the threat and triggering a short news piece in the paper. Next week the story was 
taken up by the Roscommon Herald. 159 
The story was given impetus by confusion over remarks made by Redmond on the subject of 
conscription when speaking at Waterford on II th October. Here, Redmond told his audience 
that if Germany won the war, conscription would be the 'first inevitable result' of 'the defeat 
of the Allies'. 160 However, his remarks were distorted by his opponents 16 1 and misunderstood 
by his ftiends to indicate that a setback in the war - 'defeat' for the Allies - would suffice to 
trigger conscription. The Westmeath Examiner leader on Redmond's speech declared that if 
the war were prolonged and the voluntary system broke down, there was not the slightest 
doubt that compulsion would be introduced. 162 On 16 th October, the Dublin Irish Independent 
weighed in with a news story claiming that reactivation of the Militia Ballot Act was 
imminent and that the government was putting in place the procedures, including printing 
work, to implement it. This story was carried in several local papers the next day. 163 
156 The cumulative emigration numbers, for most months of the year, were published in the Leitrim Advertiser 
(see 12'hFebruary, 12'hMarch, WhApril, 18'h June, 16'hJuly, 13th August, 17t" September, 12"' November, 17th 
December 1914). 
157 Roscommon Journal, 31' October 1914. 
158 Sinn Fein, 5th and 19th September 1914. 
1511 Slj, 0 Champion, 12'hSeptember (the letter was reprinted in the RoscommonJOUrnal on 17'hOctober); 
Roscommon Herald, 19'h September 1914. 
160 Irish Independent, 12th October 1914. 
161 See Irish Voluntcer, 24'hOctober. This report of Redmond's speech left out all mention of Germany winning 
the war. but retained the reference to Allied defeat leading to conscription. 162 Uestmeath Examiner, 17'hOctober 1914. 
163 Irish Independent, 16'h October. ffestmeath Independent; Leitrim Observer; Roscommon Journal, 17" 
October 1914. 
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The Irish Independent story triggered a full-scale conscription scare and comprehensive press 
coverage. Over the next week young men from Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon, Sligo, Mayo 
and Galway left for America. The police estimate was that 600 Volunteers, aged between 18 
and 30, sailed from the port of Queenstown on 21"-22 nd October alone. 164 The Roscommon 
county inspector believed that some 200 young men left his county, 'with the intention of 
returning when the war is over'. 165 Groups of between 10 and 40 men were reported to have 
left Frenchpark, Roscommon, Strokestown, Arigna, Boyle, Mohill, Dromod, Longford, 
Clonguish, Edgeworthstown, Granard, Tobercurry and Sligo. ' 66 The scare was short-lived - 
tofficial' denials from the government and Redmond were unequivocal - and some of the 
emigrants returned to Longford at least, having tried to embark at Londonderry. 167 The 
response of the local press, whether party-loyalist, Sinn Feiner or unionist, was universal, 
even from those papers that had carried the story on 17 th October or before. Those fleeing 
were fools and/or cowards,, who brought shame to Ireland. True to form, the Tully brothers in 
the Roscommon Herald and Midland Reporter carried analyses of the plot behind the scare 
and of how Redmond's Waterford speech was to blame. ' 68 The Leitrim Obser-ver remarked 
that it was a pity a couple of German cruisers could not be stationed in the Atlantic. 169 
The Year's End 
Just how far was provincial nationalist Ireland 'right behind Mr Redmond' in his advocacy of 
Ireland's participation in the war? The collapse of the Volunteers, lack of recruiting and 
Militia Ballot panic indicated that the somersault of nationalist public opinion brought about 
by the war - in which support for England overturned years of anglophobia ('Bravo 
England! ') - did not extend to a whole-hearted commitment to participate in the war effort. 
Within weeks of the outbreak of war, undoubted popular support for England was qualified 
by suspicion and unease about the delay of Home Rule and reluctance to take on anything 
other than a defensive role in the war. The passage of the Act was greeted with no more than 
relief, and certainly not rapture. Redmond's immediate call to Irishmen to enlist was based on 
164Crime Special Branch monthly report, October 1914 (PRO CO 904/120). 
165 Monthly report of the Roscommon county inspector. October 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
166 Leitrim Advertiser; Midland Rep07-tcr, 22 nd October; Roscommon Messenger; Roscommon Journal; 
Roscommon Herald; Longford LeadC-, 7-, ' Sligo Independent, 24th October 1914. Lady de Freyne did later write to 
the Irish Times denying the departures from Frenchpark (Roscommon Herald, 14th November 1914). 
167 LongfordLeader, 24thOctober 1914. 
168 Midland Reporter, 2 7nd October; Roscommon Herald, 24'hOctober. 1914 
169 Lcitrim Obseri, cr, 24'hOctober 1914. 
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sympathy for the Allies, moral obligation and instinctive (and compelling) political 
calculation. It triggered a brief and vigorous political fight for control of the Volunteers, 
during which well over 90% of the Volunteers supposedly pledged themselves to support 
Redmond's policy. However, the response of most nationalists, whether Volunteers or not. 
was to maintain an intense interest in the war, express a general sympathy for the Allies, 
declare a general loyalty to Redmond and then keep their heads down. Recruitment was 
dismal, fear of conscription already endemic and withdrawal from public 'political' activity 
commonplace. 
After the Volunteer takeover and the Militia Ballot scare, politics quietened significantly in 
the five counties at the end of 1914. Purely local stories again appeared more prominently in 
the press, though still alongside the regular columns of war news. Manorhamilton teachers 
objected to Gaelic classes (for them), a new Catholic Club was opened in Boyle and a land 
dispute broke out, with attendant cattle drives, in Easkey, County Sligo., 70 The Roscommon 
Herald could devote 22 columns to reporting a bitter, personal libel case between the Carrick 
party boss Patrick Flynn and a local solicitor Michael McKeon, who won damages of a 
farthing. 17 1 The quietness of the Irish party - with the slump of UIL branch activity and the 
death of the National Volunteers - was balanced by inactivity from its Sinn Feiner opponents. 
When the party lost a parliamentary by-election in neighbouring King's County, though the 
result was hailed in the local 'opposition' press, Sinn Feiners appear to have played little or 
no part. 172 
On 24th December, John Dillon wrote to T. P. O'Connor that 'a very satisfactory change - has 
come upon the country during the last six weeks - And I think recruiting will go on much 
better now'. 173 Dillon had some grounds for satisfaction; the crisis caused by Sinn Feiner 
influence in the Volunteers appeared over and the party to have won. Politically, things were 
much more tranquil. However, this relative quiet was less an indication of the Irish party's 
success than of its failure. In the first five months of the war, the party's primary local 
organisation, the UIL, shrivelled and its major acquisition, the Volunteers, disintegrated in its 
170 Leitrim Obse"ver, 21" November; ff'estern Nationalist, 26hDecember 1914; monthly report of the Sligo 
county inspector, December 1914 (PRO CO 904/95). 
17 1 Roscomnion Hei-ald, 19'h December 1914. 
172 See Maume, The Long Gestation, p. 168. 
173 Dillon to T. P. O'Connor, 24th December 19141, Dillon papers. TCD, f 6740,, '229. 
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hands. Its opponents, if also not very active, were both more numerous and more coherent 
than they had been before the war. In Griffith's phrase of 1910, they could now provide 'a 
national political centre to which men may turn', 174 a focus of nationalist, anglophobe 
opposition to England and to the Irish party's central wartime policies. Moreover, these were 
policies, of military alliance with England and support for recruiting, to which many Irish 
party supporters now paid little more than lip service. If a large majority of nationalists were 
'behind Mr Redmond' as he led Irish opinion from the front, the distance between them and 
their leader was widening fast. The year-end reports of RIC county inspectors displayed a 
common pattern : interest in the war, 'sympathy' for the Allies, don-nant Volunteers, no 
drilling, no public political meetings and little recruiting. At the end of December, the 
Roscommon county inspector summed up the strict limitations of nationalist support for the 
war and for Redmond's wartime policy: 
So far as the Volunteers in this county are concerned the recruiting for the army is nil. 
They hope that Germany will be defeated, but it rests there. ' 75 
174 Sinn Fein, 8h October 19 10. 
175 Monthly reports of the Leitrim, Longford, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath county inspectors. December 
1914 (PRO CO 904 `95). 
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Chapter 11 : Conclusions 
The central questions asked in this study have related to the Irish party - that is the Irish 
parliamentary party in Westminster and its affiliated organisations and supporters in Ireland - 
and to the broader mass of provincial, nationalist public opinion. Just how pacified and 
6 constitutional' was local nationalist opinion in the last days of the Union? How far did it 
share the vision and tactics of the Irish party, and its leader Redmond, in their parliamentary 
pursuit of limited Home Rule? Was the party 'representative' of Irish society and opinion 
before the First World War or was it so 'rotten', decayed and out of touch with the dynamic 
forces of Irish nationalism that its wartime demise was both inevitable and easily explained. 
Returning to the imagery of F. S. L. Lyons, was the party 'swimming with the stream' of 
modem Irish nationalism or was it instead 'throwing a barrier across the course of the 
current"? I 
Judging the condition of the Irish party in the late summer of 1913, the answer to Lyons's 
question would have to be the fon-ner. Though its primary affiliate, the UIL, was in 
significant decline, it was still on balance far more representative than rotten. However, the 
party's position relative to other nationalist organisations was soon to be transformed, first by 
the Home Rule crisis and mass militarism and secondly by its wartime campaign to control 
the Volunteers and support recruiting for the British army. The party's condition just before 
its death should, therefore, be assessed not in a single snapshot, but during each of these three 
stages - up to the end of August 1913, July 1914 and December 1914. 
August 1913 
Before the Home Rule crisis broke across nationalist Ireland, the Irish party in 'middle 
Ireland' was still an umbrella nationalist movement. It represented a broad spectrum of 
beliefs (from conciliation to bellicosity), of tactics (from the mildest constitutionalism to 
theoretical advocacy of force) and of class and sectional interests (from Catholic gentry to 
landless labourers; urban grandees to trades unionists). All could unite in pursuit of what 
was still a loosely-defined goal, of 'independence' through Home Rule. The breadth of the 
party was such that it could give expression to just about any nationalist belief going; there 
' Lyons. The Irish Parliamentan! Paqv, p. 264. 
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was virtually no element of provincial Irish nationalism that could not be 'represented' by 
some element of the Irish party. While It had numerous local opponents, the I ge ma n ar jo ity of 
the party's nationalist enemies could be dismissed as isolated 'factionalists', distinguishable 
not by ideology or class, but purely by personal, local feuding. More coherent nationalist 
oppositions (O'Brienite, Sinn Fein) either never gained a foothold locally or were themselves 
in sharp decline in the period. Moreover, the party continued to draw strength from an 
intricate network of 'connections'. Membership of the party's affiliated political 
organisations (principally the UIL and AOH) overlapped with participation in a prolific array 
of religious, 'benevolent', special interest, cultural and recreational societies. 'The party' 
was still the near-monopoly leader of local nationalism and, in the words of the Liberal chief 
whip the Master of Elibank, held the 'copyright' of the national movement as well as its 
'machine'. 2 
Despite this, there was also a common contemporary perception that all was not well. Writers 
and politicians commented on the lack of activity and the listlessness of nationalism. 
Unionist writers cited this as evidence that nationalists did not care about Home Rule; 
nationalists that quiet, orderly and law-abiding Catholics posed no threat to the Protestant 
minority. The causes of such 'apathy' are not hard to find. Systematic land purchase and 
rising farm incomes had taken the steam out of the land agitation that had driven so much of 
the Irish party locally for over thirty years. The other wellspring of party activity, the goal of 
Home Rule, was complacently seen to be grinding its way through parliament. The Home 
Rule bill was judged to be more or less intact, unharmed by repeated, unsuccessful, unionist 
efforts to bluff British opinion or unsettle the resolve of the Liberal government. 3 It really 
was in 'these quiet days of peace', according to the Westmeath Independent, that 'a smug man 
may ask what need there is for a League'. 4 
The Party Machine 
Indeed, for proof of apathy and of a sickness within nationalism, observers had to look no 
further than 'the League', the UIL. Here, while the police might record relatively stable 
'on 2 Memorandum on the political situati In Ireland, 31' March 1910 (Elibank papers. National Library of 
Scotland, Ms. 8802 f 39). 
3 Only mob violence against Ulster Catholics, as, in July and August 1912. could alarm local opinion. 
4 It estmeath Independent, 14'h December 1912. 
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branch and membership numbers month after month, the organisation had to a significant 
extent become what the police also called 'nominal'. Land agitations had faded away. 
parliamentary elections were virtually all uncontested, fund-raising had fallen and Home Rule 
was assured. Would the League even be in existence after Home Rule? In the five counties, 
those UIL branches achieving the bare minimum of activity to be in good order with the 
National Directory, holding annual 'reorganisations' and paying their 0 subscriptions, fell in 
number from 1910 to 1913 by over 20%. These fewer branches in turn became individually 
less active. In 1913 UIL activity, measured by local press reports of UIL rallies, branch and 
committee meetings, was between 30% and 50% down on the levels of 1910. The main, 
residual function of the League now appeared to relate, if not to outright corruption, then to 'a 
good-natured desire to help a neighbour's child'; 5 effectively influence-peddling, nepotism 
and jobbery. 
However, it can also be argued that the Irish party, as a near-monopolist of local politics, 
would inevitably bear the brunt of a more general decline of activity and of a period, outside 
Ulster, of political 'quiet'. In the years 1910-13, the waning of popular politics was 
particularly apparent among farmers and outside the towns. Land agitations did not stop 
entirely but, given the scale of land purchase now under way, took on the characteristics of 
(mopping up' operations after a battle already won. Fanners were now likened by observers 
as diverse as John Dillon and the novelist Canon Sheehan to a penurious and narrow-minded 
'French' peasantry. Political activity contracted to the market towns dotted across the region 
and this contraction reinforced the hold over the local Irish party of urban commercial traders, 
shopkeepers and professionals. Such men - there were virtually no women publicly active in 
local nationalist politics at this time - gave every appearance of being eminently respectable, 
conservative and unrevolutionary. 
Their political horizons before 1914 were also almost uniformly local. In the five counties, 
the issues that propelled men to political activity related to jobs, newspaper and Printing 
contracts, road-building, light railways, disputed land-ownership, the rates and, of course, 
feuds that could stretch back for decades - between villages, businesses, newspapers, families 
and individuals. Small towns may have been dominated by local elites, who attended 
5Anderson, With Plunkett in Ireland, p. 228. 
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committee meeting after committee meeting of an interconnected array of societies and clubs. 
but their opponents were also well-entrenched in local societies. Those who were 'in', nearly 
always controlling the local UIL, denounced their opponents as 'cranks' and self-serving 
factionists who undermined the national cause with their disunity. Those who were 'out in 
the best traditions of oppositions everywhere, were vocal in their denunciations of the 
jobbery, 'wire-pulling', 'cliques' and 'bosses' which betrayed the national cause, and which 
they said characterised. the UIL in particular. 
Such underlying, incessant local rivalries gained prominence at times when there was little 
else happening politically. They were, therefore, only too apparent in the years 1910-13. 
Undoubtedly, the Irish party was enervated as a result; mutual co-operation and support 
receded along with the UIL's organisation and activity. In Leitrim and rural Sligo, politics 
may have appeared close to comatose in this period, but the party's surface control of local 
life was fissured with hairline cracks, the product of persistent squabbles. In Longford and 
County Roscommon, local feuding was endemic and slightly more focused. In Longford this 
was in reaction to the 'bossism' of J. P. Farrell; in Roscommon a consequence of the assertive,, 
unceasingly-active personalities of Jasper Tully and Canon Cummins, who provided 
leadership for local factionists that was lacking elsewhere. 
Opposition to local bosses and cliques did not mean, however, that factionists were always 
anti-party. Many local 'outs' were still party men active, if not in the UIL, in other party- 
affiliated organisations such as the Foresters, town tenants or Hibernians. Others, if not 
members of local party organisations, continued to pledge their national loyalty to John 
Redmond and Home Rule. Only a handful, of whom Jasper Tully was the most prominent, 
denounced both the local party and its national leadership (and even Tully retained loose ties 
to the Boyle AOH which he had set up in 1905, well after his expulsion from the UIL). The 
exception to this pattern was, however, North Westmeath, where followers of the outcast MP 
Laurence Ginnell had come to express their opposition to John Hayden and the UIL in a quite 
separate and rival organisation, initially the 'Independent UIL' and later the 'Westmeath 
Nationalist Executive'. Here again, the roots of division were almost exclusively local, with 
personal, family and clerical likes and dislikes counting for far more than either class or 
ideological differences. Politically, the followers of Hayden and Ginnell bore a closer 
resemblance to the Tweedledum and Tweedledee of North Westmeath than to any prototypes 
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for later, deeper divisions, but organisationally the split between the two sides was fonnal and 
consistent. The effect on the local UIL was little short of catastrophic. Ginnell and his 
followers were victorious in almost all of a succession of elections and the local UIL 
collapsed to a demoralised rump. If there was one part of the five counties where the Irish 
party could be described as terminally ill before its wartime death, it was North Westmeath. 
'Politics'. and particularly the UIL, may have been on the wane, but 'society' continued to 
flourish. Hibernian, village and church halls were built in profusion; social, sporting and 
cultural clubs,, benefits societies, labour leagues, trades unions and town tenants' associations 
all grew in number, with the region's small but busy market towns again a focus for activity. 
It has been argued by some that the Irish party before 1914 was challenged by such bodies 
and responded to their challenge by 'vampirising' and controlling them. However, the 
evidence of the five counties does not support this view. While episodic disputes between 
UIL men and town tenants, labour men and Foresters did occur, co-operation and 
interchangeability of personnel between the various societies was far more the norm, without 
the party having to be overtly acquisitive. Moreover, a majority of Land and Labour 
Associations, town tenant branches and Foresters had for years been formally affiliated to the 
Irish party, supplying funds, supporting its candidates for office and participating in 
membership conventions. Of the party's various, formal affiliates by far the most vigorous 
was the AOH. 
The AOH's growth stemmed from considerably more than its pole position, under the 1911 
National Insurance Act, as an approved insurance society. It provided a wide range of leisure, 
sporting and social activities, linked these to the trappings of a not-very-secret society, gave 
voice to a more militant nationalism, was dedicated to the advance of 'Catholicity' and 
appealed to the young. While the UIL decayed the Hibernians blossomed, becoming a major 
prop for the Irish party in Longford and most of Roscommon and the dominant partner of the 
UIL in Leitrim and Sligo. Only in Westmeath was the impact of the AOH small. In counties 
Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo at least, the increase of press reports of AOH activities almost 
exactly offset the slump of UIL reports. Not only was the younger, more militant and more 
overtly sectarian AOH by far the most vigorous component of the Irish party, but as a 
consequence the party (in aggregate and with the clear exception of North Westmeath) was 
far closer to holding its own locally than to ossification. 
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Events in Sligo town illustrated how the Irish party as a whole was still capable of self- 
renewal. Here, the party derived strength from its allies and affiliates (in this case labour and 
the Hibernians respectively) and succeeded despite continued, internecine faction-fighting. 
After 1905, local nationalist politics had seen a running dispute between on one side the 
town's Catholic business grandees, the church, the Sligo Champion and the UIL, and on the 
other 'smaller men' and the AOH. The leaders of each side, P. A. McHugh MP for the UIL 
and Daniel O'Donnell for the AOH, were both 'ffiends of labour' and both had cultivated 
support on the town's Trades Council. However, in the jostling to fill the vacuum left by 
McHugh's death after 1909, O'Donnell emerged as the leading champion of the labour cause 
and in 1911 actively promoted the arrival and growth in the town of the ITGWU. Annual 
elections to Sligo's Corporation quickly witnessed a successful alliance between O'Donnell's 
Hibernians and labour. Admittedly, the first major dock strike by the ITGVV'U, in 1912, did 
witness hostilities along class lines among nationalists. Some of the town's leading Catholic 
businessmen (usually prominent in the UIL) were among those resisting the strikers. 
However, by the time of a second, protracted strike in 1913, there was virtually a solid 
Lab/Nat front against the Protestant controllers and owners of the town's major shipping 
interests, docks and mills. UIL and AOH men, craft unions, transport workers, the church and 
the town's Catholic haute bourgeoisie were now allied, electorally and industrially, under the 
leadership of O'Donnell and then of his opportunistic colleague/rival John Jinks, who was 
senior in both the UIL and AOH. This Lab/Nat alliance was to remain solid until the autumn 
of 1914. Even North Sligo's MP, Tom Scanlan, could declare that as a member of the legal 
profession he too was a trades unionist. 6 
Popular Opinion 
The political language of Irish party speakers and newspapers before 1914 covered the full 
spectrum of nationalist beliefs and attitudes, reflecting the breadth of the party as a 
comprehensive nationalist movement. Intense social conservatism, reverence for the Catholic 
church and a craving for respectability ('the real conservative Ireland ... profoundly sceptical 
of revolutionary movements and revolutionary ideas ý)7 could combine, paradoxically, with a 
'democratic'. radical language imbued in nationalists over years of agitation and opposition. 
6 Sligo Independent, Sligo Times, 14'bSeptember 1912. 
7 Colum. Mv Irish Year, p. 12 7. 
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Locally, however, the rhetoric used most consistently, by platform speakers, newspaper 
editors, clerics, councillors and committee men was that of Ireland's 'Cause', her fight for 
freedom, her suffering and conflict. While speaker after speaker would declare that the armed 
conflict of the past was no longer necessary, they also repeatedly paid homage to the party's 
Fenian predecessors (several of whom were still alive and MPs), and to the 'men of 1848' and 
1798. The fight had to go on until Ireland had won her 'independence'. Even though the Irish 
party was now acknowledged to be in a constitutional, parliamentary alliance with Britain's 
'democracy', local oratory and writings were suffused by the traditional, deeply-ingrained 
language of Ireland as a cruelly and unjustly-treated underdog and victim. The list of 
Ireland's enemies was still prolific. Traitors, 'blood-suckers' and oppressors of Ireland could 
include landlords, aristocrats, land agents, government officials, 'the garrison', 'the Castle', 
Orangemen, 'Tories', Ulster unionists and carrion crows. 
Though this catalogue of enemies was also nearly all Protestant, it was unusual for Protestants 
to be attacked solely on the basis of their religious creed. Party speakers went out of their 
way to emphasise that Home Rule would not mean Rome Rule. Unionist claims of 
discrimination against local Protestants were indignantly denied and a pantheon of nationalist, 
Protestant heroes, from Tone to Parnell, constantly praised. However, nationalists' equally- 
repeated claim, that no religion would be privileged under Home Rule, carried the obvious 
implication that those who were widely believed to enjoy privileges would have to surrender 
them. As Sligo's favourite son, Daniel O'Donnell, put it at the great Dublin Home Rule rally 
in 1912, a minority had been nursed and pampered off the feeding bottle of Dublin Castle for 
over 300 years. Soon the 'health' of these 'superior persons' would 'return to a more normal 
state'. 8 (Sectarianism did surface more often in O'Donnell's home town, where there was still 
a wealthy, politically-vocal, Protestant business class to be resented. It was the Sligo 
Champion which in 1909 predicted 'Catholic omnipotency and its attendant conciliatory 
results'. )9 The AOH, of which O'Donnell was the Connaught regional director and national 
trustee, remained explicitly sectarian throughout the pre-war period and dedicated to 
advancing the interests of Catholics. Was it any coincidence that it was also, until 1914, by 
far the most vigorous organisation across the region, whether, political, cultural or social? 
8 Sligo Champion, 6 th ApnI 1912. 
9 Ibid, 9h October 1909. 
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Another component of the prevailing nationalist orthodoxy was a perennial distrust and 
contempt for most things 'English', whether defined as English materialism, dishonesty, 
commercial self-interest, cruelty or decadence - or even the 'mincing' English accent. In its 
impact on contemporary debate this was far greater than the praise given, often by the same 
speakers and writers, to the Irish party's parliamentary alliance with England's 'democracy'. 
A ritualistic but vehement dislike of England and Englishmen was easily triggered, whether 
by the activities of 'English' trades unions, the supposed English plot to destroy the Irish 
cattle trade or the importation of dirty English books and newspapers. In the late-summer of 
1913 it was about to blossom again. The Irish party locally may have been run by small-town 
conservatives, with its policies more constitutional and the countryside more pacified than for 
years, but nationalism's political orthodoxy was still one of resentment and conflict. 
Nationalism was defined by reference to its enemies and far and away the greatest of these 
was England. 
Encouragement of the local manifestations of Gaelic, 'cultural' nationalism - its festivals, 
sports, language teaching, music and dramas - was therefore wholly consistent with the 
prevailing outlook of almost all leading local nationalists. While local Irish party leaders and 
newspaper editors were more often than not too old to take part in football, athletics or hurling 
and quite unable (in common with most adults) to acquire more than a smattering of Irish, 
they were fully supportive of what were seen as respectable, 'national' organisations such as 
the Gaelic League and GAA. Support for Ireland's 'national day', for the campaign for 
Essential Irish in the National University, for the temperance movement, the Gaelic League's 
'Language Fund' or a succession of 'Buy Irish' initiatives was nearly always axiomatic. 
Press coverage of such politically-correct Gaelic activities was pervasive. Gaelic sports 
certainly flourished locally in the period and the activities of the Gaelic League were usually 
an integral, albeit fluctuating, part of small-town social life. Interwoven into almost all of this 
local activity was the Catholic clergy, very often local guardians of nationalism's cultural 
orthodoxy and just as active in nationalism's 'politics' as they were in its 'culture'. 
It would be wrong, however, to say that these cultural organisations were affiliated to or came 
under the control of the Irish party. The Gaelic League remained resolutely 'non-[party] 
political' and a large number of its activists. while they might welcome Home Rule and 
anticipate the advance of Irish culture under it, took little or no part in UIL or AOH affairs. 
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Indeed some 'Gaels' formed a nucleus of advanced nationalist opposition to the party, 
particularly in Athlone, and nationally the GAA remained more under the control of the IRB 
than any other 'cultural' organisation. For all that, there was significant local overlap 
between Irish party activists and those prominent in Gaelic sports, language and temperance. 
It was just as normal for prominent party men to participate in their local Gaelic League, 
finance a football or hurling tournament or speak at a temperance rally as it was for them to 
take part, sometimes to excess, in the battery of other local activities and committees available 
to them. At this local level, talk of a separate world view or weltanschauung for 'political' as 
opposed to 'cultural' nationalists is simply meaningless. 
If a barrier was being thrown across the current of Irish nationalism (whether 'modem' or 
atavistic, 'cultural' or 'political', democratic or conservative), the culprit was not, therefore, 
the Irish party. Nor could a gulf be discerned, before the Home Rule crisis, between the 
political outlook of the party in Ireland and that of its parliamentary wing. This is hardly 
surprising, given that the majority of MPs were local men who had served long 
apprenticeships as agitators, editors, committee men, party officers and/or councillors. They 
had for years lived either in their constituencies or home towns, dispensing patronage and 
sustaining local networks of supporters and societies. Farrell in Longford, Fitzgibbon in 
Castlerea, Hayden in Mullingar, O'Dowd in Tubercurry and Meehan in Manorhamilton were 
archetypal political 'bosses', while Smyth and Phillips were both fundamentally 'local' 
politicians. Admittedly, presiding over such parish pump operations was not necessarily 
essential to stay in harmony with local opinion. Neither the totally-absent J. J. O'Kelly nor 
Ginnell, who for years had pursued his political career in Dublin and London, could be said to 
be swimming against the stream of their followers' beliefs. Nevertheless, a regular, local 
presence surely helped and when the MPs came to be absent in Britain for long periods, as 
they were for much of 1913 (whipped in at Westminster to vote for the Home Rule bill or 
travelling across England and Scotland on speaking tours) their responsiveness to local 
political pre-occupations must necessarily have weakened. 
The region's two MPs most removed from the prevailing nationalist orthodoxy, though 
locally born and bred, were both politicians whose careers and social lives were conducted 
well away from their constituencies. Sir Walter Nugent and Thomas Scanlan most 
consistently gave voice to those views on Ireland's loyalty to the British empire, the need to 
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conciliate Protestants and unionists and the need for men of standing to play their full role in 
an independent Ireland which echoed those of their national party leader, John Redmond. 
Neither MP could be said to be a marginal figure, with Nugent chairing the Freeman's Journal 
Company and Scanlan co-running the Irish Press Agency and secretary to the parliamentary 
party. Their local political position appeared unaffected by their conservative moderation. 
Their commitment to Home Rule was beyond doubt and their continued political success was 
a tribute to the breadth of opinion which could be encompassed in an all-embracing national 
movement. Their Redmondism was, however, distinctly a minority view in the five counties, 
and makes the party's continued, undoubted loyalty to its leader all the more noteworthy. 
Of course, Redmond himself could at times be anything but 'Redmondite' and over his career 
had voiced the full range of nationalist rhetoric, from mild-mannered to bellicose, from 
imperialist to separatist. His unionist opponents would happily quote selectively from his 
speeches and writings to demonstrate that behind his conciliatory fagade there lurked a man as 
extreme as any Fenian. Redmond had also several times in his career - in 1904,1907 and 
1910 - backtracked from moderate proposals for Irish devolution and/or federation in the 
interests of nationalist unity and party management. His position as party chairman was not 
always secure, but it had been boosted hugely by his electoral and tactical successes of 1910, 
which created the real possibility, for the first time in decades, of Irish self-goverm-nent. With 
his oratorical and parliamentary skills, his management of the parliamentary party's inner 
leadership and his status as Parnell's disciple and successor, he was regarded as far more than 
just the 'chairman' of the parliamentary party. Throughout the local press he was referred to 
as 'the leader', and there is no doubt that in the late-summer of 1913 the Irish party 
considered itself to be right behind him. 
The Irish party in the late summer of 1913 was, therefore, waiting, confident that Home Rule 
would become law during 1914 and come into operation during 1915. The overall popular 
mood of local nationalists in relation to the progress of the Home Rule bill was quiet and 
complacent, leaving them open to. the unionist charge of apathy, that they did not care. The 
bill had survived the theatrical terrors of the Ulster campaign substantially unscathed and the 
Roscominon Journal really could 'rest somewhat contented, with the long lost goal appearing 
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inview'. 10 In at least five counties of 'middle Ireland' the Irish party may, chronologically, 
have been close to its political death, but it was not out of touch with popular opinion and was 
not at odds with 'modem' Irish nationalism. Weakened (in the UIL), parochial and faction- 
ridden it may have been , but taking 
into account its amorphous collection of affiliates, its 
ability to form local alliances and its harmony of outlook with the prevailing nationalist 
orthodoxy of the time, it was (with the clear exception of its dire state in North Westmeath) 
anything but terminally ill. 
July 1914 
In his biography of Parnell, Paul Bew has written of the period 1879-92 that 'once the masses 
got involved in politics ... all the "leaders" were swept along'. 
II Much the same could be said 
of the Irish party's relationship to popular nationalist opinion in the months leading up to July 
1914, as the Home Rule crisis finally broke and Tom Kettle's 'great wave' of Volunteering 
crashed down across nationalist Ireland. The months before the Great War saw provincial 
opinion almost totally absorbed in the Home Rule crisis, with national rather than parish 
pump issues driving local political actions. Would Ireland achieve Home Rule despite a 
succession of 'English' betrayals? How far would 'Ireland's army', the Irish Volunteers, have 
to fight for it? The crisis entailed a mass political mobilisation, militarism and a bellicosity of 
language unseen in recent times. Some Irish party politicians still considered that they were 
at the head of the Irish Volunteers, but in reality the party's standing changed for the worse 
and its cohesion and organisation weakened, both relative to the burgeoning Volunteers and 
absolutely. The Irish party did not generate the 'great wave' of Volunteering and could not 
control it. It could only be swept along. 
In the autumn of 1913, a succession of initiatives, speeches and 'conversations' by British 
politicians aroused nationalist fears across Ireland that the Ulster unionist campaign of 'bluff 
might actually be working and Home Rule lost or mutilated. Local calls for nationalists to 
imitate the Ulster Volunteer Force multiplied, both as a political counter-bluff to scare British 
opinion back into line and as a defensive force to protect Connaught or Leinster towns and 
villages against a widely-feared incursion by Carson's men. Coverage of the Irish Volunteers 
became the major news story of the local press and leading articles consistently supported the 
10 Roscommon Journal, 16"' August 1913. 
11 Bew, Charles Stewart Parnell (Dublin 1980). p. 143. 
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idea of local men drilling and bearing arms. Such calls came not just from 'cranks' and 
factionists, but from right across the mainstream, party-supporting press. Indeed the 
Westmeath Independent, arguably the most Redmondite of the local newspapers, gave the 
movement a boost nationally with its own published fantasy of thousands of men marching 
through the streets of Athlone. The change of popular mood, from complacent anticipation of 
Home Rule to palpable sense of crisis, was sudden and dramatic. A range of nationalist 
speakers and writers - many of them middle-aged, bourgeois, conservative and 'respectable' - 
now advocated the use of arms. 
However, with the first Volunteer companies fori-ning in Dublin and elsewhere, the Irish party 
moved against this groundswell of popular opinion and tried to hold it back. In this, the 
party's parliamentary wing was at odds with the mood of many of its followers in Ireland. 
For the parliamentary party, which had for several years focused on securing the passage of 
the Home Rule bill, the 'battleground' of Home Rule was in Britain, either through the MPs' 
presence at Westminster to protect the bill against tactical ambushes or via their participation 
in a succession of British speaking tours. Not only had the party leadership been focused on 
the campaign in Britain, but the crisis had come upon them suddenly. There had been no long 
build-up to accustom them to the idea of radically different tactics. Redmond himself was 
instinctively hostile to mass mobilisation and physical force. Others in the leadership feared 
that the Volunteers would be impossible to control or calculated that an armed mobilisation 
would only alienate British politicians and parties. 
The parliamentarians did, therefore, go against the grain of local opinion, but the majority of 
the party locally was nevertheless prepared to follow its leaders. Moreover, the party's 
success in stifling the spread of Volunteering was indicative not of its decay, but of the 
organisational cohesion and loyalty upon which it could still draw. Even J. P. Farrell, the only 
party MP in the five counties living locally in the autumn of 1913 and the only local party MP 
(surely no coincidence) then to call publicly for Volunteers, would for nearly the next six 
months tell his Longford followers that the time was not ripe. The party was able to restrict, 
if not stop, the spread of Volunteering until the late spring of 1914. 
Paradoxically, the scale of the party's influence could also be seen where its internal 
discipline failed and local nationalists pressed on with the formation of Volunteer 
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companies. In three of the four local instances where this occurred (in Sligo, Granard and 
Boyle) the active support of local UIL/AOH men of 'influence' was both forthcoming and an 
essential ingredient of the new companies' success. Arguably the healthiest party 
organisation in the region, in Sligo town, took the lead from the outset in the town's 
Volunteers and backed one of the strongest corps in Ireland. By contrast, where a Volunteer 
company was organised without local party support, in Athlone, it was nearly still-bom. 
If the party nationally retained a sufficient grip over its followers to hold back the formation 
of Volunteer companies, its efforts were ultimately futile. A steady trickle of new companies 
in the five counties indicated that the party's discouragement of the Volunteers was only 
partially effective. By the end of April, as the Home Rule crisis gathered in intensity, the 
initial four companies in the region had grown to seventeen. As event followed on event, it 
became apparent to local nationalists that Ulster's unionists and the UVF could act with 
impunity (and if they could, why shouldn't nationalists? ), that the Home Rule bill would be at 
best 'mutilated' through Ulster's exclusion, that 'Ireland' was indeed being betrayed by the 
'English' political parties and that purely parliamentary tactics were not enough. It was still 
believed that some forin of Home Rule Act would pass through parliament, but the chances of 
it coming peacefully into operation across the whole of Ireland were progressively more 
remote. The public rationale for the Volunteers, therefore, changed and they were seen 
increasingly as 'Ireland's army', which would not only stay in being after Home Rule's 
passage, but might well have to fight to secure Home Rule's operation. 
Moreover, though party support was still fundamental to the success of individual Volunteer 
companies, the party locally tended to lose status relative to the new force. Sportsmen, 
language enthusiasts, farmers and their sons, shop assistants and labourers who had not been 
politically active were mobilised, but not into a 'party' organisation. Villages and country 
districts were re-mobilised back into political life after several years of relative inaction. At 
the peak of the movement, between 25% and 35% of young and young middle-aged men had 
enrolled locally. This mass of men joining up might still cheer for Redmond and Home Rule, 
but they did not necessarily represent a new burst of support for the Irish party. Former Sinn 
Fein supporters and IRB men who had been quite marginalised were now given a local 
prominence they had not enjoyed for years. A new, much more numerous nationalist 
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coalition was fonning, centred on a paramilitary movement, and the Irish party was only a 
part of it. 
The response of the party leadership was to recognise the inevitable and, from the end of 
April 1914, positively to encourage support for the Volunteers. The immediate result was a 
mushrooming of Volunteer numbers and activities across the five counties, a tribute to the 
effectiveness of the party's previous restraint. It did not, however, increase the party's control 
over the movement, nor did it reverse the trend for the party to be sidelined within it. Of 
course, thousands of party members did now join up, and each new company was graced by 
senior UIL and/or AOH men on its governing committee. Statistically, as the police still 
counted over 20,000 UIL members in the five counties in 1914 and over 20,000 Volunteers 
by the end of August, significant overlap was unavoidable, but the majority of UIL men who 
enrolled in the Volunteers had been 'nominal', passive non-parti cip ants in the UIL for years. 
At the level of 'activists' - comparing UIL/AOH speakers, officers and committee men 
against comparable Volunteer leaders - the level of commonality between the two 
movements was far from high, at only 25 - 35%. The new nationalist coalition represented by 
the Volunteers was just as broad after the party leadership took its foot off the brakes as it had 
been before. 
The next move by the party's leadership, to attempt a formal, national takeover of the 
Volunteers at the end of June, encountered almost no local resistance but was wholly 
ineffective. In less than a handful of local companies, Athlone being the most conspicuous, 
was there any change of local Volunteer leadership. Not only did the party 'vampire' not 
feast on the blood of the Volunteers, but its largest affiliate, the UIL, began to appear 
decidedly anaernic. June and July 1914, the peak months for new Volunteer company 
formation, also saw a sharp downwards lurch in UIL activity and even a temporary dip in that 
of the AOH. UIL activity, fund-raising and the number of branches 'in good order' with the 
National Directory all fell rapidly in 1914. Not only was the Irish party no longer a near- 
monopolist of local politics, having failed to gain in vigour and popular participation from the 
national crisis, but it also appeared to lose ground absolutely, crowded out of nationalist 
activity by the new movement. 
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The beginnings of the collapse of the Irish party can, therefore, be traced to its failure to lead 
local nationalist opinion during the Home Rule crisis which erupted in late- 1913. Onbalance., 
the failure the Irish party was not one of local organisation or ideology, but of its national 
political leadership. In temperament, its local, small-town politicians with 'blinking eyes and 
wavering speech ... representative of the real conservative 
Ireland' 12 might seem to be the last 
people to be carried up in a wave of paramilitary emotion, but when the crisis broke their 
initial endorsement of drilling and the use of arnis was clear. Party men in towns such as 
Boyle and Sligo proved perfectly able and willing to start successful Volunteer companies - it 
is noteworthy that such towns had 'bosses' linked to the more vigorous and militant 
Hibernians and who also operated independently of largely- absentee MPs. It was by contrast 
the parliamentarians, though they were still able to harness the discipline of a far from rotten 
local organisation, who attempted, and failed, to place a 'barrier against the current' of 
popular Irish opinion. The result was that by the time the party came actively to back the 
Volunteers it was marginallsed and definitely, in John Dillon's words of late-May, 'playing 
with fire', running the risk that the Volunteers could 'utterly ruin the National movement - 
and repeat the disasters of 1798'. 13 Given the anger and excitement that would soon follow, 
with constant drilling and parades, rumours, linguistic bellicosity ('Ireland is out for blood 
and murder'), 14 arms landings and Dublin shootings, Dillon's lack of enthusiasm was perhaps 
understandable, but the party's position as the leader of nationalism had been significantly 
weakened. 
Though the goal of almost all nationalists was still 'Home Rule' and Redmond was still seen 
as their leader, forces other than the constitutional Irish party were now 'right behind' him 
and were quite often menacing in their support. In mid-July, the staunchly-Hibernian Henry 
Monson could of course stress, to a County Sligo audience of 'soldiers of Ireland', that the 
rights they would defend had been won by 'great leaders' and that the use of arms could be 
dangerous unless 'properly guided'. However, his description of the constitutional agitation 
as a 'flimsy dam' holding back a 'mighty pent up volume of water' that was Ireland's revived 
martial spirit (see page 127), was truer to the mood of the time. So too was his conclusion that 
if English statesmen should surrender Ireland's cause to her enemies, 
12 Coluin, ltýv Ii-ish Year, p. 127. 
13 Dillon to Blunt 21" May 1914. Blunt Mss., West Sussex Record Office, Chichester. Box 16 Vol. 6. 
14 John Jinks reported in the Western Nationalist, 8th August 1914. 
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then down will go the dam, and like a mighty devastating torrent the Irish Volunteers will 
sweep over Ireland, and it will be well for England if they demand no more than Home 
Rule (loud and continuous applause). " 
December 1914 
Though an eventual war between England and Germany was long anticipated, particularly by 
Jasper Tully, the actual outbreak of a European war in August 1914 was almost totally 
unforeseen in an Ireland that was wrapped up in its own crisis. The war immediately and 
undoubtedly acted as a 'deus ex machina', altering the course of Irish politics. However, its 
initial impact was not to discredit either constitutional nationalism or the Irish party, but to 
defuse the immediate crisis that had been faced by so many Irish politicians at the end of July. 
'Home Rule' was temporarily submerged by the impact of local soldiers and reservists going 
off to battle, by panic buying, spy and invasion scares, relief work, tax increases and a 
general, nervy anticipation of a terrible war. The habitual anglophobift running through 
nationalist political rhetoric, which had been given full rein in the Home Rule crisis, was 
immediately stilled by a widespread belief that England and her wartime allies were, for once, 
clearly in the right. Not only was the crisis which had propelled the 'great wave' of 
Volunteering superceded but the Irish party proceeded to take control of the Volunteers in a 
way which had completely eluded it during the summer months. 
However, the remarkable swing of nationalist opinion, towards what Augustine Birrell called 
'great friendliness' towards England in the war, would only fleetingly re-secure the position 
of Irish party as the undisputed leader of nationalist opinion, let alone make Ireland safe for 
Redmondism, the empire or conciliation with England. Instead the Irish party, committed to a 
policy of active participation in the war effort and support for recruiting, would now decline 
almost uninterruptedly until it went to electoral oblivion in 1918. The relative quiet and 
stability of nationalist politics at the end of 1914 reflected not the wartime health of the Irish 
party but rather its own, imminent mortality. 
However, Redmond's first wartime initiative, his early-August offer that the Irish Volunteers 
and UVF should together defend Ireland against invasion, was absolutely in tune with the new 
popular mood triggered by the war and, ývas hailed, locally, by almost all nationalists. It held 
15 Monson speaking at Highwood, County Sligo. Sligo Champion, 18'hJuly 1914. 
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out the promise of securing the future role of 'Ireland's army', increased the probability of the 
passage of Home Rule, tactically outflanked the unionists in parliament and gave clear voice 
to Irish support for what was seen as a just cause. Most notably, the long-standing 
Redmondite themes of conciliating England, taking Ireland's rightful place in the empire and 
uniting all Irishmen in a common cause appeared for once to be fully in harmony with the 
'current' of popular thought. The offer was seen as an act of ffiendship towards England, and 
approved as such. 
Equally startling, but indicative of just how volatile the popular mood was in 1914, was the 
speed with which the new national consensus given form by Redmond's offer began to 
unravel. Within two to three weeks, discussion of what was seen as yet another betrayal 
permeated the local nationalist press, in a range of loyal, party-supporting papers. The 
progress of the Home Rule bill was being stalled; the Volunteers were being given no support 
or training; Redmond's offer was being spurned; the war would be long and might trigger 
conscription. Dissidents within the Volunteers, former Sinn Fein supporters, former and 
current IRB men and some habitual, local 'cranks' began to form a distinct nationalist 
opposition, given coherence by their attacks on the war effort and the Irish party, and even 
acquiring the soubriquet of 'Sinn Feiners'. Moreover, their ranks were swelled by the first 
'trickles' of what was to prove a long stream of defections from the Irish party - of politicians, 
clerics and newspaper editors who simply could not stomach being on the same side as 
Ireland's 'real enemy', England. 
It was, therefore, against a background not of harmonious consensus but of mounting 
disaffection that Home Rule (still delayed indefinitely in its operation and highly likely to 
exclude most of Ulster) finally became law. The party's leadership immediately went on the 
offensive to check this unrest, reaffirm its support for the war effort and curb the nascent Sinn 
Feiner opposition. The party's MPs, local leaders, speakers and press were wheeled out to 
fight an uncomplicated, partisan battle to secure its organisational base, focusing on the body 
over which its control was weakest and in which its opponents were most entrenched, the 
Volunteers. The efficiency and speed with which the party now took control of the movement 
was, again, a tribute to the continuing internal cohesion and discipline of its machine. Within 
six weeks, right across Ireland, meetings were packed, parades mustered, dissidents isolated, 
committee members voted off and resolutions of loyalty to Ireland's leader passed. This was 
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the time, above all others, when nationalists were meant to be 'right behind Mr. Redmond'. 
The party's public policy was now set by its leader, emphasising Ireland's fiiendship and 
alliance with England, her proper place in the empire, the need to honour the grant of Home 
Rule, the reconciliation of all creeds and classes (and unionists and nationalists) through 
shared military comradeship and, above all, the duty of Irishmen taking their place in the 
British army, 'in the firing line'. 
That such an agenda was emphatically not in tune with popular nationalist opinion, that 
'Redmondism' was always a minority taste in provincial, nationalist Ireland, has been one of 
the recurring themes of this study. Nevertheless, the Irish party locally in the autumn of 1914 
appeared to throw itself with gusto into this new campaign. There seemed to be a clear 
perception that while Home Rule had passed, its coming into operation was anything but 
assured and that sullen defiance of England in the midst of the most terrible war in history 
would be, politically, suicidal. The Volunteers had to be controlled, disciplined and trained - 
there could be no more 'playing with fire'. What is striking, however, is how much of the 
specifically Redmondite agenda was lost by the party in its local campaigning. Men were 
indeed exhorted to join up, but to the Volunteers. They were told that they would not be 
'called up' to the army and assured repeatedly that party speakers were not 'recruiting 
sergeants'. Appeals were made to nationalist unity and discipline rather than to ffiendship for 
England. The loyalty that was desired was to 'the leader' rather than to the empire. The 
party's conception and that of Redmond, as to what exactly they were 'right behind', were not 
the same. 
The party's takeover of the Volunteers was also the most phyrric of its victories. Not only did 
more of its traditional supporters defect, unable to declare for England (let alone tell young 
men to join the British army), but the newly-controlled National Volunteers crumbled to dust 
in its hands. It seems clear that while the takeover did not initiate the process of the 
Volunteers' collapse - it was already under way beforehand - it certainly hastened it. 
Volunteers stopped drilling, parading, even meeting, because of a pervasive fear that such 
public military activity increased the chance of their being called up for the army. The party's 
trecruiting' campaign of support for Redmond and the war could only magnify such fears. 
Though publicly they declared their allegiance to Redmond, the mass of Volunteers showed 
their true intentions subsequently by voting with their feet. 
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The party's autumn campaign, therefore, both accelerated the disintegration of the Volunteers 
and drove more of its supporters, local factionists and the formerly apolitical into the ranks of 
its opponents, who themselves became the focus for nationalist opposition to 'England' and 
the war. The party was now trapped by the exigency of war into a policy which it could not 
abandon without destroying Home Rule, and which it could not continue without alienating 
its natural supporters. That the party's war policy was fundamentally against the grain of 
local nationalist thought was soon evidenced in the middle and west of Ireland, by levels of 
recruitment which were widely acknowledged to be 'disappointing' and which were in reality 
derisory when compared with other rural areas of the United Kingdom. The mid-October 
flight to the ports of hundreds of young men, panicked by a press rumour of imminent 
conscription, was a far more powerful testament to the mood of provincial Ireland than 
Redmond singing 'God Save the King' and flying the Union Jack alongside the Green Flag at 
Aughavanagh. 
Paramilitary activity in general slumped in this envirom-nent, both for the party and, initially, 
for its Sinn Feiner opponents. The countryside retreated to inactivity and 'apathy'. The effect 
on what was still the party's main affiliate, the UIL, was little short of disastrous, coming as it 
did after several years of slow decline and the summer's downwards lurch of activity. 
Though the more socially-active Hibernians (still buoyed by their recreational and benefits 
society roles and both more militant and more sectarian) were far more resilient than their 
UIL affiliates, the aggregate decline of the party's organisation was now so steep as to call 
into question whether it could pull out of the dive. Increasingly divided over the issue of the 
war and losing touch with its natural base of support in provincial Ireland, the Irish party, for 
the first time, approached that state of terminal decay so often described by its contemporary 
enemies and by so many historians. 
As Always, Behind Mr. Redmond 
The story of the Irish party across provincial Ireland over the years 1910-14, was. therefore. 
undoubtedly one of failure. This failure was not the result of structural rottenness, nor of the 
party being ideologically obsolete and out of step with a 'new' Ireland. Rather it was a 
consequence of it adopting policies, formed by its parliamentary leadership, which went 
fundamentally against the grain of nationalist public opinion during the crisis of late 1913 and 
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again in the first months of the war. It is tempting to seek out a scapegoat for this in the form 
of the party's respected, long-serving leader, Redmond. His perception of Ireland's 
relationship with England, with parliament, men of property and the empire was for many 
years substantially different from that of the mass of his followers. His instinctive, 
conciliatory conservatism underpinned the party's decisions first to check the spread of the 
Volunteers and then to campaign for England and recruiting in the war. Despite this, 
Redmond did not act alone. The party's broader parliamentary leadership, while they may 
have backed their leader for quite different and far less Redmondite reasons, endorsed 
Redmond in both periods of crisis. Moreover, the party's local 'machine' still functioned 
sufficiently well, and internal loyalty was still sufficiently strong, for it to weigh in behind its 
leader and implement his policies. 
However, the roots of the Irish party were still deeply embedded in small-town, provincial 
Irish life. Its local leaders were steeped not only in conservative respectability and machine 
politics, but in the bellicosity of language, Catholicity, sense of victimhood, glorification of 
struggle, identification of enemies and antipathy to England which suffused provincial, 
nationalist orthodoxy throughout the pre-war period. The strains placed upon the party 
locally, in implern enting policies which ran counter to its instinctive beliefs, were too great. 
In mid- 1914, the party was able to abandon its policy of antipathy to Volunteering, but after 
the autumn of 1914 the protractedness and scale of the war left it no escape from its pro- 
England, pro-recruiting, pro-Redmond stance. Its organisation now decayed rapidly. The 
fissures of local, pre-war factionism widened and often acquired the dignity of being about the 
national question, whatever their parochial origins. Some long-standing party activists 
defected to the new Sinn Feiner opposition. Others simply gave up the political ghost and, in 
the early years of the war, stopped all activity. The Irish party, if not yet discredited, now 
lacked the necessary resources of support, loyalty and cohesion to withstand the shocks and 
disasters of 1916. 
In the end, the Irish party broke under the strain of following the wartime policies of Its 
leader. Redmond's political leadership had for years been placed rather uncomfortably at the 
head of the less compromising nationalism of the mass of his followers. In the autumn of 
1914, however, the political imperative of not alienating England in a terrible NA, ar meant that 
the party was, on the surface, 'right behind Mr. Redmond'. In fact, it was now so far behind 
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Redmond as to be almost out of sight. Redmond's goals were not only against the stream of 
nationalist public opinion but were also beyond the powers and against the instincts of the 
organisation most representative of that opinion, his own party. Redmond's moderate, 
conservative vision of a self-governed Ireland embracing all creeds and classes, of Home Rule 
peacefully and constitutionally achieved within the British empire, simply could not be 
realised. 
339 
Appendices 
and 
Bibliography 
340 
Appendix A: Continui 
The Irish par! y 1914, rish Volunteers 1914 and Sinn Fein 1917-18 
The issue of 'continuity' between the Irish party and Sinn Fein, its wartime successor as an 
umbrella national movement, was raised among historians by David Fitzpatrick in Politics 
and Irish Life some twenty-five years ago. Fitzpatrick argued that there was significant 
continuity between the two movements : of personnel, campaigning methods, organisational 
models and ideology. It was, after all, Canon Cummins who in November 1918 hailed Sinn 
Fein as the 'new, virile Irish Party'. ' To requote the more recent observation of Fitzpatrick 
'the political culture of nationalist Ireland re-emerged, draped in a tricolour that barely 
obscured the outline of a golden harp'. 2 
However, in his PhD thesis Land and Politics in Connacht 1898-1909, Fergus Campbell 
tested the hypothesis of continuity against the experience of the party in Galway. Campbell 
analysed a list of known 1914 Irish party members and supporters in East Galway against a 
comparable list of 1917/18 Sinn Fein members and supporters. The lists were derived from 
reports of, respectively, UIL meetings in 1914 and Sinn Fein meetings in 1917/18, both 
published in the Connacht Tribune. 334 UIL names were collated and 311 Sinn Fein names. 
Significantly, only 3% (i. e. II individuals) of those attending the 1914 UIL meetings were 
named as attending the later Sinn Fein meetings. To quote Campbell, this 'does not suggest 
that there was a large amount of continuity between the two organisations'. 3 
In his earlier work on County Clare, Fitzpatrick had achieved rather different results. He 
compiled lists of: 
- 749 Irish party lay 'bosses' and 46 Irish party priests from the years 1913-16, and 
- 913 separatist secular leaders and 73 separatist priests from the years 1917-2 1. 
Of the 1913-16 Irish party laity, 12% of Hibernian leaders, 13% of United Irish Leaguers and 
23% of 'Redmondite Volunteer chiefs' were also on the later list of lay separatists. Of the 
1 Roscommon Journal, 30'hNovember 1918. 
2 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, p. 69. 
3Campbell. Land and Politics in Connacht, 1898-1909, p. 25 8. 
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1917-21 lay separatists, 55 had themselves been local councillors before 1920; 54 had been in 
the UIL and 72 in the 'Redmondite Volunteers'. 
The contrast between the two sets of results is substantial, prompting the understated 
observation from Campbell that Fitzpatrick's conclusions on continuity did 'not appear to be 
applicable to East Galway'. 5 Interestingly, Campbell saw far less continuity than Fitzpatrick 
even though in Galway he was comparing support for the 1914 Irish party with the essentially 
'political' Sinn Fein movement of 1917-18. By contrast, Fitzpatrick's Clare comparison also 
encompassed the more violent, revolutionary years of 1919-2 1. Intuitively, one would have 
expected Campbell to have found the greater continuity. 
Campbell's exercise has been replicated here to give a statistical indication of continuity in 
three of the five counties: Leitrim,, Roscommon and Sligo. Data from two newspapers have 
been used in this exercise - the Roscommon Herald and the Sligo Champion. 
The Choice of Newspapers 
The Herald and Champion 
Despite their differing political affiliations, these two newspapers were chosen because they 
both published extensive reports of Irish party meetings in 1914 and Sinn Fein meetings in 
1917/18. Between them they covered virtually all of the three counties Leitrim, Roscommon 
and Sligo. Though overlapping, the geographical coverage of the two papers was 
complementary. The Champion covered North Sligo, Sligo town, North Leitrim, to a lesser 
extent South Sligo and, intermittently, South Leitrim and North Roscommon. The Herald 
covered North Roscommon and South Leitrim, to a lesser extent South Sligo and South 
Roscommon and only intermittently North Sligo and North Leitrim. In both cases, the 
geographic areas covered in 1914 were also covered in 1917/18 and good like-for-like 
comparisons between the two periods can be made. 
In the case of the Herald, some additional Sinn Fein branch reports from 1917/18 have had to 
be excluded. By that time the Herald had become the 'paper of record' for almost the entire 
Sinn Fein movement of county Longford, whereas in 1914 it had carried only a handful of 
Longford Irish party reports. Mercifully, Jasper Tully always flagged the county origin of 
4 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lffie 1913-21, pp. 134.138 and 289. 
5 Campbell, Land and Politics in Connacht, p. 260. 
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each branch report published. All Longford reports, and a smattering of reports from Galway 
and Mayo, have been excluded from the Herald analysis for both periods. 
The differing political biases of the Herald and Champion may have affected the data 
provided by each paper. The Herald was relentlessly anti-party throughout while the 
Champion was a loyal party supporter. In 1914 the Herald carried significantly fewer UIL 
reports than the Cham ion and some UIL branches - notably Boyle - did not submit reports 
to the paper. The Herald'S under-reporting of UIL meetings may have. removed a number of 
strong party supporters from the 1914 list, thus exaggerating the later continuity to Sinn Fein 
of those 1914 party men still named in the paper. This was, however, compensated for by a 
large volume of AOH reports. As a result, the list of 1914 Irish party supporters derived from 
the Herald was almost as long as that derived ftom the Champion (634 names against 643). 
In 1917/18, the Herald'S strong support for Sinn Fein meant that its list of Sinn Feiners, even 
excluding those from Longford, Mayo and Galway, was considerably longer than that of the 
Champion (847 names against 548). It cannot be said with any accuracy whether this latter 
difference between the two papers acted to deflate or inflate the impression of Irish party/Sinn 
Fein continuity : it could reduce the percentage of 1917/18 Sinn Feiners who were previous 
party supporters, but inflate the percentage of 1914 party supporters who later embraced Sinn 
Fein. 
Other Newspapers 
None of the other newspapers studied in this thesis provided sufficient data to make valid 
like-for-like comparisons between the two periods and the two movements. Thus the 
Hayden-owned Roscommon Messenger and Westmeath Examiner carried almost no reports of 
Sinn Fein meetings in 1917/18; nor did J. P. Farrell's Longford Leader. The Westmeath 
Independent, though both loyal to the party in 1914 and strongly pro-Sinn Fein by mid- 1917, 
did not carry enough 1914 branch meeting reports to make sensible comparisons. Tully's 
Midland Reporter carried almost no 'Irish party' reports in 1914, whether UIL, AOH or 
Ginnellite. Similarly, the Roscommon Journal did not carry many branch reports in either 
period. The remaining newspapers were either too small to produce enough individual names 
for both periods, or were incompletely preserved, or were unionist. 
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It is possible that a hybrid analysis could be constructed for County Longford - from the 
Longf6rd Leader and Roscommon Herald for 1914 and the Herald for 1917/18 - but this 
would lack the validity of the immediate like-for-like analysis conducted by Campbell for 
East Galway (and which can be replicated well by using data from the Champion and the 
Herald). An even weaker hybrid for Westmeath would use Westmeath Examiner and 
Midland Reporter reports for 1914 (of which there are not many, from either paper) and 
Midland Reporter reports for 1917/18. This rather dubious construct would only cover the 
north of the county. 
Composition of the Lists 
From the Sligo Champion, the lists compiled are of 643 Irish party supporters from 1914 and 
548 Sinn Fein supporters from 1917/18. From the Roscommon Herald the comparable figures 
are 634 Irish party supporters and 847 Sinn Feiners. The lists compiled are not of what 
Fitzpatrick referred to as 'bosses', but of activists, consisting of all those named as members, 
officers, speakers, proposers (and seconders) of resolutions and platform-attendees at public 
rallies. Public figures who declared openly for Sinn Fein in 1917/18 and those who 
nominated Sinn Fein election candidates in those years are also included on the Sinn Fein 
lists. No distinction has been made between laity and clergy; the latter, where named in the 
newspapers, are included on the lists. 
Not included on the lists. ) unless they were clearly named as members of the relevant 
organisations, are those who were reported as helpers, donors, subscribers or (as was often the 
case) recipients of condolences. The same applies to those who were simply listed as 
attending public rallies, and to attendees at dances, balls and concerts. Similarly, members of 
4 satellite' or politically-allied organisations have not, generally, been included on the lists for 
either period. Thus, Town Tenants, Foresters, Land and Labour men, ITGWU members, 
GAA members and Gaelic Leaguers have been excluded. Also excluded - see below - are the 
Irish Volunteers of 1914. In the case of none of these organisations could the clear 'party' 
affiliation of all its individual members be demonstrated. 
The major exception to this rule is, however, the Hibernians, whose influence was pervasive 
in Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo in 1914 and whose organisation was undoubtedly loyal to 
the Irish party in that year. They are. therefore, most definitely included in the 1914 Irish 
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party lists (whereas they were not included by Campbell in his Galway study). In addition, 
for 1917/18 members of two other affiliates have been included on the Sinn Fein lists : first, 
the Irish Volunteers (though very few reports were published) and secondly, those Hibernian 
divisions which had formally defected to the 'Irish American Alliance'. Members of both 
organisations were clearly Sinn Feiners. 
One 'satellite' excluded from the 1917/18 Sinn Fein lists is Cumann na mBan. While its 
branches and clubs were undoubtedly 'Sinn Fein', there is no valid comparison with the 1914 
party list. Barring a handful of AOH 'ladies' auxiliary' divisions in Leitrim and Sligo, the 
Irish party locally made minimal local provision for the enrolment of women before the war 
and virtually no female party supporters were reported by either newspaper in 1914. There 
was, therefore, no like-for-like comparison between the two periods. This exclusion would 
clearly act to increase the percentage of later, male Sinn Fein supporters who had a prior Irish 
party affiliation. 
In the case of both newspapers, two years of Sinn Fein reports were analysed against only one 
for the party. This is because neither the Herald nor the Champion published significant 
reports of Sinn Fein branch or club meetings until after the Longford by-election in May 
1917. In addition, from June 1918 until October, some Sinn Fein reports were suppressed in 
the aftermath of the 'German Plot'. Sinn Fein support also built up cumulatively during 
1917/18 and a number of Irish party supporters only 'came out' as Sinn Feiners in late 1917 
or in 1918. The best like-for-like comparison is therefore derived from the use of Sinn Fein 
reports for both 1917 and 1918. 
Analysis - The Irish Par! y 1914/Sinn Fein 1917-18 
The Irish party and Sinn Fein lists of names derived from each newspaper were compared. 
This exercise was carried out first for the Sligo Champion lists and then for the Roscommon 
Herald. Names that were found to duplicate between 1914 and 1917/18 were classed as 
4matches', 'probables' and 'possibles' : 
' Matches' occurred when there was an obvious duplication of names between the two 
lists. 
9 Trobables' occurred when there was an element of doubt about the degree of matching. 
In many instances, newspaper reports did not give an individual's ftill name, sometimes 
345 
quoting just one or more initials and sometimes just the surname. Thus a 'J. Smith' on a 
list for 1914 might compare with any one of 'John' or 'James' or 'Joseph Smith' on a list 
for 1917-18. In the case of particularly common first names, however, the assumption 
was made that the match, while imperfect, could be called 'probable' (for example, 
matching P. and Patrick, T. and Thomas, J. and John, M. and Michael). In addition, if a 
'J. Smith' on one list was compared with two or more less common names on the other 
(for example with both Julian and Joseph Smith) then it was assumed that the individual 
on the first list was a probable match with one of the individuals on the second. 
Tossibles' occurred when an individual's initial on one list could be compared with only 
one less common first name on the other (eg J. with Joseph or M. with Martin). 
It is recognised that the distinction between firm matches, 'probables' and 'possibles' is 
arbitrary and involves considerable guesswork. However, to exclude the latter two categories 
totally from the analysis would be equally arbitrary and, while a degree of continuity could 
still be discerned from the use of 'matches' alone, would certainly understate the degree of 
commonality between the two movements. 
The Sligo Champion 
As noted above, the lists generated from the Champion comprised the names of 643 Irish 
party members and 548 Sinn Fein members. 
4P 74 names were 'matches', equivalent to 11.5% of the party list and 13.5% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
48 names were 'probables', equivalent to 7.5% of the party list and 8.8% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
19 narnes were 'possibles', equivalent to 2.9% of the party list and 3.5% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
In total, therefore, 'matches', 'probables' and 'possibles' combined amounted to 21.9% of the 
party list and 25.8% of the Sinn Fein list. However, given the subjectiveness of the 
categorisation of 'probables' and 'possibles', such combined figures must be considered too 
high. 
Excluding the 'possibles' and leaving just the 'matches' and 'probables' combined would 
give figures equivalent to 19.0% of the party list and 22.3% of the Sinn Fein list. If, more 
conservatively, it is assumed that only half of both 'probables' and possibles' were actual 
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matches, then combining these with the 74 clear 'matches' would give figures equivalent to 
16.7% of the Irish party list and 19.6% of the Sinn Fein list. 
The Roscommon Herald 
The lists generated from the Herald comprised 634 names of Irish party members and 847 
Sinn Fein members. 
* 81 names were 'matches'. equivalent to 12.8% of the party list and 9.6% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
e 40 names were 'probables', equivalent to 6.3% of the party list and 4.7% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
27 names were 'possibles', equivalent to 4.3% of the party list and 3.2% of the Sinn Fein 
list. 
'Matches', 'probables' and 'possibles' combined amounted to 23.4% of the party list and 
17.5% of the Sinn Fein list. 'Matches' and 'probables' amounted to 19.1 % of the party list 
and 14.3% of the Sinn Fein list. 'Matches' combined with half of both 'probables' and 
'possibles' amounted to 18.1 % of the party list and 13.5% of the Sinn Fein list. 
The results from the two newspapers are compared in tabular form below : 
Irish Party 1914/Sinn Fein 1917-18 
% of Champion 
Party List 
% of Herald 
Party List 
% of Champion 
Sinn Fein List 
% of Herald 
Sinn Fein List 
A Matches 11.5 12.8 13.5 9.6 
B Probables 7.5 6.3 8.8 4.7 
C Possibles 2.9 4.3 3.5 3.2 
A+B+C 21.9 23.4 25.8 17.5 
A+B 19.0 19.1 22.3 14.3 
A +! /2(B +Q 16.7% 18.1% 19.6% 13.5% 
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In summary, the firm 'matches' alone, excluding any 'probables' and 'poss, bles'. indicated 
that between 10 and 15 percent of Irish party activists in 1914 later became members of Sinn 
Fein. Taking account of all the imperfections relating to the categorisation of 'probables' and 
'possibles', it seems likely that the actual rate of commonality between the two movements 
was closer to between 15 and 20 percent in counties Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo. (In both 
cases, the outliers in these results are the lower percentages of the longer Sinn Fein list 
derived from the Herald. ) 
All of these percentages are significantly higher than those recorded by Campbell for Galway 
and more in line with those recorded by Fitzpatrick (for 'bosses' and for different periods) for 
Clare. The main variations of this exercise from that of Campbell are that : 
e the lists in this exercise are rather longer than those compiled by Campbell and are derived 
from two newspapers, 
" Campbell effectively limited his comparison to firm 'matches' and 
" Campbell restricted his analysis of the party to UIL members, whereas here the party lists 
included large numbers of Hibernians. 
Even taking all of these differences into account, the difference of these results from 
Campbell's is still substantial. Admittedly, Galway was significantly more 'disturbed' than 
the counties of East Connaught in the pre-war years and serious land agitations persisted far 
more than in 'middle Ireland'. However, it should be noted that Fitzpatrick's Clare was also 
significantly more 'disturbed' than any of Counties Leitrim, Roscommon and Sligo before the 
war. 
Based on 'percentages', Fitzpatrick's hypothesis of continuity is, therefore, more supported 
than undermined these results. However, it remains equally clear that over 80% of local pre- 
war Irish party activists in these three counties did not become Sinn Fein activists, at least by 
1917-18. Similarly, over 80% of wartime Sinn Fein activists had not been active in the Irish 
party in the immediate pre-war period. Number-counting alone will not resolve the debate 
about whether the glass of Irish party/ Sinn Fein continuity was half full or half empty. 
The Irish Part-N, and the Irish Volunteers 1914 
As noted above, Irish Volunteers were not included in the lists of Irish party members collated 
for 1914. However, a parallel exercise was also undertaken, compiling lists of Volunteer 
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activists for that year. From the Champion a list of 478 Volunteer names was compiled; from 
the Herald one of 649. These two lists were then compared with the lists of Irish party 
members derived from the same newspapers in the same year and 'matches', 'probables' and 
'possibles' identified on the same basis used in the Irish party/Sinn Fein exercise. The results 
are shown in tabular fon-n below: 
Irish Party/Irish Volunteers 1914 
% of Champion 
Party List 
% of Herald 
Party List 
% of Champion 
Volunteer List 
% of Herald 
Volunteer List 
A Matches 20.5 18.8 27.6 18.3 
B Probables 7.0 6.0 9.4 5.8 
C Possibles 5.6 4.1 7.5 4.0 
A+B+C 33.1 28.9 44.5 28.1 
A+B 27.5 24.8 37.0 24.1 
A+Y2 (B +Q 26.8% 23.8% 36.0% 23.2% 
On the basis of firm matches only, some 18% to 20% of pre-war Irish party activists were also 
Irish Volunteer activists in 1914 and vice versa. Including half of the 'probables' and 
6 possibles', these numbers rise to about 25%. The major divergence from this pattern relates 
to the significantly higher percentages (27.6% and 36.0%) of the Champion'S Volunteers who 
were also party activists. These were inflated by the smaller number of Volunteer names 
derived from the Champion. These results are discussed in Chapter 9 of the main thesis. It 
remains the case that some two-thirds (and possibly closer to three-quarters) of the local 
Volunteer leadership in 1914 was not, in that same year, active in the Irish party. 
The Irish Volunteers 1914/Sinn Fein 1917-18 
The final comparison undertaken was between the lists of Irish Volunteers compiled for 1914 
and those of Sinn Fein activists for 1917-18. Again, 'matches', 'probables' and 'possibles' 
were identified and the results are shown in the table below. On the basis of 'matches' alone, 
some 10% to 15% of Irish Volunteer activists in 1914 later became Sinn Fein activists in 
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1917-18. and vice versa. On the broader basis, adding in half of the 'probables' and 
6possibles', these numbers rise to between 15% and 20%. 
On the surface, the continuity between the 1914 Volunteers and later Sinn Fein activists 
appears to have been similar to that between the 1914 Irish party and Sinn Fein. This seems 
to imply that many Sinn Feiners in 1917-18 were new political activists, who had been 
prominent in neither the Irish Volunteers nor the Irish party in 1914. However, this analysis 
is confined to comparisons between activists in both periods. The mass of Volunters, whose 
names were rarely recorded in the press and who are thus not included in the Volunteer data 
analysed here, may or may not have contained many who later committed themselves to Sinn 
Fein. Nevertheless, the commonality between those who were prominent in the 'great wave' 
of Volunteering in 1914 and those who were mobilised to become Sinn Fein activists during 
the later upsurge of nationalist anger three to four years later is surprisingly low. 
Irish Volunteers 1914/Sinn Fein 1917-18 
% of Champion 
Volunteer List 
% of Herald 
Volunteer List 
% of Champion 
Sinn Fein List 
%of Herald 
Sinn Fein List 
A Matches 13.0 13.6 11.3 10.4 
B Probables 7.3 7.2 6.4 5.5 
C Possibles 3.8 4.9 3.3 3.8 
A+B+C 24.1 25.7 21.0 19.7 
A+B 20.3 20.8 17.7 15.9 
A+ '/2 (B +Q 18.5% 19.6% 16.1% 15.0% 
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Appendix B: Continui 
Irish partv activists 1910-14 and their politics in 1917-18 
In this thesis, over one hundred individuals, all of them male, have been named who were 
active in the UIL and/or the AOH at a relatively senior level in the years 1910-14, whether as 
MPs, party officers, councillors, candidates or influential patrons. Like so many other 
nationalists,, almost all of them were faced with the wartime choice between staying loyal to 
the Irish party, embracing what became the new national movement of Sinn Fein, or dropping 
out of active politics. In the case of the senior activists identified in the thesis, their 
subsequent political careers can in almost all cases be charted. Such an analysis provides 
another indication of the degree of continuity between the pre-war Irish party and the Sinn 
Fein party of 1917-18. 
Specifically, 104 party activists were named in the thesis 
9 12 based in Leitrim; 
0 13 in Longford; 
0 29 in Roscommon; 
0 25 in Sligo and 
0 18 in Westmeath. 
97 (such as John Hayden or Patrick McKenna) not be categorised into any one county. 
Supporters of Home Rule and Redmond who did not have an identifiable link to the party 
organisation in the years 1910-14, such as the owners of the Leitrim Observer (Patrick 
Dunne), Roscommon Journal (William Tully) and Strokestown Democrat (P. Morahan), have 
not been included. 
A short narrative for each of the 104 individuals, outlining their pre-war Irish party 
connections and their subsequent fate and/or wartime political experiences, is given below. 
Each has been placed in one of four groups 
- stayed with the party JP), 
- moved to Sinn Fein (SF), 
- died (D) or 
- became inactive. neutral or independent J). 
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By county, the 104 individuals were categorised as follows : 
Leitrim IP 5; SF4; D 0; 1 3; 
Longford IP 6; SF 5; D 1; 1 1; 
Roscommon IP 16; SF 8; D 1; 1 4; 
Sligo IP8; SF9; D 4; 1 4; 
Westmeath IP 10; SF 5; D 1; 1 2; 
Others IP 2; SF 1; D 0; 1 4. 
This analysis carries significant caveats. First, the list is arbitrarily selected, solely from those 
party figures named in the thesis. Secondly, Leitrim and Longford are under-represented in 
the analysis primarily because there were no separate 'case study' chapters on these two 
counties. Of the 104 named, seven died before or during the war. A further 18 either dropped 
out of politics, stayed neutral between the party and Sinn Fein, or (in the case of two) left the 
party in favour of more pro-British, pro-union policies. Nevertheless, there remains a 
significant balance of 79 individuals who did not die or opt out. Of these, 47 were still party 
supporters in the last months of the war while 32 by then backed Sinn Fein, indicating that in 
the five counties there was a significant minority of leading party figures who gravitated to 
Sinn Fein before the end of the war. 
Within the counties, two significant variations stand out. In Sligo, continuity between the 
party and Sinn Fein appeared greatest and more named individuals transferred to Sinn Fein 
than stayed with the party. This outcome was very largely the result of developments in Sligo 
town : seven of the county's nine party activists who later joined Sinn Fein came from the 
town. In Westmeath and Roscommon, party/Sinn Fein continuity was much less, if still far 
from insignificant. Here, the durability of urban party cliques, long opposed to local 
'factionists' and in 1917-18 opposed to Sinn Feiners, was undoubtedly important. In 
Westmeath, no fewer than seven of the ten remaining party loyalists in 1918 came from 
Hayden's North Westmeath clique around Mullingar. 
Overall,, the erosion of commitment and loyalty to the Irish party during the war is only too 
evident. Even excluding those who died, the proportion of leading, pre-war activists who 
stayed publicly loyal to the Irish party up to the end of 1918 was less than half. 
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Individual Narratives : 
William Barry (IP) :a Hayden and UIL loyalist. Barry was secretary of the Mullingar UIL, a 
Forester and a Mullingar district councillor. He stayed loyal to the party right through the war 
and signed the parliamentary nomination papers of P. J. Weymes in December 1918.1 
Rev. Butler (1P) : became chaplain of the Sligo Hibernians on his return from the USA in 
1913. He succeeded Rev. Doorly as the clerical administrator of Sligo in 1916 and became 
president of the town branch of the UIL in that year. In 1918 he threw in his lot with the 
town's Ratepayers' Association Ooining several of the town's leading unionists) and in 
Decemberl 918 served on the committee selecting ratepayers' candidates for the January 
1919 Corporation elections. Nevertheless, in December 1918 he also signed Scanlan's 
parliamentary nomination papers. 2 
Joseph Callaghan (SF) : one of Farrell's clique running Longford politics and secretary of 
Clonguish UIL branch. He broke with Farrell and the party at the time of the Volunteer split 
in September 1914 and was a vocal Sinn Feiner thereafter. Callaghan was arrested in 
Longford in Easter Week 1916 for refusing to give his name and for carrying a revolver. 
Tried by court martial, he was acquitted on the technicality that he was arrested before the 
Martial Law proclamation was posted in the town. 3 
Michael Carter (SF) : Leitrim county president of the AOH, president of the Kiltubride UIL 
branch, county councillor and joint secretary of the County Leitrim ratepayers. He continued 
to support the party during most of 1917-18, but opposed the recommendations of the Irish 
Convention in 1918, resigned as county president of the AOH in October and in December 
declared that he would vote for Sinn Fein and James Dolan. On the day of the election he 4 
worked on the local 'Sinn Fein staff . 
Peter Cawley (IP) : leading party and committee man in County Sligo, UIL organiser and 
county councillor. He stayed loyal to the party and signed Scanlan's nomination papers in 
December 1918. 
Thomas Chapman (SF) : proprietor of the Westmeath Independent and a Westmeath county 
councillor and party member. The paper became bitterly disillusioned with the party after the 
failure of Lloyd George's proposals for an Irish settlement in July 1916 and advocated the 
policies of the Irish Nation League in the autumn of that year. By August 1917 Chapman was 
president of the Athlone Sinn Fein club, but in 1918 was criticised by Tim Healy as a man 
with two sons at the Front who was a Sinn Feiner only because he happened to employ a 
'fiery editor' (i. e. MacDermott-Hayes). ' 
1 Wevnieath Examiner, 7"' December 1918 
2 Sli go Chanipion: Sligw Independent, 7"' December 1918. 
Monthly report of the Longford county mspector, April 1916 (PRO CO 9041100). 
SUM Champion, 19'h October; Lcitriin Obsei-ver, 22 nd June. 21" December 1918. 
It, 5 MidlandReporicr, 6'h June 1918. 
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John Connolly (D) : the longest serving of Sligo town's grandees, a leading UIL man and a 
member of Sligo Corporation since 1878. Connolly died at the end of 1915 leaving an estate 
of over E20,000. 
Patrick Conry (IP) : Fitzgibbon's closest associate in Castlerea politics, a fonner Fenian, 
Castlerea guardian, county councillor and cousin of one of Fitzgibbon's local opponents, John 
Hanson. Conry stayed loyal to Fitzgibbon and the party in 1918. 
Christopher Corcoran (IP) :a Hayden and UIL loyalist in Mullingar who lost his district 
council seat to a Ginnellite in 1911. He stayed loyal to the party throughout 1917-18, signing 
Weymes's nomination papers in December 1918. 
Michael Cox (SF) : secretary of the Longford town division of the AOH, of which Farrell 
was chairman. Cox broke with Farrell and the UIL at the time of the Volunteer split in 
September 1914, but remained secretary of the town AOH. He was suspended from the AOH 
in 1917 after campaigning for Joe MacGuinness in the South Longford by-election. In 1918 
he called himself 'county secretary' of those Hibernians supporting Sinn Fein. 6 
Dr. Coyne (1) : while parish priest of Boyle a close associate of T. J. Devine, in both the 
town's Gaelic League and the UIL. Coyne nominated J. J. O'Kelly as candidate for the 
January 1910 general election at the North Roscommon UIL convention at the end of 1909. 
He was also a contributor to the Irish party's Home Rule fund when Bishop of Elphin. There 
was, however, no local press record of his intervening in political debates among nationalists 
in 1917-18, though he disciplined Father Michael O'Flanagan for his political (Sinn Fein) 
activity. 
Rev. Crehan (SF) : president of the St. John's branch of the UIL when he was resident in 
Sligo. Crehan publicly advocated loyalty to Redmond during the Volunteer split of autumn 
1914. In September 1916 he was still president of the Grange branch of the UIL, which 
unanimously passed a resolution of confidence in Redmond. By May 1918 he was president 
of the Grange Sinn Fein club and in December signed the nomination papers of J. J. Clancy as 
Sinn Fein candidate for North Sligo. 7 
Canon Cummins (SF) : president of the Sligo town UIL when he was Sligo administrator, and 
the chairman of meetings of the North Sligo UIL. Cummins pitched into Roscommon town 
politics on his return there, including the selection, with Hayden, of a county council 
candidate. It was this latter issue that triggered his permanent breach with the town's UIL 
branch in 1911. He remained a supporter of Home Rule and of Redmond until 1914, but was 
disaffected soon after war broke out. In November 1918 he declared unequivocally for Sinn 
Fein and became a leading speaker/organiser in Harry Boland's South Roscommon campaign. 
Rev. Daly (1P :a noted UIL supporter in the later 1900s when he was administrator at 
Mullingar, Daly seems not to have been active in the UIL after he became parish priest in 
Castlepollard, an area of strong Ginnellite support where the UIL was moribund. In 
November 1918 he wrote a public letter describing sovereign independence for Ireland as 
6Midland Reporter, 7hFebruw-N, 1918. 
7 Slic (yo Champion, 23dSeptember 1916: 1 OhMay, 7thDecember 1918. 
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'impractical' and in December he subscribed funds to the campaign of P. J. Weymes against 
Ginnell. 8 
T. W. Delany (1) : Longford crown solicitor, vice-chairman (under J. P. Philips) of Longford 
county council and a cousin by marriage of Farrell. Delany was a supporter of recruiting in 
1916 and active in the county recruiting committee. He resigned from the county council in 
1916 for personal reasons and was not politically active thereafter until, in January 1918, he 
advocated the formation of an All-Ireland Farmers' Society. 9 
Harry Depew (SF) : Henry Monson's closest associate among the Sligo Hibernians and a 
member of Sligo Corporation. Depew was a committed Sinn Feiner by early 1917 and in 
December 1918 signed J. J. Clancy's nomination papers. In January 1919 he was re-elected 
to Sligo Corporation as a labour candidate. ' 0 
T. J. Devine (1P) : the Irish party boss in Boyle and in January 1917 the party's defeated 
candidate in the North Roscommon by-election. Devine remained loyal to the party 
thereafter, though the party did not contest the North Roscommon seat in December 1918. 
0. J. Dolan (SF) : Chairman of Athlone UDC in 1914 and a leading Forester. Dolan led the 
takeover of the local Volunteers, in the interests of the party and in support of Redmond, in 
the summer of 1914. By August 1918 he was at least in sympathy with Sinn Fein, attending a 
major Sinn Fein rally and a month earlier voting for the co-option on to the UDC of the 
town's leading Volunteer, Sean Hurley. " 
Rev Doorly (IP) : president of the Sligo town UIL branch while he was clerical administrator. 
He became president of the Cliffoney UIL when he became parish priest there in 1916. Like 
his bishop, Dr. Coyne, whom he would eventually succeed, he was not politically vocal 
during 1917-18, though he remained a UIL officer and at least a passive supporter of the 
party. 
Joseph Dorr (SF) : Roscommon county councillor and party man who in 1914 acquiesced to 
the demands of the County Ratepayers' Association in order to secure re-election. By 1918 
he was seen as a Sinn Feiner, but in September was attacked for not supporting a Sinn Fein 
candidate for a county council job. 12 
J. P. Dowdall (D) : one of Hayden's leading supporters in North Westmeath, Dowdall died in 
July 1916. His son was crown solicitor for Westmeath. 
Robert Downes (IP): with Dowdall, another of Hayden's 'clique' in North Westmeath. 
Downes remained a party supporter through to the 1918 election and contributed funds to P. J. 
Weymes's unsuccessful campaign against Ginnell. 
8 Wewmeath Examiner, 30'h November, 14'b December 1918. 
9 Long 
,, 
/67-d Independent, 26"h January 1918. 
10 Sligo Champlon, 21" December 1918,18'h January 1919. 
" Westmeath Independent, 18'h August 1917.24b July 1918. In the Dail elections of September 1927, Dolan 
was to stand unsuccess fully as a Curnann na nGaedheal candidate. 
12 Roscomnion Herald, 14'r' September 1918. 
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Thomas Duft (1P) : One of Farrell's lieutenants in Longford town who stayed loyal to 
Farrell when the town's Volunteers split in September 1914. Duffy supported the Irish party 
in both the South Longford by-election and the 1918 general election (though his support for 
McKenna in the by-election, as was Farrell's, was lukewarm). 
C. J. P. Farrell (1P) : J. P. Farrell's younger brother, Christopher Farrell, a solicitor and 
stalwart of the Longford town UIL. He remained loyal to his brother and the Irish party. 
J. P. Farrell MP (1P) : Farrell, the party boss of Longford politics, both North and South, 
stayed loyal to the Irish party throughout the war, going down to defeat in the 1918 general 
election. The strain that this created for him was demonstrated after the fon-nation of the 
wartime coalition government in 1915, when he denounced the 'lying and hypocrisy' of 
Liberal 'gentlemen' and said that for ten years he had been voting 'often against his will ... 
like 
a chained dog. ' 13 
John Fitzgibbon MP (1P) : Fitzgibbon remained committed to the Irish party and the war 
effort right through to the end of 1918. Two of his sons were killed in the war, one at the 
Dardanelles and one in France. He did not contest the 1918 election and died soon thereafter. 
Thomas Flanagan (1) :a long-serving Sligo alderman and UIL man, Flanagan remained out of 
sorts with the Lab/Nat coalition running the town and stood down from the Corporation in 
January 1914. At the end of 1918, he was chosen by the town's (unionist-led) Ratepayers' 
Association as a candidate for the January 1919 Corporation elections, 14 but was not elected. 
John Flanagan (IP) : one of the dissidents on the Strokestown guardians and active in the 
Roscommon ratepayers' movement in 1913-14. Flanagan was still on the county board of the 
AOH in October 1918, well after it had been purged of Sinn Feiners. 
Thomas Fleming (1P) : one of the most prominent placemen and job-seekers around 
Roscommon town, Fleming remained loyal to the Irish party through the war. He remained a 
UIL branch secretary and was a public supporter of Hayden in the December 1918 general 
election. 
James FlyM (IP) : editor of the Sligo Champion after 1912. Flynn became assistant secretary 
of the North Sligo UIL (his rival, Bernard McTeman of the Sligo Nationalist, was secretary) 
in December 1913. Loyal to the party, he became secretary of Sligo's re-formed National 
Volunteers in November 1914. Flynn stood for election to Sligo Corporation in January 
1915, but failed to be elected. He succeeded McTernan as secretary of the North Sligo UIL in 
June 1916. The Champion continued to support the party during 1918.15 
Patrick Flynn (1P) : the omniverous party boss, office-holder and committee man of Carrick- 
on-Shannon, who despite signs of wavering stayed with the Irish party during the war. In 
March 1916 he publicly supported recruiting. On June 1918, he was challenged 
unsuccessfully by his long-standing rival and now-committed Sinn Feiner, Michael McGrath, 
for the chairmanship of Carrick No. I RDC. Flynn's response was to declare that if he joined 
'3 Strokestown Democrat, 12'h June 1915. 
14 Sligo Independent, 7h December 1918. 
15 Slý,,, o Champion, 13'h December 1913; 21" November 1914. 
356 
Sinn Fein he could not be in entire agreement with it. He was for attendance at any Peace 
Conference, against conscription and for unity. If Sinn Fein 'changed its rules' he would oin 
them. 16 (He didn't. ) 
Edward Foley : one of Sligo town's commercial grandees and aldermen, Foley was Jink's 
closest associate in promoting the Volunteer movement in 1914. He was still on the county 
recruiting committee in January 1916 and'at that time backed Jinks against a mayoral 
challenge from D. M. Hanley. In March 1917 he was accused by Sam Tarrant of having 
campaigned for Count Plunkett in the Roscommon by-election and of being on the reception 
committee organising Plunkett's award of the freedom of the town. However, he avoided 
both the reception and banquet for Plunkett and in April backed Jinks in voting, 
unsuccessfully, against sending delegates to Plunkett's Mansion House conference. In 
September 1918 there was talk of his being associated with a new (but stillborn) Irish 
Progressive party. He took no part in the general election campaign, being seriously 111.17 
Frank Forde (SF) : one of the Fitzgibbon's Castlerea asociates, secretary of the Town 
Tenants' association, who was one of the few beneficiaries of the 1912 deal brokered by 
Fitzgibbon carving up the Sandford demesne. Nevertheless, Forde was one of Fitzgibbon's 
opponents when the town's Volunteers split in October 1914 and in March 1918 was publicly 
aligned with the new Sinn Fein. ' 8 
Patrick Gafffiey (IP) :a county councillor, founder of the Leitrim Ratepayers' Association 
and a Carrick associate of Patrick Flynn. Gaffney stayed loyal to the party during the war, but 
showed no hostility to Sinn Fein. In June 1918 he expressed his views, as reported in the 
Roscommon Herald, at the county council : 'He is not a Sinn Feiner; he is a Nationalist and he 
thought that after time had left its mark on the two movements that it would result favourably 
to all Ireland. They were all Irishmen and loved their country and with them it was Ireland 
over all and God save Ireland (applause)'. 19 
John Galvin (IP) :a Fitzgibbon loyalist and Roscommon county councillor, chairman of the 
county agriculture committee, who stayed loyal to the party and signed Hayden's nomination 
papers in December 1918.20 
James Geoghegan (I : active in the Leitrim ratepayers' and farmers' protection movements, it 
was Geoghegan who in March 1913 proposed a UIL resolution of 'love and gratitude' to 
Liberal, Scottish and Irish MPs who had worked to achieve Home Rule. He does not appear 
to have been politically active during the war. 21 
William Gibbons (SF) :a member of the Sligo town UIL branch and of the North Sligo 
executive, 22 he was elected as a labour member of Sligo Corporation, with Hibernian support, 
16 Leitrim Observer, 8hJune 1918. 
17 Sligo Independent, 29"' January 1916; WhNovember 1918; Sligo Champion, 24th March, 7thApril 1917,14'h 
September 1918. 
18 Henry Fitzgibbon to Fitzgibbon, 4th October 1914, enclosed 'Da letter from Fi ibbon to Dillon, l2thOctober 
1914, Dillon papers. TCD, f 6754/480; Tf'estmeath Independent, 23dMarch 1918. 
'9 Roscommon Herald, 22 nd June 1918. 
20 Roscommon Messen 'ger, 
VbDecember 1918. 
21 Leitrim Obscrver, 29hMarch 1913. 
22 Slig 
,o 
Champion, 7h June 1914. 
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in 1911. In September 1914, Gibbons, with fellow Corporation member Ned Harte, showed 
his anti-war allegiance by heckling Thomas Scanlan MP at a public meeting after the passage 
of Home Rule. Gibbons and Harte, now deprived of party support, were defeated by Jordan 
Roche and Samuel Tarrant in the January 1915 Corporation elections. 
P. J. Gillooly (SF) 
-: 
secretary of the Four Mile House UIL branch, on the executive of the 
South Roscommon UIL, assistant secretary of the county council, Gealic Leaguer and leading 
supporter of the GAA. By 1916 he was seen as one of those sufficiently disaffected to be 
arrested in the aftermath of the Easter Rising. In October 1918 he chaired a meeting setting 
up a branch of the ITGYVU in Roscommon town and in December signed Harry Boland's 
nomination papers. 23 
James Grogan (1) :a Roscommon town commissioner, senior in the local Town Tenants' 
association and a regular attendee at meetings of the town's UIL 'clique'. He did not appear 
to have been politically active, at least publicly, during the war. 
Michael Grogan (SF) : one of Fitzgibbon's Castlerea associates and a Roscommon county 
councillor. Despite his opposition to Fitzgibbon's Sandford demesne land deal, Grogan 
reverted to supporting Fitzgibbon and backed him and Redmond at the time of the 1914 
Volunteer split. By January 1917, however, he voted with other Sinn Feiners against 
Fitzgibbon at the Castlerea guardians and became a committed Sinn Fein organiser and 
speaker thereafter. This did not stop him signing the county council's resolution regretting 
the death of Redmond in March 1918. Grogan then said that Redmond, strictly honest and 
upright, had devoted the best days of his life to Ireland - 'like many other Irishmen he was 24 betrayed by England' . 
John Hanson (1) :a Castlerea district councillor and Roscommon county councillor who was 
one of the county's leading pre-war 'disappointed men' and a critic of Fitzgibbon. He was 
not politically active, at least in public, during the war. 
John Hayden MP (1P) : Hayden remained loyal to Redmond and the Irish party during the war 
and campaigned vigorously against Sinn Fein right through to his defeat by Harry Boland in 
the 1918 general election. 
J. J. Healy (1P) :a Strokestown district councillor and Hibernian who became active in the 
Roscommon ratepayers' movement, against Fitzgibbon, in 1913. Healy supported the war 
effort and his brother was killed in the war. He remained a vocal opponent of Sinn Fein until 
he left Ireland, moving to Swansea in February 1918. 
John Heverin UP) :a solicitor,, secretary to Roscommon county council and a long-standing 
Pamellite associate of Hayden and Fitzgibbon, Heverin stayed loyal to the party throughout 
the war and campaigned for Hayden in the 1918 general election. 
25 
23Roscommon Herald, 13'hMay 1916; Roscommon Journal, 12 th October and 7 th December 1918. He eventually 
, succeeded Heverin as secretary to the county council. retiring 
in 1943. 
24 Roscommon Herald, I 30h January 1917: Roscommon Journal, 16 th March 1918. 
25 Heverin was suspended by the Sinn Fein-controlled county council in the autumn of 1920. resumed work in 
April 1921 and finally resigned in January 1922 (see Daly, The Buffer State, p. 58). 
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James Higgins (IP) : another of Sligo town's commercial grandees and aldermen, Higgins 
stayed loyal to the Irish party during the war. In the 1918 general election he was one of 
those signing Scanlan's nomination papers and he both campaigned for and spoke publicly in 
favour of Scanlan. 
Dr. Hoare (1P) : closest to the Irish party of all bishops in the five counties, Dr. Hoare's 
political allegiance did not waver during the war. He actively sought to influence the choice 
of the party's candidate for the South Longford by-election in 1917 and headed the list of 
those nominating the eventual choice, Patrick McKenna. He also signed Farrell's nomination 
papers in December 1918.26 
John Jinks (1P) : the unchallenged boss of Sligo town politics by early 1914, Jinks eventually 
surrendered the mayoralty of the near-bankrupt Corporation in January 1917. Jinks was 
undoubtedly loyal to the party during the war. His son joined the army and be went into 
opposition on the Corporation after January 1917. In December 1918 he both signed 
Scanlan's nomination papers and campaigned actively for him. 27 
John Keaveny (IP) : UIL National Directory member and organiser for North Roscommon, 
business partner of T. J. Devine and joint Connaught regional director (with Monson) of the 
Hibernians. He stayed loyal to the Irish party throughout the war, finally losing control of 
Boyle No. I RDC, and his chairmanship of that council, in June 1918.28 
Denis Kelly (SF) : chair of the Athlone guardians, vice-chair of Roscommon county council 
and a long-standing Pamellite associate of Hayden and Fitzgibbon. In July 1916 Kelly, 
though saying he was still a party supporter, was critical of the Lloyd George plan for Ulster 
and claimed that it was being forced down Ireland's throat by martial law. A week later, he 
resigned as chairman of the guardians (after 34 years in the role) calling them catspaws of the 
Local Government Board . 
29 From mid- 1917 Kelly was an active and senior Sinn Feiner, both 
in Athlone and across South Roscommon. 
Rev. Lang (1) : president of the Abbeylara UIL when in county Longford and politically 
active for years, having been one of the leading anti-Pamellites in Athlone in the 1890s. 
Langan was undoubtedly a supporter of Redmond during the Volunteer split of 1914, but 
while he stayed active during the war (chairing the Westmeath county agriculture committee 
and leading all-party moves against conscription in 1918) he seems to have become neutral 
between the party and Sinn Fein. 
John Ledwith (SF) : the Granard district councillor and former Longford county councillor 
who stayed in the UIL after William Ganly was expelled. He nominally headed the Granard 
Volunteer company from its formation. Ledwith was a consistent Sinn Fein supporter from 
the spring of 1917 at the latest. 
26 Longford Leader, 5'ý May 1917; 7'ý December 1918. 
27 Jinks again became mayor of Sligo in 1921 and was briefly a TD for the Nation League in 1927. He used his 
4senior alderman's' casting vote to re-elect himself mayor in 1934, just before his death. 
28 Keavený' stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate for the Dail in the two 1927 general elections. 
29 w(, StMeath Independent, 22d July and 5th August 1916; Leitrim Advertiser, 27th July 1916. 
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M. J. Lennon (IP) : Lennon had once been chairman of the Athlone branch of Sinn Fein, but 
he 'regained confidence in the Irish party' in December 1909.30 Chairman of Athlone UDC 
until the beginning of 1913 and sometimes (when the clergy were absent) acting as chairman 
of the Athlone UIL, Lennon was still a supporter of the Irish party in March 1917, opposing 
support for Plunkett's 'manifesto'. He was still serving as an Athlone magistrate in October 
1918, but appears to have had played no active part in the general election. 31 
James Lynott (SF) :a supporter of F. E. Meehan MP in Manorhamilton since the 1908 by- 
election and Meehan's deputy in the Manorhamilton UIL branch. Lynott was a Sinn Fein 
supporter, active both in Manorhamilton and across Leitrim, from November 1917 at the 
latest. 
Patrick McCann (IP) : uncle of Patrick McKenna, ally of John Phillips MP and deposed by 
Farrell in late 1908 as president of the Clonguish UIL branch. He regained his seat on 
Longford District Council in 1911. McCann continued to be a supporter of the party, and of 
his nephew McKenna, in the South Longford by-election. 
H. 1. McCourt (IPJ : secretary of the Roscommon town UIL and an employee of the 
Roscommon Messenger. McCourt stayed in the Roscommon town UIL branch through to 
1918. 
Thomas MacDermott (1) : chainnan of the Carrick-on Shannon AOH and vice-president of 
the Carrick UIL. MacDerrnott was an associate of Michael McGrath and set up a branch of 
the Foresters in Carrick with McGrath in August, 1916,32 but there was no public indication, in 
the press, of MacDennott following McGrath into Sinn Fein during the war. 
Michael MacD ennott-H ayes (SF) : editor of the Westmeath Independent and secretary of the 
South Westmeath UIL. MacDermott-H ayes was bitterly critical of the proposed Lloyd- 
George settlement July 1916. In August 1916 a leading article in his paper praised 'Sinn 
Fein' for reawakening the spirit of the country and called on the Irish party to go back to 
independent opposition. By September the paper was praising the Irish Nation League. 
However, in February 1917 MacDermott-Hayes appeared on the same public platform as 
Hayden and praised him as 'distinguished among the Nationalists of Ireland'. To add to the 
confusion,, the same edition of the paper that reported the Hayden meeting carried a leading 
article hailing the outcome of the South Roscommon by-election. By May 1917 the paper 
was a strong supporter of Joe MacGuinness in the South Longford by-election. Thereafter the 
paper, and MacDermott-Hayes, were consistently pro-Sinn Fein. 33 
Martin McDonnell (IP) : the elderly fori-ner Pamellite and Roscommon county councillor 
whose rigged selection as candidate by the Roscommon town UIL in 1911 so outraged Canon 
Cummins. McDonnell was still voting with the party majority on the county council in June 
1918.34 
30 RIC Crime Special Branch precis. November 1909 (PRO CO 904 118). 
31 Wcwtnzeath Independent, 31" March 1917: 5'h October 1918. 
Leitrim Observer, 26th August 1916. 
33 Westmeath Independent, 5h August, 16th September 1916; 10b February 1917. 
34 Rosco7nnion Journal, 15'h June 1918. 
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Thomas McGovern (1) : supporter of F. E. Meehan and chain-nan of the Manorhamilton 
guardians and RDC. On the county council he abstained, with Michael Carter, on a vote 
congratulating the South Longford electors in May 1917 35 and did not appear to take sides 
politically in 1918. In June of that year was re-elected to his chairmanships unopposed, at a 
time when Sinn Feiners were contesting elections on public boards across the region. 
Michael McGrath (SF) : pre-war Hibernian and critic of Patrick Flynn in Carrick-on- Shannon. 
McGrath became president of the Carrick Sinn Fein club in February 1918 and in that year 
was one of the leading Sinn Fein speakers and organisers in County Leitrim. 
Frank MacQuinness (SF) : J. P. Farrell's chief lieutenant in Longford town since the 1880s, 
secretary of the South Longford UIL and a leading Hibernian. MacGuinness broke with 
Farrell at the time of the Volunteer split in September 1914 , 
but in March 1916 was still 
secretary of the South Longford UIL, a JP and, when Farrell was absent, chaired meetings of 
36 Longford UDC . He travelled to Dublin during the Easter Rising (his brother, Joe, was 'out') 
and was jailed for a month afterwards. He became a key organiser for Sinn Fein in Longford 
and his brother became South Longford's MP in May 1917. 
James McGurrin (SF) :a party 'orator' who returned to Leitrim from the USA in the autumn 
of 1913 and addressed a number of party rallies and Volunteer parades in Leitrim and Sligo in 
1914. McGurrin was a public Sinn Fein supporter in Leitrim from November 1917 at the 
I atest. 
Alfred McHugh (1) : proprietor of the Sligo Champion, member of Sligo Corporation and son 
of the late P. A. McHugh MP. He stood down from the Corporation at the beginning of 1913 
and appears to have taken little or no active personal role in Sligo politics thereafter, though 
his paper continued to support the party during the war. 
Eugene McHugh (D) : secretary of Sligo county council and son of the late P. A. McHugh 
MP. McHugh died in 1912, aged only 25. 
Patrick McKenna (1P) : after his defeat by Ginnell in January 1910, McKenna became the 
UIL National Director and organiser for South Westmeath and a Westmeath county 
councillor. He stayed loyal to the Irish party and was the party's candidate, again 
unsuccessfully, in the South Longford by-election of May 1917.37 
Patrick McManus UP) : the UIL candidate defeated by the Hibernian Michael Carter in the 
1911 Leitrim county council elections, but also chairman of the dissident Arigna AOH and 
enemy of John Keaveny. In June 1918 on Carrick No. I RDC, he appears to have voted for 
the party man Flynn when the Sinn Feiner McGrath unsuccessfully challenged Flynn for the 
chairn-ians ip. 38 
. 15 Sligo Ch )nd , ampion, - 
June 1917. 
36 Longford Leader, 4b March 1916 
37 McKenna was elected a Farmers' party TD in 1923. but lost his seat in 1927. 
38 Leitrim Observer, 8h June 1918. 
N. T. McNaboe (IP) : one of Hayden's supporters in Westmeath and a Westmeath county 
councillor. He stayed loyal to the party and consistently voted with the party on the county 
council in 1918. 
Bernard McTeman (D) : founder and editor of the Sligo Nationalist and secretary of the North 
Sligo UIL. McTernan was killed in a cycling accident in May 1916. The Nationalist 
remained pro-party through to the end of 1918, only being transforined into the radical 
nationalist Connachtman on its sale after the war. 
, 
Joseph Maguire (SF) : chairman of the Strokestown guardians, vice-president of the 
Roscommon County AOH and leading ratepayer scourge of Fitzgibbon. Maguire initially 
supported the war effort, but lost the chairmanship of the guardians, to a party candidate, in 
June 1916. He consistently voted with the Sinn Fein group on the guardians through 1917 
and 1918. 
Patrick Mallon (SF) : one of Farrell's UIL associates in Longford until 1912, when he 
promoted the Foresters in the county in rivalry to Farrell's Hibernians. Both he and his 
brother William became speakers at Sinn Fein rallies in the county in 1918. 
Rev. Manning (1) : president of the Mohill UIL branch while in Leitrim, but not publicly 
politically active after he moved to Mount Temple, Westmeath in 1914. 
F. E. Meehan MP UP) : Meehan remained a party stalwart throughout the war, but did not 
contest the 1918 election for the new, single Leitrim seat. As Smyth also stood down, the 
party had to draft in one of J. P. Farrell's sons, Gerald, to be defeated by James Dolan. 
Henry Monson (SF) : Daniel O'Donnell's successor as leader of Sligo's Hibernians and the 
joint Connaught director of the Order. Monson voted against Jinks in the January 1916 Sligo 
mayoral election. Though in September 1916 he denounced the Irish Nation League as 
vampires who cared for nothing but their own selfish interests, 39he campaigned for Count 
Plunkett in the Roscommon by-election. He was suspended from the AOH in May 1917 and 
campaigned actively for Sinn Fein thereafter. He failed, however, to be re-elected to Sligo 
Corporation in January 1919. 
E. P. Murray (1) : the original compromise UIL candidate to contest the Roscommon town 
division in the 1911 county council elections, who was then passed over by the town UIL in 
favour of Martin McDonnell. Murray played no further public political role. 
P. V. C. Murtagh (IP : Athlone's town clerk, a Gaelic Leaguer, supporter of votes for 
women, and UIL man. Murtagh stayed with the National Volunteers after the September 
1914 split and campaigned for Hayden in the 1918 general election. 
P. J. NeM (SF : AOH county secretary for Roscommon, Gaelic sportsman, Gaelic Leaguer, 
UIL man and writer of political verse. Neary had broken with the party by the end of 1916 
and campaigned for Count Plunkett. The dissident Roscommon AOH county board was 
39 Sligo Nationalist, 23'dSeptember 1916. 
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dissolved in May 1917 and Neary was suspended as secretary for twelve months. By 40 November 1917 he was recording secretary of the North Roscommon Sinn Fein executive. 
P. J. Neilan (I :a partner in the same law practice as John Heverin, trustee of the 
Roscommon AOH county board and a prominent speaker at Volunteer rallies across South 
Roscommon in 1914. Though he was made the solicitor to Cummin's RAEC in 1917 and 
acted for several Sinn Fein defendants in criminal proceedings in 1918, he was not publicly 
politically active during the war. 
Michael Nevin (SF) : secretary in 1914 of the Sligo town AOH. Nevin gravitated to Sinn 
Fein at the same time as Monson and Depew. He also became secretary of the Sligo Trades 
Council and stood, successfully, with Depew as a labour candidate in the Corporation 
elections of January 1919.41 
Sir Walter Nugent MP (1) : Nugent eventually broke with the party in 1918 because of the 
party's alliance with Sinn Fein in the campaign against conscription. He stood as an 
independent candidate in the 1918 general election, gaining only 603 votes against 3,458 for 
42 Weymes and 12,435 for Ginnell . 
Daniel O'Donnell (D) : the leading Hibernian and nationalist in Sligo until his death in 
February 1914. 
John O'Dowd MP (IP) : O'Dowd stayed loyal to the party throughout the war, going down to 
a heavy defeat by Alex McCabe in the 1918 general election. 
J. D. O'Farrell (1P) :a long-standing party man, friend of J. J. O'Kelly MP, county councillor 
and one of the enemies of Fitzgibbon on the Strokestown public boards. Though he declared 
at the county council in June 1916 that his conscience could no longer let him support the 
Irish party, 43 he campaigned for Devine in the Roscommon by-election and consistently voted 
for the party on public boards in 1918. 
Rev. O'Grady (SF) : president of the Keash UIL and member of the South Sligo UIL 
executive, as well as one of the leading GAA men in County Sligo and one of the county's 
Volunteer organisers in 1914. In 1915 he was responsible for Alex McCabe losing his job as 
a National schoolteacher, giving him three months' notice because of his 'objectionable 
political activity'. By June 1917 he had given his support to Sinn Fein and the Keash Sinn 44 
Fein club, of which he later became president . 
Charles O'Keeffe (IP) : accountant and clerk to Roscommon county council, secretary of the 
county agriculture committee and one of the small group running the Roscommon town UIL 
throughout the pre-war period. O'Keeffe stayed loyal to the party during the war and 
campaigned for Hayden in the December 1918 election. 
40 He became a county councillor in 1920. 
41 He later became a leading enemy of the Treaty in the civil war and mayor of Sligo (see Farry, The 4ftermath 
qfRevolution). 
42 He was subsequently a Senator and a governor of the Bank of Ireland. 
43 Roscommon Herald, 24thJune 1916. 
" Farry, Sligo, 1914-1921. p. 57. Sligo Champion 30 ffi June 1917, 
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J. J. O'Kelly MP (D) : did not actually attend his North Roscommon constituency after 1902 
and died in December 1916. 
Michael O'Mullane (SF) : though Sligo-born, not a local political figure - he was president of 
an AOH division in Dublin - until he became a prominent speaker at Volunteer parades in 
County Sligo in 1914. By the spring of 1917 he was Count Plunkett's secretary and 
campaigned for Joe MacGuinness in the Longford by-election. 
Seamus O'Mulloy (1) : the UIL organiser who memorably described getting money from 
farmers as 'trying to knock blood out of a tumip'. He was not publicly politically active in 
the area during the war. 
J. J. O'Neill (SF) : Longford county councillor who became president of the North Longford 
UIL when William Ganly was expelled from the party. He was re-elected president of the 
North Longford UIL executive on January 1917, but by May 1918 was vice-president of the 
North Longford Sinn Fein executive. (He should not be confused with another James J. 
O'Neill, chairman of Granard RDC, who stayed loyal to the party and was killed in a riding 
accident in 1917. ) 
George O'Reilly (IP) : Roscommon county president of the AOH. O'Reilly stayed loyal to 
the party throughout the war, campaigning for Devine in the North Roscommon by-election. 
Rev. O'Reilly (1) : parish priest of Tang and president of the Tang UIL. A well-known Gaelic 
scholar and enthusiastic Volunteer in 1914. O'Reilly effectively broke with the party in the 
autumn of 1914 by being ostentatiously neutral during the Volunteer split. He went to China 
as a missionary in 1916. 
O'Shea T. F. (SF) : chairman of the Mullingar AOH division from its formation, O'Shea was 
voted off the town's Volunteer committee when it was re-formed in the autumn of 1914. 
When in December 1917 the Mullingar Feis committee was taken over by supporters of Sinn 
Fein, O'Shea was elected to the committee. By mid- 1918 O'Shea was speaking and voting 
against the party on the Mullingar town commissioners. 45 
John Phillips MP (D) : though privately denounced by Farrell to Dillon as being 'pro-German 
mad' in the autumn of 1914, Phillips gave no public sign actually of being so. Indeed Phillips 
signed a Longford Recruiting Committee circular in March 1916, pledged loyalty to 
Redmond at a UIL meeting with Farrell in April 1916 and, when very frail, deferred his 
resignation at Redmond's request in November 1916.46 He died in April 1917 
HeM Reilly (1) : chairman of the Sligo Trades Council, a Hibernian and vice-president of the 
North Sligo UIL. In 1912 he stood down from these positions on becoming a registration 
clerk at Sligo town's new labour exchange. Though still speaking at town tenants' meetings 
and associated with the National Volunteers in the autumn of 1914, he was not thereafter 
politically active during the war. 
Eugene Robins (SF : chairman of Athlone No. I RDC, president of the South Westmeath 
UIL, chainnan of the Moate AOH and the party's leading 'boss' in the south of the county. 
45 Midland Reporter, 6bDecember 1917; 8h June 1918. 
4" Lon, ( gffiord Leader, 
18'b March. 8'h April: Longford Independent, I lbNovember 1916. 
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Robins supported the party during the Volunteer split in the autumn of 1914. In July 1916 he 
expressed his strong discontent with the party and with Redmond, whom he said had acted as 
a 4recruiting agent', at the time of the proposed Lloyd George Ulster settlement. In February 
1917, at the South Westmeath UIL, he backed a resolution congratulating Count Plunkett on 
his election victory. In August 1917 he joined the committee of the newly-fonned Moate 
Sinn Fein club, of which his son, Lorcan, was the president. 47 
Jordan Roche (SF) :a Sligo UIL man and organiser of the Town Tenants association, under 
Jinks. Roche was elected to the Corporation in January 1915 when two sitting labour 
candidates, Ned Harte and William Gibbons, were defeated. In January 1919, however, he 
stood unsuccessfully as a Sinn Fein candidate in the Corporation elections of that month. 
Michael Ronan (IP) :a long-standing UIL organiser in North Westmeath and an ally of 
Hayden. Ronan was also Westmeath county president of the AOH. He stayed loyal to the 
party and campaigned for Weymes in the 1918 general election. 
Thomas Scanlan MP (IP) : Scanlan remained loyal to the party, going down to defeat by J. J. 
Clancy in the 1918 general election. 
Peter Shanagher (IP) : president of the Tulsk UIL and one of the Roscommon county 
councillors who reached an accommodation with the county's ratepayers to secure re-election 
in 1914. He stayed loyal to the party during the war, voting for the party on various public 
boards in 1918. 
Rev. Sharkey (IP) : Coyne's curate in Boyle who led a major AOH parade there, with Joe 
Devlin, in 1911. By January 1917 the parish priest of Boyle, he was one of the nominators of 
T. J. Devine in the North Roscommon by-election. 48 
T. F. Smyth MP (1P) : Smyth stayed loyal to the party, but could still say in March 1918 that 
'he did not blame the Sinn Feiners and everyone was entitled to their views'. He went on to 
stress that all Irishmen had to sink their differences for the sake of Ireland. 49 He lost his 
chairmanship of Mohill RDC, to a Sinn Feiner, in June 1918 and like his fellow Leitrim MP, 
Meehan, did not stand in the 1918 general election. _ 
. 
Samuel Tarrant (SF) :a Sligo solicitor and member of the North Sligo UIL executive in 1913. 
Tarrant was elected to Sligo Corporation in January 1915 at the same time as Jordan Roche, 
defeating the two anti-war labour men, Ned Harte and William Gibbons. During the war he 
was a bitter critic of the incompetence, corruption and near-bankruptcy of the Corporation and 
attacked nearly all of his fellow members, whatever their political persuasion. He was a 
declared supporter of Sinn Fein during most of 1918 and stood unsuccessfully as a Sinn Fein 
candidate in the 1919 Corporation elections. 50 
47 If "estmeath Independent, 2 )nd jUly 1916,17'hJuly, II 
th August 1917. 
48 Stroh-wtoiiv Democrat, PFebruary 1917. 
49Leitrim Obsei-ver, 23dMarch 1918. 
50 Roscommon Journal, I 3"bDecember 1913. 
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P. J. Weymes UP) :a UIL loyalist and supporter of Hayden in North Westmeath. Weymes 
stood as the party's candidate for Westmeath in the 1918 general election and duly lost to 
Ginnell. 
P. N. White (SF) :a long-standing UIL and AOH associate of Daniel O'Donnell in Sligo 
town. By early 1916, White was voting with the opponents of Jinks on the Corporation and 
was made an alderman, backed by their votes, in January. 51 In December 1918 he signed J. J. 
Clancy's nomination papers and was re-elected to the Corporation in January 1919. 
Owen Wickham (IP) :a Hayden and UIL loyalist, active in the Mullingar UIL branch who 
gave up his chairmanship of Mullingar RDC in 1911. He was a prominent supporter of 
Hayden who remained loyal to the party throughout the war. 
51 slig 
,o 
Champion, 15'h January 1916. 
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Appendix C: Provenance of the diaries of 
Laurence and Alice Ginnefl 
In 1970, Charles Kelly wrote an unpublished MA thesis for Maynooth College, Laurence 
Ginnell - 1852-1923, A Short Biography, which is now lodged in the Westmeath County 
Library in Mullingar. In this biography, Kelly made several references to the diary of 
Laurence Ginnell, which had been made available to him by a member of Ginnell's family. 
That diary has not subsequently been researched. 
Another researcher, John Wylie, a Mullingar accountant who is writing a biography of 
Ginnell, had been informed by Ginnell's great-nephews, who had earlier lived in Laurence 
Ginnell's house and subsequently moved on from it, that they could now find no trace of 
Ginnell's diaries. At a meeting on 14th October 2001, however, Wylie informed the author 
that he believed the diary of Alice Ginnell, Ginnell's second wife still existed. Moreover, 
Alice Ginnell may have rewritten extracts of Ginnell's own diary notes into her own diary. 
This had in turn been transcribed from shorthand (both Laurence and Alice Ginnell were 
shorthand writers) at a later date. It was believed that this was the source used by Charles 
Kelly in 1970. 
On 15 th October 2001 . the author met 
Charles Kelly, who is now a Mullingar solicitor and a 
partner of Kelly, Caulfield and Shaw (the 'Shaw' in the firm being descended from the pre- 
VAVI Shaw family). Kelly infon-ned the author that in 1970 he had worked on a photocopy of 
extracts of much of Ginnell's diary. This had been 'more or less put together' and provided 
for him by Philip Ginnell, Ginnell's nephew, as a favour to the Kelly family (Philip Ginnell 
and Kelly's father having been friends). This Philip Ginnell, now dead, was the father of two 
of Ginnell's great nephews, Martin and another Philip. 
On being told by the author that John Wylie believed the original of Laurence Ginnell's diary 
had been lost, or was at best unobtainable, Kelly replied that he still had in his loft at home 
the photocpoy which he had used in 1970. However, Kelly could not share this copy without 
the consent of Ginnell's nephew, the now dead Philip Ginnell. Kelly also informed the author 
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that the other Phillip Ginnell, Laurence Ginnell's great-nephew, was an architect working- in 
Mullingar. He gave the author Phillip Ginnell's address and when the author suggested 
getting his consent in place of his late father, Kelly had no objections. The author then met 
Phillip Ginnell, also on 15th October 2001. He gave his consent to the author being given the 
photocopy currently in Kelly's possession. He said that he believed that his father Philip had 
transcribed the diary from shorthand. 
As a result of this, the author gained possession of the photocopy used by Kelly in 1970. This 
is of a manuscript transcription of extracts from the shorthand diary of Laurence Ginnell, 
together with extracts from the diary of his second wife, Alice Ginnell. The whole document 
is titled Diary L Ginnell 1852-1912. 
The Diaries of Laurence and Alice GinneH 
The 'diary', comprising 85 hand-written pages, actually begins not with diary entries but with 
'Autobiographical Notes ("Transcribed from LG's shorthand notes")' and commences : 
'I am the third son of Laurence Ginnell ... My 
father was born in the same neighbourhood in 
1799. ') 
The first 34 pages of the document comprise these autobiographical notes, covering Laurence 
Ginnell's life up to 1895. They are all written in the first person by Laurence Ginnell himself 
The style of these autobiographical notes quickly changes, however, from a brief history of 
Ginnell's life to the reproduction of selected daily events, obviously culled by Ginnell ftom a 
diary or diaries. As a result, from page 14 (1882) onwards Ginnell's 'autobiography' consists 
mostly of a succession of selected, dated, daily notes and events. 
From the end of page 34 (1896), the autobiography ends and is succeeded by straightforward 
diary entries. Such entries cover the period 1896 to 1912 and continue through to the end of 
the document. It is not possible to say whether they were transcribed into longhand direct 
from Ginnell's original diaries. However, as will be seen, Ginnell's diary entries later become 
inten-ningled with those of Alice Ginnell. It therefore seems probable that the shorthand 
document transcribed into manuscript was in fact the diary of Alice Ginnell. (as belleved by 
John Wylie) and that she had in turn copied and inserted extracts from her husband's original 
documents. 
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The entry for 29hMay 1899 on page 38 provides a clue as to the earliest date of the longhand 
transcription. That entry ('Was received in private audience by Pope Leo X111, to whom I 
presented my book "The Doubffiul Grant ofIreland", dealing with Pope Adrian's Bull. ') is 
followed by a note written by the transcriber: 
see David Hogan's articles in 'Irish Press' - Sept, I think, 1955. 
The diary entries for both Laurence and Alice Ginnell are irregular, with long gaps, and it is 
quite possible that the manuscript transcriber/s were also selective in the material they used. 
In September 1900, Ginnell married Alice King, daughter of James King of Kilbride, 
Mullingar. 
From page 39 (1" April 1903) some entries begin to appear which were clearly not written by 
Laurence Ginnell but by Alice. These entries from Alice Ginnell's diary are then interspersed 
with those from Ginnell's diary for most of the rest of the document. Moreover, some entries 
for a single date combine passages from both diaries. For example, the entry on page 52, for 
7th May 1907, starts with Laurence Ginnell describing Birrell's introduction of the Irish 
Council Bill 
Redmond practically accepted it. In the course of his speech he asked : "Is this a Bill 
which we ought to accept? " I answered "NO". No other member of the Irish Party 
answered, though all of them I heard murmuring agreed with me. 
The next paragraph in that day's entry then switches to Alice Ginnell's diary, as she describes 
how she did not get into parliament to hear the debate and how she then edited a letter of 'L' 
to the Times. 
However, despite this mixture of entries from both diaries, Alice Ginnell in all cases referred 
to Ginnell as 'Laurence' or as 'U, while Laurence Ginnell continued to use the first person 
'P. It is, therefore, clear throughout which entries were Alice's and which Ginnell's. The last 
entry in the document, from Ginnell's diary, is dated 6 th January 1912. 
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